4 




Class _'B„.L^2_00_ 
Book l^lLL 



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COPYRIGHT DEPOSn. 



Studies in ¥heism. 



BY 



BORDEN P. BOWNE, 

Professok of Philosophy in Boston University, and Author oi 
" The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer." 



NEW YORK: 
PHILLIPS & HUFT, 

CmClNNATI: 
CRANSTON- db ST OWE. 



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I JUl Si 90f ] 

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Copyright 1879, by 

PtlIJl,LlPS & MUNT. 

New York. 

Copyright 1907 By 
Bord9n P Bowne 



PREFACE. 



'T^HE following papers have been written long 
-*- enough for me to become somew^hat dissatis- 
fied with them. But as I still agree with them for 
** substance of doctrine/' and as I have not the 
time for a rewriting, I venture their publication. 
The Introduction is written for the sake of calling 
attention to several points which are rather obscurely 
stated in the work itself, and which are of great 
importance in estimating the value of the theistic 
argument. The title shows that the work does not 
claim to be a complete treatise on theism. 

I have dwelt mainly upon the theoretical aspects 
of the question, and have aimed to expound princi- 
ples rather than to give illustrations. No other 
method can be decisive. Illustrations can have 
little value until principles are settled ; and when 
they are settled, there is less need of illustration. 
At the same time I have not written for a philo- 
sophical audience. If I had had such readers in 
mind, both matter and form would have been mod- 
ified. This, however, does not mean that I have 
misrepresented my own views, but only that many 



IV PREFACE, 

pdints of philosophic theory have been omitted, as 
they would have seemed to most readers to be 
needless, if not misleading, refinements. I hope 
at no very distant date to deal with these philo- 
sophic questions in a more thorough manner. 

The ^* conflict of science and religion'* has not 
been referred to. This is partly due to a convic- 
tion that it is both an unjust, and a pernicious prac- 
tice to gather all the friends of religion into one 
camp, and all the friends of science into another, 
and then to represent them as eternally hostile. 
Nothing could be more untrue to history, and it 
has a pernicious influence upon weak heads, which, 
unfortunately, are not wanting on either side. But 
the omission is mainly due to the fact, that what a 
thoughtful person wishes to know is, not what sci- 
ence teaches, nor what religion teaches, but what is 
proved, or made probable. Reason resents every 
attempt to intimidate it, in the name of authority, 
from whatever quarter. It decides by evidence, not 
by names. It accepts nothing, therefore, because 
it calls itself science, or because it calls itself relig- 
ion, but because it has evidence in its favor. No 
more does reason reject any thing because it is 
science or because it is religion, but because of a 
lack of evidence. No attentive reader can have 
failed to observe that this simple principle has been 
largely ignored by both sides in the controversy. 



PREFA CE, V 

Many a view has been passionately rejected because 
it was thought to be irreligious ; and, conversely, 
the last few years have seen many a view passion- 
ately advocated whose chief recommendation was, 
that it trampled all moral and religious convictions 
under foot. It has taken a long time to learn that 
a theory is not proved by being religious ; a still 
longer time is needed to reach the conviction that 
it is also not proved by being irreligious. 

A word about dogmatism. A writer*s statements 
are only his own opinions, and no vehemence of 
utterance can make them more. This being under- 
jtood, one may be allowed to express his views in a 
dogmatic form. It saves both time and space, and 
is withal in better taste. When a discussion is be- 
tween equals, professions of fallibility are both tire- 
some and needless, for the audience will surely take 
the fact for granted. If, then, some rather vivacious 
expressions of opinion occur in these papers, they 
are not to be taken as showing a belief in personal 
infallibility. Every rational author knows that his 
opinions are primarily only his opinions ; he pub- 
lishes in the hope that they may be shared by 
others. 

^* There are many echoes, but few voices.'' Like 
all works on this subject, this work is more an echo 
than a voice, though it may not be without some 
individuality of tone from the last reflecting sur- 



VI PREFACE. 

face. There is little new to be offered on either 
side ; and any thing which should be new in princi- 
ple would almost certainly be a personal aberration. 
But it is necessary for each age to do its own think- 
ing; and w4iile the truth maybe the same from age 
to age, the presentation will always vary. But 
while this work is an echo of what theistic thinkers 
have been saying from the beginning, I am not 
conscious of any specific obligation to other writers 
which demands recognition. I shall always be un- 
der general obligation to my friends and former 
instructors, Professor Ulrici, of Halle, aild Professor 
Lotze, of Gottingen. 

B. P. B. 

Boston, May 5, 1879. 



CONTENTS. 



Chafteb Faob 

Introduction 3 

I. Knowledge and Skepticism 9 

II. Knowledge and Belief 61 

III. Postulates of Scientific Knowledge 108 

lY. Mechanism and Teleology 146 

Y. The Conservation of Energy * . . . 199 

YI. Substances and their Interaction 226 

YII. Theism and Pantheism 261 

YIII. Relation of God to the World 28*7 

IX. The Relation of God to Truth and Righteousness. . . 326 

X. The Soul : Spiritualism or Materialism 3*75 

XI. Postulates of Ethics 406 



INTRODUCTION. 



TN order to a correct estimate of the theistic argu- 
ment, we must know its exact scope and purpose. 
Misconception on this point is very common, and in- 
justice is done to theism. It is commonly assumed 
that the theist aims to demonstrate the existence of 
God. Of course a strict demonstration is impossible, 
and then theism is held to be overthrown. No notice 
is taken of the great fact and field of probable reason- 
ing upon which both daily life and objective science 
are built. It is also urged that the theist assumes that 
all order is designed order, and thus begs the question; 
for the dispute is, whether the natural order be de- 
signed. Most criticisms of theism turn upon one of 
these objections. Either the argument is rejected as a 
failure, or it is called a begging of the question. Such 
criticisms, so far as they are made in good faith, rest 
upon a failure to distinguish between demonstrating a 
theorem and solving a problem. The demonstration 
of tteorems belongs entirely to the formal sciences; all 
the sciences which deal with reality aim only at the 
solution of problems. They find their problems in the 
observed facts, and then they raise the question how 
we must think of the back-lying cause or causes, or 



4 INTRODUCTION. 

antecedents, in order that the facts should be as they 
are. Every scientific hypothesis is an attempt to solve 
the problem presented by a certain class of facts; and 
the proof of the hypothesis always consists, not in its 
being impregnably deduced according to the canons of 
formal logic, but in its furnishing the only adequate 
solution of the facts. The geologist finds traces of fire 
in the rocks, and he explains them by assuming that 
the earth was once molten. Now even allowing this 
conclusion to be just, he would not pretend that he had 
demonstrated the original fluidity of the earth, but only 
that he had given a rational solution of the problem 
contained in certain geological facts. So with the neb- 
ular, the atomic, the ether, the evolution theories, etc.; 
they are all solutions of problems, and our faith in them 
is based entirely upon their adequacy to the facts. 

The theistic theory is of the same kind; it has the 
same aim, and is judged by the same canon. The theist 
does not claim to demonstrate the existence of God, but 
only that the problem of the world and life cannot be 
solved without God. He does not assume that all order 
is designed order, but he insists that the actual order, 
which of course includes man, cannot be understood, 
except as the outcome of design. To the objection that 
he assumes that nature can be understood, he replies, 
that all science is based on the same assumption, and is 
but an attempt to comprehend the facts of experience. 
To the claim that what is necessary to an understand- 
ing of nature is not, therefore, necessarily a fact of 



INTRODUCTION. 5 

nature, lie replies, that so far as this lies against theism, 
it is equally valid against any and every scientific 
hypothesis. Atoms, ethers, and a certain order of past 
events are necessary to an understanding of the present 
facts; but if we choose to be skeptical, we can say that 
this necessity does not prove their reality; and we can 
say it in this case with as much justice as in the case of 
theism. 

Another point to be borne in mind is, that every the- 
ory must be judged, not only by its power of making 
grimaces at opposing theories, but also and chiefly by 
its own positive adequacy to the facts. This simple 
rule of criticism has been so generally ignored in judg- 
ing theism tjiat it is necessary to insist ujDon it. Every 
one acquainted with atheistic treatises will recognize 
that their chief force has been in picking flaws in the 
theistic argument. There has been comparatively little 
effort to show any positive sufliciency of atheism to 
give any rational account of the facts. On the con- 
trary, the failure of theism to exclude all possibility of 
doubt has been oddly enough mistaken for a proof of 
atheism. It never occurs to the atheist to ask whether 
the difficulties and improbabilities of his own system be 
not infinitely greater than those of theism. In this re- 
spect he is like a disciple of the Ptolemaic astronomy, 
who, finding difficulties in Copernicus and Newton, 
should conclude that, therefore, the Ptolemaic system 
is true. A rational judgment can be reached only as 
the theistic theory, with all its difficulties, is placed be- 



6 INTRODUCTIOK 

» 

side the atheistic theory, with all its difficulties. When 
this is done, the theist will have no cause to be ashamed 
of his faith. In neither case is it a matter of demon- 
stration, but of rational probability. This point is gen- 
erally kept out of sight in atheistic discussions; all the 
more, then, must the theist call attention to it. 

Still another point must be mentioned. The nature 
of reality is never a matter of perception, but solely of 
/ inference from the phenomena. At this point crude 
common sense often lends aid and comfort to atheism 
and materialism. Matter as noumenon and as cause is 
supposed to be given in immediate perception; and as 
God and the soul are not perceived, but inferred, the 
impression spreads that atheism and materialism have 
fact on their side, while the opposing views are only 
subjective theories. Of all crudities in thinking, this 
is certainly one of the worst; it is in philosophy what 
Jasperism is in astronomy. It will be remembered that 
Brother Jasper, of Richmond, Va., has reached the con- 
clusion that the sun moves ; for he "hab seen de sun 
on one side ob de house in de mornin', and on de odder 
side ob de house in de afternoon; and as de house hab 
not moved, derefo' de sun he do move." This is very 
clear and convincing. Brother Jasper thought that a 
resting sun could not be seen on both sides of the 
house, and hence he mistook the astronomical truth for 
a denial of the phenomenon. The philosophical Jas- 
pers make the same blunder. They mistake inferences 
from the phenomena for tlieir denial. Hence when 



IXTRODUCTIOK 7 

they hear that nature may be but the manifestation of 
a spiritual power working under the forms of space and 
time, they fancy tliat visible and tangible phenomena 
have been denied; and they think it sufficient to stamp 
on the ground or to kick a stone in disproof. It is pit- 
iable in the extreme to find even distinguished editors 
of distinguished periodicals advancing such ghastly 
irrelevances. No one dreams of denying any of the 
phenomena of inner or outer experience. Brother Jas- 
per, of course, has a very clear idea of matter; but the 
physicist finds himself forced to go behind material 
phenomena — not to deny, but to explain. At once he 
finds himself in a supersensible world, which can be en- 
tered only by thought, and whose reality can be assured 
only by thought. But the results reached are never to 
be mistaken for denials of phenomena, but as conclusions 
from them. The astronomical heavens do not deny the 
visible heavens, but are based upon them. It is over- 
sight of this fact which accounts for the popular im- 
pression that philosophy leads to skepticism; and which, 
on the other hand, accounts for the popular skepticism 
of philosophical results. The question of all specula- 
tion is not whether there is reality, but what it is, and 
what. its nature may be; and science and philosophy 
alike recognize that this question cannot be solved by 
immediate perception, but only by consistent thinking 
upon the phenomena. The most of the factors of phys- 
ical science belong entirely to a thought- world, and can 
only be reached by thought. And even the Jaspers 



8 INTRODUCTION. 

of speculation themselves partly recognize tliis fact. 
When they are told of dynamic atoms, and solid ethers, 
and omnipresent forces, they are charmingly acquies- 
cent; but when the theist, by the same method and 
from the same data, concludes to an omnipresent force 
which is also intelligent, then, instead of examining his 
logic, they think it sufficient to call his view an un- 
heard-of absurdity, and an inversion of common sense. 
Custom explains many beliefs; it also explains many 
unbeliefs. The customary is clear, and clear because 
customary. Nevertheless, we insist upon the point. 
When it is seen that the complex and unintelligible 
theories of the atheist and materialist are not facts of 
observation, but only their way of explaining the facts, 
those theories will not be long in appearing in their 
innate irrationality. 



STUDIES IN THEISM. 



CHAPTER I. 

KNOWLEDGE AND SKEPTICISM. 

rpWO questions, quite distinct, are often confused : 
1. Is knowledge possible? 2. How is knowledge 
possible ? The former question is plainly the more fun- 
damental, and the skeptic's reply is, that knowledge is 
not possible. Thus, at the outset of our studies in 
Theistic Philosophy, "No thoroughfare" stares us in 
the face. Before going on we must have a word with 
the skeptic. Of course it cannot be our intention to 
prove that knowledge is possible ; this would be the 
Don Quixotism of philosophy. Our plan is to examine 
the skeptic's objections, in order to see if there be any 
thing in them to shake the mind's trust in its own 
power to know. If the objections fail, knowledge will 
not be proved ; but skepticism will appear groundless 
and irrational. 

But this question is a purely philosophic one, and 
why discuss it in an essay on Theism ? Skepticism of 
our cognitive faculties in general tells as much against 
one department of knowledge as against another, and 
universal skepticism is none. Because it doubts every 
thing, it, in effect, doubts nothing. Being impartially 



10 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

distributed over all the faculties, it leaves tlioii* relative 
position and rank undisturbed, and decides nothing. 
The only significant skepticism is that which discredits 
the higher faculties in the name of the lower; and 
brings discord into the mind. A skepticism whicli ex- 
alts the senses and the animal, and thus seeks to throw 
doubt upon the rational and moral nature, is the only 
dangerous one. The theist is quite content to let the 
skeptic vapor as he will about the general uncertainty 
of knowledge, so long as it can be made out that rea- 
son, such as it is, supports theism. Reason may be 
ver^^ feeble, and the facts may be very imperfectly 
known, but if they unite in pointing to theism as the 
only sufficient explanation of the world, the theist is 
satisfied. Why, then, burden ourselves with difficulties 
which are common to every theory of knowledge, and 
thus run the risk of failing in our gratuitously-assumed 
task ? 

Theoretically, these objections are well taken ; but, 
practically, another course is more promising. Philo- 
sophic skepticism is impotent, except in moral and re- 
ligious discussion. Elsewhere daily contact with reality 
and the imperative needs of life make real skepticism 
practically impossible. Busy men turn their backs on it, 
and answer it by walking away. But it is both wonder- 
ful and instructive how the objections are brought out 
when discussion touches on moral or religious quee-- 
tions. Points, which in daily life would seem pedantic 
or foolish, are made with the emphasis of conviction and 
the zeal of a new discovery. After swallowing the 
camel, the gnat is carefully .strained out; and, once in 



KNOWLEDGE AND SKEPTICISM. 11 

awhile, even conscience is invoked against the impiety 
of ready belief. In an age of dogmatism religion is 
impossible, because we know too much. According to 
the dogmatist, there is nothing but matter and force in 
the universe, with no room for God or ghosts. In an 
age of skepticism religion is impossible, because we 
know too little. The reason is unimportant, if only the 
conclusion be reached. No matter what form the rav- 
ings of speculators may take, religion is sure to be 
beaten. No matter what the speech treats of, it is apt 
to end with — " Carthage must be destroyed." Theism, 
then, has a practical interest in examining the skeptic's 
arguments, such as none of the sciences have. We 
further reply to the objections of the preceding para- 
graph, that our purpose is not so much to solve the 
general difficulties of knowledge, as to show that they 
are general. Volition cannot be argued with; but it is 
worth while to show a candid objector that the difficul- 
ties at which he hesitates, are no greater than others 
which he accepts. The lack of logical and philosoph- 
ical training frequently results in the imagination that 
metaphysical difficulties are found only in Natural The- 
ology. It is of service to such a one to show that these 
'difficulties underlie all the sciences, and even logic it- 
self. We reply finally to the objector, that it is not 
our purpose to give an exhaustive theory of knowledge, 
but only to clear up the subject a little by some criti- 
cisms and definitions. The chief difficulty of the ques- 
tion lies in the fog which envelopes it. 

The prevailing agnosticism is not speculative, but 

practical. It does not arise from any psychological 
2 



12 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

study, but solely from the necessity of avoiding certain 
disagreeable conclusions. It prevails especially in sci- 
entific quarters. Physics is pushed up to the verge of 
atheism and materialism, and then a halt is called. To 
save trouble, agnosticism is adopted as a compromise.. 
Hence the dualism of agnostic treatises. They give us 
atheism and materialism for subject and predicate, but 
omit the copula. The evilly-inclined reader supplies 
the omission. Along with the atheism go divers expres- 
sions of awe at the all-pervading wonder, and the mys- 
tery of the molecule. These men are not to be blamed. 
Their inconsistency is based on the need they feel for 
supplying some foundation for morals and religion. 
One must admire the motive, even in criticising the 
outcome. But the dualism is apparent, and its worth- 
lessness is equally plain. Moreover, their agnosticism 
appeals only upon occasion. It is when dealing with 
an opponent's views that it becomes prominent. We 
have made a careful study of the works of leading 
agnostics, and have never detected the slightest indica- 
tion of conscious ignorance. On the contrary, the zeal 
of conviction and the dogmatism of infallibility, are 
every-where apparent. They publish long theories of 
things, and appear to have great confidence in them," 
although things are declared unknowable. They invest 
the fundamental reality with various attributes, after 
declaring any attribution unallowable. This fact makes 
tlie study of their works vanity and vexation of spirit. 
1lic results of compromise, their works have all the 
liodgc-podge character of compromises in general. We 
must not ('liar<;r the writers with the unparalleled inso- 



KNO WLED GE AND SKEPTICISM. I '^ 

hrfiee of assuming that their opponents only are incapa- 
ble of knowledge; we must rather refer their views to 
the logic of the situation. There was need of a recon- 
ciliation between science and religion; accordingly they 
destroyed both, and called it peace. Meanwhile, if 
])ressed by hard questions, they have but to wave the 
wand of the unknowable, and the difficulties disappear 
into chaos and impenetrable night. This convenience 
is an additional argument. The theoretical foundation 
is the weak part. We know only phenomena is the 
magic word. But what is it to know? What is a 
phenomenon, and what is its relation to its noumenal 
ground? Can one phenomenon know another phenom- 
enon ? If not, can a group of phenomena know another 
group? Or is there knowing only, w^ithout a knower 
and a thing known ? These are interesting questions, 
and a little light on them would be a boon to the stu- 
dent. Unfortunately the average agnostic seems never 
to have dreamed of them. This vexatious state of the 
argument comports so ill with their confident declara- 
tions, that we must assume that here, as elsewhere, 
wisdom is justified only of her children. To attempt 
to get any exact meaning from the current expositions 
of agnosticism would only lead us to the conclusion 
that the doctrine itself is the true unknowable. We 
attempt, then, to examine the skeptic's argument for 
ourselves. 

Unless wx know what knowledge is, how can we 
tell whether we have it ? Plainly a definition is called 
for, and we give it as follows: knowledge is the cer- 
tainty that our concept ionts correspond to reality or to 



14 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

truth. By reality, we mean any matter of fact, whether 
of the outer or inner world. By truth, we mean ra- 
tional principles. By certainty, it is plain that we can- 
not mean any thoughtless assurance, but only tliat 
which results from the necessity of the admission. 
Rational truth is seen to be valid every-where and 
always; and as the result of this insight, it is said to be 
necessary and universal. Both of these terms are mis- 
leading. Necessity is often interpreted as if it repre> 
sented only a habit of the mind, or, at best, the out- 
come of the mental constitution. In this way color is 
given to the notion that, by altering the mental consti- 
tution, truth itself would be altered. This notion is 
without any warrant in experience. There is nothing 
to indicate that truth depends on any arbitrary make 
of the faculties which recognize it, instead of on its 
own clearness and self-evidence. Universality, again, is 
often understood to mean consciously present in every 
mind. This mistake has kept the empiricists at work 
ever since the time of Locke, hunting in the minds of 
babies and savag(5S for failing cases of universal truths. 
The self-evidence of the truth is its fundamental sup- 
])ort. The test of necessity has only the negative value 
of ])revonting us from deceiving ourselves as to what is 
self-evident. When we go carelessly to work, we may 
easily mistake the customary for the unquestionable; 
and then we can right ourselves only by setting up the 
contradictory of the proposition. In this way we de- 
tect the influence of habit, and remedy the results of 
loose analysis. The universality, means only that ra- 
tional truth is not conditiom^d by space or time, or 



KNOWLEDGE AND SKEPTICISM. 15 

aught else. Our knowledge of it may be conditioned 
by ignorance and stupidity ; but the mind does not 
make, it recognizes, the truth. When the mind has 
this clear insight into a principle, so that it is seen to 
be self-evident, and its untruth is impossible, we call 
the result knowledge. 

Our knowledge of things consists, (1) in the certainty 
that they exist, and (2) that they have certain attributes 
or ways of working, and certain relations among them- 
selves. When we reach any such certainty about a 
thing, we have a knowledge of the thing to that extent. 
» This knowledge may be more or less, but its extent is 
indifferent to the definition. It is conceivable that 
other beings should have deeper insight into the nature 
of things than we have, but in such case their knowl- 
edge would not be more real, but more exhaustive, than 
ours. But even their knowledge w^ould come under the 
same definition — the certainty that things exist and 
have certain properties and powers. A large part of 
the skeptic's argument consists in referring to the vast- 
ness of the unknown in comparison with the known. 
He points out that we do not know the inner nature of 
things, nor how things are made. We grant all this, 
but insist that we know sundry truths about things 
after they are made. The scientist does not pretend to 
know how the elements are made, but he claims to 
know something about their ways of working. Our 
knowledge of the soul does not consist in any insight 
into the soul's being, but only in the certainty that 
souls exist, and have peculiar assignable powers. Nei- 
ther science nor philosophy has, or is likely to have, 



1 6 STUDIES IN TITETSM. 

any recipe for creation. The utmost the finite can 
ever hope to do, is, not to create things, but to under- 
stand them after they are created. When reality has 
been comprehended under the forms of thought, science 
and philosophy have finished their work; and the remit 
we call knowledge, as far as it goes. If this is not 
knowledge, what is? References to the mystery of be- 
ing, and the vastness of the unknown, are quite irrele- 
vant in discussing the reality of knowledge. 

The statement that the reality of knowledge is inde- 
pendent of its extent, deserves further emphasis. It 
has been strangely enough assumed by both believer 
and skeptic, that the reality of knowledge can be main- 
tained only by proving that all perceptive beings must 
see all things alike. Of course such a proof is forever 
impossible, and the skeptic wins an easy triumph. But 
this question, also, must be ruled out as irrelevant. The 
point is not whether other beings see things as we do, 
but whether the powers and relations which we find in 
them are really there, independent of our thought. 
Touch is not contradicted by vision, though each gives 
some elements which are impossible to the other. The 
question whether angels or animals see things as we do, 
is a perfectly idle one. Sextus Empiricus based a skep- 
tical argument on the fact that cat's eyes have oblong 
pupils, while men's eyes have round pupils. It will 
pro})ably be impossible for us to tell how cats view 
things until cats become able to think or speak, or un- 
til we become cats without losing our human faculties. 
l>()th events seem quite unlikely, and the advance of 
knowledge in that direction is barred. The attempt to 



KNO WLED GE AND SKEPTICISM. 1 1 

find how angels, or some hypothetical beings, may re- 
gard things, appears equally hopeless. Be it far from 
us to say what such beings might see and think. All 
such suggestions are irrelevant, unless it be claimed 
that their knowings contradict ours; and. in that case 
we should ask what ground there is (1) for assuijiing 
that these hypothetical beings are real ; (2) for saying 
that their knowledge contradicts ours; and (8) for as- 
suming that, in case of contradiction, these imaginary 
beings must be in the right? The last assumption is 
plainly gratuitous, for they would not contradict us 
any more than we should contradict them; and hence, 
after all, we should have to decide the question by ap- 
pealing to our own reason. Although this fashion of 
appealing to imaginary beings, in the interests of skep- 
ticism, has the support of Descartes, it must neverthe- 
less be regarded as unworthy a rational being, because 
it is both gratuitous and indecisive. 

The fact that the reality of knowledge is independent 
of its extent also contains an explanation of the pre- 
tended antithesis of absolute and relative knowledge. 
This antithesis has no meaning from the side of the 
subject. For the knower, there is either certainty or 
uncertainty concerning a fact or proposition; and he 
may either know it to be true or false, or he may be- 
lieve it to be true or false, or he may be in doubt con- 
<;eming it. These are the possible mental states of the ^ 
knower, and for him the distinction of relative and ab- 
solute has no assignable meaning. We must, then, seek 
the meaning of the distinction in the object; and here 
we come upon the following fact: We know things only 



] 8 STUDIES IN TUEISM. 

in relations either to ourselves or to other things. This 
perfectly true statement is, then, illicitly transformed 
into another which is entirely different, namely, that 
we know only relations. When something is known to 
exist as this or that, relations may also be known to 
exists between it and other equally known things; but 
that we should know the relations of essentially un- 
known objects is a contradiction in psychology. Knowl- 
edge may go deeper and deeper, but so long as the 
word represents any thing intelligible, it will always 
consist, not in being the thing known, but in forming 
conceptions about the thing. Such a deepening of 
knowledge would not displace what we know, but only 
extend it. Even in the realm of rational principles, 
it is possible that our knowledge does not reach the 
ultimate. They lie in our mind as mutually independ- 
ent data. The law of identity, or of causation, carries 
with it no necessity that the mind should also have an 
intuition of space. The understanding is conceivable 
apart from the moral nature. This mutual independ- 
ence in our experience leads the mind to surmise that 
in the ultimate ground of being there may be an inter- 
dependence of these principles, so that all may flow 
from one root. German philosophy has made great 
efforts to show such a relation, but the success has not 
been great. But if such a relation existed, it would 
not in any way affect the validity of rational principles: 
we should only have a deeper knowledge. Theoretical 
mechanics has advanced through successive generaliza- 
tions until tlie whole science is reduced to an interpre- 
tation of a single principle; but no knowledge is dis- 



KNO WLED GE AND SKEPTICISM 1 9 

turbed by the advance. In like manner, if space were 
found to be only a form of manifestation, our knowl- 
edge of space would remain just as it is. The science 
of space relations would continue to be valid: we 
should only discover that there is something deeper 
than space, and not that space is delusion. The current 
thought that the ideality of space implies that space is 
merely a human delusion, is one of the many misunder- 
standings found in the popular speculations. That 
doctrine denies that God is limited in any way by 
space, as if space were a thing like other things, but it 
does not deny him a knowledge of space relations, as if 
something in the world of the thinkable were unknown 
and unknowable to the Source of all thought and knowl- 
edge. 

Again, with regard to things, a deeper knowledge 
does not discredit real knowledge. If it should turn 
out that the chemical elements are compound, it would 
leave our present knowledge where it is. A prof ounder 
insight into their structure would not overturn their 
known laws. Where, then, is the opposition between 
absolute and relative knowledge? The true antith- 
esis is that of more or less, and not that of relative and 
absolute. Absolute knowledge is greatly to be de- 
sired, and its unattainability is a great loss, no doubt; 
but still a large reward might be safely oifered for any 
definition of it which would not reduce either to an un- 
intelligible chimera or else to exhaustive knowledge. 
But no one ever claimed an exhaustive knowledge of 
any thing for any finite mind. Every thing stands in 
infinite relations to the rest of the system, and only 



20 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

Omniscience could know a thing through and through. 
Even a simple number, as two, can be formed in an 
indefinite number of ways; so that no finite intelligence 
could possibly exhaust its relations. Here the relativist 
wdll break out, that this is only a knowledge of rela- 
tions; and we reply, that it is not a knowledge of rela- 
tions, but a know^ledge of real things in actual relations. 
If he adds. But I want to know what the thing is in 
itself; the reply would be, It is that substantial some- 
thing which is capable of sustaining those relations. 
He can next ask. But how is it capable? This is to 
demand how reality is made; and this is an idle ques- 
tion. Or he can further object. All our conceptions oi 
things are built up by telling, not what they are, but 
how they act, or what they do, etc. This objection was 
made very much of by the Greek skeptics. They urged 
that we are shut up to the phenomena of being, and 
never reach the knowledge of being in itself. A sufii- 
cient answer is, that the demand to know what things 
are in terms of something besides their essential attri- 
butes, is either a demand to know how things are 
made, or else it is utterly unintelligible. In either case 
it is irrelevant in discussing the validity of our present 
knowledge. 

Here the phenomenalist appears, and expresses his 
delight at finding us agreeing with him in rejecting all 
ontological and noumenal knowledge. The truth, he 
says, on which all great thinkers are agreed, is, that 
knowledge is only of phenomena. Here, again, we have 
a truism converted into a falsism. The truth that we 
know things only through their appearances or mani- 



KXO WLED GE A hW SKEPTICISM. 2 1 

festations is quietly changed to read that we knov/ only 
appearances; and thus the possibility of real knowledge 
is once more ruled out. But, in fact, there is sad con- 
fusion in the use of these words. A phenomenon, or ^ 
appearance, implies two factors: (1) something which 
appears; (2) a mind to which it appears. Properly 
speaking, phenomena do not exist apart from the mind; 
and they have mental existence only in the moment of 
perception. In strictness, then, a phenomenal universe 
is the creation of the mind, and vanishes with con- 
sciousness. But it rarely happens that the phenome- 
nalist ventures to regard the objects of knowledge as 
merely modifications of ourselves, although this only 
would be strict phenomenalism. No one can persuade 
himself that the solar system is only a subjective aflci. 
tion, or that the force of gravity is but a relation be- 
tween ideas. It would be quite impossible to regard a 
fierce dog who was making suggestive advances as any 
thing like a state of self. This difiiculty leads to an- 
other definition of phenomenon. In this second stage, 
a phenomenon is entirely objective to the mind, and 
means only a particular mode or manifestation of 
reality. But, as thus used, it has a double meaning. 
Sometimes it means just what common sense means by 
thing; and sometimes it means just what common sense 
means by attribute. The first meaning is well illus- 
trated by what Spencer calls "relative reality." In 
his system there are, (1) an absolute reality; (2) a rel- 
ative reality; and (3) our knowledge of this relative 
reality. This relative reality is declared to be as real 
as the absolute reality; in short, his relative realities 



1 



22 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

are things as they exist for science and common 
sense ; and these we are allowed to know. Here 
every thing is phenomenal except fundamental be- 
ing. This view is a reproduction of the Platonic 
doctrine, that only the independent truly is. Closely 
allied to this view is another, based on a double mean- 
ing of thing. By thing we may mean a metaphysical 
unit, or we may mean a composite of such units. Now, 
according to the atomic theory, none of the things we 
see are metaphysical units, but are compounds. Ad- 
vantage is taken of this double meaning to call com- 
posites phenomena; and then our knowledge is said 
once more to be only of phenomena. But such phenom- 
ena are properly modes of reality; and our knowledge 
of them is objectively valid. The ocean is not a phan- 
tom, because water is a compound and not an element. 
Again, phenomenal knowledge is often identified with 
the product of sense-perception, and the denial of nou- 
menal knowledge is intended to limit us to the things 
we see. This is a fantastic mixture of sensationalism 
and the crudest common sense, and is as fatal to science 
as to religion. It denies the possibility of knowledge 
through inference; and thus reduces all scientific theory 
to cobwebs of the brain. But in most cases a phenom- 
enon is simply an attribute; and the claim is, that we 
can know being only through its attributes or manifes- 
tations. This is a truism. The notion that thereby 
we suflFer any loss, is based on an unreal separation be- 
tween a thing and its properties. We never know 
properties alone, but a thing as having properties. 
'J'licii, inisU'd by our tcnidency to mistake abstractions 



KNO WLED GE AND SKEPTICISM. 2 3 

for things, we gather these properties into a phenome- 
nal thing which we know, and contrast it with a nou- 
menal thing which we do not know. Thus, back of the 
conscious soul we plant a noumenal soul, and mourn 
because we cannot know it. Or, back of the thing we 
know, we fancy some thing in itself which obstinately 
refuses to come into knowledge. But all this is delu- 
sion. The conscious, active soul, or the thing which is 
known to exist in certain relations, or to have certain 
properties, is all there is to know, unless we raise the 
idle question, how reality is made. In any other sense 
the thing in itself is as empty an abstraction as ever 
imposed on men. The phenomenalist may urge that 
the properties we attribute to things belong to them 
only in relations to ourselves ; but this is true only for 
sense-qualities, and these are but a vanishing fraction 
of their qualities. Things are defined in general not 
by their relations to ourselves, but to one another. We 
conclude, then, that if there is any thing in objects and 
their relations which we recognize or infer, and do not 
make, the knowledge of that something is absolute oi 
noumenal in the only intelligible sense of these teiiiir>. 
It is also plain that phenomenal as applied to knowledge 
has no definite meaning and can only lead to confusion. 
We repeat our definition of knowledge. Knowledge is 
the certainty that our conceptions correspond to the 
fact or truth. 

With this definition, we pass to consider the skeptical 
objections to the possibility of knowing. It is mani- 
fest that a skepticism which should deny all certainty, 



24 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

subjective and objective alike, is suicidal; for it can 
make out its case only by assuming the validity of the 
laws of thought, and the general testimony of con- 
sciousness. If the skeptic question these, he must be 
content with a purely dogmatic skepticism, without 
reason and without proof. He may not even say of 
any proposition that it is not proven, or does not follow 
from the premises, without assuming valid principles 
of proof. If there are no such principles, one thing 
follows as well as any other. Hence, not even the uni- 
versality of error can be affirmed without admitting the 
reality of truth; for error is meaningless except as be- 
ing a departure from the truth. This unprincipled 
skepticism has, indeed, appeared in the history of phi- 
losophy; but its self-contradictions are so great as to 
call for no consideration. Mere whimsies must not be 
encouraged to think of themselves more highly than 
they ought to think, by a too elaborate refutation. 
Most of the objections of the Greek skeptics are of this 
sort. They either impress the modern thinker as puer- 
ile, or they represent a theory of perception long since 
abandoned. 

The more common form of the skeptical argument 
does not question consciousness as revealing subjective 
states, and does not deny that there are certain sub- 
jective necessities of thought. We must, for instance, 
reason according to logical laws ; we must admit the 
reality of the external world, and the reality of causa- 
tion. All this the skeptic readily allows, and concludes 
that knowledge is uncertain on that very account: for 
while we admit that there is truth, we are only too suro 



KNOWLEDGE AND SKEPTICISM. 25 

that there is error ; and who shall say that these neces- 
sary affirmations do not belong to the side of error? 
The history of this form of skepticism is very interesting. 
The early philosophers opposed to skepticism the doc- 
trine of innate ideas, or laws of our faculties, which com- 
pel the mind to act in certain ways. But by and by it 
was urged that the fact that an idea is necessary to the 
mind does not prove its objective, validity; and then 
the doctrine of innate ideas, modified into the Kantian 
doctrine of mental forms, became the basis of the most 
subtle and formidable skepticism possible to philos- 
ophy — May we not, by a law of our nature, be held back 
from the truth? This question includes the doubt of 
Descartes on the basis of an imagined devil, and also 
all the skepticism which has sprung from the Kantian 
philosophy. 

This doubt divides into two: (1) a doubt of the 
validity of rational principles; and, (2) a doubt of the 
trustworthiness of external perception. We shall find 
it advantageous to consider them separately. 

The skeptical argument against the truth of rational 
principles takes on two forms : One form seeks to shoAV 
that if we allow them to be true, and then develop them 
to their logical results, we find the reason contradicting 
itself. This is the only method which could be deci- 
Bive. If the mind could be involved in insoluble contra- 
diction with itself, the result would be to cast discredit 
on all our taculties, and reduce intelligence to the scale of 
practical life. It is commonly supposed that Kant did 
this in his '* Critique of the Pure Reason," and especially 
in his famous antinomies. But it is not only a mistake 



2« STUDIES IN THEISM. 

to say that he did it ; it is also a mistake to say that he 
meant to do it. Kant never proposed the question: Is 
reason trustworthy? His inquiry was the entirely dif- 
ferent one : Where is reason trustworthy ? This ques- 
tion no more implies a distrust of reason than an inquiry 
into the limitations of mathematics implies a distrust 
of mathematics. Kant appealed to reason to set its 
own limits, and to declare those limits reasonable. Yet 
even Hamilton charges Kant with making reason self- 
contradictory. Blunders of this sort are no longer ex- 
cusable. Kant claimed simply that the reason, in its 
spontaneous and unreflective activity, is the source of 
illusion, just as unreflecting common sense forms theories 
of things which disappear at the first touch of criticism. 
But Kant also claimed that reason, when reflective and 
critical, is able to discern and correct its unthinking 
errors. The very antinomies to which appeal is made, 
prove that Kant did not regard the reason as divided 
against itself; for he claimed that they result from a 
wrong or careless use of the reason; and he also claimed 
to have solved them by showing that the thesis and 
antithesis in each antinomy are, at the worst, only con- 
traries and not contradictories. So much for Kant's 
skepticism on this point. We will only add, that it is 
by no means necessary to adopt the Kantian distinction 
of noumena and phenomena in order to see that tho 
argument for one member of the antinomy is always 
inconclusive, and often bristles with paralogism. A 
little patient reflection will suflice for this insight. 

Since Kant's time, some who thought they were fol- 
lowing him, have attempted to show that the mind does 



KNOWLEDGE AND SKEPTICISM. 27 

fall into inevitable and insoluble contradictions. Hamil- 
ton only established the harmless theorem, that of con- 
tradictories both may be equally incomprehensible, and 
not that both may be established with equal cogency. 
The most notorious of these attempts is that of Man- 
gel, who claims that the mind insists on regarding the 
ground of the universe as first cause, absolute and in- 
finite. The entire argument rests on playing with the 
etymology of the words, and ignoring their philosoph- 
ical content. The argument has been reproduced, with- 
out improvement, in the philosophy of the unknowable. 
In sound philosophy, the first cause, the absolute, and 
the infinite, all mean only that independent being upon 
whom the conditioned world about us depends. But 
etymologically, the infinite may mean the all, and the 
absolute may mean the unrelated. Hence arise many 
puzzling and profound questions. How can the finite 
coexist with the infinite, when the infinite must be the 
all? How can the absolute be a cause, since the abso- 
lute is the unrelated, and a cause must be related to 
its effect ? These difificulties disappear as soon as we 
abandon etymology and attend to the philosophical 
meaning of the terms. These attacks on the consist- 
ency of reason have a slight pedagogical value in fur- 
nishing the teacher with examples of various logical 
fallacies; but they certainly have no philosophical 
fcignificance. 

To the same class must be reckoned the attempts 
sometimes made to discredit our simple, geometrical in- 
tuitions, by the doctrine of a space with more than three 
dimensions. Helmholtz, in an exposition of the doc- 



28 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

trine, imagines beings living on a sphere, and assumes 
that they are capable of motion only along the surface 
of the sphere. Now, if we further assume that our no- 
tion of space is generated by experience alone, it would 
follow that these beings would never get the notion c f 
a space of three dimensions, but only of such a space 
as is represented by a spherical surface. Hence their 
idea of space and their geometry would differ from 
ours. For them the shortest distance between two 
points would be an arc of a circle, while for us it is a 
chord. Two straight lines would inclose a space; and 
they would be just as sure that they can inclose space, 
as we are that two straight lines never can inclose 
space. Hence it w^as concluded that our geometry is 
only of limited validity. The feebleness of this con- 
clusion is quite extraordinary, as a scanty amount 
of definition would have made it impossible. Under 
the supposed conditions, space would be the surface of 
a sphere, and the shortest distance between two points 
in such a space would be what we mean by the short- 
est distance between two points on the surface of a 
sphere. That the imaginary inhabitants should declare 
such shortest distance to be an arc need not surprise us, 
for we say the same thing. Indeed, all the conclusions 
drawn by these people, are simply the conclusions of 
our own geometry with regard to spherical surfaces. 
liut because botli propositions are about two points in 
space, advantage is taken of the common term to for- 
get that in one proposition space means our space of 
three dimensions; and in the other it means only the 
surface of a sphere. Tt Avould not be SMrprising if such 



KNOWLEDGE AND SKEPTICISM'. 29 

splendid play secured an overwhelming triumph. The 
doctrine of a curvature of space, and of a space of n 
dimensions, is based on similar pettifoggery. When 
we say that parallel lines will never meet, or that two 
right lines can never inclose a space, we are told to re- 
member that space may have a cur\^ture, so that every 
line shall return into itself, or perform some other feat. 
I) reply, we ask what is meant by a curvature of space ? 
Lines and outlines may be curved in space, but no one 
can understand any thing by a curvature of space it- 
self. To mean any thing intelligible, this doctrine 
must only say that there are no absolutely straight or 
parallel lines, etc.; but the geometrician does not say 
that there are. He merely says that if such lines exist, 
they will not meet. A curvature of number, so that 
by adding unit to unit we should finally conie back to 
unity, is just as rational a notion as that of a curvature 
of space; so that by always going on in a straight 
line, one should finally come back to the starting-point. 
The talk about a space of n dimensions is either equally 
empty or equally unintelligible. The facts concerning 
this notorious doctrine are these: Algebraic analysis is 
independent of synthetic geometry; and as long as we 
confine ourselves to abstract symbols we are not limited 
to any number of co-ordinate axes. Further, it is found 
that when there are no more than three axes, the analyt- 
ical expressions can be geometrically represented by 
lines, etc., in space. Now, nothing is easier than to say 
tliat if space had n dimensions, then an expression in- 
volving n axes of reference could also be geometrically 
represented. Of course it could. If space had n di- 



30 STUDIES IN THEISM, 

mensions, it would have n dimensions. But to conclude 
from this fact that real space may have 7i dimensions 
is not reasoning, but a pitiable logical grimace. The 
simple fact that a can be represented by a line, a^ by a 
plane surface, and a^ by a cube, while a^ and all higher 
powers cannot be geometrically represented, is as go^d 
ground for believing in space of n dimensions as any 
thing which is offered in support of the notion; for we 
can always say that if space had n dimensions, then a° 
could be geometrically represented. The analytic forms 
which arise from the assumption of hypothetical spaces 
are often very interesting, and give rise to most curious 
conclusions as to what would be true in such space. 
For example, it is said that in a space of four dimen- 
sions a sphere could be turned inside out without rupt- 
ure, but a knot could not be tied. And as analytics is 
independent of geometrical representation, there is no 
objection to such assumptions so long as they are not 
mistaken for reality. But, by sheer force of talking 
about spaces of n dimensions some writers have come 
to believe that the expression represents a possible ex- 
istence of some sort, instead of being merely analytic 
assumptions. An extended algebra of imaginary quan- 
tities is possible; but that does not prove that the 
quantities are not imaginary. We know one real space 
of three dimensions, and we know no other. What 
may be meant by a space of n dimensions is utterly 
unintelligible. The thought escapes and defies all con- 
struction. It is not a thought, it is a phrase. The man 
who utters it has not said something; he has merely 
made a noise. Common sense must defend itself against 



KNOWLEDGE AND SKEPTICISM. 31 

such imposition by demanding that a phrase represent 
a construable thought as well as a combination of let- 
ters or sounds. 

The attempts to prove that reason is essentially self- 
contradictory, have never proved any thing but the 
philosophical incompetency of those who made them. 
It is very easy to find contradictions in the spontaneous 
metaphysics of common sense; but reason itself always 
suffices to detect and correct such errors. In the failure 
of this method, the skeptic adopts another. He next 
claims that rational principles cannot be proved even in 
the mind; still less can they be proved to have object- 
ive validity. He admits that they must control our 
thinking, and that we cannot conceive them false ; but 
he urges that this proves only a subjective necessity, 
and does not prove an objective necessity. He sug- 
gests, therefore, that these principles do not hold for 
the external world, or for what he is pleased to call 
" things in themselves." 

This skepticism seems fair and rational; let us look 
at it more closely. And first we examine the demand 
for proof of first principles. If by proof the skeptic 
means deduction, it is clear that he is right in saying 
that rational, or first, principles cannot be deduced, for 
deduction implies something more fundamental than 
the conclusion. Since Jacobi wrote the Faith Philoso- 
phy, there is no reason for calling this truism a dis- 
covery. But if the skeptic means that what cannot be 
deduced is, therefore, uncertain, we shall find it neces- 
sary to inquire what proof is. Now the essence of 



32 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

logical proof consists in so combining propositions 
which we know, that we finally see some other propo- 
sition to be a necessary admission, which was not seen 
as such before. That is, we reach a feeling of certainty 
in affirming the proposition which we did not have ; and 
then the proposition is said to be proved. But the 
essence of the proof consists in just this certainty, and 
not in the number or nature of the steps taken. If 
now the proposition should be directly seen at the start 
to be necessary, we should need no proof : (1) because 
we should have the essence of proof — the feeling of 
certainty; (2) because the longest argument could give 
us nothing more than this feeling ; and, (3) because the 
certainty arising from a logical demonstration can never 
be greater than that of the principles on which it rests. 
If the mind is able to see some truths to be self-evident, 
or to know some things without a process, it is mere 
logical pedantry to demand further proof. It is more 
than pedantic; it is absurd. The self-evident, in its 
very notion, is that which is able to stand alone. To 
demand proof of it is to declare that it is not self- 
evident. It is plain that the ultimate test of truth 
must be the mind itself, and its faith in its own power 
to know. The skeptic is unwilling to admit the dicta 
of reason, and insists on having their validity in some 
way established. But it is plain, again, that thc^se 
dicta can be tested only by assuming some more ulti- 
mate dictum as a standard; and this final standard, can 
be known as such only by the self-evidence with which 
it appeals to the mind. But the demand for proof can 
be repeated here with equal justice, and the same sense- 



KNO WLED GE AND SKEPTICISM, 3 3 

less round might be renewed forever. The skeptic's 
demand for proof, beyond the feeling of self -evidence 
and certainty, is one which in its very nature cannot be 
met by any intelligence whatever. Angel or archangel 
would be in exactly the same condition as we are, in 
tliis regard. The skeptic is commonly supposed to be 
of all men the most acute, but surely there is nothing 
very brilliant in making an irrational demand, and then 
triumphing because it has not been met. When asked, 
then, for the ultimate warrant of rational principles, 
we do not hesitate to declare it to be reason itself. 
Whatever appears as truly self-evident and necessary, 
the mind will always feel justified in regarding as true. 
It is clear that it must come to this at last, not only for 
human intelligence, but for all intelligence. Every ra- 
tional being must at bottom trust his. rational insight. 
To call this a circle, and quibble over it, is mere petti- 
foggery. The trust of the mind in itself can be shaken 
only by showing inconsistency in its intuitions. The com- 
plete test of truth, then, might be stated as self -evidence 
and necessity at the beginning, with consistency in the 
outcome. The skepticism which is based upon contradic- 
tions in details, is rational and valuable for details, and 
the course of the mind in such cases is to go over its 
work in the light of rationality, and bring the warring 
details into harmony. But a skepticism of rt^ason it- 
self, based, not on inner contradiction, but solely on the 
possibility of verbal denial, is something which busy 
and sincere men may justly ignore. To ask some ques- 
tions is a proof of mental power. To ask some others 
is a proof of mental weakness and confusion. To the 



34 STUDIES JV THEISM. 

latter class belong all skeptio^al demands for proof of 
rational principles. 

But the skeptic rejoins, that if the rationalist's argu- 
ment were allowed, it would only prove the subjective, 
not the objective, validity of these principles. He de- 
clines, therefore, to believe that they are objectively 
valid. It is plain that a skepticism of this sort is forever 
irrefutable, resting, as it does, solely on the possibility 
of stating a verbal doubt. "Whatever objective necessity 
there may be, can appear in the mind only as a subject- 
ive necessity, an impossibility of thinking otherwise, 
etc., and even objective reality exists for us only as it is 
conceived. We can test the value of this objection by 
applying it. A straight line is the shortest distance be- 
tween two points; things respectively equal to the same 
thing are equal to one another; every event or change 
must have a cause. The rationalist says, that such prin- 
ciples are as valid for things as for thought; but the skep- 
tic objects, because the necessity with which they ap- 
peal to the mind produces only a subjective necessity of 
admitting them; and a subjective necessity is no proof of 
objective fact. It is evident that reason runs no serious 
risks from attacks like these, for while the doubt is for- 
ever possible, it is forever equally baseless and barren. 
It appeals not to reason, but from reason, and may 
rightly be left to its own irrationality. One grave dis- 
advantage of language is, that it allows men to speak 
without saying any thing. There is no difficulty in 
framing such phrases as square circle, straight curve, 
causeless events, and tlie like; but there is a strict im- 
possibility in thinking any thing under thorn. We are 



KNOWLEDGE AND SKEPTICISM. 35 

persuaded that skepticism would play a much less prom- 
inent part if the skeptic were forced to make his hypoth- 
eses intelligible. This he always neglects to do, but 
furnishes himself rather with phrases t^liich cannot be 
construed in thought, as if the first demand upon a 
hypothesis were not that it be at least thinkable. When 
Mr. Mill suggested that two and two may make five in 
some other world, it was an oversight not to tell us why 
five, instead of fifty, or five thousand, or three only, or 
even nothing. We are clear that in the same world 
four might equal five. It might also equal three. It 
might equal any thing. It might also equal nothing. 
Indeed, every thing might equal any thing and nothing 
at the same time. Any of these propositions are just 
as rational as the far-famed one of Mr. Mill. Unfor- 
tunately, a certain half-heartedness on Mill's part leaves 
us in doubt as to whether his proposition is any thing 
but a truism expressed in a most extraordinary form. 
He was not quite prepared to deny the law of identity, 
or A=zA. Hence, four equals four, and five equals five, 
but four does not equal five. But as two and two do 
equal four, and four is not five, it follows that the five 
which in some other world they equal, is not five as we 
understand it, but is really what we mean by four. 
Either this fantastic platitude, or else the law of iden- 
tity, must be abandoned. But here, again, we are puz- 
zled by the fact, that at times Mill seems to have meant 
by five what we all mean by five; for he quotes approv- 
ingly the hint of a barrister who suggested a way of 
conceiving that two and two should really make five. 
The barrister said, that if there should be some law of 



36 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

association whereby, whenever we add two and two, an 
additional unit should be suggested to the mind, then 
the sum of two and two would always seem equal to five;. 
Both Mill and the barrister fail to see that in that case 
not two and two make five, but two and two plus the new 
unit. Here, then, it would seem as if Mill meant to 
deny the law of identity. If a theologian should utter 
such wisdom, no one would hesitate to pronounce him 
imbecile; but as no theologian has ever won such glory, 
let us recognize the utterance as that of a great, and 
accurate, and candid thinker. It is also suggested by 
the skeptic that there may be worlds where the law of 
causation does not hold. We are quite clear that in 
those worlds things create themselves, and vanish into 
the void whenever they tire of existence. By hypoth- 
esis, nothing produces an event or cliange, and yet the 
event and the change do come to pass. They arise 
from the nothing, and vanish into it. No one can tell 
whence they come nor whither they go. There is no 
whence and no whither. Things are and are not, and 
probably both at once. These propositions again are just 
as rational as the denial of causation. If reason be re- 
pudiated, there is no longer any thing irrational. The 
one measures the other. The skeptic, then, ought to 
stop at nothing in the way of absurdity. There is 
nothing to forbid any notion except reason itself; and 
as the skeptic has victoriously overcome reason, the 
road is fully open to any and every whim and supersti- 
tion. A half-way skeptic is a sorry sight. But the 
trouble with the propositions we have mentioned is, that 
mental palsy results from any attempt to construe them 



KNOWLEDGE AND SKEPTICISM 3*7 

in thought; and as long as this is so, we shall hold that 
skepticism of rational principles is really credulity or 
bravado. In either case, it belongs to the department 
of mental pathology. 

But it may be asked, in mitigation of this severe 
judgment, did not Kant deny that rational principles, 
which are at bottom only rules of mental action, apply 
in any way to things in themselves? He did, and 
thereby destroyed his own system. He first proved 
that there are forms of thought which are regulative in 
the mental life. This was his great service to philoso- 
phy. Then without any warrant of any sort, he con- 
cluded that these forms were not also valid for things. 
In this way he transcended his own premises, which 
would never warrant any thing more than doubt. Dog- 
matic denial is impossible to a consistent Kantian. In 
this way, also, he made the idealism of Fichte a logical 
necessity. For the categories he declared to be sub- 
jective only. Among these he placed causality and 
reality. The denial of the former made his " things in 
themselves" useless. They do nothing; they do not 
even produce phenomena. Hence they account for 
nothing, and sink into metaphysical ghosts. By deny- 
ing the objectivity of the category of reality, we are 
forbidden to call "things in themselves" real. They 
are then nothing. Phenomena are the only realities, 
and absolute dogmatism is reinstalled. In short, one 
cannot become a Kantian without a " thing in itself," 
and one cannot remain a Kantian with " a thing in it- 
self." Reason will always revenge itself upon any the- 
ory which limits rational principles to subjective appli- 



38 STUDIES IK THEISM. 

cation, by den) mg the irrational reality outriglit. Such 
a thing is not merely the unknowable; it is more; it is 
the unaffirmable. It was Kant's subjectivism which 
produced the absolute philosophies of Germany, Th3 
later forms of phenomenalism have been constantly 
pressed with the same difficulty. l>y denying that 
phenomena are proper manifestations of things, and 
that things can be truly known through phenomena, 
they have made things unnecessary for the explanation 
of phenomena; and thus phenomena become the only 
reality. Consistent phenomenalism must lead to abso- 
lutism. 

Leaving now the question of principles, we inquire 
next into our knowledge of things. Since the time of 
Heraclitus, a knowledge of nature has been declared 
impossible, because all things flow. Plato, also, says, 
that since development is the law of the natural, our 
knowledge of nature can never be more than probable. 
Indeed, physics recognizes that our knowledge is hypo- 
thetical, resting always upon the implicit assumption 
of the uniformity of nature. But for our purpose it is 
not necessary to descend to such refinements. The 
objection of the Heraclitic skeptics is interesting as 
showing the great difference between ancient ^.nd mod- 
ern speculation. The faco of change or becoming, they 
held, makes any true statement about things untrue in 
the next moment; whereas we start with change, and 
look for its changeless laws. Being, for us, is not a rigid 
sameness, but a concreted formula of change. But we 
pass to anotlicr point. The fact of an objective reality 



KNOWLEDGE AND SKEPTICISM. 39 

of some kind has never been questioned except in word. 
Tlie true idealist does not deny that something is; he 
only asks, What is it which really is? Nothing is more 
common in popular speculation than utter misunder- 
standino; of idealism. Fichte's critics insisted that he re- 
garded himself as the creator of the universe; and Berke- 
] .^y 's critics have, with great fatuity, loudly affirmed what 
Berkeley never denied. Philosophical apprentices and 
counterfeit idealists are commonly equally short-sighted. 
They commonly mistake idea for delusion and individ- 
ual dream, and land necessarily in solitary egoism. This 
doctrine really makes the single thinker the universe. 
All other thinkers are but states or ideas of the first. 
Which of many thinkers shall be the universe, depends 
on which begins to think first. Two such talkers meet 
together, and each reduces the other to states of him- 
self. This is the low farce of philosophy. The only 
reason such a view can offer in support of itself is, that 
the existence of any thing independent of the subject, 
cannot be proved. This has passed, for a long time, as 
a perfect abyss of philosophic profundity; but it is, in 
fact, only another case of that logical pedantry which 
fancies that proof can give any thing more than cer- 
tainly, or that the certainty of logical proof can ever 
transcend that of the immediate intuitions on which it 
rests. It is really mortifying to find alleged thinkers 
still engaged in peddling these tawdry rags of logical 
finery and winning philosophical reputation by the 
sale. If this view will be logical, it results in solipsism, 
or the doctrine that the solitary thinker is the universe. 
If not logical, it belongs to volition rather than reason. 



40 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

The existence of something independent of the finite 
knower can never be deduced, but it may be certainly 
known. It lies in the nature of immediate knowledge 
that it is incapable of mediation, but at the same time 
it can dispense with it. 

Rational idealism raises no such questions as counter- 
feit idealism. It never pretends that in self-i)erception 
the object is the subject, or that the thing known is 
also the knower. In every theory, account must be 
taken of the fact that the world of conceptions is dual, 
a part being conceptions of self and states of self, and 
a part being conceptions of objects not ourselves. Ra- 
tional idealism recognizes this fact and its full signifi- 
cance. It does not question the existence of the world, 
or its independence of the finite power; but it raises 
the entirely different question as to the manner of its 
existence. It leaves the object just as it appears and 
where it appears. It questions nothing which the 
senses can give us. It only denies that under phe- 
nomena there is any hard, inert materiality as their 
source and support. But it does not claim that phe- 
nomena are produced by an unconscious activity of the 
knower; it regards them, rather, as resulting from the 
activity of an omnipresent spiritual being. There are 
different types of rational idealism, but they all agre<3 
in declarmg it absurd to posit an object as unrelated to 
thought, while, as object, it is essentially a complex of 
thought relations. These views are not well described 
as idealism; they are properly intellectualism and spir- 
itualism. Moreover, they are less a theory of percep- 
tion, than a metaphysical doctrine concerning the nature 



KNO WLED GE A XD SKEPTICISM. 4 1 

of reality. And here skepticism appears again. It is 
willing to admit the existence of things independent of 
the finite knower, but it doubts whether we can ever 
know them as they are. We know them as they ap 
pear, but who shall assure us that we know them as 
they are, or that the appearance does not misrepresent 
the fact ? This is the form especially of the relativist's 
objections to the possibility of valid knowledge. 

This doctrine is so multiform in its misconceptions 
and philosophical prejudices, that it is impossible to 
give a single decisive criticism. It relies for its defense 
chiefly upon an illustration, and upon the impossibility 
of proving a correspondence between our conceptions 
and their objects. The illustration is taken from the 
doctrine of sense-qualities. It is a commonplace of 
psychology that our senses do transform things so as to 
have no likeness to themselves. All sense-qualities, as 
light, heat, color, etc., are only subjective affections 
which resemble nothing external. If we stroll on the 
moon-lit beach, the moon shines and the waves plash 
only as we see and hear. We return home, and the 
moon shines and the waves ripple no longer. All that 
is left is a vast chaos of waves in sea, and air, and sk^, 
which neither sound nor shine. The eye comes, and 
the dark ether tides burst into a sphere of light. The 
eye goes, and there is light no longer. In the psycho- 
logical sense, light was not made on the first day nor on 
the fourth day, but when the first rudimental eye ap- 
peared. On the strength of this analogy, it is urged 
that the mind transforms all its objects, so that they 
can never be known as they are. 



42 STUDIES IN TUEISM. 

The subjectivity of sense-qualities serves to illustrate 
the skeptic's meaning, but it lends no support to his 
theory. If one were inclined to be obstinate, he could 
rightly claim that this subjectivity is incapable of proof. 
He might insist that things really are colored, etc., 
and that the various vibrations are only the mechanism 
by which we learn what the qualities of things are. 
Still one may allow this subjectivity without admitting 
the skeptic's notion, for the proof that any sense-quality 
is su])jectiA^e, is based entirely on the assumption that 
we know what the reality is. The physicist says, that 
the antecedents of sensations are really vibrations of 
some sort. But if we deny the reality of the vibra- 
tions, the proof of .the subjectivity of sense-qualities 
fails entirely. We cannot disj)rove the objectivity of 
one set of predicates, without admitting the objective 
validity of another set. Plainly the skeptical argument 
from sense-illusion is divided against itself. 

Two theories are possible concerning the relation of 
the mental life to the external world. We may regard 
the world as something complete in itself, and lying 
there in reality just as it appears to common sense. In 
this case the mind is merely a copyist. It contributes 
nothing ; its sole function is to reproduce in thought an 
exact picture of the external reality. This is the view 
of unreflecting common sense. Another theory, equally 
possible, is, that the mental life has a value of its own, 
and a function other than copying. The mind helps to 
create the facts it recognizes. Tlie external world is 
not finished until the perceiving mind appears. It did 
not exist as it appears to our senses, until sensitive 



KNO WLED GE AND SKEPTICISM. 4 3 

minds were created. The external reality is but the 
foundation on which the mental world is built. But 
the mental world is not an accident ; it also belongs to 
the system of reality. It not only belongs to the sys- 
tem ; it is the very summit and crown. Here the skep- 
tics divide. Some innocently assume that the mind 
is meant to copy reality, and if it does not do this, it 
is a failure. Every proof that the mind lielps create its 
objects, as in light, sound, etc., they regard as showing 
the weakness of the knowing power. But this is the vul- 
garest prejudice of the most thoughtless common sense. 
Color and harmony, heat and cold, are not delusions, 
and do not cease to exist, because they exist as such only 
in the mind. They have all the reality desirable, and 
our knowledge of them is as valid as it ever was. The 
average skeptic is in such bondage to common sen^ 
prejudices that he cannot see any difference between 
existence in, and for, the mind, and pure delusion. 
That the mental life may have a value on its own 
account, is an unheard-of notion to him. Other skep- 
tics adopt the second theory, that the mind is a fac- 
tor of all its objects, and conclude on that account 
that reality is unknowable. The mind contributes 
much ; who can tell how much? The object of knowl- 
edge is a composite of external and internal factors, 
which no analysis will ever serve to separate. We are, 
then, forever shut out from a knowledge of reality pure 
and simple. 

This claim can never be established, because our con- 
ceptions can never be known as false, without assum- 
ing that some conceptions correspond to the fact. But 



44 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

If it could be proved, the loss would not be great. For 
it reduces to the harmless truism, that we shall always 
be limited to a knowledge of things as they exist for 
our intelligence. It is doubtful if the most determined 
realist would not be satisfied with such a knowledge; 
indeed, he would be so far from demanding any other 
knowledge, that he would profess his inability even to 
conceive what this other, and impossible, knowledge 
might mean. This alleged reality which is unrelated 
to intelligence, is not a thought, but a contradiction; 
or, rather, it is a mental blank, first obtained by cancel- 
ing the conditions of thinking, and then mistaken for 
the thing in itself. When thought posits an object out 
of relation to thought, or one defined only by negative 
attributes, it contradicts itself. A knowledge of things 
in relation to mind, or as they exist for intelligence, is 
all that is possible to any mind whatever. To demand 
more is to be unintelligible. It is as if one should ask 
how something feels which is not felt. The skeptic here 
is really groping to know how being is made, or else* he is 
fretting himself with the thought that things may have 
properties other than those we perceive; but this is irrele- 
vant to the question concerning the reality of knowledge. 
Still this answer will hardly satisfy the skeptic, who is 
sure that tlie full force of his objection has not been ap- 
preciated. Common sense, also, is uneasy for the secur. 
ity of knowledge when it fails to reach the very thing 
instead of a relation. Who can tell that the relation of 
the mind to its objects might not change, and thereby 
knowledge disappear ? To this scruple of common 
sense, the r^^ply is, that such change could only result 



I 



KNO WLED GE AND SKEPTICISM, 4 5 

from a change either m things or in the mind. If things 
change, our knowledge ought to change; because its ob- 
jects change. A change in the nature of the mind, on 
the other hand, whereby its relation to things should be 
essentially altered, is an utterly gratuitous assumption. 
All knowledge of things assumes their constancy. We 
have no security that every thing will not suddenly ac- 
quire new properties and abandon all the old ones. The 
constancy of intellect is at least no more violent an as- 
sumption than the constancy of external nature. But 
w^e return to the skeptic's claim, that reality can never 
be known, because the mind modifies its objects. 

This doubt, when universal, depends on overlooking 
the distinction of thought-knowledge and sense-knowl- 
edge; and yet all doubt which is not purely gratuitous 
rests upon this distinction. From the dawn of specula- 
tion, it has been recognized that the world as it appears 
to sense, is not the world as it appears to thought. In 
the ancient speculation they were regarded as in oppo- 
sition; and the early skeptics made the most of the 
contradiction. But a truer theory of perception shows 
that the senses give affections of self; and that all per- 
ception is by the mind itself. There is no perception 
until thought-elements are introduced into sensations, or 
until sensations are built up into a thought-system. In 
this way the mind reaches a world instead of a chaos 
of subjective impressions. The world of appearances, 
and even the " phenomena " with which the skeptic 
conjures so mightily, are so penetrated with rational 
elements, that they often amount to what common sense 
understands ])y things. The senses do not give us 



46 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

things, causes, space, time, number, relations. These 
are the metaphysical data of the mind, which alone en- 
able it -to pass from subjective sensations to a world of 
reality. Grant, then, that the senses give us only sen- 
sations, and that sensations are only the effects which 
things produce in us ; grant, also, that these sensations 
are totally unlike their causes ; still it will not follow 
that the thought-elements of perception are also only 
subjective. The distinction between the elements of 
sense and those of thought is so patent, that it is un- 
pardonable to overlook it. The impressions of sense 
furnish the data for a thought-construction; and this 
the mind supplies by referring them to things as their 
causes. These things, again, are differentiated in quan- 
tity, quality, space, time, and number; for the difference 
in impressions points to corresponding differences in 
things. Law, or regularity in the impressions, points 
also to law and regularity in things. Thus there arises 
in the mind the conception of a world of real things, 
having relative permanence and power, and in various 
relations of interaction, co-existence, etc., with one an- 
other. As such they are quite independent of the finite 
knower; for they exist for all alike, and we are helpless 
in their presence. We recognize; we do not create. The 
knowledge thus gained, represents the fact without mis- 
representing it. The further question, whether these 
things may not be products of an all-embracing activity 
which manifests itself in all things, is irrelevant here. 
We know things, however produced, and however com- 
pounded, as having relative permanence, as having cer- 
tain properties, qualities, or powers, and as being in 



KNOWLEDGE AXD SKEPTICISM 47 

certain relations. And we further know that the mind 
does not make these qualities, relations, etc., but recog- 
nizes them. They are independent of our knowing. The 
other questions, as to the mode of things' production, 
or their relation to the infinite, are metaphysical ones, 
which are for us insoluble, but which must not be con- 
founded with the theory of knowing. The creative, or 
modifying action of our minds in knowing, must be 
limited to sense-qualities. There is no hint in experi- 
ence that the rational relations and elements which we 
seem to find in things are not really thejpe. The reason 
is evident. These rational factors are the frame-work 
of our mental life, and enter into all our mental opera- 
tions. It is not so with the elements of sense, they do 
not belong to rationality. 

But the doubt is raised, how can it be laid? The 
skeptic adopts our own language as his best justifica- 
tion. Because the categories of thought are the frame- 
work of our mental life, we can never escape them; and 
who shall assure us that they are also categories of fact ? 
The jaundiced eye must see all things yellow, no mat- 
ter what their proper color. The kaleidoscope imposes 
a form on its objects whatever their own shape. The 
skeptic, so far from ignoring the distinction of sense 
and thought-knowledge, bases his skepticism on the 
universality of the latter as compared with the former; 
for while he allows its universality, he also afiirms its 
subjectivity. This brings us to close quarters with the 
pioblem. A groundless skepticism is irrational. Being 
groundless, it is forever possible, and forever irrefuta- 
ble; but being also irrational, it should be left to its 



48 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

own irrationality. Now the mind cannot deal with the 
external world without applying its metaphysical no- 
tions of thing and quality, or of substance and attri- 
bute, of cause and effect, of space and time, of quantity 
and quality, of unity and number, of likeness and dif- 
ference, etc., and the mind affirms with absolute cer- 
tainty that these categories apply to things. The 
denial of their validity leads necessarily, as in the case 
of Kant's philosophy, to a denial of the thing. To 
affirm something which is neither active nor passive, 
substance nor attribute, neither one nor many, without 
quantity or quality, etc., is, so far as thought is con- 
cerned, merely to make an inarticulate noise. Now the 
skeptic should show some ground for his doubt. He 
cannot show any contradiction which results from al- 
lowing their objective validity of the categories. He 
cannot show any reason for affirming the existence of 
any " thing in itself," if the categories are denied. He 
can only claim that their objective validity cannot be 
proved. If this were true, it is perfectly clear that it 
cannot be disproved. Strangely enough, the relativist 
and phenomenalist have rarely failed to become nega- 
tive dogmatists. Not content with doubting the ob- 
jective validity of our conceptions, they have also 
denied it. The contradiction of this position is evi- 
dent. Before I can rationally deny the correspondence 
of my thought with reality, I must in some way be able 
to compare my false thought with the truth of things. 
I must always have a true knowledge of things before 
I can declare my knowledge false. This is the contra- 
diction into which all modern systems of relativity have 



KXO WLED GE AND SKEPTICISM. 4 9 

fallen. The largest conclusion which reason can ever 
draw is, that our conceptions may not correspond to the 
fact; and this conclusion is based upon the impossibil- 
ity of proving a correspondence. But this is to fall 
back into the logical pedantry of which we have so 
often complained; for though it may not be deduced, 
it may be certainly known. 

In this demand for proof, again, the skeptic mistakes 
the nature of the case. He has such a habit of asking for 
proof, that he calls for it even when the demand is irra 
tional. Things themselves can never enter the mind, and 
the mind can never transcend its conceptions of things. 
We have, and can have, no other mental content with re- 
gard to things than the conceptions which arise in the 
mind concerning them. But this is the case, not only 
with our intelligence, but with all intelligence. So long 
as knowing means any thing intelligible, it consists in 
forming conceptions of things and their relations ; when 
it does not mean this, it means nothing. There can, then, 
be no proof of the correspondence of thought and thing 
by comparing our thought with the thing, and for the 
simple reason that the thing exists for, and in, the mind 
only as it is conceived. This is as true for an infinite 
intelligence as for a finite one. Proof by comparison 
is more than absurd; it is a contradiction. The only 
proof which the nature of the case admits of, is the feel- 
ing of necessity or of fact, which attends knowledge, 
together with the inner harmony of our experience. No 
other proof is possible, even to omniscience. Neither 
the skeptic nor the every-day realist can grasp the prin- 
ciple that we can never transcend our conceptions, and 



50 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

that reality can exist for the mind only as it is con- 
ceived. Both are haunted by the notion that things 
may somehow turn up in thought and discredit our con- 
ceptions. But it is clear that all the skeptic can justly 
claim is, that our conceptions may yet fall into contra- 
diction. We reply, that doubt should be postponed 
until then. As long as our conceptions are forced upon 
lis and are mutually consistent, doubt is gratuitous. 

To estimate the force of this no-proof objection, let 
one ask himself how he knows that he is not standing 
on his head, or that he exists, or that he is not in some 
other place than where he is; and then let him further 
ask himself how much patience he would have with 
the suggestion, that his conception of the fact does not 
guarantee the fact. We offer the whole body of ph5^s- 
ical science in illustration of the possibility of valid 
knowledge. The discoveries of the physicist and the 
chemist are real discoveries. If it be said that physical 
science deals only with phenomena, the reply is, that it 
deals with the phenomena and relations of things. We 
have previously referred to the confusion in the use of 
the word phenomenon. The claim that we know only 
phenomena, is either the truism that we can never tran- 
scend our conceptions of things, or else it means that 
our conceptions misrepresent the fact. To say that we 
know things only as they appear is a harmless common- 
place, unless it mean that things do not appear in their 
true nature and relations. In the latter case, we sliall 
ourselves be skeptical of skepticism, until some good 
reasons be given for this dogmatic statement. It would 
be hard to persuade the astronomer, or the pliysicist, or 



KNO WLED GE AND SKEPTICISJf. o 1 

the chemist^ that the relations, and properties, and laws 
which he discovers are the creations of his own fancy. 
Indeed, it would be hard to get him to listen to such a 
claim, unless patience had had its perfect work. 

What our general doctrine is, will best appear in an 
illustration ; A desk is before us of certain form and prop- 
erties. It has certain relations to other things in the 
room, and to the entire system of things. Of noume- 
nal and absolute desks we know nothing, not even that 
they exist; but this real desk before us exists, and we 
claim to know certain of its properties and relations. 
They are not creations of our mind, but are quite inde- 
pendent of our knowing; for they exist for others as 
well as for ourselves. This desk is not a phenomenon, 
unless phenomenon means thing, or whatever is not 
self-dependent. Our knowledge of it, so far as it goes, 
is parallel to the fact. If it be said that the desk is a 
phenomenon because it is composed of atoms, the reply 
is, that this would not make it a phenomenon, but a 
combination of real elements. We did not claim that 
the desk is a metaphysical unit; but if it be composed 
of real elements, it remains as real as ever. The prop- 
erties and relations of the desk remain what they were, 
in spite of the atomic theory. These properties and 
relations may result from something deeper than ap- 
pears; no matter, they are what they are. The desk 
itself may be destroyed; still our knowledge of it, 
while it remains, is valid. If the idealist say that the 
desk is only an idea, the reply is, that the name is indif- 
ferent, if the thing be retained. This which he is 
pleased to call an idea, is independent of my knowing, 



52 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

both in its existence and in its relations; and that 
^^^ which thus exists and supports relations, is the precise 
definition of a thing. This class of ideas differs from 
all others in just the way in which things differ from 
subjective thoughts. If he adds that it is only a mani- 
festation of a universal spirit, we have no objection; 
for, as such manifestation, it has the attributes which 
we ascribe to it. If he further call it a mode of real- 
ity, we agree again; for as such mode it is real; and we 
know both it, and reality as manifested in it. It may 
not be self -existent; for all we know, it may be the con- 
stant product of an activity not its own. Nevertheless, 
however produced and however compounded, our knowl- 
edge of it is undisturbed. These questions as to the ul- 
timate nature of metaphysical reality, are foreign to a 
theory of cognition. Much can be known about a thing, 
and its relations to other things, even if we cannot tell 
how the thing is made, or how it is related to the infi- 
nite. Now, throughout this illustration, nothing has 
been suggested which makes against the knowledge we 
have; and the ignorance which has been pointed out, is 
merely ignorance of what we do not pretend to know. 

Now since our conceptions of things are all with which 
the mind has to do, it follows that error can be known as 
such only by the appearance of discord among these con- 
ceptions. This the mind will always regard as a sure 
sign of error, and will proceed to rectify it. This discord 
always arises from taking a new mental stand-point, or 
from a more extended experience; and the rectification 
never consists in abandoning the mind's power to know, 
or in discrediting its principles of judgment, or in over- 



KNOWLEDGE AND SKEPTICISM, 53 

turning what it really knew before. It consists, rather, 
in showing that false inferences have been based on 
real facts, or in limiting too extensive generalizations. 
The doctrines of the antipodes and of the world's rev- 
olution are cases in point. The necessity of these doc- 
trines arose from the fact that only thus was it possible 
to bring all our conceptions and experiences into har- 
mony; and their acceptance involved no abandonment 
of rational principles, but only a more careful applica- 
tion of them. Reason received no shock from these 
doctrines; and knowledge was not overthrown, but 
extended. This is the case with the thousand rectifi- 
cations which we are constantly making. We find dis- 
cord among our conceptions, and are compelled to 
limit and modify our previous positions; yet never 
does actual knowledge become shaken, but only its in- 
terpretation. Even our theories of knowing undergo 
similar modifications, but no fact of knowledge is dis- 
turbed. We begin by thinking that sense-qualities re- 
veal things as they are. Soon this view is rejected; but 
the nature and relations of these qualities are the same 
as before. Then sense-perception presents the world as 
a plurality of objects of various kinds. Finally, we sus- 
pect that even this view does not give us the deepest 
fact, but that things which appear are functions of things 
which do not appear, and that the many are forever de- 
pendent on the one. Thus we reach at last the view, 
that neither sensation nor sense-perception, but reason 
only, is able to reveal the truth of things. Yet all the 
while we question nothing which the senses give, and 
we deny no fact of perception. We only deny those 



54 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

false implications with which our spontaneous percep- 
tions are filled. Perception, as well as reasoning, needs 
the constant supervision of the reason. The question 
which reason asks is. How must we think of things ? 
And when there is necessity and perfect harmony in our 
conceptions, the mind will regard that as the highest 
proof that thought and thing are parallel. Of course, 
the old doubt is still possible; we may still question 
whether things may not in truth be altogether different 
from what we think them; but until some reasons can 
be given beyond the possibility of the verbal doubt, the 
doubter must be left to himself. He is amenable to 
neither argument nor intelligence. 

But the skeptic is not easily baffled. He clutches 
eagerly at what we have said about the antipodes and 
the world's revolution, and claims that the opposite be- 
liefs were once universal and necessary; and, therefore, 
universality and necessity are not sufficient tests of 
truth. He next asks, how we know that some future 
revolution of thought will not displace all our current 
conceptions. To the claim, we reply that the doctrines 
of the earth's flatness and steadfastness were never 
either universal or necessary in the philosophical sense 
of those words. The conception of a round and mov- 
ing earth is as easy as that of a flat and fixed earth. 
To the ancients the antipodes were not inconceivable, 
but simply incredible. They had not the evidence or 
the facts which make them credible. When the facts 
were discovered, reason had no difficulty with the be- 
lief. With rational principles, however, the case is 
entirely different. Their opposites are not only incred- 



KNO WLED GE AND SKEPTICISM. 5 5 

ible, they cannot even be conceived. Their denial is 
possible in word, but not in thought. Like the phrase, 
square circle, it defies all construction. Now, to con- 
found the simply incredible with the truly inconceiva- 
ble, or the impossible in thought, is infantile in the 
f^xtreme. The objection we are considering rests upon 
I i ■ kt!i confusion. The conception of universality, which 
appears in the objection, proves only the need of fur- 
ther philosophical study on the part of the objector.. 
To the question, whether our present conceptions may 
not be displaced in the future by the discovery of rev- 
olution in what we now regard as fixed, we reply that 
this is very possible with regard to our empirical 
knowledge of things. But no skeptical conclusion con- 
cerning knowledge follows from this admission. The 
bulk of our so-called knowledge is theory, and is far 
from being either self-evident or necessary. This de- 
partment of theory is in constant change, but the 
knowledge on which it is based abides. The rotundity 
of the earth displaced a false theory, but overthrew no 
knowledge. The theories of physics and chemistry 
change, but the known facts and laws abide. Water 
and its properties are just what they were when it was 
regarded as an element. Phlogiston and caloric have 
vanished as theories of heat, but no known fact about 
heat has been disturbed. Whatever, then, the discov- 
eries of the future, and however they may overturn 
current theories, we may feel sure that they will not 
displace present knowledge, provided, always, that the 
objects of knowledge remain as they are. 

But do we really know things as they are ? Is it not 



5G STUDIES IN THEISM. 

possible that if we had some angel's eyes, we should see 
things to be quite other than we now see them ? Such 
is the doubting question which, not knowing what it 
asks, ever returns. Well, let an angel draw near and 
make revelations. He might very possibly tell us many 
things which we do not know. He might correct our 
errors, and confirm our knowledge. But if he should 
begin by contradicting what we know, we should lose 
all faith in his further revelations. If an angel should 
arrive from Mill's world, where two and two make five, 
and should announce this great truth, we should be 
quite sure either that he meant something different 
from what we do by two and five, or else that he was 
mistaken. The skeptic can greatly strengthen his faith 
by imagining some such principle as this of Mill's to be 
a matter of revelation. Let him think of the doctrine 
of the Trinity, if he wants to know how strong his faith 
is in numerical axioms. Let him put Mill's suggestion 
into the Bible, if he wants to know how abjectly irra- 
tional it is. Yet we continue to say, if our eyes were 
only opened to the reality of things, how we should be 
surprised and astonished. Let us grant it. It is still 
clear that this surprise and astonishment are possible 
only as we, and the world, remain the same. If the 
world were changed by this opening, it would be an- 
other world; and it would not be surprising if another 
world were different from this. If we were changed, 
and our memory of our old conceptions were lost, there 
would still be no ground, and no possibility, of surprise- 
It is plain that this hypothetical surprise could only con- 
sist, not in the loss and overthrow of ^nir present knowl- 



KNOWLEDGE AND SKEPTICISM. 51 

edge, but in seeing that the commonplace objects about 
us stand in a multitude of relations, and have various 
powers which we had not suspected before. Such an 
opening of the eyes might well surprise us, but it 
would not destroy our present knowledge; it would 
only enrich and extend it. 

A marked characteristic of all these skeptical argu- 
ments is, that they all assume that the mind is a 
stranger in the universe, and without any relation to 
the nature of things. Hence, thought and thing are 
incommensurable, and can never come into correspond- 
ence. But suppose we turn skeptics, and ask for the 
ground of this strange assumption. This reality, which 
is the negation of thought, what warrant is there for af- 
firming it ? What is it but the void ? This mind, also, 
which is alien to all reality, whence comes it ? Whence 
has it its strange laws, which so mask and transform 
the fact, that it is itself no longer ? We have here a dual- 
ism of the worst kind, and one which, according to the 
theory, can never be reconciled. But if the world be 
the product of mind, there is no reason why our minds 
should not know it as it is. No theist is justified in 
being an agnostic, except in the commonplace sense 
that our knowledge is limited and imperfect. If, on 
the other hand, mind is a product of the external world, 
we should expect a still more exact correspondence of 
thought and thing. For does not evolution teach that 
the mind, and all that is in it, result from the " interac- 
tion of the organism and the environment?" And is 
not all thinking defined to be an internal adjustment to 
the environment? And is not this "correspondence^' 



58 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

said to go on increasing in exactness, both in space and 
time, until " the adjustment of inner relations to outer 
relations" becomes complete? Certainly, in such a 
theory one would look for exact knowledge. Judge, 
then, of our surprise on learning that thought com- 
pletely misrepresents the fact, and that the so-called 
adjustment is only an ever-widening alienation. The 
result is so unexpected, so alien to the reasoning, that 
one knows not what to make of it. The universe is set 
to developing minds, and to stocking them with proper 
notions about itself; and although it does this under 
the law of necessity, and under every possible obliga- 
tion to tell the truth, it proceeds to give a garbled 
account of itself, and makes no account of the truth 
whatever. We must reckon this among the many mys- 
teries which the evolutionists have bequeathed to the 
world. 

Our aim in this discussion has not been to determine 
what we know, but rather what it is to know. We 
have sought, by giving a definition of knowledge, to 
enable the reader to judge for himself whether knowl- 
edge is possible. A universal standard of certitude is a 
chimera; but certitude is possible for persons. Doubt- 
less a careful analysis would show that we know much 
less than we think we do; or that the realm of knowl- 
edge is much smaller than that of belief. It may 
occur to some that our argument for the reality of 
knowledge moves in a circle, because it consists in say- 
ing that the mind must have faith in itself; but such 
a criticism involves a complete misunderstanding of the 



KNO WLED GE AND SKEPTICISM. 5 9 

question. The mind begins with trust in itself; and 
the skeptic seeks to break down that trust. To do so 
he must bring reasons. If he bring no reasons, or if 
his reasons prove irrelevant, or admit of sufficient re- 
ply, then his skepticism becomes groundless and irra- 
tional, and the mind may resume its trust in itselF. 
We have not sought to demonstrate the validity oi 
knowledge, but the groundlessness of skepticism. This 
we stated at the beginning. The skeptical argument 
we regard as a weak misunderstanding. Rational skep- 
ticism is healthful and necessary; and there never was 
greater need of it than at present. It is also a ques- 
tion whether there ever was less of it than now. But 
the skepticism with which we have been dealing is not 
of this character. Its positive arguments against 
knowledge are all failures. Its chief reason for doubt 
is, that knowledge cannot be proved to be objectively 
valid. This demand for proof is either a misunder- 
standing of the nature of proof, or else it is absurd. 
We cannot estimate such efforts very highly. On the 
contrary, all fundamental skepticism is a mark of weak- 
ness and disease. Its rebellion against reason tends to 
issue in abject credulity. As a preparation for adopt- 
ing the most debasing superstition, there is nothing 
equ*l to a little practice in philosophical skepticism. It 
produces the same effect upon the understanding which 
anchastity does upon the character ; and it might not 
improperly be called a mental whoredom. The ration- 
al being denied, there is no longer any irrational; and 
one view is as tenable as another. 

Concerning the reconciliation of science and religion 
5 



60 STUDIES IN THEISM, 

which agnosticism was supposed to effect, it is needless 
to speak. Events have judged it. The religious world 
has been deservedly punished for invoking skepticism 
to defend obnoxious doctrines. The unknown God may 
be a ground for fear; he is no subject for love or wor- 
ship. If agnosticism be taken in earnest, both science 
and theology are only subjective dreams. If it be al- 
lowed that our conceptions may, more or less well, rep- 
resent reality, then the question arises whether phys- 
ical or spiritual conceptions best represent the ultimate 
fact. Thus the so-called war between science and re- 
ligion emerges at the end of the agnostic controversy 
in the same form which it had at the beginning. We 
pass now to consider belief. 



KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF, 61 



CHAPTER 11. 

KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 

r^NLY that is properly said to be known whose evi- 
dence or nature is such as to compel acceptance. 
Very little, however, of our so-called knowledge has 
such a degree of certainty. Rational principles, and 
the facts of consciousness and immediate perception, 
are all that can claim to be strictly knowledge. Still 
it does not follow that all else is delusion; for, though 
not strictly certain, it may be rationally probable, and 
thus a subject for rational belief. By rational belief, 
then, we mean the acceptance of any thing on grounds 
which, while they render it probable, do not strictly 
compel its admission. They justify the mind in accept- 
ing it, but do not exclude the possibility of the oppo- 
site. We believe that the present laws of nature will 
be valid to-morrow, but we do not know it. It is con- 
ceivable that some change might occur in the nature 
of things, which would reverse all the present orders 
of co-existence and sequence. The assumption of the 
uniformity of nature is necessary to enable us to ad- 
vance a step beyond our experience, whether in space or 
time; but this assumption is no necessity of thought. 
The mind finds no difficulty in the conception that all 
the laws with which we are acquainted may be limited 
both in space and time. The physicist believes that 



62 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

material things are composed of ultimate atoms, but he 
does not know it. The entire structure of scientific 
theory is equally a matter of belief. Theories are 
never facts of observation, but inferences; and they 
never rise to the rank of certainty. Probability is mo]-e 
than the guide of daily life; it is also the guide of sci- 
ence and reason itself. Were the natural sciences re- 
stricted to what is truly known, they would shrivel up 
to a handful of unrelated facts, of much value for 
practice, but of little or none for intelligence. 

A belief, to be rational, must have rational grounds. 
When held without grounds, it is a volition; when held 
on irrational grounds, it is a prejudice or a superstition. 
But the grounds of belief may be manifold. They may 
be such as appeal only to the passionless understand- 
ing, and hence such as any one with common sense 
would recognize. The mathematical doctrine of prob- 
abilities is a great illustration. Such grounds oi uelief 
are elementary, and call no elements of character into 
play. They admit of calculation, and result in sub 
stantial harmony of opinion. But the grounds of belief 
may also be such as appeal not only to the understand- 
ing, but also to the esthetic, and moral, and religious 
nature. As such, they are no less rational than the 
former, though their validity would not be recognized 
by any in whom the esthetic and religious elements were 
lacking. All beliefs are of this class into which senti- 
ment of any kind enters, whether it be of patriotism, 
or of duty, or of love, or of art, or of religion. We 
may say, then, with sufficient accuracy for our purpose, 
that the grounds of belief may be objective and sub- 



KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. G3 

jective. The former are the facts of sense-perception: 
the latter are the manifold facts of feeling and instinct, 
the longing for the true, the beautiful and the good, 
the sense of dependence and moral obligation, the de- 
sire to worship, and the fervors of religious aspiration. 
Belief on such grounds might be defined as the accept- 
ance of something, for reasons subjectively sufficient, 
but objectively insufficient. In every such case, the 
development of the subject determines, to a great ex- 
tent, the credibility of the fact. Belief on objective 
grounds is entirely simple; belief on subjective grounds 
demands some further explanation. 

When we speak of believing on subjective grounds, 
the first impression is that we are advocating mere cre- 
dulity; indeed, credulity consists in taking our feelings 
and impressions for arguments. This is plausible only 
when abstractly stated, or when, by feelings, whims are 
meant. For feeling also is a fact; it is the product of 
the universe, and must have some relation to it. It 
must further be borne in mind that when the grounds 
of belief are objective, they are seldom capable of for- 
mal statement. Just as we recognize a face with per- 
fect certainty, though we might be unable to describe a 
single feature in detail, so in daily life we discern a be- 
lief, or a course of action, to be rational, even while it 
would be impossible to formulate . the real grounds of 
our opinion. If we attempt it, we find that our state- 
ments do not state, but rather misstate, our reasons. 
This is characteristic of daily life. We constantly be- 
lieve and act upon impressions which we could not put 
into words without seemin(y ridiculous, and which we 



64 STUDIES m THEISM. 

could not ignore without being irrational. The mer 
chant, or captain, knows well that one course is better 
than another, but he would often be sadly puzzled to 
justify his opinion by any thing but the favorable re- 
sult. Such action and judgment partake of the nature 
of instinct. They are the total outcome of our past 
experience; and, although the reasoning element has al- 
most entirely disappeared, they are, in general, far 
more trustworthy than our labored calculations. The 
reasons for trusting or distrusting persons, also, are sel- 
dom susceptible of formulation; and that, too, in cases 
where the greatest interests are ventured. This is es- 
pecially the case with personal influence. An impres- 
sion is made upon us, and we are stirred and molded by 
something which we feel but cannot tell. In short, the 
great bulk of human belief and action rests upon 
grounds which admit of no satisfactory statement; yet 
we cannot disallow such grounds of belief and action 
without declaring life to be illogical and irrational. 
But in that case, the practical man could retort upon 
the theorist, that unless he is able to do better, perhaps 
the mistake is with him. As a rule, no one is more help- 
less, or more stupidly absurd, in dealing with reality, 
than the fanatical logician. As long as this is so, com- 
mon sense will be more concerned to have its beliefs in 
liarmony with reality as tested by results, than to have 
them in harmony with formal logic. Experience tends 
to issue in instinctive action and judgment, and of such 
action results are the great test. We conclude, then, 
that it is no objection to a belief that its grounds do 
not admit of satisfactory formal statement, provided 



KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 05 

always that it works well. Is it any greater objection 
that its grounds are subjective, and even incommuni- 
cable ? 

Feeling proves nothing. This oft-repeated dictum is 
one of those which, from frequency and vehemence of 
utterance, have been mistaken for self-evident. It is 
true only for individual, isolated, and transitory feel- 
ings ; the great, fundamental, and abiding feelings of 
the race may prove much. Those who appeal to this 
dictum are seldom aware to what an extent feeling and 
sentiment enter into our intellectual life, and even into 
their own theories. The deepest propositions concern- 
ing life, and duty, and character, have no other proof 
than the moral recoil which attends their denial. At 
the same time the only disproof possible is the absence 
of that recoil. It is an attempt to prove a negative on 
the strength of negative evidence. Every one in whom 
the moral nature is active, needs no proof of the beauty 
of holiness; and he regards a denial as we regard a 
blind man's protest against the absurd doctrine of vision. 
In Fenelon's "Telemaque," Ulysses tries to convince 
one of his crew who has been changed into a hog by 
Circe, that it is shameful for a man to be a pig, but with- 
out success. Here is a point where argument is impos- 
sible. If there be no sense of dignity in man nothing 
can appear degrading. Both in ethics and esthetics the 
ultimate fact upon which all theory is built, is a move- 
ment of the sensibility, which thus founds the distinc- 
tion of good and bad, beautiful and ugly. The most 
rigorous rationalist in morals cannot escape the ultimate 
appeal to feeling to sanction his theories. The whole 



66 STUDIES IN TUEISM. 

mental life, also, springs out of feeling. It is extremely 
doubtful if a purely perceptive being, without any sub- 
jective interests, could attain to rationality, even if its 
physical existence were secured. Indeed, it is demon- 
strable that our sentiments outline and control all men- 
tal development.* Before mental growth can begin, 
there must ^e an awakened interest, and when the in- 
terest is awakened, the leaden chaos of sense-experience 
begins to take on intelligible forms. The love of truth, 
which is the mainspring of science, is only one phase of 
religious feeling and worship. Truth, as simple corre- 
spondence of thought with fact, cannot arouse enthusi- 
asm. It has, indeed, a low value of utility, but nothing 
on which a soul may live. It would be an interesting 
psychological problem to trace the history of a gigantic 
intellect from which all feeling of interest had vanished. 
The enthusiasm of knowledge tacitly assumes that the 
object is worth knowing. It assumes that the universe 
is the abode and manifestation of a wisdom infinitely 
more august than our own. Without this implicit as- 
sumption, science becomes a mere hunt for bread and 
butter, or for personal notoriety. This subjective ele- 
ment appears even more prominently in all theories of 
life and the world. No such theory can be framed 
without teleological implications, and the choice of 
many possible standards depends upon the subject. A 
very common notion with skeptically inclined persons 
is, that the only fit end of life is to learn physical facts. 
They would empty the mind of all esthetic and moral 

♦This point has been very liappily put by Dr. James in the "Jour- 
nal of Specuhitive Philosophy," for January and July, 1S78. 



KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. ^u 

aims, and turn it into a store-house of statistics. One 
man thinks hasty belief a blasphemy to be visited witli 
the penalty of deathless fire; and another declares* that 
he will go to hell rather than worship a being whom he 
does not respect. But why fill the mind with bare facts 
rather than with good feelings ? Why exalt statistics 
at the expense of esthetics ? This apotheosis of fact in 
cognition over pleasure and exaltation in feeling, may be 
entirely justified, but its evidence is purely subjective. 
If it be said that the former works better in the long 
run, still we do not escape subjective standards. For 
the working better must be tested by the effect upon 
well-being, and this, again, involves several assumptions. 
It assumes either that the truest must work best, and, 
conversely, that what works best is the truest; or else 
it assumes that truth in itself is worthless, and that 
our interests are the only standard of truth and falsehood 
for us. Moreover, well-being itself is ambiguous. It 
may be physical, mental, or moral well-being, and the 
theorist must decide which he means. But the standard 
of judgment can only be a feeling of worth, and not any 
objective norm. Thus subjective interests and senti- 
ments constantly turn up as the decisive factors of the- 
ory. The theist and optimist are often twitted with 
making human welfare the standard by which they 
judge the system. But the pessimist does the same 
thMig. When he declares that this world is worse than 
none, he has human well-being as his standard, and 
commonly he thinks only of physical well-being. No 
theory of the world is so vilely anthropocentric as that 
of the pessimist. The same subjectivity appears in all 



68 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

the atheistic criticisms of nature and life. None are so 
purely subjective as those who affect to renounce sub- 
jectivity. As between world-theories, therefore, no one 
has any right to charge any other with resting on feel- 
ing rather than on fact, because all alike are built on 
this foundation. Some claim that the end of man is to 
eat, and drink, and die. Others, again, insist that thei'^ 
is something better than living and worse than dying. 
The atheistic evolutionist holds that the mind exists 
only to secure the physical survival of the individual and 
the species. This doctrine is as purely teleological as any 
other, only its teleology is of the lowest form. The 
theist holds, on the contrary, that the whole physical 
system exists only as means for securing mental and 
moral existence. The positivist claims that the great 
duty of man is to fill his mind with physical facts. The 
artist and the moralist alike detest a merely statistical 
mind, and demand that the mind devote itself to realiz- 
ing the true, the beautiful, and the good. We may as 
well recognize that as soon as we leave the facts of 
immediate perception, and begin to frame theories of 
things, subjective interests and impressions are the most 
important factor. Nature furnishes the raw material, 
and each one builds his own image. The supremacy is 
claimed for sense, for reason, for physical interests, 
and for esthetic and moral interests. The uncondi- 
tioned good is put in eating and drinking, in feeling 
good, in knowing facts, and in mental, moral, and re- 
ligious development. All alike, then, being subjective, 
the only question which remains is, which of these sub- 
jective interests sliall control our theories, and wiiich of 



KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. G9 

them is best supj^orted by all the facts. Teleologieal 
our theories must be; is there, then, any end which has 
an absolute value and a divine right to rule ? And in 
discussing this question, we must never forget that the 
mind itself, and its experiences, are also facts. They 
are no chance products, but rather the flower of the uni- 
verse. Whatever end, therefore, we may propose, it 
must be able to satisfy the mind's deepest and highest 
wants. No other end is likely to be parallel to reality, 
for on any theory, except that of utter skepticism, these 
wants and aspirations must be viewed as oracles. They 
are the voice of the universe in us. Something must be 
ventured: either we must trust the higher against the 
lower, or we must trust the lower against the higher. 
Formal proof is no more impossible in one case than in 
the other. 

It may be worth while to restate this view in an- 
other form. When the human mind comes to self-con- 
sciousness, it becomes aware of many interests. There 
ure practical, speculative, esthetic, and moral interests. 
These are the motive-powers of the mind, and outline 
its development. The only functioi* of the logical 
understanding, with regard to them, is to expound their 
implications, and determine their mutual relations. Of 
course, the man who believes only in what he sees 
belongs to no intellectual class. All that he demands 
of the system, is something to eat and drink. But 
every other man assumes instinctively that the sys- 
tem contains what his nature prompts him to seek. The 
speculator finds himself unable to rest in an un- 
related manifold, and hence he posits unity in the 



_X. 



70 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

diverse. His mental discontent leads him to assume 
the possibility of unification. But why should nature 
be unifiable ? Why should a mental unrest be made 
the ground for assuming, that the system really is what 
we wish it to be? The scientist also assumes that the 
system is intelligible and rationally construable; and 
any suggestion to the contrary he regards as essentially 
absurd. But why ? Why should the system be con- 
struable ? Is that the highest end of its existence ? If 
we have a general order in the leading phenomena of 
nature, that is enough for practical purposes. Until 
the present time, the world has contrived to get on, 
although whole departments of facts have been to us 
almost utterly lawless realms, and it is quite conceiv- 
able that they should never manifest any consistent 
intelligible order. No practical interest would be af- 
fected, but our speculative interest would receive a 
great shock. Yet the scientist does not hesitate to re- 
gard this mental unrest as pointing to the conclusion 
that reason and law are universal. If we ask him why, 
he replies that on any other assumption, science would 
not be possible. But why should science be possible? 
What crying need is there for such a universal science 
as he dreams of? The scientist often mistakes his 
enthusiasm for science, and his passion for formulation, 
for proofs that reason and law are universal. It never 
occurs to him that this is a tremendous assumption, 
based only on his subjective needs; and hence, he often 
tells what science can and cannot allow, as if its needs 
were the fixed points of the inner and outer universe. 
But tlie man of artistic and poetic temperament is 



KXGWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 71 

quite indifferent to the aim of the scientist and specu- 
lator, lie thinks it a very small matter to gather up 
many things into a single formula. It may have a 
certani low value in our mental book-keeping, but, 
olherwise, such summation is meaningless and worth- 
less. Suppose it possible to unite all things under a 
common law, what of it? What we want to know is, 
the meaning and worth of things. Formulation gives 
no value to things essentially meaningless and worthless. 
He declares, therefore, that the work of the speculator 
and scientist is unutterably stupid and tedious, unless 
it introduce us to a world of meanings and values. 
He insists that the universe must have grand meanings, 
which our only aim as rational beings should be to read 
off and interpret. He dwells upon the riddle of the 
world and life, and seeks to charm its meaning from it. 
He catches glimpses, as he thinks, of a supreme beauty, 
and gets hints of meanings too deep for utterance. 
These are the things for whose revelation the great 
world stands. Allied to this view is that of the moral 
enthusiast. For him the free moral personality is the 
only unconditioned good. For him there is no science 
like that of duty, and no beauty like the beauty of 
holiness. Personal righteousness is the highest thing, 
and he, therefore, insists on holding that the system 
was constructed for righteousness' sake. Now all of 
these views alike start from subjective sentiments. 
Mental unrest causes us to assume that law and reason 
are universal. Mental unrest causes us to assume that 
the universe has magnificent meanings hidden in it. 
Meiital unrest also causes us to assume that its most 



'^2 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

magnificent, its all-interpreting meaning, is love and 
righteousness. Thus we see that the great, leading man- 
ifestations of the mind are based entirely on subjective 
interests; and thus these interests become to us the great 
interpreters of the universe. These several sentiments 
are not equally strong in all; and there is a tendency in 
every one-sided person to ignore or ridicule those things 
which he does not appreciate. The physicist laughs at 
the philosopher, and the half-philosopher scorns the 
physicist. The lover of beauty cares for little else; 
and the moralist often places duty so high, as to make 
all else vanity and vexation of spirit. But as long as 
the world stands, and man remains man, there will be 
physicists, and poets, and artists, and thinkers, and 
lovers of righteousness. 

Now, what we wish especially to insist upon is, the 
subjective character of the scientific and speculative 
sentiment. Because this fact is commonly overlooked, 
there is all the more need to insist upon it. The moral 
sentiment is forbidden to make its needs an argument 
for objective correspondence, yet this is precisely what 
the scientific speculator does in his own case. He 
assumes that the world was made on an intelligible 
and rational plan, and for no other reason than the 
mental distress which results from denial. He may 
say that experience at least partly supports the as- • 
sumption; but the moralist also can say, that experi- 
ence at least partly supports his assumption, that the 
world was made on a moral plan. In general, the 
power not ourselves does make for righteousness. It 
is, then, idle to imagine that any of our general views of 



KNOWLEDGE AXD BELIEF. 73 

tilings can escape the control of subjective interests. 
All such tliieories are alike assumptions; and there is 
nothing to do but to ask which of them best satisfies 
the mind, and which is best supported by the sum of 
our experience. It is equally idle to imagine that 
the scientific interest will ever expel the others; for, 
as pointed out, the doctrine of meanings and values is 
the only thing which gives any significance whatever 
to science and speculation. At times, the speculative 
interest may overtop all others, but not long. The re- 
action against the usurpation of the scientific senti- 
ment is already apparent. By ignoring or denying 
the doctrine of meanings and values, it has become a 
prey to pessimism, and pessimism is the reductio ad ab- 
surdimi of any theory. This does not follow as a form- 
al conclusion from formal premises, but none the less 
does it follow from the total experience of the human 
mind. It may be an opaque fact in the soul, but it is 
beyond doubt, that no theory will endure which blas- 
phemes the system of things, and makes life not worth 
living. Whether such a fact proves any thing we shall 
see hereafter; at present, we insist upon the fact. 

The practical man might further retort upon the spec- 
ulator, that his theories have never been able to cope even 
with physical reality, and still less with mind and life. 
All reality has obstinately refused to come into his for- 
mula, and has scoffed at the vain attempts of the spec- 
ulative reason. The history of thought is the his- 
tory of failure. The history of scientific theory is one 
of incessant change. Hence, philosophic skepticism. 
Hence, also, phenomenalism both in science and philos- 



74 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

ophy. The most prominent feature of the scientific 
and speculative thought of the century is the convic- 
tion that reality is unknowable. We do not share this 
conviction, but its wide acceptance does certainly show 
that speculation has little ground for boasting against 
life and conscience. One cannot glance along the his- 
tory of thought without saying, with Mephistopheles, 
" A speculating fellow is like a beast on blasted heath, 
led round in circles by an evil spirit." It is not with- 
out ground, therefore, that Kant insisted upon the 
primacy of the practical reason, and the subordinate 
character of the speculative. Man is life rather than 
reason; and reason only strives to formulate what life 
and reality are. Certainly, if it were only a matter of 
mutual recrimination, the practical reason has much 
the stronger case. In the light of its own history, no 
faculty should be so humble as the speculative, for none 
has. so disgraced itself. What has it achieved, but con- 
fusion and mischief? The claim that practice is illog- 
ical, is met by the retort, so much the worse for logic; 
for thereby it confesses that it is unable to cope with 
the real. Speculation owes far more to life than life 
owes to speculation. If it were possible to shut up a 
body of speculators apart from all contact with prac- 
tical interests, there is no doubt that the outcome would 
be the supreme of grotesqueness and absurdity. Even 
now the so-called advanced science is so possessed of 
the unifying and formulating mania, that it can hardly 
be restrained from destroying all its own data. By 
consequence we are presented with the odd but in- 
{^tructive spectacle, of a science whicli overthrows life, 



KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 75 

denies consciousness, obliterates all distinctions, repudi- 
ates all those principles by which men and governments 
live, and confounds even the most heterogeneous things, 
for the sole purpose of bringing every thing under a com- 
mon formula. This is simply speculation gone mad, and 
committing suicide. Life has the field, and the might 
of the actual will always prevail at last over aberrant 
speculation. We conclude, then, once more, that all 
general theories of life and the world are based on 
subjective interests, and that the only questions which 
can be raised are, which of these interests should rule, 
and which works best as a ruler. In this inquiry, too, 
we cannot help making the general assumj)tion that 
nature is no more of a step-mother to man than to the 
lower animals, and that his instincts are equally trust- 
worthy. Those views, therefore, of man and his rela- 
tions which must develop and dignify human nature, 
and which work best in practice, are at least presump- 
tively true. Pessimism and despair are the only alter- 
native. In addition, then, to beliefs deduced from 
formal data, there are other beliefs which are based on 
results. Such beliefs have not the support of formal 
proof, but they have what is better, the attestation of 
reality. 

But still we have not shown that feeling points to any 

thing objective. Thus far we have only made out, that 

all theories are subjective; why not, then, abandon all, 

and have faith in none? One reason is, that it cannot 

be done. The pretense has often been made, but it has 

never been more than pretense. Teleology is the frame- 
6 



76 STUDIES m THEISM. 

work of both the speculative and the practical reason. 
But, it will be urged, do you seriously mean to say that 
a thing is real because we wish it? I wish to believe 
in God, therefore there is a God; what logic is there in 
such a conclusion? We reply, that of course we can- 
not intend to base any conclusion on individual and non- 
essential feelings and interests, but only on the essential 
needs of the mind; and these, we hold, render an object- 
ive correspondence highly probable. Indeed, not even 
the atheist ought to "object to this position. The power 
which has brought us forth is not, indeed, intelligent, but 
it acts as if it were; and hence we may assume as prob- 
able, that what intelligence would call for, that the 
blind power will furnish. It has been able to create 
animals and fit them to their lot, to supply them with 
proper organs and instincts, and in wonderful ways to 
provide for its children. But, curiously enough, the 
atheist supposes that this power must turn blockhead, 
with man. Here it has produced wants which it cannot 
meet, and instincts without any object. Surely, if it 
can do all that the atheist assumes it can, there should 
be no difficulty in believing that it has also provided 
for the human wants and instincts which it has created. 
The power which has been wise enough to make us, 
ought, especially on atheistic principles, to be able to 
keep us in existence, and even to punish and reward us 
according to our works. But, seriously, we do hold 
that a general belief renders a corresponding reality 
highly probable, even when no sufficient formal defense 
is possible. Such a belief represents the total outcome 
of a race-cx])cricncc, the impression which the universe 



KNO WLED GE AND BELIEF. 1 1 

has made upon us. Especially should philosophical 
evolutionists allow the force of this argument; for they 
insist that all our beliefs are made for us, and represent 
the totality of our experience. But, oddly enough, 
while they allow its full force with regard to rational 
principles, they dispute it with regard to moral and re- 
ligious beliefs. The oldest truths, they say, represent 
the most fundamental elements of experience. If there 
be any relations which are fundamental, we should ex- 
pect that they would appear in all our experiences, from 
the earliest to the latest. Hence their superior age and 
cogency. Conversely, a general belief can only be re- 
garded as a transcript of our most general experiences, 
and hence as having the highest degree of probability. 
Yet when these philosophers have occasion to criticise 
ethical and religious principles, the opposite doctrine is 
set up, that the new is most trustworthy. We are often 
called upon to reject theism as having a suspicious par- 
entage, being the outgrowth of fetichism, and the prod- 
uct of a savage state. Yet it would seem that a belief 
which has been able to impress itself upon all ages and 
stages of humanity, ought to be at least as probable as 
the late opinion of a little clique. But a narrow con- 
sistency is not one of the failings of the evolutionist. 
We are not prepared, then, to reject the argument from 
general feeling and belief, because on any theory of 
knowledge, a feeling or want which is common to men 
is the expression of a fact; it is the way in which reali- 
ty manifests itself in us. Our feelings are the subjective 
side of the universe. Upon this point we are in full ac- 
cord with the evolutionist. They conserve well-being, 



78 STUDIES IX THEISM 

point out duty, and outline development. We must once 
more express our surprise that the evolutionist should 
fail to see that on his theory feeling and instinct, rath- 
OY than understanding, are the great guides of life. It 
looks almost as if the subjectivity of prejudice were 
needed to explain so peculiar an oversight. 

Our position will appear less strange if we attend to 
perception in general. All sense-perceptions are but 
conclusions from sense-impressions; or rather, the ob- 
ject is posited by the mind because of its sensations. 
The senses do not give us reality, but only states of 
self. The reality is reached only by the mind. Now 
the final test of reality in perception is, that it compels 
and coerces our sensations. How the object does this 
we do not know; and we know that there is an object 
only because the sensations are coerced. If, then, there 
is any other element in the totality of our experience 
which equally coerces our belief, and which, when de- 
nied, invariably comes back, then there is the best 
ground for saying that in such experience, as well as in 
sense-perception, we come in contact with sometliing 
not ourselves. There is nothing in psychology to forbid 
the thought, that contact with reality may take place 
other than through the senses. Indeed, the world of 
physical reality is, for the most part, inaccessible to the 
senses. At best, the senses give us only impressions; 
the interpretation is of the mind. Forces, and atoms, 
iind ethers do not exist for the senses. The senses nev- 
er reveal that the points of light above us are suns and 
systems. The mind affirms these realities, because of 
its sense-impressions. In tlie same way the subjective 



KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. ' 79 

impressions of conscience, the haunting conviction of 
things not realized, the dreams of a beauty and a good 
beyond all that we have experienced, may well be the 
revelation in us of some power which besets us on every 
hand, and makes for righteousness. They have this ex- 
ternal character in experience. They are in us, but not 
of us. Conscience has always seemed to the race to 
speak less in its own name than as the delegate of an 
invisible king. And the sense of things unseen often 
drifts in upon us with such a feeling of reality that the 
solid earth grows phantom-like in contrast. That is the 
conviction which these experiences have made upon the 
race. They coerce us, and we cannot escape them. 
That they are indeed the working of an objective power 
may not be proved, but still less is it disproved. A 
race-psychology is, in many respects, far more trust- 
worthy than the pyschology of the individual; and its 
verdict is, that these things are indeed the manifesta- 
tion in us of a person not ourselves. And if we find 
that with the growth of moral character such convic- 
tions become firmer and firmer, until they arise to a sub- 
jective certainty which cannot be shaken, then there is 
good ground for assuming that they lie parallel to real- 
ity, and are derived from it. On the basis of certain 
impressions, we posit material objects. On the basis of 
other impressions, we posit spirits like our own. On 
the basis of its total mental and moral experience, the 
race has posited God. 

This general conviction in a divine existence, we re- 
gard as less an inference than a perception. This is 
shown by the history of the belief, which is older than 



80 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

reflection and speculation. The sense of the supernal 
iiral is a distinguishing feature of the human mind, 
even in its lowest stages. And this conviction cannot 
be deduced from our sense-experiences alone; for a 
sense-object is simply a sense-object, and cannot be any 
thing more, unless there be some sense, or feeling, or 
conviction of the supernatural. This feeling being 
given, our sense-experience may serve to give it form; 
but, without the feeling, the senses can never transcend 
themselves. A stick must be more than a stick before 
it can be made a fetich. The sun must be more than it 
seems before it can be worshiped. Until the feeling of 
the supernatural in general is given, man is on the re- 
ligious level of the brute. The senses of the latter are 
sharp enough, and it experiences, too, the same vicissi- 
tudes of fortune as man, but without religious manifes- 
tations. Some speculators attempt to deduce the belief 
from the phenomena of dreams. They trace the whole 
religious history of the race to the fact that some an- 
cestral savage dreamed, and mistook his dreams for re- 
alities. The idea of the supernatural once afloat, was 
speedily and greedily taken up by the race, and, with 
the exception of a few rare and choice spirits, it has 
been haunted by the notion ever since. This view needs 
no criticism. It assumes that men in general are fools ; 
and there is nothing to do but to return the compliment. 
It is no argument against our view that the perception 
of God is vague, and in itself almost formless. For even 
sense-perception derives its certainty from our inces- 
sant experience. We learn to perceive. A vague sense 
of objectivity is all that is immediate in perception. If 



KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. Bl 

tlie mind should remain as it is, but the sensations on 
which perception depends should be rare, or conditioned 
on character, we should have the same belief about the 
external world which we now have aboat God. There 
would be a general belief in the outer world, but the 
content of the belief would be vague and misty. A 
constant experience is necessary to reduce the vague 
objectivity which is given in sensation to definite order 
and meaning. There would, also, be many skeptics 
demanding. What is this outer world ? Where is it ? 
What is the proof of its existence ? Of course, they 
would denounce the general belief of the race as worth- 
less. Finally, there would be uncertainty whether this 
outer world were an inference or a perception. For 
ourselves, we hold that God himself is the great source 
of the belief in God; yet only in the sense indicated. 
Just as sensation needs reason to interpret and arrange 
it, and w^ithout reason remains chaotic, so the feeling of 
the divine needs reason to interpret it; and without 
reason and conscience, it remains a confused suspicion of 
an object which can be neither escaped nor understood. 
But just as sensation is an absolute condition of percep- 
tion, so this feeling of God is the absolute condition of 
tl 'jistic belief. The reflective reason does not originate 
it, but justifies or rectifies it. The arguments for the- 
ism have never originated the belief, but have only 
aimed to give reasons for the belief already there. 

With regard to individual beliefs on the basis of per- 
sonal experience, there can be no argument; for there 
is no common ground between the believer and the 
doubter. All that the latter can rationally say is, that 



82 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

his experience warrants no such beliefs; and the former 
replies, that his does. Direct perception, whether of 
sense or spirit, can never be mediated, and its grounds 
can never be communicated. The attempt to tell how 
we perceive, always results in simply restating the fact 
of perception. Only experience under similar condi- 
tions can in any way test its truth. When the doubter 
and believer thus come face to face, each will have to 
allow the other his opinion. The former cannot deny 
the experience, and the latter cannot supply the expe- 
rience to another. There is no ground for claiming that 
perceptive power must be equal in all. Some may see 
farther than others; why may not some see more than 
others? On the low plane of sense-perception, great 
diversity of perception would work confusion; yet even 
here it is a question how much of apparent harmony is 
due to a common language, rather than to identity of 
sense-experience. But, in the higher realm of spiritual 
perception, it is not incredible that there should be va- 
rying power, and that such variation should be condi- 
tioned by the moral character of the person. If the 
poet, the mystic, and the Christian affirm a spiritual 
communion with the unseen, only narrowness and con- 
ceit can find any argument against the reality of such 
communion in the fact that others, who do not fulfill the 
conditions, are not conscious of it. Argument is idl( ; 
experience only can truly test such a claim. The only 
demand we can make upon such persons is, that their 
higher experience shall not distort the lower. A mind 
which distorted all the facts of daily life, and all the 
common principles of judgment, would be justly sus- 



KNO WLED GE AND BELIEF. i '^ 

peeled of madness rather than illummation ; but a laind 
which is healthy in its lower perceptions is not to be 
distrusted simply because its higher perceptions tran- 
scend the range of the five senses. When the Christian 
finds that faith in Christ is attended by a growing love 
of righteousness, and by growing power to realize it, 
and when he further finds that a multitude of others 
have the same experience, then he has a right to con- 
clude that he is not deceiving himself, but that he and 
they have come within the range of some mighty spir- 
itual attraction, whose effects are as real and as demon- 
strable as those of gravitation. Why should it be 
thought a thing incredible, he demands, that God 
should raise the dead soul and fill it with himself ?^ 
Speculation cannot give experience, and cannot give the 
matter for thought. There must be reception from 
«ome quarter before thought can begin; and then the 
only function of thought is to work over the raw mate- 
rial. A great fact, therefore, like the consistent expe- 
rience of Christians for many centuries, can be tested 
only by accepting their standing challenge to the world 
to try it and see. As the mind posits the physical 
world upon occasion of sensation, so it may posit a spir- 
itual power on the basis of its spiritual experience. In 
either case the validity of the perception must be tested 
by each for himself, and never by another. The per- 
ception of an infinite personality is in itself no more 
mysterious than the perception of a finite personality. 
We never see one another. The senses never reveal the 
person. The fact of personal communion is so familiar, 
that we lose sight of its mystery; but, on reflection, 



84 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

nothing is more mysterious than the way in which we 
posit persons other than ourselves, and even enter into 
their secret thoughts and sympathies. A touch, a thrill, 
a sound falls upon us, and we say that a person, a spirit 
is speaking to us, and demanding entrance into our 
thought. Experience has no greater mystery. But the 
infinite is nearer than the finite; and it must be solely 
a question of experience whether there may not be as 
intimate and real a communion between the finite and 
the infinite, as between the finite and the finite. We 
doubt the senses, at times, but the coercive power of 
reality soon expels the doubt. We question, also, the 
reality of the spiritual and moral; but here, too, the 
doubt is soon driven off by the experiences of daily life. 
Persistence and power to compel experience, the only 
tests of reality, are present in both cases, though in dif- 
ferent degrees. If it be rational to afiirm the existence 
of the physical world on these grounds, it is equally 
rational to afiirm the existence of a spiritual and moral 
world on the same grounds. The arguments which 
shake our faith in the latter, are equally valid against 
the former. It is for each to determine for himself 
whether the sphere of rational belief and objective re- 
ality is bounded by the five senses, or by the impressions 
upon the senses. 

Our purpose in the preceding paragraphs has been 
complex. One aim has been to suggest questions and 
possibilities, and leave each to deal with them for him- 
self. We have, also, sought to show that the grounds 
of belief are generally complicated, and often incom- 
municable. Nevertheless, the human mind as it is, re- 



KNO WLED GE AND BELIEF. 85 

gards them as justifying belief and action. Frequently 
they are individual and class experiences. In such cases, 
those who have not the experiences must simply sus- 
pend judgment. To claim that their experiences ex- 
haust reality, and that all else is delusion, is insufferable 
insolence. It is the railing of the eyeless against vision. 
Or the grounds of belief may be the great feelings and 
instincts of humanity. We have sought to show that 
in any theory of knowledge which is not purely skep- 
tical, such feelings and instincts as have objective cor- 
relates must be regarded as affording a high probability 
that such objective correlates really exist. They give 
the psychology of the race, and are in many respects 
more trustworthy than the psychology of the individ- 
ual. They eliminate all that is individual and peculiar, 
and express in its purest form the impression which re- 
ality makes upon the mind. Finally, in reply to the 
charge of subjectivity, we have pointed out that all 
theories of life, and mind, and the universe, are and 
must be subjective. Human interests and aim» are the 
raw material of which all theories are built, and the 
standard by which all are judged. Teleology cannot 
be escaped. It only remains that we choose the stand- 
ard which shall bring the greatest peace and dignity 
into life. We must venture beyond knowledge. Let 
the venture be toward the highest. 

What we have next to say is pedagogical rather than 
speculative. Commonplace errors can be met only by 
the repetition of commonplace truths. A romantic 
credulity in the direction of irreligion has led to a 



86 STUDIES IN THEISM. . 

wide-spread notion that all the doctrines of pbysical 
science are absolutely certain. The holders of this 
notion seem never to have heard that positivism and 
agnosticism, both of which agree in limiting science to 
phenomena, and in discarding all theories except as con- 
venient fictions, have never before flourished as they do 
in this century. In this way undue authority is claimed 
for physical speculations, and unjust disparagement is 
cast upon other departments of knowledge. To such an 
extent has this grown, that the bare word science acts 
like an enchantment to disarm criticism; and mental 
quacks perceiving this, hasten to call their nostrums 
science. In this way great injury is done to science it- 
self. Atheists and materialists, in particular, have squat- 
ted on scientific territory to such an extent, that the opin- 
ion has got abroad that science is identical with atheism 
and materialism; and of course the squatters do their 
best to keep up the delusion. Whoever, therefore, feels 
irreligiously inclined, has but to make a picnic party into 
the scientific realm, and pick up a few scientific phrases 
and misunderstood doctrines, and at once his irreligion 
takes rank as science with all kindred spirits. This com- 
bination of credulity and insolence threatens to become 
pathologic, and it certainly has been for a long time a se- 
rious infestation of popular thought and literature. The- 
ism especially suffers injustice from this state of things. 
Speculative and metaphysical doctrines are taken on trust 
when assumed by science, but are combated with won- 
derful acuteness and fervor when assumed by theism. 
It is, then, worth while to point out that the greater part 
of natural science is a matter of belief rather than knowl- 



KNO WL ED GE AND BELIEF. 8 1 

edge, and that the difficulties involved in theism are, at 
least, no greater than those involved in any objective 
science, and even in thought itself. But as the error 
is an exceedingly vulgar one, the refutation must be 
correspondingly commonj)lace. Of course, we do not 
attribute these oversights to all scientists, but only 
to the half -educated, who, unfortunately, are always 
with us. 

All objective science assumes the uniformity of 
nature, both in space and time. The limits of this uni- 
formity are the limits of science. By sheer force of 
repetition many have brought themselves to think such 
uniformity universal and necessary; but, in fact, we 
have to regard it as a happy circumstance. There is 
not the slightest rational ground for affirming that any 
of the laws which we know, excepting, possibly, the laws 
of motion, are not temporary and limited. The laws 
we know may be but a transient function of unknown 
laws, which, like the laws of motion, allow complete 
disorder in the outcome. But allowing the uniformity 
of nature, natural science falls into two parts. There 
are, first, the perceived facts and their orders of co- 
existence and sequence. There is, second, the depart- 
ment of theory and hypothesis, whereby we seek to 
explain the observed facts. If, now, we reckon the 
facts perceived to the realm of knowledge, we must 
1 eckon scientific theories mainly, if not entirely, to the 
realm of belief. In sound science the first thing is the 
facts, and then comes the attempt at rational explana- 
tion. For example, there are sundry peculiar planetary 
phenomena, and the mind says that they become intel- 



88 STUDIES IN THEISM, 

iigible only as we assume that all the planets go around 
the sun. Sundry other phenomena are explamed by 
assuming that the particles of matter attract one anoth- 
er, according to certain laws. Various facts of physics 
and chemistry are accounted for by teaching that mat- 
ter has an atomic and molecular constitution. Optical 
phenomena seem to demand for their comprehension 
the assumption of a new and peculiar kind of matter. 
Now, it is claimed that biological phenomena make it 
necessary to assume a common genealogical origin for 
living things. Such is the nature of all scientific ex- 
planations. The facts to be explained are referred to 
a number of observed or hypothetical causes, which are 
further assumed with just such powers and just such 
" relations as are necessary to account for the facts. But 
it is clear that all these theories are only inferences 
from the facts, and that it must be difficult to reach ab- 
solute certainty. For this whole process assumes, in 
addition to the uniformity of nature, the rationality of 
nature. It assumes not only that an explanation is pos- 
sible, but that a rational explanation is possible. It 
further assumes, that of many consistent explanations, 
that one is true which is most simple and rational. 
But why should an explanation be possible ? least of all, 
why should a rational explanation be possible? But 
even if nature be rational, why should its methods be 
such as we think them? Why may they not be inef- 
fable and even transcendental to any conceptions we 
can form ? Why may not all our theories of the pro- 
duction of phenomena be but the makeshifts of our 
feeble minds, whicli (l'->, indeed, serve some purpose, 



KNO WLED GE AND BELIEF. 8 9 

but which reveal no fact? Such is the doctrine of the 
positivist and agnostic. But allowing all that can be 
claimed for the rationality and openness of nature, it is 
still seldom possible to reach certainty with regard to 
any scientific theory. It is always easy to postulate a 
cause or causes, which, if real, would explain the facts; 
but we can seldom be sure that they were not produced 
in any other way. That a hypothesis fits the facts, is 
far from proving that it corresponds to reality; for the 
hypothesis was made for that very purpose, and the cor- 
respondence ought not to surprise us. The only excep- 
tion to this principle is, where a theory is seen to be not 
only a possible explanation, but also the only one pos- 
sible to reason. In other cases a theory may even be 
susceptible of mathematical expression, and lead to theo- 
retical results which most experiments shall justify, and 
yet be' no fact of nature. Such a one is the emission 
theory of light, or that of electric and magnetic fluids; 
and Mill and Comte insisted that the present ether 
theory is of the same sort. A useful working theory 
may still be unclear in itself; or it may conflict with 
some known facts; or it may introduce more difliculties 
than it resolves, and thus cancel its own reason of ex- 
istence. It is not until a theory devised to account for 
certain facts is found to account for many other facts, 
not included in the original plan, that it acquires even 
a tolerable degree of probability. If a single motion 
were to be accounted for, and we were restricted solely 
to accounting for the motion without regard to any 
other conditions, an indefinite number of solutions 
would be possible. So in nature there are very few 



90 STUDIES IJSr THEISM. 

facts which do not admit of many explanations. Hence 
the theory reached can only result from weighing dif- 
ferent possibilities, and the various arguments for each. 
But thereby the possibility of error is increased so rap- 
idly, that it is never possible to reach any thing higher 
than a rational probability. 

In estimating the claim, often heard, that science is 
infallible and impregnable, it is of first importance to 
distinguish sharply between science as fact, and science 
as theory. The latter is forever shifting; the former 
only abides. It must be added that the practical value 
and utility of science belong entirely to science as fact, 
and not to science as theory. Its power consists, not in 
any insight into causes, but solely in having the law of 
phenomena. Having this, it can read the past, and 
previse the future; and, by arranging the antecedents, 
it can determine the consequents. Given the laws of 
chemical combination, we have all that is practically 
valuable in chemistry. Given the laws of heat or of 
electricity, it is practically indifferent what theory we 
may adopt. Indeed, we should be no worse off without 
any theory. Even in gravitation, the law is every thing 
and the theory is nothing. The law is, that all bodies 
tend to approach one another with an intensity which 
is directly as the masses, and inversely as the squares 
of the distances. It is absolutely indifferent to the as- 
tronomer how this result is produced, whether by uni- 
versal attraction, or by universal repulsion, or by 
universal pressure, or by the impact of some assumed 
ether atoms. The practical astronomer has no call to 
decide for any of these possibilities. His sole business 



KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 91 

is to apply the law, and determine the resulting posi- 
tions and orbits of the heavenly bodies; and as long as 
the law holds, his calculations will be valid, even if wo 
should adopt the theory that every planet is led or 
driven in its orbit by some angel or devil. Had New- 
ton announced only the fact of gravitation, he would 
have said nothing either new or valuable. It is the law 
only which gives the fact significance. This is the 
reason why the notion of gravitation has been so much 
more fruitful than that of affinity or cohesion. We 
have the law in the former case, and can mathematic- 
ally deduce its consequences. In the case of affinity, 
this is impossible at present, and hence the notion re- 
mains barren. In strictness, the law of gravitation 
itself is not known to be exact. All that can be said 
is, that no appreciable error has^ arisen from assuming 
its correctness. But when it comes to an explanation 
of this law, we are once more outside of the realm of 
fact and knowledge, and come again into the realm of 
theory and belief. But here the difficulties are so 
great, that one can hardly help sympathizing with the 
positivist's doctrine, that the function of science is only 
to find the law of phenomena, and never to inquire into 
causes. 

A glance at the actual state of scientific theory justi- 
fies us in excluding it from the realm of knowledge. 
When the attractive theory of matter was accepted, it 
displaced the previous doctrine, that all material action 
is by pressure or impact. Its disciples soon grew so 
enamored of it, that they sometimes declared the notion 
of non-gravitating matter to be unthinkable. The ether 



^ 



92 STUDIES m THEISM. 

theory, however, has given them some light in this di- 
rection, and now they find it easy to conceive the im- 
possible notion. We said in the last paragraph, that 
the law of gravitation does not explain itself, and, ac- 
cordingly, we find the most diverse theories for >is ex- 
planation. It seems clear to us, that universal attraction, 
or universal tendency of every atom toward every other, 
is the best and simplest statement of the physical fact; 
and if any explanation of the fact is to be found, it must 
be in assuming an omnipresent spiritual being. The doc- 
trines of universal repulsion and impact involve many 
auxiliary hypotheses, and their mechanical possibility is 
far from evident. Nevertheless, both doctrines are not 
without advocates. The Cartesian doctrine, that all 
action is by impact, has been revived in Le Sage's the- 
ory, and this, again, has been renewed in the mechan- 
ical theory of gases. In these theories a universal rain 
of atoms is made to account for attraction and repul- 
sion. Sir William Thomson says, that he has no faith 
whatever in atoms endowed with attractive and repul- 
sive forces. Of course, no defender of these views 
denies the law of gravitation; but, while all agree as 
to the law, there is the widest difference as to its ex- 
planation. Whence it becomes clear, thav not even the 
attractive theory of matter can rank higher than a 
rational probability. In chemistry it is still worse. 
There one theory has displaced another, until at present 
there is no theory which has general acceptance, or 
which is at all satisfactory. A few years ago, the 
electro-chemical doctrine was the reigning view, but it 
has fallen into complete disfavor. Since then we have 



KNO WLED GE AND BELIEF. 9 3 

been surfeited with types and radicals, etc.; but it is 
hard to find any agreement among the speculators. 
Our text-books do, indeed, give us the most elabo- 
rate representations of the inner structure of mole- 
cules, but, except as a convenient fiction, the thought- 
ful chemist has little use for them. In Germany, this 
state of the science has led to the proposition to ex- 
clude it from all but the technical schools, on the 
ground of its lack of rational system. Mere heaps of 
facts do not train the reason, as they appeal only to 
memory. 

Geological theory is still less at rest. Whoever has 
read much in geology will doubtless agree with the fol- 
lowing opinion of a German geologist, F. Pfaif, quoted 
by Ulrici: "It is certainly an undeniable and surprising 
fact, that, in spite of the oft-mentioned 'agreement of 
investigators,' not a single geological phenomenon can 
be mentioned which would not be explained in the most 
diverse and contradictory ways. From the form and 
temperature of the earth, to the motions in the earth's 
crust, and the effects of water, which are taking place be- 
fore our eyes, there is not a single geological fact con- 
cerning which the most diverse theories have not been, 
and are not, proposed; but of these theories there are 
none, however well-founded they may seem, whicn have 
not been doubted; and none, however ill-founded, which 
have not been believed."* The great trouble with 
geology is, that many hypotheses are possible, and no 

* Ulrici : Gott iind die Natur, p. 343. For examples of differing 
opinions in geology, sec the second edition of Prof. T. Sterry Huurs 
most instructive work, "Chemical and Geological Essays." 



f^ 



04 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

one is so firmly and necessarily deduced from the facts 
as to exclude the other possibilities. For example, 
none of the plutonic theories has been regarded as 
more firmly established than the doctrine ©f a fluid 
and fiery center of the earth. In particular, volcanic 
phenomena and the increasing heat as we descend into 
the earth, were held to make such a conclusion neces- 
sary. Both points have become very doubtful. The 
Sperenberg borings indicate that the common assump- 
tion of a regular increase of heat as we descend into 
the earth, is a mistake. On the contrary, the results 
pointed to a constant temperature much below the 
melting point of metals. In 1872 Professor Le Conte 
declared that " the whole theory of igneous agencies — 
which is little less than the whole foundation of theo- 
retic geology — must be reconstructed on the basis of a 
solid earth."* We are all familiar with the long peri- 
ods which evolution geologists have been accustomed 
to claim for the most trifling modifications. Having 
eternity at their backs, they did not hesitate to allow 
that only indefinite time would suflice to evolve the 
higher from the lower forms. According to Mr. Dar- 
win, in the first edition of the " Origin of Species," 
(p. 287,) three hundred million years will not suflice 
for a very recent portion of geological history. But 
now the physicists claim, from calculations on the tidal 
wave, the form and internal heat of the earth, and the 
rate of dissipation of heat from the sun, that fifteen 
million years, at the utmost, are all that can be allowed 

* Ks«My on tlio Formation of tlic Fcjituros of tlic Kartli's Crust 
Anicricun Journal of Science for November and December. 



KNOWLEDGE AXD BELIEF. 05 

for geological transformations/^' These conclusions 
have been before the world since 1868, without any 
damaging criticism. In one of his "Lay Sermons,' 
Mr. Huxley attempted a reply, which, in turn, was 
demolished by Sir W. Thomson. In 1876 Professor 
Tait reaffirmed the conclusion in the most emphatic 
manner. Whatever, then, the truth may be, it is plain 
that geological theory is still militant, without any im- 
mediate prospect of being triumphant. But, in case of 
a collision between physics and geology, there can be 
no question as to which is the law-giving science. In- 
deed no geological hypothesis can be viewed as estab- 
lished until it is seen to be a consequence of the laws 
of physics under the assumed conditions. 

No more are the general theories of light, heat, mag- 
netism, and electricity rescued from all doubt and ob- 
scurity. When, some years ago. Professor Tyndall's 
friend asked him if he had not a theory of the universe, 
the professor replied that he had not even a theory of 
magnetism. Whether he is any better furnished since 
he ''prolonged his vision backwards, and discerned in 
matter the promise and potency " of every form of life, 
we cannot say; but it is certain that the most distin- 
guished scientists remain without any theory which they 
regard as having more than a w^orking value. In regard 
to all these subjects, a host of useful facts are known; it 
is the explanation, the rational comprehension, which is 

*0n this point, see Tait: "Recent Advances in Physical Science," 
Lect. YIL Also, two papers by Sir W. Thomson, in the " Transac- 
tions of the Geological Society of Glasgow," for 1868 and 1869, on 
Geological Time and Geological Dynamics. Professor Huxley's ob- 
jections are criticised in the latter paper. 



90 STUDIES IX THEISM. 

wanting. The present state of scientific theory, even in 
the basal, inorganic sciences, is emphatically one of fer- 
mentation, with no signs of a speedy settling. In biol- 
ogy, we have an epoch making discovery every few 
years, and the epoch and the discovery vanish together. 
To hear the biologist speaking of the certainties of bio- 
logical theories, is enough to move the most saturnine to 
mirth, and to fill the humane bystander with compassion. 
The archeologist and ethnologist have long been allowed 
their claim, that disagreement with the Bible does not 
disprove a theory; but there is little hope for solid ad- 
vance, until they grasp the far more difiicult principle, 
that such disagreement alone does not prove a theory. 
There is a growing suspicion that an irreligious tendency 
is not of itself sufiicient to justify a theory. Now, 
whatever the truth may be in the cases mentioned, 
these facts show that the greater part of science is a 
matter of belief only; part of it rational, part of it not 
so rational. One must, then, be always on his guard 
against the imposition which claims for scientific theory 
the certainty which belongs only to scientific fact. It 
is an auspicious omen that scientists are laying unusual 
emphasis upon this distinction. They have been forced 
to do this in self-defense. Reckless and extravagant 
dogmatizers have sought, by sheer force of noise and 
insolent intimidation, to capture science, and to whip 
in scientists to vote as ordered. The reaction which 
has set in is most healthy and prophetic of progress. 

These facts will serve to show the value of a class of 
objections against philosophy and religion which may 



I 



KNO ViLED GE AND BELIEF. 9 7 

all be summed up in the claim, that neither can demon- 
strate its conclusions. At best they can only reach a 
probable result, and thus they must ever stand at a 
great remove from the certainties of science. If we 
grant that philosophy is in this plight, we now see that 
physical science is no better off. A bottomless pit of 
acuteness is found by some writers in the claim that no 
hypothesis can be allowed in science which cannot be 
verified. Hence the hypothesis of a personal and intel- 
ligent First Cause is inadmissible, because it is essen- 
tially un verifiable. There is an air of great logical rigor 
about this canon; but unfortunately it is delusive. 
Before applying this dictum against theism, it may be 
well to point out that its scope is somewhat greater than 
those who use it seem to think. Can the hypothesis of 
evolution be verified? Can the origination of life from 
the lifeless be verified ? Can the ether theory, or the 
atomic theory, or the nebular theory, or the original 
fluidity of the earth, be verified? In truth this objec- 
tion, so far as it is urged against theism, is based on 
pure thoughtlessness. For how is a theory verified? 
If it be such that observation is possible, it is verified 
by observation. But most theories are not susceptible 
of such a test, and here verification takes another form. 
In this case, we reason back from the facts to a sufficient 
cause; and verification consists in showing that only 
tliis theory will meet the conditions of the problem„ 
A¥here such a showing is possible, the theory becomes a 
matter of knowledge. 

The demonstration of by far the greater part of scien- 
tific hypotheses consists simply in showing that the 



98 STUDIES IN rilEISM. 

facts are unintelligible upon any other assumption. 
No one ever saw an atom, and no one ever will. 
But the phenomena of matter are inexplicable except 
upon the atomic theory, and this fact is its onjy proof. 
No one ever saw the ether, but we cannot compre- 
hend heat and light without assuming it. To show 
this, is to verify the theory. No one was present 
when the earth was fluid. We verify such an assump- 
tion only by showing that the present state of the earth 
is incomprehensible without it. The hypothesis of a 
spiritual author of nature is verified in the same way; 
and if it can be shown that the physical uni\erse is un- 
intelligible without this assumption, and that from every 
side we are led down to this ultimate aflirmation, then 
the hypothesis of an intelligent creator has just the 
same kind of verification which the bulk of scientific 
theories have. But it is urged in rebuttal, that phys- 
ical science must explain every thing by physical agents; 
and since an intelligent creator would be non-physical, 
the hypothesis is intrinsically inadmissible. This is 
merely an old saw of the positivists, which has played a 
greater part than is becoming. The aim of science is not 
to explain things in any particular way, but to find the 
truth; and if facts point toward theism, it is the duty of 
all truth seekers to recognize it. The earlier positivists 
urged the same objection against the ether theory. A 
materia] substance without weight, they said, is foreign 
to all our experience of matter, and hence the theory is, 
in its very terms, inadmissible. But the physicist is 
calmly superior to all such suggestions, and endows the 
ether, not with such qualities as the positivist allows, but 



I 



KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 09 

with such as enable hhn to explain the facts. The only 
care necessary in the process is, to make assumptions 
which shall not contradict existing knowledge or one 
another. In short, the notion that science has any other 
aim than to find the truth, whatever it may be, is a 
pestilent heresy. 

Many reasoners upon the philosphy of science seem 
fond of playing the positivist upon occasion. Accord- 
ingly we meet, now and then, with the following pro- 
fundity. They say: What help do we get from any of 
these theories ? We explain light by an ether, but leave 
the ether unexplained. We explain gravity by a grav- 
itating force; chemical affinity by chemical force, etc. 
But, in all these cases, what do we win more than a 
name? Do we get a shadow of insight into the facts 
by any such postulates? And, notably, in what is our 
comprehension of the world increased when we have 
explained it by referring it to God? Is God any less in- 
comprehensible than the world? and, if not, are we not 
once more rolling the world on the tortoise's back, with- 
out in any way finding relief from the necessity of 
standing at last on nothing? But if it must finally come 
to this, why not stop with the first puzzle, the world of 
phenomena, and let the metaphysical elephants and tor- 
toises go ? 

In the mouth of a positivist, this is. intelligible and 
consistent; but, when uttered by any one else, it in- 
volves a complete misunderstanding of scientific method. 
The guiding principle in forming hypotheses is, the law 
of the sufficient reason; and the justification of a theory 
is not to be found in its utility, but in its providing an 

LOf C 



100 STUDIES ly THEISM. 

adequate cause. Hypotheses are commonly only mintal 
supplements by which the mind seeks to render the 
facts intelligible. Their value consists, not in removing 
the mystery of the facts, nor in giving the mind more 
power over the facts, but solely in enabling the mind to 
reconcile the facts with its demand for a sufficient cause. 
We can deduce no valuable practical results from the 
atomic theory; so far as utility is concerned, we are as 
badly off with this theory as with any other. The af- 
firmation of the ether as an objective fact, is valueless 
for optics. The fact that the phenomena of light are 
analogous to wave phenomena in elastic fluids, contains 
all that is necessary for the mathematical development 
of the science. The doctrine of an objectively vibrating 
ether depends solely on the mental demand for a suffi- 
cient cause; it contributes nothing to practical optics. 
The doctrine of the soul in psychology, and of God in 
nature, contributes as much to practical science as the 
bulk of scientific theories, that is, simply nothing. At 
the same time, as necessary to our comprehension of the 
facts, they have the same evidence and value as the bulk 
of physical theories. Finally, the reason for making an 
Hypothesis does not consist in its answering all ques- 
tions. It may involve utterly mysterious and incompre- 
hensible conceptions, and still be none the less necessary. 
The conception of an eternal spirit involves many unan- 
swerable questions; but the conception of eternal matter 
involves, at least, as many more. The question, in either 
case, is not whether the conception is perfectly luminous 
to us, but whether it is demanded by facts ? To play off 
the metaphysical difficulties of all ultimate facts against 



KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. 101 

theism, and take every tiling on trust from atheism, im- 
plies neither mental nor moral insight. 

In truth, all science and all thought are full of what 
the Germans call limit-notions; that is, notions which 
the facts force upon us, and which are perfectly clear 
from the side of the facts, but which from the farther 
side are lost in difficulty and mystery. They express 
an ultimate affirmation along a given line or thought, 
and can never be grasped from the farther side. When 
taken out of their relations, or when we seek to compre- 
hend them without remembering the law of their for- 
mation, nothing is easier than to make them seem con- 
tradictory or absurd. We find such notions even in 
mathematics, in the case of the so-called imaginary quan- 
tities. These appear as the results of entirely rational 
processes, and not a little use is made of them in the 
higher analysis. But they express a limit where our or- 
dinary conceptions of mathematical quantities vanish 
into the unrepresentable. So, also, in the case of the 
infinitesimal calculus. Here we deal with infinites and 
infinitesimals of different orders; so that Avhile a quan- 
tity is infinite or infinitesimal, it may be infinitely less 
or infinitely greater than some other quantity. Now, if 
we cut these notions from their connections, and at- 
tempt to conceive them in themselves, the contradiction 
is palpable; and it will be easy to wax merry over the 
absurdities of the higher analysis.* What, it might be 
asked, is meant by a quantity which is infinitely smaller 

* The statement of these difficulties has been made, once for all, by 
Bishop Berkeley in his papers : " Free Thinking in Mathematics," 
and " Defense of Free Thinking," etc. 



102 STCniES IX THEISM. 

tlian another which is ah'eacly iufinitesimal. The verbal 
diiiieiilty would be equally great if we adopted the New- 
tonian notion of Huxions rather than the Leibnitzian 
notion of inhnitesimals. But if we bear in mind the 
way in which these quantities are formed, or their rela- 
tions to other quantities, there is no difhculty in dealing 
with them with perfect rationality and certainty. 

Even in logic it is not difficult to start questions 
about the theory of reasoning, which admit of no easy 
answer. In physics the notion of the atom is a limit- 
ing notion. It is the unanimous voice of the scien- 
tists, that the atomic theory is supported by all the 
phenomena of matter. Thought itself finds it difficult 
to escape the notion; for if matter be truly composite, 
there must be indivisible ultirnates. The notion of ^ 
a com^Dosite where there is nothing simple, is an out- 
right contradiction. To affirm the infinite divisibility 
of matter is to make the notion of matter an insoluble 
absurdity, like the notion of number without any unit. 
But on the other hand, who understands the atom? 
The metaphysical difficulties connected with it are so 
great, that the moment we lose sight of the facts 
which demand the assumption, we are tempted to aban- 
don it. The ether doctrine is of the same kind. The 
physicists seem to have combined to make the notion 
as contradictory as possible. It must be as non-resist- 
ing as a vacuum, and more solid than steel itself. It 
is at once the plenum and the void. The mode of trans- 
mission is as difficult of conception as the ether itself. 
As long as only a single ray is to be transmitted, we 
can form some tolerable conception of the process; but 



KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF. lOo 

when we remember the actual conditions of the prob- 
lem, clear conception becomes impossible. At any 
given point in our atmosphere an infinite number of 
rays are passing at the same moment, and in opposite 
directions. Moreover, these waves are of different 
lengths, even for light; but if we add the chemical and 
heat waves, the complexity is greatly increased. Now, 
in this case every particle of ether must be vibrating so 
as to forward all these waves of different lengths in all 
directions at the same instant of time. It is hard to 
see why a particle, under such conditions, should move 
at all, because for each impulse in any direction an 
equal and opposite one ought to exist. But if it move, 
and if the plane of its orbit must have a constant incli- 
nation to the direction of the ray, then it would seem 
as if the particle must be describing all the surfaces of 
a series of concentric ellipsoids at the same moment. 
The mathematician is apt to mistake the possibility of 
expressing such a doctrine by a series of equations, for 
a true conception of it; but plainly there is a difference 
between an abstract equation and a geometrical con- 
ception of its meaning. There is no need to further 
complicate the matter by attempting to make the ether 
account for magnetism, electricity, and gravitation. 
How the demands which optics makes upon the ether 
are mechanically possible, is past finding out* Some 
speculators, pressed by these difiiculties, are mclined to 

* We said that the transmission of a single ray is easily conceived, 
but it is well known that the principle of transverse vibrations was 
for a long time regarded as mechanically impossible, and was one of 
the great stumbling-blocks of the theory. See Whewell's "Hist. 
Fnductive Sciences," 3d edit, p. 101. 



104 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

assume one or two extra ethers; but it is really in- 
sufferable that a new ether should be invented when- 
ever a theory begins to limp. It is clear, then, that 
the ether-theory involves many difficulties, and no in- 
telligent holder of it will pretend that it is ultimately 
comprehensible. 

We need only refer to the doctrine of gravitation. 
All the facts seem to call for it; but the bare possi- 
bility of the fact lies beyond all comprehension. That 
the inert clod at our feet should be striving toward 
all other matter in the universe — that it should fill 
space with drawings tow^ard itself — and that, too, with- 
out any consciousness either of itself or of its ob- 
jects, and without any visible or assignable media ol 
connection, is certainly a conception which is not per- 
fectly luminous to an unbesotted intelligence. The ma- 
terialist sometimes swaggers out with the assertion, that 
an eternal mind is so incomprehensible as to be quite 
inadmissible, but it fares no better with his own theory. 
For this demands the conception, not only of eternal 
matter, which is, to say the least, no easier than that 
of an eternal mind, but also the conception of eternal 
conditioned motion, which borders on a contradiction. 
The Spencerian finds the notion of self-existence obscure 
and incomprehensible, and thinks to mend the matter 
by denying self-existence, and affirming only dependent 
existence, which, after all, depends on nothing. In psy- 
chology and physiology also, we come down to similar 
ultimate notions which are forced upon us, but wdiich 
can, in no true sense, be explained or comprehended. 
Such are the notions of space, time, cause, etc., and such 



KNO WLED GE AND BELIEF. 1 05 

is the relation of sensation and consciousness to their 
physical antecedents. This latter question has been one 
of the black beasts of psychology from the beginning. 
To escape it, some have denied the soul, and have only 
increased the mystery. Others have denied the body, 
and have only made matters worse. Body and soul 
coexist and interact, but the method is lost in mystery. 
There is no surer mark of mental weakness than to take 
offense at the difficulties of some ultimate fact, and then 
exchange it for one in every respect more obnoxious to 
intelligence. At the same time, nothing is more com- 
mon. After one has vindicated his acuteness by reject- 
ing a received doctrine, he feels justified in accepting 
any thing. Hence the doubter of Christianity is prone 
to accept the profoundly rational doctrines of spiritual- 
ism, and the denier of theism finds great mental peace 
and satisfaction in atheism and materialism. But this 
is only counterfeit thinking. True reason looks before 
and after. It is never disturbed at the mystery of a 
notion. It asks, first, whether the facts call for it; and, 
second, whether the mystery would be any less on any 
other theory. If the facts do call for it, and if any 
other conception is equally difficult, then reason holds 
fast its beliefs. 

Here, then, is our theory of knowledge. We begin 
with knowledge; but this is confined chiefly to rational 
principles, and the facts of direct perception and con- 
sciousness. These facts, however, are of such a kind 
that the mind cannot entertain them without supple- 
menting them by affirming certain other facts. If the 



106 STUDIES IN THEISM, 

case is of such a kind that the mind sees these other 
facts to be the only ones which will explain the given 
experience, then they, also, may be reckoned as knowl- 
edge. When the facts admit of more than one expla- 
nation, but still favor one more than another, that 
explanation cannot be regarded as knowledge, but as a 
scientific faith. The strength of this faith will vary, 
of course, with the number of possibilities, with the 
strength of the conflicting evidence, and with the dis- 
tance of the conclusion from the premises on which it 
is based. We have, then, a center of knowledge, a 
border of faith, and poured around all, the great ocean 
of the unknown. It is both unnecessary and impossi- 
ble to draw a sharp dividing line between what is 
known and what is believed. This is a question which 
every one must settle for himself. 

Thus it appears that the method is the same for both 
scientific and religious investigation. Both must pro- 
ceed from the known to the unknown, and both, when 
certainty cannot be reached, must content themselves 
with rational probability. Reason does not, indeed, 
give a very strong light, but it is the only light we 
have, and we can lay claim to rationality only as we 
follow it. If we declare its powers limited, reason it- 
self must draw the limit, and declare the limitation 
reasonable. It is not rational to take what we like, 
and cover our inconsistency by appealing to the un- 
knowable. It is not rational, in the failure of knowl- 
edge, to reject probability. It is not rational, when all 
the facts support a given proposition, to reject it be- 
cause we cannot fully comprehend it. Least of all is 



KNO WLED GE AND BELIEF. 1 7 

it rational, when a proposition cannot be strictly demon- 
strated, to conclude that therefore it is certainly false. 
7'his assumption has been so confidently made in athe- 
istic discussions as to call for this disclaimer. Whether 
the divine existence cau be shown to be necessary to 
an understanding of the world, or whether it remains, 
like most of our science, only a rational probability, 
each may decide for himself. We have only sought to 
make clear the principles which must govern such a 
discussion. 
8 



103 STUDIES IN THEISM, 



CHAPTER III. 

POSTULATES OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE. 

rpHE discussion with the skeptic turned upon the 
question : Is knowledge possible? Assuming this 
to be answered in the affirmative, the question next 
arises: How is knowledge possible? This is the great 
question of philosophy. 

To plain common sense, knowing is the simplest thing 
in the world. One lias only to open his eyes, and the 
world stands before him just as it is. The process is so 
simple that no question can be raised about it, except 
by some mole of a thinker who delights to root in the 
dark. But, upon a little reflection, the matter is not so 
simple, and soon it becomes plain that a true knowledge 
of the world can be affirmed only as we make certain, 
definite assumptions about the nature (1) of the world, 
(2) of the mind, and (3) of the relation between the 
two. 

Not every philosophy of mind and nature is con- 
sistent with the possibility of objective knowledge. For 
example, the theory of knowledge held by the material- 
istic evolutionists is fatal to objective science. That 
theory has for its foundation the notion of an unknow- 
able force, which is known, hoivever, to be subject to 
mechanical and necessary laws. In its manifold " dif- 
ferentiations and integrations" it produces various 



POSTULATES OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE. 1 OD 

minds. All these are produced by necessity, and all 
that takes place in them — all thinking, feeling, and will- 
ing — is the necessary product of that only force which 
is the sole reality of the universe. All hnite minds and 
])ersons are but its phenomenal and transitory products. 
There is but one actor and one thinker. But, plainly, 
it is irrational to speak of false and true thoughts in 
such a system; for one thought is just as necessary as 
another, and all alike are the product of the one un- 
knowable. Now, when this unknowable says one thing 
in one mind, and takes it back or contradicts it in an- 
other, we are at a loss to know when to believe it. For 
example, the unknowable, as modified into the Spen- 
cerians, has written long accounts of itself, in which it 
declares the doctrine of mechanical evolution to be true; 
but then the same unknowable, as modified into other 
men, has criticised this doctrine, and emphatically re- 
jected it. In the one place the unknowable gives out 
the doctrine as true; in another place it rejects it as 
the baldest absurdity and falsehood. Or take the feud 
between the scientists and theologians. It is the same 
unknowable which speaks on both sides, and with equal 
necessity in each case; and yet what a different report 
it gives! Or take the opinions of different generations: 
again, it is the same unknowable which has produced 
them all; but how fond it is of variety, and even of 
contradiction! All the absurdities now held, and that 
ever have been held, are its work. Even the antics of 
the fetich worshiper are the doings of this same un- 
knowable. Are there evil and folly in the world ? both 
have an unknowable parentage. And, seeing that the 



110 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

unknowable has changed its mind so often, who knows 
what it may yet do, or that it will finally content itself 
with the evolution philosophy? Now, we cannot speak 
of true and false without the possession of some stand- 
ard, for truth means the agreement with the standard, 
and error means the departure from it. But on thig 
theory the standard cannot be the necessity of truth 
and the non-necessity of error, for A\"e are expressly told 
that all opinions are alike produced by and from neces- 
sity. Truth, then, can be found only by taking a vote. 
If the unknowable says yes, oftener than it says no, we 
may conclude that on the whole it inclines to the af- 
firmative. But, alas for truth in that case! Unfortu- 
nately, even this method is worthless; for as the un- 
knowable is often in error, it might be in error in the 
vote. We hold opinions different from those of our 
ancestors; but they differ from us as much as we 
from them, and by the same necessity. Who shall de- 
cide between us? The unknowable has contradicted 
itself so often, that we can never know when it does 
speak the truth. Indeed, the doctrine is, that it never 
does; for not one of the opinions about itself which it 
has produced is found to have any likeness to reality. 
This seems an absurd and farcical result, but, if the 
theory be true, it must come to this. In short, the 
evolutionist of this type can give no account of error, 
and no valid test of truth. He can properly recognize 
no distinction between truth and error, for all opinions 
are fleeting. The unknowable is forever weaving and 
forever unweaving; and, sooner or later, all things and 
oj^inions pass. Laws and principles flow as well aa 



I 



POSTULATES OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE. 1 1 1 

things. Of course, no science is possible on such a ba- 
sis; but the evolutionist has a ready answer. Uncrit- 
ical common sense has its own view^s, and among these 
are the reality of the finite mind, and the distinction of 
truth and error. When, then, the evolutionist is pressed 
with the skeptical consequences of his own theories, he 
has but to fall back on this unreflecting common sense; 
and when common sense promptly repudiates the con- 
sequences, the evolutionist mistakes the fact for a vin- 
dication of himself. Meanwhile, the philosophical critic 
hardly knows whether to be vexed or charmed at the 
innocence of the procedure. Innocent it certainly is, 
and denotes that the beginnings of philosophical criti- 
cism have yet to be mastered. Every theory of neces- 
sary development which is not based on a free creation 
leads to like skeptical results. The basal power of the 
universe is either rational and self -determining, or it is 
blind and necessitated. In whatever form the latter 
view may be held, it leads to the destruction of knowl- 
edge and science. 

We reach the same skeptical conclusion from another 
point of view. Rational principles in application must 
be above all doubt, if we are to have faith in the con- 
clusions. But the doctrine of the mental evolutionists 
is, that our primal beliefs, as well as all others, are gen- 
erated in us. Apart from experience we know nothing. 
The mind is totally unable to know any thing on its own 
account. All beliefs^ then, fundamental and derived 
alike, represent only the deposit of experience in us. 
In our anxiety to retain faith in objective knowledge, 
it occurs to us to ask whether this experience might not 



112 ' STUDIES IN THEISM, 

have been otherwise, or whether it will always continue 
as it is. Do we know that the universal and abiding 
laws of the universe havfe so revealed themselves in our 
experience, that we are secure against the reversal of all 
our laws of thinking? Are we even sure that there 
are any fixed and universal laws in the system? The 
scanty experience of the whole race is far from proving 
so large a conclusion. Do we know that the cohesions 
among our ideas, which now determine our beliefs, will 
not shift in the future so as to determine us to contra- 
dictory beliefs? The writings of most mental evolu- 
tionists already reveal a strong tendency in this direc- 
tion. Unfortunately, we have no such knowledge. 
If derived from experience, all primary beliefs must 
be doubtful; and yet, as principles of investigation, 
they must be unquestionable. Here is the dilemma of 
the mental evolutionist: he cannot prove his theory 
without assuming the certainty of first principles; and 
as soon as the theory is proved, they become uncertain. 
The way in which this difficulty is escaped, is one of the 
most striking examples of that philosophical innocence 
which is so common in evolutionist circles. An outer 
world is first assumed in intelligible relations, and with 
constant and rational laws, and when we ask for a rea- 
son for the constancy of intellect, we are referred to 
the rational universe. But how do we know that there 
is a constant and rational universe ? We assume that. 
These philosophers have even been known to bluster 
when charged with not providing for the constancy of 
the mental life. It would be a hard-liearted critic, in- 
deed, who would not be disarmed by such childlike sim- 



I 



POSTULA TES OF SCIENTIFIC KNO WEED GE, 113 

plicity. We repeat, that evolution as opposed to free 
creation, cannot be made a fundamental principle with- 
out destroying science. 

The associationalist, also, is in the same dilemma, and 
commonly emerges by the same illegitimate assumption. 
Why do we believe and think about any thing as we 
do? The answer which he gives, when stripped of its 
verbiage, reduces to this: We think and believe as we 
do, because we have become used to it. Habit is at the 
bottom. There is no such thing as necessary truth. 
Two and two may make five; and, if so, they may 
make any thing or nothing. Events need not have a 
cause. We are used to thinking so, and now we can- 
not help it; but, in fact, one thing is just as possible 
as another. There is no rational and no absurd, no 
consistent and no contradictory; but every thing is in- 
differently one or the other, as we have learned to 
think. This doctrine, though commonly held in the 
interests of skepticism, is the extreme of credulity and 
superstition; yet, strangely enough, its holders are the 
most sensitive of all critics to the irrationalities of re- 
ligion. No one has a more vivid intuition, at such 
times, of what can and cannot be than the association- 
alist. Theism, miracles, divine control of nature, and 
divers other doctrines, are pursued by him as with the 
besom of destruction. They are irrational, absurd, im- 
possible; nevertheless, he holds that two and two may 
make five, and that there is no necessary truth. 

A similiar mode of reasoning applies to every ma- 
terialistic theory. In such theories, thought is a prod- 
uct of the brain, just as bile is a product of the liver. 



114 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

But as we never speak of true or false bile, or of true 
or false blood, so we can never, with any sense, speak 
of a true or false brain or of a true or false thought. The 
consistent materialist can know no true or false, no 
high or low. These are ideals of the mind, and have no 
objective existence. For the materialist, the actual is 
all; and the ideal is delusion. He can kni^w only what 
his brain secretes. When it produces true thoughts 
and when false ones, or whether it ever prodaces true 
thoughts, he cannot tell. He may attempt to distin- 
guish between true and false by saying that true 
thoughts result from the normal action of the brain, 
while false ones result from its abnormal action; but 
this distinction will not save him. For normal means, 
according to the standard, and abnormal means, not 
according to the standard; and the materialist has no 
standard. He, like the evolutionist, may attempt to 
reach a standard of normality by taking a vote; but 
this would be especially unfortunate for the materialist. 
For brains are so constructed, that they almost in- 
variably decide that there is a soul, a God, a moral 
government of the universe, and a future life. But as 
the materialist rejects these notions, although held by 
the majority, it is clear that he cannot determine what 
is normal in brain action by appealing to a vote; for in 
that case, we should have to conclude that the material- 
ist has an abnormal and untrustworthy brain. On the 
other hand, it is a rather startling proposition that the 
only normal brains in the world belong to a few ma- 
terialists, who, as a class, have never manifested es- 
pecial power in any direction except that of self-stulti- 



POSTULA TES OF SCIENTIFIC KNO WLED GE. 115 

fication. In that case, it would become a serious 
question ^^hether a normal brain would be an especially 
desirable possession. 

Here Ibe materialist may object that all this pleas- 
antry is quite irrelevant, that he has a standard of 
truth and error, and that it is not determined by any 
vote. This standard is simply results. Those thoughts 
and views are true which work well; and those are 
false which work ill. In a rational system such a 
test would be valid; but the materialist has no such 
system. Moreover, he fails to see that in setting up 
such a standard, he has fallen into the jaws of his 
black beast, teleology. In assuming that the use- 
ful is the true, he either assumes an unexplained har- 
mony between the true and the useful, or else he as- 
sumes that the useful is the only true. The former as- 
sumption entangles us in the doctrine of design; and the 
latter is a complete abandonment of science in order to 
hunt for our own interest. And here again we fall into 
difficulty, for if we allow that the useful is the only true ; 
the question arises, Useful for what? Of course, use- 
ful to promote well-being; but what well-being ? Phys- 
ical, or mental, or moral well-being? It will hardly be 
clain^ed that materialism elevates and enriches the moral 
nature; or that it leads man to think highly either of 
himself or of his kind; or that it leads to social and 
political prosperity. In spite, too, of the materialist's 
" normal brain," the doctrine makes an equally sorry 
show in producing mental power. If, then, we are to 
test its truth by its outcome for well-being, we can hold 
it only by showing that the supreme end of man is to 



116 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

develop a body, and that materialism is especially use- 
ful in promoting the interests of the animal nature. 
The normal brain is that which takes care of itself; 
and the test of truth is self-preservation. Moral aims 
and scientific truth, so far as they have no physical 
value, must be voted not merely worthless, but de- 
lusion; for the test of truth is physical preservation. 
Hence the inhabitant of the sty would be the prince of 
materialistic philosophers ; he is not troubled by delu- 
sions, and he preserves himself. He has, then, the 
deepest truths of the universe. Of course, the mate- 
rialist will indignantly repudiate these conclusions as 
caricatures; but he is more given to repudiating than 
to reasoning. Let him for once forego indignation, 
and give his standard of truth and error, or his test of 
a normal brain. It will be an unusual, but profitable 
subject for reflection. 

Now it is not our purpose to criticise any of the pre- 
ceding doctrines as to their truth and falsehood, but 
only to show that they are fatal to scientific knowl- 
edge. And we think it must be plain, that it is not in- 
different to science what kind of a philosophy we hold. 
On the contrary, the philosophic and anthropologic 
problems concern the very life of science. What is the 
mind, and what is its relation to reality? What is 
truth, and how may it be known? In a skeptical 
time, these questions must be answered before there 
can be any question about science. But language 
allows the formation of such phrases as materialistic 
science and atheistic science; and confusion and inca- 
pacity accept them as representing great facts; Avhere- 



J'OSTULA TES OF SCIENTIFIC KNO WEED GE. 117 

as, they are as contradictory as the phrases square 
circles, wooden irons, etc. The existence of rational 
science is involved in that of the theistic and spiritual 
philosophy. We lay down, then, the following thesis: 
(1) Unless we admit the existence of the mind with an 
outfit of rational principles, and for which principles it 
needs no proof beyond its own power of insight, there 
is no rational science possible; (2) Unless we admit 
that these rational principles are also the laws of re- 
ality, or that reason is law-giving for objective fact, 
again no rational science is possible; (3) Unless we 
allow that the basal fact of the universe is a free and 
rational creator, there is no rational science possible. 

The first part of the thesis needs no further proof. 
The attempt to deduce first principles from experience 
always results, when thought is tolerably clear, in 
dragging all rational knowledge down into ruin. Em- 
piricism cannot deny that two and two may make five, 
although but one empiricist has had the courage to 
avow it. On such a theory not even mathematics can 
be saved; where, then, shall the other sciences appear? 
Since the time of Hume, empirical philosophy has been 
a patent anachronism; and the zeal with which its 
claims have been upheld, clearly disproves the notion 
that thought never goes backward. It was a long time 
before the empiricists understood Hume, and then they 
ignored him. By consequence, the most of our English 
philosophy is in the crude, uncritical state in which 
Locke left it. The method by which they cover up 
their inconsistency has been already referred to. In 
practice they hold the common sense view of reality 



1 1 8 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

and rationality. In polemics, when on the offensive, 
they hold the sensational view; but when pressed with 
the skeptical consequences of their doctrines, and forced 
to act on the defensive, they fall back on common 
sense, and make sundry remarks about the absurdities 
of skepticism. Neither madman nor fool, they say, 
could doubt the testimony of common sense about the 
external world; and thus they think to escape from 
themselves. But plainly what is needed is, not a judg- 
ment about the sanity of the skeptic, but a showing 
that these insane consequences do not necessarily follow 
from the principles of empiricism. Such a showing 
would be relevant, and is sadly needed. To forget that 
the existence of a rational and objective universe is one 
of the great battle-grounds of philosophy, and calmly 
beg the question in the interests of empiricism, is a fact 
which gives an accurate measure of the philosophical 
insight of empiricists. When consequences are insane, 
it does not prove that they do not follow from the 
premises, but rather that the premises are insane also. 
We are persuaded that this simple principle, if fairly 
grasped, would work a revolution in empirical philos- 
ophy. 

The second part of our thesis claims that the laws of 
reality and of rationality must be identical, in order to 
make science possible. This borders on the self-evi- 
dent. The unintelligible cannot be understood. The 
irrational cannot be thought. The astronomer cannot 
allow that two and two may anywhere make any thing 
but four. He cannot allow that the principles of rational 
mechanics can be subverted or dofierl bv nuy luritorial 



POSTULA TES OF SCIENTIFIC KXOWLEDGE. 1 1 9 

reality. He regards those principles as law-giving for 
the heavens. And every-where the scientist assumes 
that whatever rationally flows from any fact of reality 
is as real as that fact itself. The syllogism is sovereign, 
and nothing can withstand its might. The real aim of 
tlie scientist, though often he is not fully conscious of 
it, is to detect the reason in things. He assumes that 
nature is not merely a complex of phenomena; it is 
also a rational system. Nature is concrete reason. In 
brief, every attempt to form a theory of things assumes 
that the world is composed of intelligible elements in in- 
telligible relations. This assumption cannot be escaped 
by any philosophical school whatever. The evolution- 
ist may assume that reality is prior to rationality; but 
at the same time he must allow that rationality is but 
the thought-side of reality, and parallel with it. With- 
out this assumption, our thoughts have only a subject- 
ive validity, and objective science perishes. Without 
allowing the mind an independent insight into ra- 
tionality, it would puzzle the evolutionist to justify his 
assumption of a real and intelligible system of things; 
but we omit to press this difliculty any further, and 
point out that the evolutionist as well as the rationalist 
must assume the identity of the rational and the real. 
His own theory of knowledge ought to prevent any ob- 
jection; for it expressly teaches that the laws of think- 
ing are the results of an adjustment of thought to 
thing which has been going on during the life, not only 
of the human race, but also of the lower forms from 
which we descend. The steady objective laws, which 
the evolutionist assumes without warrant, have pro- 



120 STUDIES IN THEISM 

diiced and reaffirmed the laws of thought during so 
raany aeons that we may now regard their agreement 
with fact as complete. Besides, they have been so 
integrated by heredity that they now appear in us as a 
priori mental forms which we cannot escape. For us, 
then, who inherit the ages, there is a true pre-estab- 
lished harmony between the laws of our thinking, and 
the laws of the external universe. But by a most un- 
accountable inconsistency, most philosophical evolu- 
tionists overlook this implication of their doctrines, and 
take refuge in that suicidal notion of the unknowable. 
Any thing valuable which such thinkers may thereafter 
say, must be regarded as clear gain; just as in mono- 
moria and monomania in general, we rejoice that any 
of the faculties have been left intact. 

This principle of the identity of the rational and the 
real as the postulate of science, is of such importance 
as to warrant us in being unusually tedious in its ex- 
position and illustration. We set off, then, by a some- 
what roundabout way, in the hope of more clearly es- 
tablishing it. 

The activity of the mind in knowing is a principle 
which rational philosophy will never consent to give up. 
It was gained only after centuries of criticism; and the 
failure to grasp it is at the bottom of the chief errors 
both of ancient and modern philosophy. The doctrine 
contains the implicit refutation of empiricism, because 
it shows that experience itself, on which the empii icist 
relies, is impossible without a constructive mental ac- 
tivity. The empiricist's vision rarely enables hlni to 
perceive the mental eknnents which underlie sensc-ey- 



POSTULATES OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE. 121 

perience, and hence the imagination that sense-experi- 
ence can be the source of rational principles. Hence, 
also, the plausibility of the claim; for there is no great 
art in bringing out that which is already in. But know- 
ing is not a passive reception of ready-made knowl- 
edge; it is an active construction and interpretation by 
the mind of its raw material. But owing to the influ- 
ence of habit, this doctrine is not readily recognized. 
It is necessary, therefore, to illustrate it. 

How does knowledge get into the mind? The an- 
swer of unreflecting common sense would be, that a 
picture of the things we see passes into the mind. This 
was the answer of philosophy until the time of Des- 
cartes. Things were supposed to be throwing off im- 
ages of themselves, which entered the eye and ear, and 
thus reached the mind. But now we see that this is a 
mere figure of speech. Things are not throwing off 
pictures which are then transported into the mind, but 
knowledge originates in the mind. When two men 
speak together, no ideas leave the mind of the one and 
ride across the airy waves into the mind of the other. 
The fact is, that upon occasion of certain ideas in the 
mind of the one, certain vibrations are produced in the 
air, and finally in the ear of the other, and that other 
mind then constructs out of itself the corresponding 
thoughts, feeling, etc. But nothing leaves the one 
mind, and nothing enters the other, in any spatial 
sense. The new knowledge is constructed by the 
mind in itself. Or, suppose one writes a letter; except 
in a loose figurative sense, there are no ideas in the 
letter. Ink-scratches on paper are all that is really 



122 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

there. But when the receiver gets the letter, his mind 
will interpret those scratches - back into the ideas and 
feelings they were intended to represent. Here, again, 
we see that it is a mere figure of speech to talk of 
knowledge as going into the mind; in every such case 
the mind creates its ideas from within; and the possi- 
bility of communication plainly depends upon the as- 
sumption that both minds work alike, and that the 
same symbol shall have the same meaning for both. 

In these cases the constructive action of the mind is 
evident. The symbols are totally unlike what the mind 
perceives through them. Now, strange as it may seem, 
all perception, even visual and tactual, depends upon 
a similar mental reading of signs, which have no more 
resemblance to the object perceived than the letters of 
a book have to the ideas conveyed. And just as the 
mind constructs the thoughts and feelings corresponding 
to the words of a letter, so it constructs within itself 
the conception of external objects out of the signs of 
sensation. According to physiology, the immediate and 
only physical antecedent of perception is vibration in 
the brain. The physical raw material of perception 
consists entirely in nerve vibrations of varying rapidity 
and length. The psychological raw material consists 
solely of varying intensities of sensation. This is as near 
to the outer world as the mind ever comes. Let there be 
an external world of things in space and time, and quan- 
titatively and qualitatively different, the only hint the 
mind gets of the fact and of all these distinctions is such 
as varying intensities of sensation can convey. But 
clearly, these bear no more likeness to the external facts 



POSTULATES OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE. 123 

than the mk-scratches on paper have to the ideas they 
represent. Yet this formless stuff is all that the mind 
has to work upon, and out of it it builds and projects its 
knowledge. It has no copy by which to go, and no law 
but its (»wn. As letters and sounds are symbols of 
thoughts unlike themselves, so sensations are the symbols 
of things unlike tJiemselves; and as letters and sounds 
demand a constructive action of the mind before the 
thought can be reached, so the symbols of sensation 
demand a constructive action of the mind before things 
can be perceived at all. Thought does not exist in the 
alphabet, but in the mind which uses it and assigns 
it a meaning. No more does the outer world exist in 
sensations, which are the alphabet of realities beyond 
them; it exists only for the m'nd which, through sensa- 
tions, discerns or affirms a world of reality beyond them. 
Perception proper does not exist at all until the raw 
material of sensation has been differentiated, and inter- 
preted, and systematized. But the principles of inter- 
pretation and differentiation must be in the mind itself. 
If the language faculty be wanting, language must be 
forever meaningless. Or, even if we lack only the law 
of the given language, it is a sealed book unto us. If, 
then, the mind have no principles of interpretation in it- 
self, it can never get beyond the plane of sensation, and 
attain unto perception and cognition. But it has its 
own principles of interpretation. The law of causation 
enables it to refer the sensations to an external reality 
of some sort. Thus the distinction of subject and object 
is founded, and also that of cause and effect. The law 

of identity, together with the law of causation, gives rise 
9 



124 STUDIES m THEISM, 

to the distinction of number in objects. The principle 
of being, or substance, produces the distinction of sub- 
stance and attribute. The principle of space enables 
the mind to arrange things as here and there. The 
principle of time underlies their arrangement, as now 
and then. The principle of quantity permits the dis- 
tinction of more and less; that of quality allows the dis- 
tinction of kind. None of these distinctions are found 
in the sensations, but are brought into them by the 
mind as principles of interpretation. This does not 
deny that they may also be objectively real; but pri- 
marily they are forms of our knowing, and are carried 
into things rather than found in them. Our concep- 
tions of things, with all their manifold distinctions of 
cause and effect, substance and attribute, space and 
time, quantity and quality, are but the forms which the 
mind builds up out of the raw material of sensatjot^, 
and when these conceptioiis are objectified they stand 
to us for the external world. As our perception of 
another's thought is simply our own thought attrib 
uted to him, so our perception of the external world 
is simply our conceptions objectified. This is so strict- 
ly the case, that if we suppose the external world to 
fall away, and the present orders of sensation to be 
maintained by an omnipresent spirit or otherwise, there 
is not the slightest ground for thinking that we should 
become aware of the change. Or, if we assume a mind 
working under the same laws as our minds, whi(*h 
should never come in contact with things, but in which 
.the same order of sensations should be maintained as 
in us, again there is no ground for assuming that the 



POSTULATES OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE. 125 

world would not appear to him as it does to us. In 
the perception of familiar objects this constructive 
action is overlooked, but it becomes prominent, even 
to the unreflecting, when the object is unfamiliar, or 
vague, or at a distance. Tlie true heavens are not seen 
by the eye, they are aftirmed by the mind. For un- 
aided sense-perception, the heavens are only a low arch 
studded with points of light; but reason, reflecting u]>on 
the facts, posits infinite space, and fills it with worlds 
and suns. Here the mind posits or afiirms its object; 
and the same is true even for the most familiar objects. 
So far as they exist for the mind, they are posited by 
the mind. And here is a fathomless mystery. The 
stirrings of sensation within the mind, arouse it to build 
up conceptions of things and persons, and to objectify 
these conceptions, or to afiirm them, as objective real- 
ities. How this can be we know not, and yet we are 
forced to admit both that the object thus aflirmed 
really exists, and also that to perceive the object, the 
mind must construct the object within itself. Now, 
throughout this process, the mind is speaking its own 
language. This does not, indeed, hinder that it may 
also be speaking the language of things; but what we 
wish to emphasize is, that all perception is a mental 
activity, according to certain subjective forms and laws, 
and that these ai*e primarily forms of thought, and not 
of things. On account of this mechanism of knowledge 
some have denied that our conceptions can ever'^be 
known to correspond to reality. We have discussed 
this question in the chapter on skepticism. Here we 
point out, that if our objectified conceptions do repre- 



1 20 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

sent things as they are, it can be only as the forms of 
nature and the forms of thought are identical. That 
mind speaking its own language, and working accord- 
ing to its own laws, should agree with things which 
also speak their own language and have theii own laws^ 
is forever inexplicable without the assumption that na- 
ture is only thought realized in objective fact. Hence 
not science alone, but even the simple perception of 
things as they are is impossible, except as nature is cast 
in the mold of thought. We conclude, then, that what- 
ever will speak to man, whether it be nature or God, 
must come into the forms of human thought if com- 
munication is to be possible. 

It may be worth while to attempt another proof of 
this proposition. The nature of knowledge itself ne- 
cessitates it; for all knowledge depends upon distinc- 
tion. An object exists for the mind only as it is dis- 
tinguished from other objects. We see things by the 
differences of light and shade. In unbroken light we 
should see no more than we do in perfect darkness. 
Always to have the same sensation is equivalent to hav- 
ing none. There will be, indeed, a difference for the 
organism, but none for the mind. Hence we never 
perceive the air until it moves. We are unconscious of 
the pressure of our clothing, so long as it is easy and 
constant. The foul atmosphere of a room is not per- 
ceived by the inmates. The organic conditions of sen- 
sation may be fulfilled, but the perception can only take 
place through difference; and this is lacking. The in- 
distinguishable or indiscriminable does not exist fc^r 
thought. The object must be distinguished from the 



POSTULATES OF SCIENTIFIC KXOWLEDGE. 127 

subject, and from other objects, before it can be proper- 
ly perceived; or rather, perception consists in this proc- 
ess of distinction. But distinction is impossible with- 
out comparison. A thing cannot be known as either 
like or unlike another, unless it be compared wath it. 
But both comparison and distinction assumes norms, or 
points, of comparison and distinction. If a thing be 
like another, it must be like it ii;i some point, in form, 
or in position, or in quantity, or in quality, etc. If there 
are no common elements in things, they are neither like 
nor unlike, but incommensurable; and each would be 
the negation of every other. In truth, absolute unlike- 
ness can exist only between being and the void. This 
differentiating action of the mind is not consciously 
recognized in the simpler activities of the mind, but it 
becomes very prominent in the higher operations of in- 
telligence. But as a law of the mental constitution, it 
underlies the lowest forms of the mental life. We have 
seen that not even sensation can exist for the mind, or 
be recognized by it as a mental object, without being 
discriminated from its surroundings, and from the mind 
itself. Thus, we see, that there are norms of distinc- 
tion in the mind which are prior to all sense-experience, 
and which constitute the only possibility of sense-expe- 
rience. The associationalist makes the association of 
ideas the deepest fact of the mind; and fails to see that 
we must have ideas before they can associate, and that 
we cannot have ideas without the differentiating and 
constructive action of the mind. The ideas to which he 
appeals are, themselves, mental constructions; and the 
sense-experience on which he builds is composed of ra- 



128 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

tioiial factors. Mental activity begins back even of 
conscious sensation itself; mnch more does it underlie 
our sense-perceptions. To offer, then, to construct phi- 
losophy on the basis of sense-perception, with the aim 
of excluding all rational elements, is the Rip- Van- Win 
kleism of speculation. If the associationalist object 
that this activity does not appear in consciousness, we 
reply: (1) That which underlies and conditions con- 
sciousness, can only be reached by reasoning from the 
nature of consciousness; and (2) the wonderful, pro- 
cesses of association upon which the objector builds, are 
equally below consciousness, and, in addition, are not 
very cogently inferred from the facts. However, not 
to lose ourselves in the depths, we shall not attempt any 
list of these norms of the mental activity, or categories 
of thought, as they may also be called. Whoever 
wishes to see the fullest and best development of the 
form of Kantianism which we are supporting, should 
consult Professor TJlrici's Logik^ which, unfortunately, 
has not yet been translated. It is sufficient for our pur- 
pose to refer the notions of cause and effect, of being 
and attribute, of dependence and independence, of space 
and time, of quantity and quality, as examples of such 
norms. These are not objects of perception; they are, 
originally, principles of knowing. They are the norms 
of distinction by which the mind proceeds in transform- 
ing sensation into knowledge. Sensation does not bring 
them into the mind; but the mind brings them into 
sensation. 

This view receives a negative support from all con- 
sistent empiricism; for the consistent empiricist, from 



F OS TULA 7'ES OF S CIENTIFIC KKO WLED GE. 1 2 9 

Hume to J. S. Mill, lias admitted the impossibility 
of getting them from sensation. Hence, Hume denied 
the reality of substance, or being, and made the law of 
causation a delusion. J. S. Mill follows in his wake. 
Substance is not given in sensation; and hence Mill denies 
substantial being. All that he will allow matter to be, 
is a "permanent possibility of sensation," which is only 
an ingenious phrase for concealing the difficulty from 
both himself and his readers. Mind, in like manner, is 
reduced to a succession of feelings without substantial 
support. The same difficulty appears in his theory of 
predication. Since matter is only a bundle of qualities, 
the categorical judgment becomes the absurdity of af- 
firming one quality of another. For example, gold is 
yellow; but gold is only a name for the sum of certain 
qualities of weight, density, malleability, color, etc.; 
and the judgment becomes : certain qualities of weight 
density, etc., are yellow. But this is absurd; and hence, 
we must change the simplest forms of logic, and say 
that certain qualities belong together, though for the 
sake of good sense and the conventions of language, we 
may always use the old form. But this belonging to- 
gether is a treacherous phrase. It indicates a kind of 
inner connection which secures the thing from breaking 
up and vanishing. We must, then, guard ourselves 
against this delusion by saying that the judgment, gold 
is yellow, only means that, in our experience, certain 
qualities, of whicli yellow is one, have always been 
found together. The empiricist can adopt no other 
theory of predication; but, unfortunately, common sense 
protests that it cannot even understand what is meant 



130 S TUDTES IX THEISM. 

by qualities which are qualities of nothing. Space, too, 
cannot be found in sensation, and Mr. Mill, in obedi- 
ence to his philosophy, aims to explain it away. Cau- 
sation and dependence are also denied, and reduced to 
temporal sequence. In short. Mill was too clear-sighted 
to fancy that the categories, as objective facts, can ever 
be won from experience; his whole strength was devot- 
ed to explaining them away. To do this, he was forced, 
first, to twist the categories out of all likeness to them- 
selves; and, second, to attribute to association utterly 
imaginary powers. That consciousness itself depends 
on an application of the categories seems never to have 
occurred to him. Finally, the outcome of his philoso- 
phy was nihilism, and the denial of rationality. 

It might occur to common sense that the existence of 
things as different must result in our seeing them as 
different; but this notion disappears upon reflection. 
Even the simple differences of quantity and quality de- 
pend for their perception upon different effects in us. 
If the mind were such that it did not react differently 
upon different impressions, the most highly differenti- 
ated world would be perceived only as dead uniformity. 
Such is the world of molecular motion in things about 
us. The most complex and wonderful activity is going 
on in the clod at our feet, but we fail to perceive it be- 
cause it does not impress us strongly enough to arouse 
the soul to reaction. The waves of light may make 
melody, and the morning stars may still sing together, 
but we hear them not. Hence if the categories existed 
in things as the universal predicates of all being, they 
could never be reached by the mind unless they also ox- 



rOSTULA TES OF SCIENTIFIC KXO WLED GE. 1 3 1 

isted in the mind; for without that complex qualitative 
nature which enables the mind to react differently upon 
its impressions, and distinguish subject from object, sub- 
stance from attribute, cause from effect, quantity from 
quality, space from time, etc., the world of differences 
w^ould go unrecognized. The categories may be in 
things, but primarily they are in the mind, and repre- 
sent the norms of those basal differentiations by which 
the mind attains to consciousness and knowledge. 

This, then, is the point to which we come: In opposi- 
tion to empiricism we hold that knowing is not a pas- 
sive reception of impressions, but an active construction 
of them into rational system. Below perception, and be- 
low conscious sensation, there is an activity by which 
the mind prepares its objects for knowledge. This 
activity is fundamentally one of distinction, or differ- 
entiation. As such it must have norms of distinction. 
These are the fundamental ideas of the mind. As such 
they are to us the interpreters of the universe. The 
symbols of sensation acquire meaning only as they fall 
into these mental molds. That they inhere in the na- 
ture of the mind as the laws of its procedure is proved, 
first, by an analysis of knowledge and consciousness, 
and, second, by the failure of empiricism to account for 
them without either denying them or begging the ques- 
tion. By their use the mind constructs from the form- 
less material of sensation a thought of the external uni- 
verse, and this thought is as near to the outer world as 
the mind ever comes. As our perception of another's 
thought or feeling is our own thought or feeling attrib- 
uted to him, so our perception of the external world is 



1«'32 STUIJIES IN THEISM. 

solely our conception of it objectified under the mental 
forms of being and attribute, cause and effect, space 
and time, etc. If now we assume that our thought 
truly represents things, and otherwise our science is de- 
lusion, we must admit that the forms of thought are 
also the forms of reality, that things are but thoughts 
made substantial, and that thoughts are the ideal f(»rms 
of things. A true and comprehensive thought of a 
thing differs from the thing in nothing but in substan- 
tiality. But whatever flows rationally from the thought 
must also flow from the thing. For example, the phys- 
icist regards the physical universe as subject only to 
mechanical laws. In that case the material system is 
nothing but crystallized mathematics, and the laws of 
mechanics are law-giving for the universe. What cal- 
culation demands, we expect reality to fulfill. We 
constantly overlook this wonder. The mind spins a 
system of abstract and impalj)able relations; and they 
prove strong enough to bind with invincible bonds tlio 
whole system of physical reality. They are airy crea- 
tions of the mind, and yet they are the chief instru- 
ments of science. How mathematical conceptions can 
be set in reality so as to be its inmost law, involves 
the mystery of creation; but the physical system is 
such a realization. And, in general, the entire sys- 
tem of material reality, so far as intelligible and a 
subject of science, must be regarded as crystallized 
mind. Its laws are the laws of thought; its forms 
are the forms of thought; and if there be any reason 
for viewing it as dependent, we must regard the pow- 
er which realized it as one proceeding according to 



J 



POSTULATES OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE. 133 

the norms of intelligence; so that the categories by 
which we comprehend the world are the rules by which 
it was originally realized. But as the categories are 
primarily norms of mental action and manifestation, 
and since the physical universe is but these categories 
realized, there is good reason for believing that the sim- 
ple existence and knowability of the world points to a 
rational power which is realizing rational principles in it. 
At all events, the facts are opaque and unintelligible on 
any other assumption. The mental evolutionist may 
object that the mental laws are accounted for by our 
experience of the outer world; but (1) he forgets that 
the mental laws and forms antedate and condition all 
experience; (2) he assumes without warrant a rational 
objective world; and (3) he assumes that the physical 
system is ultimate. If he will reflect upon the first 
point, and prove the two assumptions before further 
theorizing, it will be of value to himself, and a relief to 
his readers. The materialist may, also, bring up objec- 
tions, but we have seen that his system destroys all 
knowledge, and we are arguing only on the assumed 
possibility of science. But allowing this theistic argu- 
ment to pass for what it is worth, we are content with 
having shown, (1) that knowing is an active process, 
and (2) that the possibility of objective science depends 
on the assumption of perfect parallelism between the 
rational and the real, between mind working according 
to its laws and things working according to their laws. 
Here a scruple may arise which it is well to notice in 
passing. If the real is rational, and if the reason is 
law-giving for reality, what need is there for induction 



134 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

and observation? And, on the other hand, have not 
a priori deductions been the bane and disgrace of sci- 
ence? This objection rests upon an illegitimate con- 
version of our proposition. Science must always hold 
that the real is rational, but it does not follow that the 
rational is always real. The confusion of these propo- 
sitions has been a fruitful source of mistake with ideal- 
istic philosophers. Accordingly, many purely formal 
systems have been built up, and, because they were log- 
ically consistent, they were viewed as objectively valid. 
The error, however, was not in the principle, but in its 
application. In order that the development of thought 
should correspond to the development of fact, the 
thought must accurately comprehend the fact. If the 
two have any parallax, there will be discord in the re- 
sults. Now we human beings, who dwell apart from 
the center, and not at the root of things, are seldom able 
to get so accurate a conception. Rational mechanics is 
the only realm where our thought fully grasps the fact, 
and there we do regard the development of thought as 
equivalent to that of fact. What the equations call for, 
the flying planet must fulfill. And the theist cannot 
doubt that there is a stand-point, though perhaps the 
Creator only can reach it, whence the entire physical 
universe might be seen to unfold with logical necessity 
from the basal idea upon which it is built. Even the 
mathematician is impatient of the sciences of observa- 
tion, and dreams of the possibility of so comprehend- 
ing the physical system, in a vast series of differential 
equations, that we might read its entire history from 
eternity to eternity. But we cannot grasp the all con- 



P OS TULA TES OF SCIENTIFIC KNO WLED GE. 1 ^ 5 

dltioning thonglitj and our insight even into tilings 
about us is small. Hence the need of observation and 
experiment. Moreover, the laws of reason, as the 
frame-work of all intelligible systems, do not account for 
the peculiarities of any system. They merely secure 
intellectual sequence and consistency. To distinguish 
between many systems, all equally consistent with the 
laws of thought, we must rise to the notion of purpose. 
Either we must give up all hope of understanding the 
system, or we must appeal to teleology. In this case, 
purpose would be the determining principle of the sys- 
tem, and the logic of reality could be fully understood 
only through the end at which it aims. But both the 
end and the means are largely hidden from our sight; 
and hence, while affirming the rationality of the real, 
we must still allow that induction will always have to 
assist deduction in dealing with objective fact. Hegel's 
immortal merit consists in his thorough-going identifi- 
cation of the real and the rational in the sense in which 
we have explained it. The rock on which he split was 
oversight of the weakness of the human mind, and the 
resulting attempt to give it the position of the absolute 
reason. 

Another scruple may also be noticed. It will occur 
to many that it is a matter of no significance that things 
should exist in rational relations, and obey rational laws, 
because these relations and laws are necessary principles 
of all existence. They are metaj)hysical necessities, 
and hence point to no reason in which they exist as 
modes of manifestation. To uncritical common sense this 
position seems self-evident truth; to reflective thought 



136 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

it is palpably false. For we know nothing of onto- 
logical necessity; we know only rational necessity. To 
take the simplest mental notions, space and time are not 
metaphysical necessities, but mental principles. They 
are never objects, but forms of arrangement. Hence, 
also, mathematics affirms no ontological necessities; it 
is only the science of these rational principles. Wo 
cannot affirm the objective validity even of these sim- 
plest principles without identifying the rational and the 
real. It is utterly absurd to ask what would be true for 
the real, if it be allowed to be irrational. Such a real 
would know no law, no necessity, and would admit of 
no interpretation and prevision. Hence we can never 
affirm an ontological necessity except as reason is law- 
giving for being. This, however, does not favor agnos- 
ticism, for the affirmation of being without relation to 
thought is an utterly thoughtless performance. Ag- 
nosticism rests upon the amazing notion that a rational 
experience, or a world composed of rational elements, 
justifies the assumption that fundamental being is with- 
out any essential relation to reason; whereas, in truth, 
no being can be rationally affirmed whose essence and 
law are any thing but reason. 

Thus far we have used rational as meaning harmony 
with the laws and forms of thought which condition all 
mental action. But rationality, in this sense alone, is 
not sufficient to make science possible. Nature might 
be crystalline in its elements, and the outcome might 
still be unmtelligible. The laws of motion and the 
principles of mechanics find as absolute illustration in 



POSTULATES OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE. 137 

the whirling leaf or rushmg torrent as they do in the 
motion of the planet, but, owing to the complicated con- 
ditions in the former cases, we are wholly unable to trace 
them. It is, therefore, quite conceivable that with per- 
fect rationality in the elements, the outcome should be 
without assignable order. There must be a certain ar- 
rangement of the constants of nature so as to produce 
an intelligible phenomenal order. Hence, in our scien- 
tific investigations we must further postulate (1) a cer- 
tain openness or fairness in nature, and (2) its ration- 
ality in the higher sense of the fit adaptation of means 
to ends. With regard to the first point, it is plain that 
in our study of things we are confined to surface indica- 
tions; and, without the assumption of truthfulness on the 
part of nature, we are hopelessly adrift. It is quite 
conceivable that wheat should be mimicked by poisonous 
plants, which should be known as such only by their 
effects. It is equally conceivable that nature should be 
just as tricky throughout — that here, as well as in so- 
ciety, appearances should be deceiving. In that case, 
the apparent uniformities of nature would be all mis- 
leading, and a mental existence would be impossible. 
The openness of nature is as necessary a postulate of 
science as the uniformity of nature. We find the as- 
sumpiioi, every-where. For example, the theory of 
desoen , I?* based upon sundry resemblances of the ani- 
mal kingdom. Of their production we have no direct 
knowledge, but they are assumed to point lu a common 
genealogy. The pointing in this case is not very clear, 
for the possibility of arranging species in ascending se- 
ries no more points to such common origin than the 



1 3 8 STUDIES m THEISM. 

possibility of arranging chemical combinations, or crys- 
tals, or equations in systems of growing complexity, 
proves genealogical relations. The only fact patent in 
these cases is the rational order. But, allowing the ar- 
gument for descent, it is plain that it assumes, to an 
almost extravagant extent, the truthfulness of nature. 
Who knows the resources of reality? Who knows that 
birth is the only means of producing resemblance? Is 
not birth in thought infinitely more potent in this direc- 
tion than physical generation? Moreover, if descent is 
to account for the likeness, what shall account for the 
difference ? If the scanty likeness point to a common 
genealogy, much more should the striking unlikeness 
point to diverse origins. But, letting the argument on 
either side pass for what it is worth, it is clear that our 
science must assume, not only the rationality of being, 
but also a certain ethical condescension of nature to the 
weakness and wants of the human mind. The skeptic 
may deny the objective validity of this postulate; but 
it cannot be dispensed with if we are to have faith in 
science. 

Our second point was, that rationality, in the sense of 
a fit and exact adaptation of means to ends, is a nec- 
essary assumption of science. This follows directly 
from the character of all scientific hypotheses. All 
these are formed, as we have seen, by postulating an 
agent, or set of agents, with just such powers and in 
just such relations that they shall be exactly adapted to 
produce the facts. From this point of view, the whole 
of scientific theory appears as a gigantic teleological 



POSTULA TES OF SCIENTTFIC KNO WLED GE. 139 

const met ion. Every seientifie hypothesis is so inter- 
locked with every otlier, that the assumed agents are 
< exactly fitted to produce what they do, and nothing else. 
And this is no meaningless claim, for the actual harmony 
of the world is won from the conflict of the most gigantic 
forces; but these are so nicely adapted to one another 
that they maintain the universal order. Tlie four 
chemical elements which enter into organic life are the 
chief disturbers of the universe. Oxygen is the parent 
of fire; hydrogen is the most inflammable substance 
known; carbon is doomed to burning; and nitrogen is 
the base of gunpowder and nitro-glycerine. Yet these 
are so nicely balanced that the organic world results, 
and no hint is given of the tremendous forces which 
build up the organism. Were their combining power 
varied a little, either life would be impossible, from the 
too great stability of their compounds, or the earth 
would be rocked and shattered by their incessant and 
tremendous explosions. A glance into the realm of sci- 
entific theory reveals to u^ a multitude of agents whose 
unrestrained action would plunge the system into chaos; 
but which are so adjusted to one another that order and 
harmony results. To this it will be objected, that if 
a thing does any work, it must, of course, be fitted to do 
it. If, then, the atoms and the ether are the substantial 
realities of the physical system, and produce the phe- 
nomenal order, they must, by hypothesis, be able to pro- 
duce it; but that does not prove that they were intended 
to produce it. This may be true, but it misses the 
point. The present question is, not how this adaptation 

has been produced; we insist only upon its existence as 
10 



140 STUDIES IN THEJSM. 

a necessity of scientific construction. In short, all must 
allow that the universe is constructed, from beginning 
to end, on just those rational principles, and with just 
those adaptations and harmonies which mind would have 
employed if it had intended to realize the present order 
with the present agents. One may claim that the end 
is not worth realizing, or that it might have been real- 
ized in some better way; but no one can deny that if 
the present order were to be realized by similar agents, 
only the profoundest adaptation of means to ends would 
make such realization possible. Universal adaptation of 
means to ends, therefore, if not by a rational being, at 
least such as a rational being would make if he proposed 
to realize tlie present order with similar agents, is an 
absolute postulate of science. For scientific theory is 
simply teleology read backward. Teleology conceives 
the end and adapts the agents; science starts from the 
end and reasons back to the adapted agents; but the 
adaptation in the agents is identical in each case. 

But we must advance still further. The universe 
works together with nicest balance and adaptation to 
produce any effect; but it may be claimed that science 
need only regard the effect as a rational result of its 
antecedents, and never as an end for whose realization 
things are working. In the daily detail of science, it is 
quite possible to leave the purpose of things out of 
sight; but science, as a whole, must assume the univer- 
sality of the principle of final cause. The reality of 
final cause in nature is a necessity of theoretical science, 
not merely as a conclusion from the facts, but as an 
a priori postulale. Final causality is the causality of 



POSTULA TES OF SCIENTIFJC KNO WLEDGE. I 4 1 

will. It is self-conscious power moving toward a pre- 
conceived goal. Now we must conceive the basal 
power of the universe as either intelligent or non-intel- 
ligent. In the former case, final causality is the basal 
causality of nature, and the principle of final cause is 
the determining principle of the universe. In the lat- 
ter case we fall back into the skeptical difficulties men- 
tioned in the beginning of the chapter. Apart, then, 
from all scrutable purpose in nature, science is theoret- 
ically impossible without assuming that all action in 
the universe is for an end. This is what President 
Porter means by declaring the reality of final cause to 
be an intuition; a doctrine which has been largely mis- 
understood, and still more extensively not understood 
at all. American and English thought has been so ac- 
customed to the argument from design, that when one 
declares the principle of final cause to be an a priori 
necessity of science, he is almost sure to be misunder- 
stood. And this assumption, that natural effects are 
also ends, constantly manifests itself in our theories 
and criticisms. If a theory, even in the inorganic sci- 
ences, is found to be clumsy and stupid, it is rejected 
without hesitation. But why should not nature be 
clumsy ? The pessimists assure us that the world works 
so ill, that it must be viewed as a failure; why should 
it not play the blockhead in physics, as well as in soci- 
ology ? One great argument against the separate crea- 
tion of species is, that it seems an awkward w^ay of 
realizing the end. And one great argument for evolu- 
tion is, that it will enable us to think more highly of 
the creative wisdom. But none of these criticisms are 



142 STUDIES IN THEISM, 

of any value, unless we assume (1) that the results 
reached are more than effects, but are ends also; and 
(2) that the manner in which these ends are reached, is 
the measure of some creative wisdom. For atheism, 
the actual is all. There is nothing high nor low, noth- 
ing wise nor unwise, nothing benevolent nor malignant, 
nothing good nor bad, in nature. All these words im- 
l^ly some standard of reference, and that must always 
be teleological. We cannot criticise at all without as- 
suming some end for whose realization things exist; 
and we cannot allow any inherent clumsiness and stu- 
pidity in nature without setting all scientific theory 
adrift. Every scientist must implicitly assume that the 
wisdom, insight, and rationality of the cosmos surpass 
ours, and that we can hope only to learn, never to 
teach. When we come to the organic sciences, the no- 
tion of an end which conditions the means, becomes the 
guiding principle, both of investigation and of criticism. 
Every organ is looked upon as existing to perform cer- 
tain functions, and all description and all criticism de- 
pends upon reference to that function as the final cause 
of the organ. An eye that did not see, would be called 
imperfect. But why imperfect? The word has no 
meaning, except as we assume that the end of eyes is 
vision. The same is true of any other organ, or of 
the entire organism; it can be neither described nor 
criticised without assuming an end for which it exi.sts. 
E^^en those who are most careful to refrain from attrib- 
uting any purpose to nature, hasten, after recording 
their protest, to make the freest use of teleological 
notions and language. To deny that these notions have 



POSTULATES OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE. 1 43 

objective validity, is to declare the biological sciences 
impossible, except as a series of observations. For we 
know almost nothing of the causes which produce the 
organism, and it is not probable that we ever shall 
know much. We know what purpose the eye, the ear, 
the b^ood, the reproductive organs, etc., serve; but we 
have not the slightest insight into the mode of their 
production. We know, too, that this purpose contains 
the ground why the organs should be as they are; so 
that, even while we deny a mind w^hich conceived these 
ends, we have still to assume them in order to make 
investigation possible. And every-where this necessity 
appears. We speak of the members of a species as 
perfect or imperfect specimens. But this language, 
again, acquires meaning only from the assumption that 
there are certain forms and functions which every mem- 
ber of the species ought to reach. Now however these 
ends may have been brought about, it is impossible to 
deny their existence as facts which condition both sci- 
entific investigation and the organs which realize the 
ends. Had there been no such end as vision, the eye 
would never have been as it is. Hearing, as an end, 
has conditioned the structure of the ear. Motion and 
sensation, as ends, have conditioned the structure and 
disposition of the muscular and nervous systems. No 
matter how this conditioning has taken place, the fact 
•is unquestionable, and the organs can be understood 
only in the light of their functions. Some claim that 
there was no foresight of ends ; but, pressed by the 
difficulties of any mechanical explanation, they take 
refuge in the notion of an unconscious intellieience 



.^ 



144 STUDIES m THEISM. 

which does every thing with infinite wisdom, but with- 
out consciousness. Others hold that an end, as such, has 
only an ideal existence, and, therefore, can condition 
the means only as it exists in a prearranging mind. 
They also insist that the phrase, unconscious intelli- 
gence, is a sheer absurdity, devised for the sole purpose 
of recognizing ends in nature without admitting the 
correlated thought of an adapting mind. We believe 
these points well taken; but, instead of deciding the 
question, we are content with reaffirming our position, 
that science must assume that nature is founded in pur- 
pose. Many points we reserve for future discussion. 
In particular, we expect to show in the next chajoter the 
untenability of the claim that mechanical forces might 
in indefinite time realize universal adaptation without 
any basal intelligence. 

In ethics and social science the notion of an end is 
equally controlling. No theory of duty or of rights is 
possible without assuming some end for which man 
exists. No theory of government can be stated which 
is not teleological. In proportion as we think highly 
of man's destiny will his duties appear great, and his 
rights sacred. In the previous chapter we have suffi- 
ciently illustrated the teleological nature of all world- 
theories. We have seen that pessimism and material- 
istic evolution are as fully, though not as frankly, tele- 
ological as the most optimistic theism, the only differ- 
ence being that theistic teleology gives some dignity 
and value to life, while atheistic teleology is revolting in 
the ends it assumes, and stupid in the method of their 
realization. We come, then, to this point: Materialism, 



POSTULATES OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE. 1 45 

materialistic and necessary evolution, and all empirical ^ 
theories of mind, are fatal to science; and as atheism 
necessarily leads to these doctrines, atheism is fatal to 
science. The materialist and atheist, therefore, may 
be valuable as day-laborers in science, but, left to them- 
selves, the outcome must be a scientific Babel. Fur- 
ther, we must assume, (1) the universal rationality of 
nature; (2) the fairness and condescension of nature; 
(3) a universal rational adaptation of every thing to 
every other in nature; (4) the reality of ends in nature, 
which have conditioned the means of their realization; 
and, (5) that nature, as a whole, is founded in purpose. 
Without these assumptions, science falls a prey to skep- 
ticism. We conclude, therefore, (1) from the skeptical \ 
outcome of atheism and pantheistic substantialism; and, \ 
(2) from the positive necessities of scientific theory, that 1 
God is as much the postulate and support of science as ^ 
he is of religion. 



.^ 



146 STUDIES IN THEISM, 



CHAPTER IV. 

mecha:n^ism axd teleology. 

A LL theoretical science is built upon some form of 
-^■^ the atomic theory. Those who disclaim belief in the 
reality of atoms, are still forced to assume some molec- 
ular unit which is the substantial reality of material 
things, and whose properties condition all material 
manifestation. Accordingly those who adopt the notion 
that atoms are vortical rings in a frictionless fluid, can 
do nothing with said fluid until they get their vortical 
rings; that is, until they get their atomic units. We 
may, then, abandon the Democritic notion of the atoms 
as little lumps secure forever in solid singleness against 
destruction; but we cannot dispense with the notion 
of discrete material units of some kind. It may be 
that these units are but discrete activities of some all- 
embracing power; but whatever they may be, they are 
the basis of all current scientific theory. We shall, 
then, until further notice, argue upon the assumed truth 
of the atomic and molecular doctrines of matter. All 
mechanica] theories of nature assume that the visible 
universe can be explained by the various grouping of 
these atomic units, and that these groupings take place 
in accordance with the simple laws of motion aud the 
principles of mechanics. Hence the name. In such 
theories every problem is one* of cither molar or mo- 



MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY. 14 7 

lecular mechanics. We proj5ose to examine the relation 
of this theory to the doctrine of purpose in nature; as 
it is often held that the two are incompatible. We 
have already shown, from the side of theory, that sci- 
ence must be teleological if it is to avoid skepticism. 
We now aim to show, from the side of the facts, that 
mechanism can never affect teleology. 

The belief that the order of nature cannot be ex- 
plained without assuming an intelligent creator, has 
never held undisturbed possession of the human mind. 
Very early the attempt was made to explain the world 
by referring it to physical causes; and every genera- 
tion since has seen the attempt renewed. But the be- 
lief in purpose or nature, while always more or less 
militant, seems of late to have fallen into unusual dis- 
credit. Strangely enough, too, this distrust always 
springs up among just those men who are best ac- 
quainted with the facts commonly urged to prove the 
reality of design in nature. A good part of the blame 
in this connection is popularly attributed to Mr. Dar- 
win. It is a wide-spread conviction that Darwinism is 
a Medusa head upon which no teleologist can look and 
live; for in the doctrine of natural selection we have 
at last a means of accounting for the nicest adaptations 
without referring to any adapting intelligence. In 
truth, however, the controversy lies back of Darwin- 
ism. The facts gathered under this theory are quite 
susceptible of a teleological interpretation. The objec- 
tions based upon this theory are but special phases of a 
long-standing dispute between science, as such, and the 



148 STUDIES IN THEISM, 

belief in design, as such. In studying the history of 
thought, we are met by the strange fact that when 
men have discovered how a natural effect is produced, 
they begin to think that there is no purpose in its pro- 
N duction. To learn how a thing is done, weakens faith 
in any design in its doing. Thus the nebular theory, 
inadequate as it is to the facts, has greatly lessened 
faith in any design displayed in the heavens. The so- 
lar system, it is said, is a necessary outcome of gravi- 
tation and inertia, and can dispense with any guiding 
intelligence. And from the beginning, the study of 
efficient causes has tended to discredit the belief in de- 
sign; and conversely the believers in design have tended 
to ignore the reality and necessity of efficient causes 
ill order to its realization. Both Plato and Aristotle 
complain of Anaxagoras, that, having assumed mind as 
the cause of order, he still continues to explain natural 
phenomena by physical agents. Aristophanes attacked 
Socrates for seeking a physical explanation of the 
clouds ; for this, he held, was downright atheism. Both 
theists and atheists have repeated this error ever since. 
A partial reason of the hostility of physics to tele- 
ology is found in a coarse conception of the latter doc- 
trine. To our human purposes, matter exists as some- 
thing given, and our aims are impressed upon it from 
without. Hence in all our machines there are two ele- 
ments : (1) the material and its laws, and (2) the laws 
of the combination which have been impressed upon it ; 
or, to use the Aristotelian phrase, there are matter and 
fonn. The matter does not explain the form, and the 
form is not inherent in the matter. Now when we speak 



MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY. 140 

of the universe as designed, the undeveloped mind is 
prone to look for these two factors there also, and in the 
same external relation matter is viewed as external 
to form, and form is imposed on matter. Accordingly 
Ave think of the matter of the universe as being just 
as external to the purpose of the system as it is to our 
human aims. In this way teleology comes to be re- 
garded as implying constant interference, and a me- 
chanical making of things. Thus the notion arises that 
whatever can be explained by physical laws and agents 
is rescued from the control of mind. We find this 
thought in the oft-made criticism, that the design-argu- 
ment at best would only prove an arranger and not 
a creator of the universe. We find it, too, in the eager 
search for breaks in the physical order which is so often 
made by theistic writers. But such a conception be- 
longs to the infancy of thought; and teleology is not 
bound to accept such a view. Since the time of Leib- 
nitz, and even of Aristotle, there ought to be no 
difiiculty in the conception of an immanent purpose of 
which nature is but the substantial expression. The 
teleologist may hold, then, to the absolute continuity of 
natural laws, and at the same time hold that purpose 
was the prms and condition of the system's existence. 
He may hold that purpose is realized, not by raids into 
the realm of natural law, but through natural law; and 
that purpose was legislated into the inmost law and 
essence of things, so that things and their laws are 
what they are because of that purpose; and bo that in 
their necessary unfolding they shall realize that pur- 
pose. This was the conception held by Leibnitz, and 



150 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

this was the way in which he reconciled mechanism 
and teleology. The universality and continuity of law 
were never more stoutly maintained than by him; but 
he held, also, that the system sprang from a purpose 
which conditioned it throughout. And all study is 
valuable which leads us to abandon the vulgar notion 
of design as interfering with the nature of things in- 
stead of working through the nature of things. In 
proportion, too, as the order of nature is seen to flow 
from the nature of things, the design-argument points 
not merely to arrangement, but to creation. 

The chief cause, however, of the hostility of phys- 
ical science to teleology lies in the fact, that the phys- 
icist, as such, and the teleologist, as such, occupy en- 
tirely different stand-points. The former regards nature 
as driven from behind; the latter regards it as led from 
before. The former views every event as the neces- 
sary result of its antecedents; the latter views it as the 
realization of a plan. The physicist asks of any natural 
product, how it was brought about; and sets himself 
to discover the agents which have produced it. The 
teleologist asks, what it means now that it is here, and 
what place it takes in the universal plan. He says: It 
is here to fulfill a purpose; but the physicist says: It is 
here because there was a series of antecedents which 
necessarily produced it. Here, again, we see traces of 
the error noticed in the last paragraph. The physicist 
studies how things are produced; and from failure to 
grasp the thought of an immanent purpose, once more 
he begins to doubt whether there is any purpose in the 
product. A system of necessary law, he «ays, can 



MECIIAXISM AND TELEOLOGY. 151 

know nothing of purpose, because purpose implies 
choice, and necessity is fated. Moreover, such a sys* 
tern can dispense witli purpose; for the system being 
given, it must produce its implied effect. He holds, 
then, not that the system exists to produce its effects; 
but that the system exists; and its implied effects re- 
sult. Here, then, is an antinomy between efficient and 
final cause; and the claim is, that necessary physical 
action can dispense with design; if, indeed, the notion 
of one is not logically inconsistent with that of the 
other. This claim we have to examine. 

Before proceeding to criticism, we point out that the 
perception of design in any thing is not a matter of 
science, but solely of common sense. Any person, of 
average reflective power, is as able to judge whether a 
work is designed as a scientist who can talk most learn- 
edly about it. For all that physical study can do in 
such a case is, to show how the effect has been reached. 
Whether there was purpose in the action which has 
resulted in the effect can be known only by an inspec- 
tion of the effect itself. We further point out that de-» 
sign is not properly proved by argument, but by in- 
spection. It is an intuition, rather than a conclusion. 
We prove that a straight line is the shortest distance 
between two points, not by argument, but by construct- 
ing the lines and looking at them. So, also, we convince 
ourselves that a machine was designed by looking at it. 
It is necessary to make this remark, as critics often 
insist that the argument begs the question because it 
cannot demonstrate design. But the teleologist who 



.^ 



152 • STUDIES IN THEISM. 

understands himself does not pretend to demonstrate 
design. His aim is to solve a problem rather than to 
demonstrate a proposition. Accordingly, he calls atten- 
tion to the complex harmonies and adaptations of t' ings, 
which are just like what a designing mind w^ould pro- 
duce. These constitute the problem; and his claim is, 
that a prearranging mind is the only solution which is 
at once satisfactory to the mind and adequate to the 
♦ facts. This is the true meaning of the design-argu- 
ment. As such it is not a begging of the question, but 
is an argument in harmony with universal common 
sense. Verbal quibbling will never suffice to overthrow 
it, however clearly it may show the lack of stronger 
objections. 

As an introductory criticism, we point out that in our 
experience efficient and final causes are not only not in 
opposition, but each implies the other. Our purposes 
always demand some agents for their realization; and 
our adaptation always consists in so arranging natural 
objects, that while following their own laws, they also 
realize our ends. The action of a locomotive is a pure- 
ly mechanical affair. It flows directly from the ante- 
cedents; and given the antecedents, it must act as it 
does. Still, we should not feel convinced if an enemy 
of design should conclude from this fact that there is 
no purpose in the construction of a locomotive. The 
tones of a piano result from the properties of the wires 
and the sounding-board; and we might conceive that 
some one should set out to prove that there is no design 
in a piano's construction, because from beginning to 
end the resulting notes are the ])roducts of the com- 



MECHANISM A KD TELEOL OGY. 153 

ponent parts. We should not be greatly impressed, 
however, with the conclusiveness of the logic. When, 
therefore, a physiologist tells us that all the properties 
of an organism flow necessarily from the nature of its 
constituent parts, we can very readily believe him. But 
when he adds, and therefore the organism is explained 
without assuming any purpose in its construction, we 
ask for further proof. This is a very popular argument 
with the physiologists at present* Physiological notions 
have been largely remodeled within the last twenty-five 
years. We hear much of colloids and crystalloids, of 
immediate and proximate principles, of physiological 
units, etc. These notions have been thrust so persist- 
ently in the faces of the teleologists, that it seems to 
have escaped notice all round, that they really increase, 
to an almost inconceivable degree, the structural wonder 
of the organism. The claim, then, may be just, that 
these principles explain the organism; but we see no 
cogency in the conclusion that, therefore, the organism 
is in no way a product of design. In our experience, 
purpose is realized only through means; and hence it is 
a possible thought that natural agents exist to realize 
ends, and that they are what they are, because of the 
ends for which they were created. In such a case the 
laws of nature, in their necessary working, would result 
in the end proposed; and a study of natural agents 
would show us a series of effects unfolding with neces- 
sity, and at the same time realizing a preconceived pur- 
pose. This, as we have said, was Leibnitz's conception, < 
We conclude from these considerations that physical 
causes, woi-king by necessity, do not necessarily dis- 



154 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

pense with the belief that their products were designed. 
And it is greatly to be desired that objectors would 
present some more cogent argument against purpose in 
nature, than a mere showing how it has been realized. 
In our experience, all order and harmony which we can 
trace to a beginning, existed first in thought; we know 
of no other explanation. It is, then, no far-fetched or 
violent supposition that the natural order, also, existed 
first in thought. 

These suggestions are weighty, and quite in harmony 
with common sense, but serious objections are possible. 
If it could be shown that things had a beginning, or are 
dependent on some power not themselves, or that they 
once existed in a chaotic state without definite powers 
and relations, the argument for design in nature would 
be practically a demonstration. It is infinitely improb- 
able that any agent should produce and maintain the 
order of the universe without knowing what he is doing. 
It is equally improbable that a series of blind, mechan- 
ical agents; which were once without definite law and 
order, should ever rise above chaos. Every rational 
objector to design in nature allows this with the utmost 
cheerfulness, but he denies the beginning .and the chaos. 
The phenomenal order has, indeed, had a beginning, 
and will have an end. But this order is only the mani- 
festation of a world of substantial realities which have 
their laws and properties in themselves, and the objector 
claims that there is no proof that these basal realities 
ever began. In short, he regards the physical system 
as self-sufiicient and eternal. But it may be worth 
while to let him explain his views at greater length and 



MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY. 155 

in the first person. He says: The problem for all think- 
ers is to find a sufiicient ground for phenomena; and 
this cannot be done by any a priori speculation, but only 
by studying the facts. Now, I find the order and ar- 
rangement of things fully explained by the nature and 
disposition of physical causes, and these are in no case 
free, but work under the scheme of necessity. I find 
to-day the necessary result of yesterday. That all 
admit. But the same principle makes it necessary k) 
assume that yesterday flowed with equal necessity from 
the day before. If you ask how I account for the be- 
ginning, I reply, I recognize no beginning. The pres- 
ent forms of things have not, indeed, always existed, but 
I see no reason for denying that the present ultimate 
agents of nature have always existed, and that, too, un- 
der just the same laws as now. We all have to admit 
that something has always existed. This external exist- 
ence you find in a mind back of nature. I find it in na- 
ture, or in that complex of agents which we call nature. 
To appeal to the fact of an original chaos, is simply to 
mistake dispersion for disorder. I find the reign of law 
just as absolute in that nebulous time as it is to-day. 
If you ask how this manifold of agents should work 
together as they do, I say, I don't know. But I must 
assume them in some relation, and why not the present 
as well as any other? The objection that it is infinitely 
iiaprobable that such a mass of elements- should hit 
upon just this order of intelligence and escape all others, 
makes three unwarrantable assumptions. The first is, 
that a calculus of probabilities can be applied to first 

facts, which is a decidedly false assumption. Such cal- 
11 



156 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

cuius is meaningless, except as you have already a body 
of known and calculable agencies; and then your cal- 
culus has no effect upon the fact itself, but only upon 
your expectation before the fact declares itself. If, for 
instance, I throw a cube marked as in dioe-playing, 
there are five chances to one that an ace will not turn 
up. This consideration would make it quite hazardous 
to bet on the ace, and I should govern my action ac- 
cordingly. But when the cube has been thrown and 
the ace has turned up, I must accept the fact, and can 
never call in my previous calculus of probabilities to 
show that the ace has not turned up. I had previously 
little ground for expecting the ace to turn up ; but I 
had just as much reason for expecting the ace as any 
one of the other sides. And, now that the ace has 
turned, I accept the fact, and my previous calculus of 
probabilities has no further application. Such calculus, 
therefore, does not apply to first facts, because it is 
meaningless without first assuming a known set of agents 
and conditions. And, furthermore, it cannot be played 
off against any fact after the fact is once there. More- 
over, if we should apply this calculus to first facts, 
would a harmony among the elements be any more im- 
probable than the existence of an eternal and omnis- 
cient mind? 

The second unwarrantable assumption is, that the ele- 
ments were once in such indeterminate relations that 
an infinity of directions Avere possible; and hence the 
question arises, how they could have escaped all the ia- 
harmonious and chaotic combinations, and hit upon the 
present orderly and harmonious one. This assumption 



MECH^iNISM AND TELEOL OGY. 157 

is an unpardonable sin against the first princiiJes of 
mochanical science. It is based upon the false notion 
that all being must have had a beginning; whereas 
every system has to admit an eternal being of some 
kind as its foundation, which being, again, is, and is as 
it is, simply because it is. Explanation cannot go on 
forever; but must come down to an ultimate fact of 
which no further account can be given than that it is, 
and has such or such attributes or ways of working. 
Now, continues our anti-teleologist, there is no place for 
indeterminateness in a mechanical system such as I be- 
lieve in. The present is the necessary result of the 
past and the only possible one. Make a cross section 
of the stream of things at any point whatever, within 
the nebula or beyond it, and you find the comj^lete pro- 
vision for the present order of things, with the exclu- 
sion of every other. We can, indeed, think of other 
orders; but no other order was ever possible in fact. 
In reality, the actual is the only possible. When, there- 
fore, the teleologist calls upon the scientist to explain 
how the original indefiniteness escaped all the chaotic 
arrangements possible, and hit upon the present, which 
seems so replete with intelligence, he mistakes the most 
fundamental mark of mechanical science ; and when the 
scientist admits such an original indeterminateness, and 
attempts to show how it has gradually acquired defi- 
niteness, he sins equally against the first principles of 
the mechanical theory. This theory comes down to the 
notion of definite elements, in definite relations, and 
claims that they explain all, and that it is unnecessary 
to go behind them. Its first fact is a world-order 



^^:i^ 



158 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

among the elements. This fact is an eternal miracle; 
but then it exists, and all else exists in consequence. 
The elements must be in some relation, and why not in 
harmonious relation? What better right to existence 
has chaos than order? What real ground is there for 
assuming that disorder must have been first? 

We are anxious to let the anti-teleologist have fair 
play; and so we listen to his criticism of the third as- 
sumption. He says: It is tacitly assumed by the teleol- 
ogist that the present order is not only a miracle of de- 
sign but of perfection, too, and that any other grouping 
of the atoms would have resulted in comparative dis- 
order. It is, therefore, a ground for great wonder, that 
of all possible combinations the most perfect should 
have been hit upon, if there were no guiding mind. 
I^he anti-teleologist adds, that, admitting the untenable 
thought of various possible combinations, the teleol- 
ogist's view, that the present is the best possible order, 
is sheer assumption. So far as our experience goes, 
there is much to criticise in the order of things. There 
is much that seems to us useless; there is very much 
that seems positively mischievous; and there is very 
little that appears to have such transcendent worth 
that we cannot imagine a better, or that it should seem 
absard to ask what it is for. Nature is, to a certain 
extent, usable, and much has been made of this fact in 
the design-argument. We do employ natural agents 
to a large extent as our servants; but the argument 
forgets that nature is often obstinate and intractable. 
Certainly nature is not so eminently usable that we 
must assume a purpose to account for it. Moreover, in 



MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY. 159 

great departments of natural activity we see no pur- 
pose at all; at least we see none w^hicli it seems worth 
while to realize. What great need was there of filling 
the world with noxious nuisances, such as the insect 
world is for the most part? What crying necessity for 
producing the parasitic orders? Would the universe 
have been less perfect if fangs and claws and venom 
had been left out? Nay, even this tedious sameness, 
which is called the uniformity of nature, would not 
that be improved by an occasional change ? Why not 
something new and interesting, at least once in awhile? 
Moreover, is it at all sure that the good results we see 
could not have been reached in a far better way? The 
world, with all its imperfections, does, indeed, contrive 
to keep a-going, but that is all. The notion that it is 
the best possible is in sharp contradiction to our expe- 
rience, and is in no way susceptible of proof. 

The denier of design in nature has expounded his 
theory at great length and with much force. It is 
certain that the doctrine of probabilities is often mis- 
used in theistic writings. It is assumed that there was 
a period w^hen matter w^as lawless and chaotic, and the 
easy conclusion is drawn, that order could never have 
arisen from such a state. But the atheist need not 
admit such a state, without more proof than is com- 
monly given. The denier of design in his last objec- 
;ion has assumed that the argument for ends in nature 
rests upon observation only, whereas, in the previous 
chapter, we have seen that they are postulates of in- 
ductive science. He has also touched upon the prob- 
lem oi evil, before which all human wisdom is dumb. 



160 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

It will not escape notice that his criticisms of the actual 
order are both teleological and anthropomorphic. He 
judges it throughout by the standard of human in- 
terests; and where he can see no end, he assumes that 
there is none. But omitting further reference to these 
points, his position is this: Nature does, indeed, show 
harmony and adaptation; but they are accounted for 
by natural agents; and there is no need to go behind 
these agents for further explanation. But in judging 
this view we must guard against an unconscious self- 
imposition of which we are often guilty at this point. 
Theism is often spoken of as a metaphysical and re- 
ligious theory, while the atomic doctrine is opposed to 
it as a scientific fact. In truth, both are theories, and 
both are equally metaphysical and speculative. That 
the atoms exist, is as much a matter of inference as 
that God exists. That they are adequate to the facts, 
is knowm by assuming them so. The physical agents 
explain phenomena because they are expressly con- 
structed for that purpose by the scientific theorist. 
The theist reasons to God, to explain the unity and har- 
mony of the universe. The atheist, for the same pur- 
pose, reasons to atoms, which, no one knows how or 
why, do actually work together without intelligence 
and without knowledge of one another's existence, yet 
in such a way as not only to mimic intelligence but 
also to produce it. But after the atheist has thus rea- 
soned to his atoms, and has endowed them with all 
they need in order to get along with the facts, he re- 
gards them as self-existent and eternal. The argu- 
ment is, that if such wonderful atoms did exist, they 



MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY, IGl 

would explain the universe; and the facts prove that 
Burst atoms do exist: hence they explain the universe. 
Tt is allowed that if such atoms were created, they 
would be a miracle of wisdom; but there are no facts 
which point to their origination, and why may they not 
be viewed as the uncreated facts of the universe ? The 
rational atheist does not appeal to chance, for a me- 
chanical system knows nothing but necessity. He does 
not say that the atoms happened to be, but that they are. 
He does not say that they chanced upon their harmonious 
relations and interactions, but that they actually exist 
and work in harmony. Why things do not work other- 
wise, he does not pretend to say. It is their nature to 
work as they do, and that is the last word upon the 
subject. Their harmonious interaction and adjustment 
do not prove the dependence of the system, because 
the elements were postulated in such rational and pur- 
pose-like adjustment; and the atheist claims that there 
are no other facts which prove their dependence. The 
theist makes God his ultimate fact; the rational atheist 
finds that fact in the order and nature of things. All 
other forms of atheism he regards as vulgar and unphil- 
osophic, and an easy prey to the theist. 

In opposition to this subtlest form of atheism we 
hold: (l) This position is essentially skeptical and 
tends to the overthrow of all science. (2) The attempt 
to explain the intelligible order of the world by re- 
ferring to an unintelligent nature of things, leads to the 
necessity of denying mind in man as well as in nature. 
(3) Both physical and metaphysical arguments make it 



1G2 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

impossible to regard the visible universe as self-depend- 
ent. But before going further we shall JSnd our ad- 
vantage in a critical exposition of the system before us, 
and in a deduction of its results. 

The first thing which strikes the critic is, that this 
system properly explains nothing, but tacitly assumes 
every thing. It explains the visible order by assuming 
it in the nature of things. It explains the forms of 
matter by assuming that matter is loaded, so as to fall 
as it does. But this loaded matter is eternal, and hence 
we need not go behind it. It further necessitates very 
great changes in the current notions of matter, and 
puts to death all those vulgar forms of atheism which 
imagine that time alone can ever do the work of in- 
telligence. For wherever we make our cross section of 
the past, we find the present order given, and every other 
order excluded. In determining the nature of the cause 
or causes of phenomena, we are forced to take account 
of the phenomena, and make provision for them in the 
nature and arrangement of those causes. The crude 
materialism of the past, which aimed to get the higher 
out of the lower, the living from the dead, sensibility 
from the insensible, and thought from the unthinking, 
must be abandoned. The notion of the ancient ma- 
terialists, that matter, conceived merely as a collection 
of little hard lumps or as bits of solid extension, a\a 
explain phenomena, is spoken of by Professor Tyndall 
as " absurd, monstrous, and fit only for the intellect aal 
gibbet" (''Fragments of Science," p. 160.) In his an- 
swer to Mr. Martineau (printed also as a preface to the 
second edition of the " Fragments of Science ") he com- 



MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY. . 1G3 

plains that people persist in holding only those notions 
of matter which suffice for works on mechanics. He 
insists that matter can be defined only by observing 
what it can do. Of matter and force he says: "If life 
and thought be the very flower of both, any definition 
which omits life and thought must be inadequate, if 
not untrue," (p. 122.) Again, in the preface referred 
to, after having recounted many marvels of the uni- 
verse, he says: "Matter I define as the mysterious 
something by which all this has been accomplished." * 
Thus Professor Tyndall proves the cause of things to be 
material by the easy process of naming it matter. 
Again, Sir William Thomson says: "The assumption of 
atoms can explain no property of body which has not 
previously been attributed to the atoms themselves." 

But there is no need to pile up authority, for a little 
reflection will convince us that it must be so. The 
problem is to find a ground for phenomena, and the 
cause must fit the eflects. The scientist feels justified 
in assuming a manifold of elements at the base of 
phenomena; and the nature of these elements or atoms 
must be determined from observation of what they do. 
First, there are phenomena of gravitation. We at- 
tribute, therefore, to the atoms a general power of at- 
traction. There are next phenomena of cohesion, which 
obey other laws than those of gravitation. Hence, 

* It may be pointed out tliat this notion of a new definition of 
matter, so as to make it something mystic, plastic, wonderful, which 
is becoming so popular with atheistic speculators, is nothing but the 
hylozoism of the early Greeks. It has made its appearance often in 
speculation, especially in Hobbes and the French materialists of the 
last century. 



rz 



104 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

we give the atoms a new power of cohering under 
certain circumstances. Among certain members of the 
atomic group, and under certain circumstances, a new 
class of phenomena — the chemical — appears. We en- 
large our notion of the atom, therefore, to meet the 
emergency, and attribute to the atoms a power of 
chemical action under the fitting conditions. Coming 
higher up, we find a new set of phenomena — the vital; 
and, as we have determined to know nothing but the 
atoms, we must once more enlarge the notion of the 
atoms and make provision for vital action. Besides, as 
the results of this vital action are of the most diverse 
kind, presenting great dividing lines of classes, species, 
etc., we must arrange for this too in the nature of the 
atoms. Accordingly, the atoms must be of such a 
character that in one plant or animal they will regard 
the peculiar type to which it belongs. If we should 
allow the atoms to be indifferent to organic forms, the 
existence and diversity of forms would find no explana- 
tion in the atoms. Hence, we escape admitting species 
outside of the atoms by the easy device of putting a 
provision for them in the atoms themselves. Again, 
there are harmony and adaptation, and seeming purpose, 
in nature. These too must be explained; and w^e can 
do it only by once more reconstructing the atoms and 
making them of such a nature that they shall work to- 
gether as if for the realization of a common purpose. 
Finally, there are phenomena of sensibility and thought. 
There is no possibility of getting these out of our atoms 
as having only mechanical and chemical properties; 
but there is no difficulty in reopening the atomic no- 



MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY. 105 

tion, and stuffing in the new content. Accordingly, 
we cut the knot by conceiving certain of the atoms to 
have the power of thinking and feeling when they 
come into certain combinations. Moreover, as some 
phenomena of consciousness are of such a nature as to 
make it impossible to view them as a product of two or 
more agents, we must make some one of these atoms 
the seat of the mental phenomena at any given mo- 
ment; and, as the atoms are in constant flux, we must 
suppose the recedin'g atoms to transfer the whole of 
consciousness to those which come after, and that, too, 
so deftly as to produce not the slightest break in the 
continuity of the mental life. It is rather difficult to 
see how all this can be done; indeed, some of the de- 
mands made upon the atoms seem to border on contra- 
dictions; but we let that pass. 

The reader will see the method of the anti-teleologist. 
We have left the old materialism far behind. We have 
got life- and mind out of matter by including them in 
its definition. We have proved our atoms quite capa- 
ble of conducting the universe ; first, by assuming that 
there is nothing but atoms; and, second, by distributing 
with free hand to the atoms all they may need to enable 
them to get along with the facts. Now see the point to 
which we have come. All scientific hypotheses are con- 
structed for the express purpose of explaining the facts. 
TJie causes, or agents, assumed, are expressly adapted 
to produce the phenomena in question. To do this we 
have endowed them with the most complex powers, and 
put them in the most complex relations. We have pro- 
vided for the order and diversity of the universe by 



166 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

assuming it in the atoms. We have explained away 
the need of an intelligent creator by explaining omnis- 
cience into things. We have dispensed with a God 
back of the elements by making the atoms themselves 
a host of little gods. That this expression is none too 
strong, appears if we think of the demands which the 
simple law of gravitation makes on the atoms. Ac- 
cording to this law, every atom acts upon every otner, 
and acts upon each one as if all the rest were away. 
At every instan-t it is adjusting itself to the activities 
of every other in the universe, and regulates its own 
accordingly. But this demands the ceaseless yet in- 
stantaneous solution of the practically infinite number 
of equations which, at each moment, express the rela- 
tion of one atom to all the rest. If atoms exist at all, 
there are decillions of decillions of them; and hence 
each atom must solve instantaneously decillions of de- 
cillions of equations, and this forever. But while au 
human intelligence is palsied by the conception, the 
atom is supposed to be abundantly able to do it forever, 
and without any consciousness of itself, or of wh^^t it 
is doing, or of the existence of the others to which it 
is forever responding. Or, we can put it in another 
way. Any and every change of distance between an 
atom and any other, demands a corresponding change 
of activity. When we come to the molecules, a change 
of a millionth of an inch results in the change from at- 
traction to repulsion. But this change of distance is 
incessant, and the number of changes in every instant 
are practically infinite. The atom, then, must have 
absolute sensibility to these changes of distance, yet 



MECIIA XfSM AND TELEOL OGY. 107 

without consciousness or intelligence of any sort. That 
an army of men without reason or sensation should, 
without external guidance, but solely from the nature 
of things, come together and produce the most complex 
and purpose-like products, would have only an infinites- 
imal part of the wonder which the action of the atoms 
has. We need not complicate the matter by referring 
to the various other laws of force which the atom is 
also obeying. The simple law of gravitation almost 
forces us to take refuge from the dizzy vastness of the 
problem in the theory of an omnipotent and omniscient 
administrator of nature. Indeed, the difficulties of the 
nature-of -things doctrine are so great when applied to 
the atomic theory, that there is always a strong tendency 
among those who hold it to take refuge in some form 
of pantheism. For where there is a plurality of things, 
there must be a plurality of natures; and where there 
is a plurality of self-existent things, there must be a 
plurality of self -existent natures. Hence the atheistic 
explanation is not properly based on the nature of 
things, but on the natures of things. How these indi- 
vidual self -existent natures are brought into relations of 
interaction and harmonious co-working, it does not ex- 
plain; and yet this is the knot of the problem. Now 
when we remember (1) that the atom is not a matter of 
knowledge but of inference only, and (2) that the prob- 
lem of thought is to find the simplest and most rational 
explanation of the facts, it can hardly be claimed that 
the doctrine of a one God who creates and co-ordinates 
all things, is harder to comprehend, or less satisfactory 
to reason, than the notion we have been considering. In 



168 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

the former view, all is luminous and intelligible; in the 
latter, all is opaque and impenetrable. The nature-of- 
things doctrine explains phenomena by assuming a set 
of agents with just such qualities, and in just such rela- 
tions, that they cannot but produce the phenomena in 
question. Of course, this is an explanation. When the 
juggler's hat is first stuffed with the appropriate mat- 
ter, there is no difficulty in explaining the astonishing 
fullness of material which is drawn from it. When the 
dice are known to be loaded, it is easy to understand 
their peculiar turns. 

Before passing on, however, we may note the position 
which Darwinism and evolution must take in such a 
scheme. We have debated the question on the ground 
of the atomic theory, as that is the conception most fa- 
vored by science at present. The conclusion, however, 
is equally good for any system whatever which assumes 
that the present is the necessary product of the past. 
Every such system is forced by its principles to involve 
the phenomena before it can evolve them. Its data in- 
variably contain implicitly what afterward becomes 
explicit. The higher is never deduced from the low^er: 
but both lower and higher are but the several phases 
of the basal fact thus assumed. The blade does not ex- 
plain the ear; but both blade and ear are but successive 
phases of the cycle involved in the original nature and 
disposition of the efficient causes. The nebula does not 
explain the solar system; the dead does not explain the 
living; the non-intelligent does not explain the intelli- 
gent; the brute does not explain the man; but the neb- 
ula and the system, the living and the dead, the intelli- 



MECHANISJif AND TELEOLOGY. 169 

gent and the non-intelligent, the brute and the man, 
all are but the various phases of the one all-embracing 
cycle which is given in the primal nature and disposi- 
tion of the efficient causes of the universe. We must, 
therefore, lay aside the vulgar conception of Darwin- 
ism and evolution, which gets the living from that 
which is nothing but the dead, and man from that 
which is nothing but the brute. Every thing which is 
to mount above itself must have in itself the tendency 
to, and the provision for, that higher plane. When, 
then, nature manifested nothing but mechanical or 
chemical phenomena, it was not merely mechanical and 
chemical, but more, and was already on the way to the 
realization of that more. When nature could show 
nothing higher than the brute, nature was not merely 
brute, but more, and the advent of that more into ex- 
plicit reality was approaching. Without this assump- 
tion no scheme of development is for a moment tenable. 
Every new increment would be a creation, and some- 
thing would arise from nothing. But the great god 
Brahm is no less Brahm before he has taken on form 
and finiteness than he is afterward. He is forever equal 
to himself; and w^hen he returns to the '' void and harm- 
less infinite " we may not call it a descent. The ex- 
plicit power and wisdom which once went forth from 
him have been re-enfolded; that is all. Both Darwin- 
ism and evolution must come within the circle of the 
universal mechanism, and abandon those modes of ex- 
pression which savor so strongly of chance, as contra- 
dicting the first principles of physical science. More-^ 
over, both doctrines must descend from the rank of 



170 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

explanations into that of mere descriptions of sequence. 
They explain nothing; they assume every thing, and 
merely describe to us the successive phases of the first 
assumption. The great cycle rolls on forever, mani- 
festing all the varied phenomena of the living and the 
lifeless, of life and death. What its complete round 
may disclose there is no telling. What other possibili- 
ties it may reveal under new conditions, lies beyond our 
imagination. We can do nothing but watch its succes- 
sive phases and record them. This is the only position 
which the anti-teleologist can take which shall be in har- 
mony both with the phenomena and with the necessary 
principles of mechanical science. 

This point is of the utmost importance. The doctrine 
of natural selection is constantly appealed to as showing 
how organic adaptations have been produced without 
any presiding intelligence, but the success is only appar- 
ent. This appeal forgets that in a mechanical system, 
or in any system of necessity, there is something back of 
life which determines it, and all its unfoldings, with ab- 
solute necessity and certainty. The biological speculator, 
finding life apparently flexible and spontaneous, forgets 
the all-embracing necessity of which it is but a phase, 
and makes a false distinction between the determinate- 
ness of the physical world and the indeterminateness 
of living things. In this way, he fancies it possible to 
produce adaptations of living things to their surrc.iind- 
ings which were not originally provided for in the sys- 
tem. But this is illusion. ISIo mechanical system, and 
no system of necessity, can introduce any new elements 
into itself. In such a system, every movement of every 



MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY. Ill 

living tiling, every variation, every survival and non- 
survival, all life and all its determining circumstances, 
have always been absolutely determined. Physics lies 
back of biology, and reminds the speculator that every 
adaptation and harmony now in the system have always 
been there. The explanation of organic adaptations, 
therefore, by natural selection, or by the conditions of 
existence, or by the survival of the fittest, reduces at 
last to assuming a set of agents of such a kind, and in 
such relations, that every thing must have happened just 
as it has. With this assumption we see very clearly how 
things have been brought about; we have done more, 
w^e have explained the organic w^orld without the un- 
scientific notion of a planning and guiding intelligence. 
When, then, the Spencerians offer to show^ how an "in- 
definite, incoherent homogeneity " ought to develop into 
a " definite, coherent heterogeneity," we make them a 
present of the demonstration; "first, because the strictly 
indefinite can do nothing and is nothing, and more 
particularly because such a demonstration can have no 
application to the actual universe. For as any given 
phase of the nebula, which is what they seem to mean 
by the homogeneous, was necessarily determined by its 
antecedent phase, there is nowhere any room for inter- 
polating hypotheses about origins. An undetermined 
nebula i\as raver given; and it is quite idle, therefore, 
to speculate r.n what such a nebula would do. A self- 
centered and abiding world-order moves on through 
space and time, manifesting its various phases, and 
bringinof to life and death. The conclusion would not 

be modified at all if we allow the notion that the atoms 
12 



112 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

themselTes are products. Wherever there is producing 
there is something which produces; and if the atoms 
have been developed, we can conceive the process as 
resulting only from the action of some definite agent 
or agents, with definite nature, laws, and relations. 
Many speculators, in their romantic passion for devel- 
opment, write as if every thing might be developed 
from nothing. Such, then, is the outcome of every 
mechanical system. It does not explain order, but as- 
sumes it. Yet the intelligible order is the thing to be 
explained. 

For the thinker, this point has already been over illus- 
trated. The very notion of mechanism denies all chance 
and indefiniteness. An apparent progress from the in- 
definite to the definite in such a system is a progress 
from definiteness which only reason can perceive, to def- 
initeness which the senses can perceive. In like manner, 
an apparent progress from the like to the unlike, is only 
in appearance. It is a progress from differences percep- 
tible only to reason, to differences perceptible by the 
senses. This conclusion is but an analysis of the notion 
of mechanism; and yet we feel justified in ofFering an- 
other illustration. The nebular theory is often men- 
tioned as an instance where blind matter, under the 
simple law of gravitation, has built itself into a stable 
solar system, and has thus mimicked the work of intelli- 
gence. It is often both claimed and allowed that the 
doctrine of ends, in the solar system, has received its 
deathblow from the nebular theory; and the notion ob- 
tains, that, given diffused nebulous matter in any form 
whatever, it must build itself up into tlie present system 



MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY. 173 

of sun and planets. This is a double mistake. It is not 
true that any nebula of proper mass would form our 
system; and the notion that any tenable nebular theory 
disproves design, is due to the coarse conception of de- 
sign to which we referred in the beginning. If we as- 
sume that the solar system had a nebular origin, we 
have to assume, not a nebulous mass in general, but a 
very definite nebula, of such form and with such pecul- 
iar velocities and densities in the different parts, that 
the present system must have been produced to the ex- 
clusion of every other. No other nebula could have 
condensed into our present stable system. Whatever 
of purpose the heavens once showed they show it stilly 
in spite of any tenable nebular theory. 

The demands we must make upon the theory before 
it fits the facts are very great. No theory is simpler to 
the unmathematical reader; none, upon examination, 
needs more bolstering. The popular statement is charm- 
ingly simple: The matter of our system was once dis- 
pensed so as to spread beyond its present bounds. This 
matter contracted on itself, and in accordance with a 
well-known mechanical law — ^^the law of equal areas — it 
began to roll more rapidly as contraction went on. The 
result was, that at the equator of this mass a centrifugal 
limit was at last reached; and a ring of matter was left 
behind. This ring afterward broke up and collected 
into the planet Neptune. In the same way other rings 
and other planets were formed. These planets would 
all lie in the same plane, and would have a common di- 
rection of both orbital and axial motion. Thus some of 
the more striking features of the solar system seem to 



174 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

find an easy and simple explanation. The notion of a 
vast nebula revolving upon its axis^ and throA^ing off 
rings, is a simple one; and the process seems easy. But 
unfortunately, by the time the theory is adjusted to the 
facts, all this simplicity is gone. The end to be reached 
is a stable solar system; and it is well known that if the 
masses, or the orbital periods, or the relative distances, 
or the orbital eccentricities of the planets differed much 
from the actual ones, the system would soon fall into 
ruin. If Jupiter had as eccentric an orbit, not as the 
asteroids, but as Mercury only, the result would be dis- 
astrous. The present system may not be absolutely 
stable; but it would not be stable at all if the present 
orbits, masses, etc., were much changed. Very slight 
changes would make life impossible on our planet. 
Here is an end, and here is adaptation to secure it, ac- 
cording to the theist. The nebular theory, it is said, 
gives a simple explanation of the facts without the aid 
of intelligence. Let us see how. 

How shall we think of the nebula ? First of all, not 
as proper gas, but simply as diffused matter; for on any 
theory, gases tend to indefinite expansion, and are not 
easily brought to contract. Was it hot or cold ? The 
authorities differ. Some make it contract from cooling; 
others make it heat from contracting. But this point 
is unimportant, and besides, the views are not as much 
opposed as they seem. We must not think of the ele- 
ments as arranged according to their specific gravities, 
as that would send hydrogen out to Neptune, and leave 
only the metals for the inner planets and the sun. No 
more may we regard them as homogeneously diffused. 



%' 



MECHANIS:: AND TELEOLOGY. 1 T5 

Tliey must, rather, be so mixed that the weights of the 
resulting planets shall be such as the stability of the 
system requires; and in particular, the earth must be 
well supplied with the elements which condition life 
and civilization. We must also think of the nebula as 
rotating, and with the same amount of motion which the 
system has at present; for the principle known as the 
conservation, or equality, of areas, makes it impossible 
for any mass of material elements to vary its amount of 
rotary motion, measured in any direction whatever. 
If, then, the nebula were ever Avithout revolution, it 
would ahvays have remained so. Rotary motion, in a 
material system, is either eternal, or it is introduced or 
destroyed from without. But none of these points are 
of much moment. The first great difficulty of the the- 
ory is, to get rings of any sort thrown off. The non- 
mathematical reader who has seen the popular lecturer 
perform Plateau's experiment, in which a sphere of oil 
is made to revolve and throw off rings, finds the process 
very simple; but the mathematician can do nothing 
with the problem. The difficulty is this: By contrac- 
tion the atoms are brought nearer together, and the at- 
tractions between them are strengthened. But by the 
same contraction, the rate of rotation grows more rapid, 
and the centrifugal force is increased.* Now, it is 
clear that unless the centrifugal force increase more rap- 
idly than the attractive force, no ring can be detached. 
* This is not a contradiction of the constancy of the amount of 
rcftary motion, because that amount for a particle is measured by its 
distance from the axis into ^:he distance rolled. Hence, a small body 
rotating rapidly, may have the same amount of rotary motion as a 
laige one rolling slowlj^. 



Hi) STUDIES m THEISM. 

But if it does increase more rapidly, then when the forces 
are once balanced, matter will drop off constantly at the 
equator thereafter. For each new contraction lifts the 
centrifugal above the central forces, and new matter is 
left behind. The result is, not a series of rings at great 
distances from one another, but a lens-shaped sheet of 
matter, in the plane of the equator of the revolving 
nebula. This result follows equally if we adopt La 
Place's notion, according to which the planets were 
formed from the sun's atmosphere, and are much young- 
er than the sun. Such an outcome can be escaped only 
by arbitrarily assuming equatorial currents of matter of 
vastly greater velocity than the parts beneath them; 
and such currents can be explained by no action within 
the mass.* Another great difficulty lies in the relation 
of the orbital periods of the planets to the axial rotation 
of the sun. The most natural supposition about the 
nebula is, that, like a wheel, it all revolves together, oi 
all parts go around the axis in the same time. But such 
a supposition would be fatal to the theory; for the orbit 
al periods of the planets represent the time of the sun's 
rotation when it filled the orbits of the planets. The 
sun should have revolved once in a year when it filled 
the orbit of the earth, and once in abojit one hundred 
and sixty-five years, when it filled the orbit of Neptune. 

* Professor Newcomb, ("Popular Astronomy," pp. 514, 515.) givog 
an extremely provisional assent to the nebular theory, and points 
out its chief weaknesses. The greatest difficult}^, he thinks, '' is to 
show how a ring of vapor surrounding the sun, could condense into 
a single planet, encircled by satellites." The entire work is marked 
by a careful distinction of fact from theory, and deserves the highest 
praise. 



, MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY. i/. 

But knowing the present rate of the snn's revolution we 
can reason back by the principle of equal areas to the 
time of revolution it must have had when it filled these 
orbits. Unfortunately, theory and fact differ. If the 
theory be true, the sun, instead of revolving once a year 
when it filled the orbit of the earth, should have re- 
volved only once in three thousand two hundred years* 
Instead of revolving once in about one hundred and 
sixty-five years, when it filled the orbit of Neptune, it 
should have revolved only once in about two million 
eight hundred thousand years. We get similar diverg- 
ences between fact and theory if w^e calculate the result 
for the other planets and the moons. Finally, Mars has 
displayed a set of moons which revolve around the 
planet in less time than it turns on its own axis. Here 
contraction has resulted in retarded, rather than accel- 
erated, motion. To lessen this divergence. La Place 
assumed that the sun w^as older than the planets, and 
that the nebula was simply the solar atmosphere. But 
this only diminishes, without removing, the divergence, 
and greatly increases other difiiculties. The thorough- 
goer wishes to have sun and all explained as condensed 
nebula. But here, again, we may relieve the difficulty 
by once more assuming equatorial currents, generated 
from without. In no other way can we save the theory. 
We must abandon the notion of a common angular ve- 
locity, of a regular variation of density, and of a regu- 
lar increase of axial rotation ; and make the velocities, 
and the densities, and the rotations, just such as the 
facts call for. To be sure, it is mechanically impossible 
that riil these effects should bo produced by any action 



178 STUDIES IX THEISM. 

witliin the mass; but we may adopt the suggestion of 
Mr. Spencer, that bodies are plunging in from without, 
and that they may adjust matters. There are lots of rov- 
ing nebula which would be willing to leap in and spur 
up the revolving nebula so as to leave a ring of the right 
size at the right place. But this is a delicate operation; 
for unless the ring be of a certain size and in a certain 
place, and have a certain orbit, the stability of the sys- 
tem will be endangered. Care must also be taken that 
the new nebula fall in with the direction of rotation in 
the old; and it must be especially careful to hit near 
the equator, and parallel with it: otherwise the revo- 
lution would be set back, or the ball would be knocked 
out of its plane; and thus the stability of the system 
would be once more endangered. If it should occur to 
any one that this is a hap-hazard way of working, he 
need only think of the nature of things, and all difficul- 
ties will disappear. Of course, this is not meant as a 
disproof of the nebular theory; it is only intended to 
show that the simplicity of the theory, which is its 
great charm, must be given up if it is to fit the facts. 
And we think it clear, that by the time the necessary 
auxiliary hypotheses are made, the theory is wonderful- 
ly like a dough-face, whose nose may be put on indif- 
ferently up or down. In truth, the theory has largely 
fallen into disfavor with mathematical astronomers, and 
is held by them chiefly on grounds of physics. Its best 
friends are the magazine scientists. We conclude, then, 
that while the matter of our system may once have ex- 
isted in a neoulous state, the no-design argument makes 
a sorry show in explaining its aggregation into present 



MECIIA X/SJf J ND TELEOL OGY. 179 

order as a mechanical necessity. For it explains the 
stable system, and fits the earth for life and civilization, 
not by any nebula, but by a nebula which shall be either 
so arranged within itself, or so beaten upon from with- 
out by other nebulae, that the masses, and eccentricities, 
and distances, and orbits, and times, and composition 
of the planets, shall be just what they must be to secure 
the result. It may be said that the solar system displays 
no marks of design. Opinions differ. We only claim 
that if there are such marks, there is nothing in the 
nebular system to explain them away. Once in awhile, 
some one proposes to apply the principle of natural 
selection to astronomy, and thus, by trial, reach a stable 
system ; but such a plan shows such dense ignorance 
of the first principles of mechanics as to call for no 
criticism. 

A second general criticism upon the mechanical the- 
ory is, that besides assuming every thing at the start, 
it can, at best, only result in "a drawn battle against 
teleology."* No theory can deny the general adapta- 
tion and harmonious interaction of things; and hence, 
if they were created, they must be viewed as the prod- 
uct of transcendent wisdom. The attempt to elimi- 
nate or lessen these purpose-like adaptations, by going 
back in time, we have seen to result from mental con- 

* A sorap of autliorit}^ may be welcome to those who need it. 
Accordiiig to Professor Huxley, "The teleological and mechanical 
views of nature are not necessarily exclusive. The teleplogist can 
always defy the evolutionist to disprove that the primordial molec- 
ular arrangement was not intended to evolve the phenomena of the 
universe." — Academy^ October, 1869. 



180 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

fusion and a certain bondage to the senses. Mechan- 
ism can introduce no harmony or adaptation which was 
not always implicitly in the system. Hence, after the 
atheist has referred every thing to the atomic mechan- 
ism, the theist may insist that the mechanism be ex- 
plained. He may claim that it was made to do its 
work ; and, if we should allow that this cannot be 
proved, it is plain that it cannot be disproved. The 
theist insists that the very thing to be explained— the 
harmonious interaction of things for the production of 
purpose-like effects — is not explained at all, but as- 
sumed. The atomic mechanism has all the marks of a 
manufactured article, and the theist demands that we 
go behind it to a prearranging mind, which is the only 
real explanation of harmony and adaptation in a mani- 
fold of objects and effects. Here the atheist is com- 
pletely at his mercy, unless he show not only that the 
atomic system can be conceived as standing alone, but, 
also, that the various facts known about it compel the 
mind to affirm its self-existence and independence. If, 
on the other hand, the theist can show that the known 
facts forbid us to assume its independence, then the 
teleological argument comes back with absolute con- 
viction. 

That the atheist can furnish no such proof, is almost 
self-evident. The nearest approach to it would be an 
attempt to show that the properties of matter could 
not be other than they are, and that, therefore, the very 
notion of matter carries the present order with it. For 
example, the conception of matter seems to imply that 
it necessarily fills space; and if its activities and their 



MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY. 181 

laws resulted with the same rational necessity from the 
notion of matter, then it might seem fitted to be a first 
fact. The truths of geometry and arithmetic appear 
able to stand alone, and we build mathematical and 
logical systems without feeling any need for a support, 
because they are self-supporting. If the notion of mat- 
ter carried the present order with it, just as the mathe- 
matical axioms carry mathematics with them, it might 
serve as a first fact. But it is hardly necessary to point 
out that this is not the case. If w^e except the single 
property of extension, not a shadow of rational neces- 
sity can be shown for a single circumstance connected 
with the atoms. They have a definite number, but no 
reason can be given why that number should not havp 
been more or less. They fall into two great classes, 
ponderable and imponderable; but it is quite conceiva- 
ble that there should have been only one class, or any 
number of classes, and all of them different from what 
they are at present. The ponderable atoms again fall 
into Bome sixty classes; but there is no difficulty in the 
notion that there should have been n classes, and that 
the present classes should not have been. The case is 
not altered, if we view them as compounds of some 
sinipler unit; for this simpler unit must have had defi- 
nite properties and relations in order to form definite 
classes with peculiar properties. Certain of these 
atoms, again, have a chemical attraction for certain 
others; but it is perfectly conceivable that this attrac- 
tion should have extended to more or less atoms, and 
that the combining power should have been greater or 
less. The elements have various active properties; but 



182 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

it is entirely conceivable that these should have been 
more or less, and that they should have followed other 
laws than they do. The ponderable elements have all 
an attraction of gravitation; but it is quite conceivable 
that they should not have it, and that it should vary as 
some other law than that of the inverse square of the 
distance. It was a whim for a time with some sj)ecu- 
lators who thought mainly with their eyes, that the 
inverse square is a necessary law of all central forces. 
They were seduced into this by the idea of some subtle 
ether streaming out from a center; and, of course, the 
amount of this ether on a given surface would vary in- 
versely as the square of the distance from the center. 
But they forgot to inquire where this outstreaming 
ether came from, and how an outstreaming could cause 
an attraction or an in-going. They further failed to 
notice that on this law there could only be one force, 
either of attraction or of repulsion, or none in the uni- 
verse. If the forces of attraction and repulsion were 
balanced at any point, they would be at all, and they 
would cancel each other. If not balanced, then one 
would keep the upper hand forever, and practically 
annihilate the other. But the worst failure of all w^as 
the failure to see that the majority of central forces do 
not vary as the inverse square of the distance, but as 
inverse higher powers of the spaces. Neither gravita- 
tion nor its law can be viewed as necessities of thought. 
No more is its extent necessary. The most forces act 
only at molecular distances, and no necessity of thought 
can be shown why gravitation of all the forces should 
extend across the whole diameter of the sidereal system. 



MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY. 183 

The elementary forces of the universe vary only with 
the spaces across which they act; but no necessity can 
be shoAvn why they should not vary with the time-, or 
with the velocity, or with the mass, or with the mode 
of aggregation. In most of these cases a clear teleo- 
logical reason for the present order can be given, but 
there is not a shadow of metaphysical necessity. If 
there were no universal force, the universe would be a 
straggling mob of unrelated atoms. If gravitation fol- 
lowed any other law than it does, it would introduce 
the profoundest changes into the system, and threaten 
the stability of the whole. If there were no chemical 
properties, a stupid mass of uniform matter w^ould re- 
sult. If their combining powers were other than they 
are, we should have dead immobility or utter instabil- 
ity. If oxygen and nitrogen combined like oxygen and 
hydrogen, a single spark would shatter the earth. If 
the relation of the air to radiant heat were slightly 
modified, life w^ould be impossible, because of the re- 
sulting heat and cold. If water evaporated only at a 
high temperature, vegetation would soon be parched off 
of the earth. If the air were speedily saturated with 
vapor, or if its absorbent power were much increased, 
the result would be disastrous. There are no water- 
works in any of our cities which display any thing like 
the contrivance of the water-works of the skies. But 
these, and a million other laws, are no necessities of 
thought. They all have the look of contrivance for an 
end. 

iiut, even granting the necessity of the present laws 
of matter, the actual results are not necessary; for ex- 



184 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

ample, the present law of gravitation is quite compat- 
ible with other orbital motions than those of the plan- 
ets, and even with no orbital motions at all. Hyperbolic 
and parabolic orbits are just as possible as elliptical 
orbits; and dead rest, or a common mass, is as possible 
as orbital motion. The choice depends upon the orig- 
inal disposition and velocities of the elements; but here, 
again, no necessity can be shown why they should have 
been so arranged as to move in an ellipse, and not in an 
ellipse or hyperbola. Of course, no life would have 
been possible otherwise, as the planets would have been 
whirled out into space, and cold, and darkness, never to 
return. That this does not happen now, is due solely 
to the great distance of disturbing bodies; and as it is, 
comets occasionally get switched off, and never come 
back. It is a direct demand of the law of gravitation 
that the elements should have arranged themselves in 
the nebula according to their specific gravities; but 
that would have sent hydrogen out to Neptune, and 
left only the metals for the earth and sun; and, again, 
life would have been impossible. Such a result could 
be warded off only by assuming such a peculiar dispo- 
sition of the elements, that this effect was not produced. 
But no one would claim that such a disposition is the 
only conceivable one. We often delude ourselves with 
the notion that the fixed laws of the elements make 
only one result possible; whereas, what those laws slull 
produce depends entirely upon the conditions under 
which they work. In themselves, they are just as com- 
patible with phenomenal chaos as with phenomenal 
order. Thus the elementary laws of matter, and even 



MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY. 185 

the laws of motion, appear as contingent, meaning 
thereby that they might conceivably have been alto- 
gether different. Still more is this the case with the 
arbitrary conditions under which they work, and which 
determine the actual outcome. The theist might, then, 
claim with some show of justice, that the foundation 
stones of the physical system are stamped with the 
marks of choice and purpose. If, now, we ask why, 
out of the myriad conceivable possibilities, the present 
intelligible order has been realized, the theist ansv/ers 
that the nature of the elements, their laws and mutual 
relations, were all determined with reference to the end 
they w^ere to realize.* The atheistic answer is, that 
things exist as they do, and that no more need be said 
about it. At all events, the atheist can give no other 
answer as long as he remains true to his mechanical 
principles. 

We conclude, then, that the no-design argument, 
based on the mechanical view of nature, can never se- 
cure a stronger verdict against theism than not proven. 
It is, also, clear that mechanism and teleology can never 
properly collide, for the teleologist seeks an explanation 
of tho, purpose-like arrangement and working of things, 

*In the volume on Theism, in the English and Foreign Philo- 
sophical Library, the chief argument is, that the conservation of 
energy explains every thing. The author's knowledge is purely 
verbal. This doctrine no more explains the design in things, than 
doc s the related one of the indestructibility of matter. Both doc- 
trines are compatible with utter phenomenal chaos. The cause of 
the phenomenal order, therefore, must be sought elsewhere. Tho 
doctrine in question is a mere commonplace, and is utterly power- 
less to throw any light on philosophical questions. 



186 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

and mechanism assumes it; or, rather, teleology de- 
mands an explanation of the mechanism. The ques- 
tion, then, is not whether the mechanical view or the 
teleological view is the correct one, for both may be 
true. The mechanical system may exist for the reali- 
zation of preconceived ends. Both theist and atheist 
may quite agree as to the existence of the mechanical 
system, but the theist holds that that system has all the 
evidences of manufacture. Thus the question between 
them takes on, at last, this form : Can purpose-like 
effects prove the existence of an intelligent cause ; or 
can purpose-like adaptations in a manifold prove its 
dependence on an intelligent cause? Now, concerning 
this system, we have seen that no rational necessity can 
be shown for any of its determinations, unless we think 
of it as made for an end. We have seen its extreme 
complexity, and the impossibility of deducing any thing 
from it which was not contained in it. And here are 
some facts: (1) The only known explanation of harmo- 
nious CO- working and adaption in a manifold, is a pre- 
arranging mind ; and if this explanation, which is so 
potent in our experience, be extended to the natural 
order, it makes the facts luminous, and satisfies the 
demands of the mind. (2) That this atomic system 
exists is not a fact of knowledge, but of inference only. 
The attempt, therefore, to play off the atomic theory as 
fact, against the theistic theory as mere hypc>thesis, 
betrays a remarkable mental or moral condition. 
(3) That nothing exists but atonrs is sheer assumption 
and dogmatism. (4) We have not a shadow of me- 
chanical insight into most of the inorganic processes of 



MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY. 187 

nature, and none whatever into the simplest organic 
processes. The assumption, therefore, that all action 
is mechanical, is not based upon knowledge, but upon an 
a priori metaphysical theory. (5) The aim of all hy- 
potheses is to enable the mind to comprehend the facts. 
(6) That hypothesis has the best claim to recognition 
which is simplest and most rational. Now, in the light 
of these f9,cts, which is the more satisfactory explana- 
tion, the theistic theory that nature has its root, and 
the explanation of its order, in an eternal, omnipotent, 
and omniscient spirit; or the atheistic theory of an 
eternal mechanism, whose parts, indeed, work together 
as if they had been contrived, but which, nevertheless, 
are unoriginated and mutually independent ? Remem- 
ber, always, that it is not fact against theory, as is so 
often assumed. It is theory against theory, w^ith reason 
to judge between them. Certainly the theist need 
never feel ashamed of his faith in holding that such a 
mechanism cannot be the first fact of the universe, but 
that, back of it, there must be a unitary and intelligent 
being. 

A final difficulty with the mechanical theory is, its 

explanation of human thought and action. A common 

fault with speculators is, to overlook the fact that man 

is a part of the system. The human mind, therefore, 

and its purposive activities, must be explained by the 

mechanical theory if it is to be adequate to the facts. 

And here it appears that mind in general is known only 

by its effects. The human mind is as much hidden 

from observation as is the infinite mind. We are con- 
13 



188 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

scions of chought and purpose in ourselves. That they 
exist elsewhere is j)ui'ely a matter of inference. And 
here we come upon the difficulty* which has always 
pressed the mechanical theory since the time of Des- 
cartes. The same argument which disproves the ex- 
istence of mind behind physical phenomena, disproves 
the existence of mind in any of the human forms we 
see. How does one know that the various living forms 
about him are sensitive and intelligent? The reply 
must be, that they act as if they were. But here the 
mechanical doctrine comes in with just as much reason 
as in the case of the universe, and urges that these 
physical forms are so constituted, that when acted upon 
they react, with divers manifestations which seem like 
feeling and thought, but in truth they are only very 
complex mechanisms, without any inner life. The " as 
if" by which the atheist discredits mind in nature, is 
even more effective against mind in man. Certainly, 
if the construction of the body manifests no thought 
there should be no difficulty in admitting that the mo- 
tions of the body can take place without any guiding 
mind. One may urge that others tell us tliat the'y 
think and feel, but this telling is also a mechanical 
effect, with a mechanical cause, and does not alter the 
argument in the least. If the nature of things is suf- 
ficient to explain the universe without intelligence, it 
is certainly capable of explaining the action and reac- 
tion of the human body without intelligence. If the 
mechanical explanation of nature is sufficient, there is 
no 2:round for believing that the forms about us which 
we call living are really sensitive and intelligent. But 



MECHANISM AN V TELEOLOGY. 189 

if, on the other hand, such a notion is impossible, and 
we may be practically sure of our neighbor's intelli- 
gence as we are of our own, and that because he acts 
intelligently, what becomes of the doctrine that no ac- 
tion of natural causes can prove the reality of mind? 
If a physical organism can so act that we are sure there 
is a mind controlling it, why may we not conclude, when 
natural agents act in the same way, that there is a mind 
controlling them? Both conclusions stand or fall to- 
gether. A few scratches on a piece of flint convince 
the archaeologist that mind has been there, although 
the scratches are its only trace; and the purpose-like 
miracles of nature are at least as strong evidence of 
mind as the hacked flint. It will occur to the thought- 
less to say, that we know from experience that human 
works are contrived, but we have no such experience 
Avith regard to nature. In truth, however, no one 
knows that any work but his own is contrived, except 
by the purpose it shows; but if purpose-like action 
proves the reality of the finite mind, it can prove the 
existence of the infinite mind also. The only escape 
from this is to deny the substantial existence of the 
iiuman mind, and make all mental action an outcome of 
physical necessity, and consciousness a delusion. Mr. 
Huxley bordered on this position in his lecture, " Are 
Animals Automata? " but he limited the doctrine, with 
regard to man, by saying* that though man is only a 
conscious automaton, still he is " endowed with free- 
will in the only intelligible sense of that much-abused 
term; inasmuch as in many respects we are able to do 
* " Fortnightly Review," November, 1874. 



190 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

as we like." The name is nothing; the meaning is 
every thing; and though it is somewhat surprising to 
hear man called an automaton, we steady ourselves by 
remembering that this term, in Mr. Huxley's mouth, is 
only a pleasing rhetorical novelty, for the automaton 
is admitted to be able to do what it likes. A device of 
this sort, therefore, will not help us out; but we must 
make men real automata if we are to save the mechan- 
ical theory. 

Even this position is held by some who claim to be 
advanced; but the denial is not yet complete. Autom- 
atism does not escape the necessity of admitting pur- 
posive action in the system so long as consciousness 
is allowed to stand. For man is a part of nature, and 
he does act with purpose. In human activity, purpose 
controls the arrangement and action of efficient causes. 
But man's activity, on the mechanical theory, would be 
only the activity of nature, and hence it would follow 
that nature does act with purpose, at least in living be- 
ings. In one department of natural activity, it is certain 
that purpose controls action; but if this is possible in 
the department of conscious life, why not possible in 
the outer world? The claim that purpose is nowhere 
controlling in the system, breaks down, and hence the 
extent of its control is purely a matter of evidence. 
But, as we have said, we have just as good ground for 
believing in controlling purposes in nature as we have 
in human action. The purposive character of human 
action cannot be denied without breaking down con- 
sciousness. And some of the more logical take even 
this step. Consciousness is held to be but a delusive 



MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY. 191 

and powerless attendant upon the mechanical processes 
which underlie it. All appearance of control over our 
activities, all sequence of thought upon thought, or of 
act upon thought, is sheer illusion. But by this time 
we reach, not science, but utter skepticism. Here, then, 
is the dilemma of the mechanical theory: either it must 
allow the testimony of consciousness, or it must disallow 
it. In the former case it cannot deny the reality of pur- 
posive action in the system of things, and the question 
of its extent is simply one of evidence. But as natural 
action exhibits the same marks of intellectual arrano^e- 
ment, we cannot deny it in the former without denying 
it in the latter. In the second case, the repudiation of 
consciousness, all knowledge vanishes, and the very data 
of science are destroyed. In truth, the no-design argu- 
ment is thoroughly skeptical in its tendencies. If the 
plain indications of things, and the demands of reason, 
are to be explained away in the interests of atheism, 
there is no reason why every thing should not be ex- 
plained away in the interests of skepticism. The na- 
ture-of-things argument, which assumes adaptation 
without a designer, is abundantly able to explain every 
thing else in the same easy way. We cannot explain 
the existence of fossils on mountain tops except by as- 
suming that the mountains were once under the sea, 
and that the fossils were once alive; but the nature 
of things needs no such assumption. If it could bring 
organic matter together to form a living organism, it 
must certainly be competent to produce an imitation. 
The geologist thinks he detects traces of fire in many 
of the rocks; but if the nature of things is such as to 



192 STUDIES m THEISM. 

produce the appearance of intelligence without its pres- 
ence, it certainly might produce the appearance of fire. 
In short, no science could stand for a moment if the 
principles of the no-design argument were allowed. 
Here, again, it will occur to the thoughtless to say, that 
we have experience in these cases, hut we have no ex- 
perience of purpose in nature; but the claim is false. 
In the case of fire rock we know that heat could pro- 
duce such appearances; in the case of intellectual ar- 
rangement in nature, we know that mind would pro- 
duce such order. The argument is equally good or 
equally worthless in both cases. In short, all objective 
science is based upon an " as if; " and if we distrust the 
theistic " as if," the scientific " as if " must also fall a 
prey to skepticism. 

Upon the whole, we must conclude that the mechan- 
ical theory makes, at best, but a sorry showing when it 
attempts to stand alone. We have no war with the 
mechanical doctrine as a partial and secondary fact. 
We object to it only, as an ultimate and universal ex- 
planation of things. Before it is able to cope with the 
simplest facts of inorganic nature it becomes so com- 
plex that the mind finds little satisfaction in it as an 
ultimate fact. By the time the organic world is included 
in it, the theory becomes a simple wax nose, which can 
be twisted in any desirable direction. As s:ch, it i^ 
held, not because it affords a shadow of insight into 
the facts, but because of the tacit assumption that these 
mechanical agents include all real being, and that hence 
they must explain the facts, even if we cannot see how. 
The theory is purely a metaphysical one, bas^d upon 



MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY, 193 

tlie assumption that all action is mechanical, and that 
all being is material. As a matter of fact, we have in- 
finitely more insight into the purposes of nature than 
into the methods of their realization; but if the as- 
sumption mentioned be allowed, we may be sure of the 
sufficiency of the mechanical theory. If we grant that 
once upon a time there was nothing but the physical 
elements, it is easy to see that they must have produced 
the order of the visible system, and for the simple rea- 
son that there was nothing else to do it. When thought 
and action are reached, the theory is forced to deny all 
freedom, and finally to forsake its fundamental prin- 
ciple, that natural activity knows nothing of expecta- 
tion. Thus, it comes down finally to the notion of a 
mechanism which can form plans and adjust the means 
for their execution. But here, as every-where, the 
name is indifferent, if the thing be understood. That 
which forms and executes plans may be called a mech- 
anism, if the name pleases so much, but it is just what 
most of us mean by mind.* Thus the mechanical the- 
ory, by an inner dialectic, passes over into its opposite 
and cancels itself. The determination to explain every 
thing by mechanism makes it necessary to give the 
mechanism mental qualities. Bearing these facts in 
mind, it hardly seems presumptuous to claim, that, as 
an ultimate and universal theory, the theistic doctrine 

* Since the time of Locke, vsorae speculators have busied them- 
selves with the question, Can matter think ? It is a simple matter 
of definition that matter, as commonly conceived, cannot think ; 
but there is no great gain in affirming that matter can think if its 
notion be extended to include thinking. The question is a verbal 
squabble. 



194 STUDIES IN- THEISM. 

is a more simple and satisfactory hypothesis. This 
conclusion we reach from considering only the teleology 
ical aspect of things; and it is the one reached by the 
common sense of mankind. It cannot be questioned 
without involving science itself in universal skepticism. 

In concluding this discussion, it may be allowed to 
restate the argument in another form. Hitherto we 
have allowed matter to be a real existence, and have 
claimed only that it is not self-sufficient. On the basis 
of this admission, the atheist argues as follows : Matter 
is a real cause of phenomena. All the more complex 
natural manifestations are explicable as results of the 
primal qualities and laws of matter. Matter, then, ex- 
plains much, and is daily explaining more. The phys- 
icist cannot question that every physical fact, no matter 
how high its order, is a necessary outcome of its phys- 
ical antecedents. But by the law of parsimony we 
are forbidden to assume causes beyond necessity. Be- 
fore, then, we appeal to God, let us find out what 
matter itself can do. We certainly have no right to 
assume a spiritual cause unless we know that material 
causes are inadequate. But who knows all the capac- 
ities of matter? Every day it becomes more mys- 
tic and wonderful, and who shall set a limit to its 
powers? By the law of parsimony, therefore, theism 
is an unnecessary hypothesis, until it has proved a 
negative. 

This argument is a very common one, and there seems 
to be great force in it. In truth, however, it rests 
upon complete ignorance of philosophy. It assumes 



MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY. Vdo 

tbut matter is known as a causal noumenon; whereas it 
is a commonplace of philosophy, that causes of any sort 
an never seen, but inferred. Matter as noumenon is as 
hidden to sense-perception as God is; and it is withal 
just as metaphysical a conception. Now what the 
theist wishes to know is, not what we shall call the 
power behind phenomena, but how w^e shall think of it. 
People who really think do not war about names pro- 
vided the thing be understood. Hence propositions to 
define matter anew fill a thinker with amazement. 
They are totally irrelevant, and denote an infantile 
stage of thought. The theist, then, is quite indifferent 
as to the name of the ultimate reality; and except that 
the word is misleading in its implications, he is as will- 
ing to call it matter as mind. But what he does view 
as important is, to form some conception of its nature; 
and this question must always be answered by an in- 
ference from the phenomena. Now the alternative can 
never be escaped of regarding the basal reality as intel- 
ligent or non-intelligent. The notion of a third some- 
thing, which is neither, is simply a verbal phrase, and 
represents no thought. The atheist chooses, for it is a 
choice, to regard it as non-intelligent. Here the views 
^ivide. We may regard this non-intelligent reality as 
one or many. In the first case, we have a pantheistic 
atheism; in the second, we have atheistic atomism. In 
the first case, the atheist explains the world by a blind 
power which works at a multitude of discrete points 
throughout infinite space; which also works in each of 
these points with exact reference to all other co-existent 
and sequent activities; and which finally combines all 



196 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

tliese activities with infinite skill into infinite products, 
all compact of seeming purpose, yet without any knowl- 
edge of itself or of what it is doing, or of the order it 
founds or of the plan it follows. In the case of athe- 
istic atomism, we explain the world by an indefinite 
swarm of self-existent atoms, which nevertheless are not 
independent, but which do constantly correspond to 
every other throughout space, with the most mathemat- 
ical exactness, and which also work together as if ani- 
mated by a common purpose; yet all the time without 
any knowledge of themselves, or of their fellows, or of 
the order which seems to rule them. No talk of natural 
law will affect this alternative ; for the law is but an ab- 
stract from the facts to be explained. Such, then, being 
the implications of atheism, the theist holds that theism 
requires less faith. 

In the previous chapter we saw that universal adap- 
tation among natural agents is a postulate of all science, 
and that the principle of finality is a postulate of the 
organic sciences. In this chapter we have seen the 
attempt to discredit finality by the mechanical theory 
of nature to be both a failure and suicidal. If there is 
mind in man, there is mind in nature. We believe, then, 
the principle of finality to be firmly established; it 
only remains to utter a word of caution as to its use. 
It is often strangely held, that because a thing is an 
end in nature, it cannot also be a means. The word 
final, in the phrase final cause, seems to be at the bot- 
tom of this misconception. But there is nothing in 
the doctrine to forbid the thought that ends may be 



MECHANISM AND TELEOLOGY. 197 

higher and lower, or that a thing may be an end with 
reference to the agents which produced it, and yet a 
means with reference to higher ends. We may also 
believe in finality in the system, without pretending to 
discern the ultimate purpose of the whole. The end 
of things is out of sight. Indeed, that the system 
as a whole has a purpose, is not clear to observation. 
We perceive a great multitude of minor ends which 
indicate that an intelligent power is at work, but it is 
not easy to make out a definite drift for the whole. 
That there is such a drift we conclude from the fact 
that the power is intelligent in its minor operations, 
and especially from the moral and religious nature, 
which will never allow that the physical system can be 
an ultimate end with an intelligent being. There must 
be an end, though we cannot see it ; and that end must 
be to develop souls, though we do not see how all the 
arrangements of the present life are necessary for such 
an end. To conclude that there is no end because we 
do not see any, is to assume omnipotence. The gigantic 
growths of the ancient forests seem wasted when 
viewed from without; but coal plays an important part 
in civilization. The prodigal production of the cereal 
grains seems wasteful enough, if we assume that repro- 
duction is the only end aimed at. It does not seem 
such folly when we remember that society could not 
nxist without corn. Indeed, some of the greatest tri- 
umphs of human invention seem stupid enough from 
the outside. A savage visiting a city and seeing the 
unsightly telegraph lines, might conclude that they had 
no purpose, or at best that they were meant as perches 



198 STUDIES IK THEISM 

for sparrows. But there is nothing irrational in believ- 
ing that a power which is seen to be intelligent where 
we can comprehend its action, is also intelligent in 
realms where we cannot detect any purpose. Never- 
theless, it must be allowed that the final purpose for 
which all lower ends exist, that '^far-off divine event 
to which the whole creation moves," is not revealed to 
our knowledge, but to our faith. We would use great 
reticence, therefore, in speaking of the divine purposes, 
for a sufficient insight is lacking. Least of all, would 
we have physical science diverted from its study of 
phenomenal laws in order to search for final causes. 
Such a course could result only in religious and scien- 
tific scandal. There are two ideals toward which the 
mind strives : first, to know how every thing is done; 
and, second, to know what it is done for. Both ideals 
are unattainable at present ; but the study of the 
methods of nature is practically of vastly more im|)or- 
tance in physical science than a study of the purpose of 
things. It is with our belief in purpose, as with our 
faith in a divine providence. If this faith be attacked, 
we are ready to show that there is no reason for being 
ashamed of it. And yet from no feeling of shame, but 
from reverence rather, we prefer not to have that great 
name too often upon our lips, but content ourselves 
with believing that our times are in God's hand with- 
out specifying too curiously how he is working out his 
will concerning us. 



THE CONSERVATION OF ENERGY. 100 



CHAPTER V. 

THE CONSERVATION OF ENERGY. 

rrilE man who journeyed from Jerusalem to Jericho 
fell among thieves. The doctrine of the conserva- 
tion of energy has been still more unfortunate; it has 
fallen a prey to the magazine scientists and rhetoricians. 
These have stripped it of its true meaning, and saddled 
false ones upon it, until scarcely any likeness to its sci- 
entific self remains. " We read constantly," says Pro- 
fessor Tait, "of the so-called ^physical forces '—heat, 
light, electricity, etc. ; of the ' correlation of the phys- 
ical forces,' the 'persistence or conservation of force,' 
To an accurate man of science?, all this is simply error 
md confusion."* These misunderstandings of the 
doctrine have given great support to materialism and 
atheism. Hence the need of examining the subject. 

The doctrine in question was first known as the cor- 
relation and conservation of the forces. The forces 
were said to correlate, and hence force is one. Force 
was also said to be conserved, and hence was presuma- 
bly eternal. But this terminology was treacherous; for 
force is defined in text-books on physics and mechanics 
as any thing which tends to change the condition of a 
body whether in motion or at rest. Hence, gravity, co- 
hesion, afiinity, repulsion, pressure, impact, etc., were all 
* " Recent Advances in Physical Science," p. 389. 



200 STUDIES IN THEISM, 

arranged under the head of force. Now, as the forces 
were said to correlate, it was easy to blunder into the 
notion that all the attractive and repulsive forces of 
matter can pass into one another. It w^s not uncom- 
mon to hear it asserted that chemical affinity, and even 
repulsion, were but transformed gravity. Even the 
space-filling quality of matter depends upon force; and 
since all the forces correlate, it occurred to some specu- 
lators that solidity and inertia also must, in some way, 
correlate with the other forces. Other speculators, 
whose ignorance was equally dense and exhaustive, 
urged that this would never do; as in such case matter 
might go off in a puff, and thus nothing would be left. 
This necessity of limiting the correlation, was felt as a 
great hardship by the more radical speculators; and was 
regarded as a victory by the conservatives. The dis- 
cussion w^as mainly a logomachy without a ray of in- 
sight into the scientific meaning of the doctrine. All 
things are phenomena of force; and are not gravity and 
repulsion, and life and mind and matter and every 
thing, forces ? How, then, can we deny their correlation? 
With this understanding of the doctrine, Mr. Herbert 
Spencer proceeded to prove a rich variety of proposi- 
tions, such as the indestructibility of matter, the con- 
tinuity of motion, the correlation and equivalence of 
physical and mental force, the impossibility of freedom, 
and divers sociological laws. Mr. Bain found in it the 
reason why one cannot attend to many things at once, 
or become great in many directions. So terrible are the 
ravages in physics of arguing from words without at- 
tending to their scientific content. 



THE CONSER VA TION OF ENER GY. 201 

The doctrine of the constancy of force suffered no 
less from this verbal exegesis. Inasmuch as force is 
constant, what shall we make of the fact that all the 
attractive and repulsive forces vary with the distance 
across which they act, so that while their law is con- 
stant, they themselves are incessantly varying? In the 
case of gravity, a body at half the distance acts with 
four times the energy; at double the distance, it acts 
with only one fourth of the energy. Whence the gain 
and loss of power? Since force is constant, the idea of 
creation or destruction is inadmissible; whence, then, 
the increment, and whither the decrement ? No less a 
man than Faraday was sent off on a wild-goose chase by 
reasoning of this sort; and he concluded that it must 
come from, and return to, the ether — that limbo of sci- 
entific difiiculties. He argues at length that without 
some such assumption we come in hopeless conflict with 
the doctrine of conservation.* Strangely enough, it 
never seems to have occurred to him that this result 
bordered on a reductio ad cd)surdimi of the conservation 
doctrine. 

In like manner the doctrine that work involves the 
expenditure of force was misunderstood. Inasmuch as 
an attracting body is forever pulling at all the rest of 
the universe, it occurred to many speculators that the 
attracting forces of the elements must be wearing out. 
Th( y have already pulled the matter of our solar system 
through vast spaces, and condensed it into comparative- 
ly very small spaces. Now as a vast amount of work 

* See his paper in " The Correlation and Conservation of Forces." 
D. Appleton & Co. 



202 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

has been done; and as work involves the expenditure ol 
force, of course the attractions are growing less and 
less. Opposed to this conclusion, however, was the 
awkward fact, that, in truth, the attractions are now 
stronger than ever before; and thus the doctrine of con 
servation was again endangered. To escape this diffi- 
culty, some speculators imagined that motions may be- 
come attractions or repulsions, and conversely. That 
motion implies something which moves, and attraction 
something which attracts, and that a moving thing, as 
such, is not an attracting thing, was a fact of which 
they had not the slightest suspicion. This impossible 
identification of motion and attractive or repulsive force 
seems to underlie the following extraordinary state- 
ment by Mr. Grove, whose treatise upon the correla- 
tion of the physical forces is popularly supposed to be 
classical: — 

" Of absolute rest nature gives us no evidence. All 
matter, as far as we can ascertain, is ever in movement, 
not merely in masses, as with the planetary spheres, but 
also molecularly or throughout its most intimate struct- 
ure, ... so that, as a fact, we cannot predicate of any 
portion of matter that it is absolutely at rest. Sup- 
posing, however, that motion is not an indispensable 
function of matter, but that matter can be at rest, mat- 
ter at rest would never of itself cease to be at rest; it 
would not move, unless impelled to such motion by 
some other moving body or body which has moved. 
This proposition applies not merely to impulsive motion, 
as when a ball at rest is struck by a moving body, or 
pressed by a spring which has previously been moved, 



77/7=; CONSERVATION OF ENERGY. 203 

but to motion caused by attractions such as magnetism 
or gravitation." * 

If by rest equilibrium is meant, this passage is true 
and trivial; otherwise, it is in such opposition to ele- 
mentary mechanical physics, and even to the true doc- 
trine of conservation, that it is difficult to conceive 
how any one, acquainted with the most rudimentary 
principles of physics, could make it. The physicist is 
constantly considering cases of motion generated from 
a state of rest by the mutual attractions of bodies. All 
that is needed is mutual attraction, with space through 
which to move. A great proportion of mechanical 
problems are of this kind. If Mr. Grove's statement 
were true as it stands, the whole science of dynamics 
would be at an end. But it would not pay to unravel 
its possible meanings. The root of the blunder lies in 
the assumed correlation of force and motion. 

Yet, in truth, there was a certain grandeur in those 
rhetorical misunderstandings. The notion of one uni- 
versal power, forever equal to itself but of infinite 
manifestation, had great attraction for speculative 
minds; and, withal, it offered manifold opportunities 
for fine writing. Proteus was almost worn out by the 
demands made upon him for illustration. Physics, it 
was said, had come to the aid of metaphysics, and 
solved magnificently the problem of the beginning and 
the end, over which philosophy had puzzled in vain. 
There is neither beginning nor end. Nature is a cycle 
returning into itself, and hence self-centered and eter- 
nal. As such it rolls on f orever,/manif csting its various 

* See chapter on " Motion in Correlation of Physical Forces." 
14 



204 STUDIES IN TUEISM. 

phases, and bringing to life and death. It may be well 
to quote a few passages in illustration of the correla- 
tionists' exalted state of mind at this period. 

According to Dr. Bray, in his "Anthropology,'' " The 
scientific idea of force is the idea of as pure and mys- 
terious a unity as the one of Parmenides. It is a nou- 
menal integer, phenomenally differentiated mto the glit- 
tering universe of things." It would be easy to fill 
pages with such dazzling matter; but volumes of it 
would give no information, and we content ourselves 
with one overwhelming glory from the pen of Dr. 
Youmans : — 

" Thus the law characterized by Faraday as the high- 
est in physical science which our faculties permit us to 
perceive, has a far more extended sway; it might well 
have been proclaimed the highest law of all science — 
the most far-reaching principle that adventuring reason 
has discovered in the universe. Its stupendous reach 
spans all orders of existence. N"ot only does it govern 
the movements of the heavenly bodies, but it presides 
over the genesis of the constellations; not only does it 
control those radiant floods of power which fill the 
eternal spaces, bathing, warming, illumining, and viv- 
ifying our planet, but it rules the actions and relations 
of men, and regulates the march of terrestrial affairs. 
Nor is its dominion limited to physical phenomena; it 
prevails equally in the world of mind, controlling all the 
faculties and processes of thought and feeling. . . . 
Star and nerve-tissue are parts of the same system — 
stellar and nervous forces are correlated. Nay, more; 
sensation awakens thought and kindles emotion, so that 



THE CONSERVATION OF ENERGY. 205 

tliis wondrous dynamic chain binds into living unity 
the reahns of matter and mind through measureless am- 
plitudes of space and time." After this unspeakable 
flight, the writer continues : " And if these high reali- 
ties are but faint and fitful glimpses which science has 
obtained in the dim dawn of discovery, what must be 
the glories of the coming day? If, indeed, they are 
but ' pebbles ' gathered from the shores of the great 
ocean of truth, what are the mysteries still hidden in 
the bosom of the mighty unexplored?"* 

Echo may safely be left to answer these questions. 
Pending such reply, the best criticism of this rhetorical 
flummery, will be to develop the doctrine of conserva- 
tion as scientists understand it. 

By a happy change of terminology, scientists have 
escaped the confusions attendant upon using the word 
force. The doctrine is now known as the conservation 
of energy — a phrase which will be explained further on. 
Meanwhile, we remark that the doctrine says nothing 
whatever about the inner nature of matter whereby it 
is enabled to attract or repel; still less does it aflirm 
any correlation between these qualities. It does not pre- 
tend that chemical aflinity or cohesion is transformed 
gravitation, but all alike are accepted as primary and 
irreducible. "We must not imagine the chemical at- 
traction destroyed, or converted into any thing else." 
" In no case is the force which produces the motion 
annihilated, or changed into any thing else." " Of the 

* " Correlation and Conservation of Forces." D. Appleton & Co. 
See Introduction by E. L. Yonmans, M.D. 



206 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

inner quality that enables matter to attract matter we 
know nothing; and the law of conservation makes no 
statement regarding that quality. It takes the facts of 
attraction as they stand, and affirms only the constancy 
of working-power. The convertibility of natural forces 
consists solely in transformations of dynamic into po- 
tential, and of potential into dynamic, energy, which 
are incessantly going on. In no other sense has the 
convertibility of force, at present, any scientific mean- 
ing." * In order, however, to affirm a constancy of 
working power, a single affirmation must be made 
about the so-called attractive and repulsive forces of 
matter, namely, they must vary only with the spaces 
through which they work. Any other law of variation 
would overturn the true doctrine of conservation. As 
the foundation of the doctrine, then, science does not 
affirm a single unitary power, but an indefinite mani- 
fold of elements in the most complex relations of action 
and reaction. How such action is possible the scien- 
tist does not pretend to know; he simply accepts the 
fact with its discovered laws, and says t]]at if we are 
allowed to make certain assumptions about the ele- 
ments, then the energy of the system is a constant 
quantity. But what is energy in the scientific sense ? 
It has two factors: (1) any attraction or repulsion, or 
other force, which can initiate motion; and (2) a free 
space in which this motion can take place. If a stone 
lie on the earth, it has no energy with reference to 
gravitation, although the attraction between it and the 

*T7ndairs "Fragments of Science," paper on Constitution of 
Nature. 



THE CON SEE VA TION OF ENER G Y. 2 7 

earth is then at a maximum. Two chemLcal elements, 
also, have no chemical energy when once they have 
united; yet their attractive grip on each other is more 
than gigantic. But let the stone be raised from the 
earth, or the chemical elements be wrenched apart, so 
that motion can take place; then energy becomes pos- 
sible. Hence, there can be no energy without both 
moving force and space in which to move. But this 
energy, which is said to be constant, turns out to be 
double. The scientist splits it into actual and potential 
energy, or sometimes kinetic and potential energy. 
Kinetic energy is the power a moving body has of 
doing work ; and in strictness the name of energy 
belongs only to this form. Potential energy is the 
possibility of kinetic energy. Thus our stone at any 
point above the earth's surface has potential energy, 
because if left free to fall, it would begin to move and 
thus develop actual energy of motion, or kinetic ener- 
gy. But the potential energy decreases as the kinetic 
increases. The energy of a body just beginning to fall 
would be all potential; its energy at the lowest point 
of its course would be all kinetic; and at all intermedi- 
ate points, it would be partly one, and partly the other. 
Neither of these forms is constant, but their sum is. 
Hence, the notion of the conservation of energy. The 
energy, then, of the universe, does not consist merely in 
the fact that the elements attract and repel, but in this 
fact with the additional one that they have also spaces 
to act through. These same elements might be so 
arranged that, remaining just what they are, the system 
should be utterly powerless. Such, indeed, is the future 



208 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

which this law of conservation seems to be preparing 
for our system. Placing ourselves, then, in the nebu- 
lous time, w^e see that the energy of the universe was 
then mainly potential, and consisted of the pushing and 
pulling forces of the elements multiplied into some 
function of the spaces that separated them. Ever since, 
that potential energy has been becoming kinetic; and 
this has been developed by the fall of the atoms through 
a portion of the space between them. We see, then, 
what the scientist means by affirming that the energy of 
the universe is constant. If at any moment we measure 
the potential and kinetic energies of our system, their 
. sum will be equal to the similar sum obtained from any 
other measurements at whatever time. Such is the 
statement of the law; it remains to inquire into its 
scientific limitations. Unless we do this, the rhetori- 
cians will renew their ravages by interpreting it 
verbally; and then we shall have another flood of dev- 
astating rhetoric. We shall best learn the limitations, 
by studying the proofs of the doctrine. 

The well-known mechanical theory of the conserva- 
tion of vis viva, when extended to molecular motions, 
gives the general doctrine of conservation. If we 
assume any finite system, say some huge nebula, and 
suppose it to fulfill certain conditions, such a system 
will be dynamically conservative. The conditions are 
as foLows: (1) The system must be free from all ex- 
ternal action. (2) The motions of the system must all 
depend upon the forces of the elements; an 1 these 
forces must vary only with the spaces through which 
they act. (3) The atoms must never clash so as to di- 



THE CONSERVATION OF ENERGY. 209 

miiiish motion by any inelastic solidity. When these 
conditions hold, the conservation of energy follows di- 
rectly from the third law of motion, or the equality of 
action and reaction. When they do not hold, energy 
is not constant. If there be forces which vary with ve- 
locity, or with time, or with the mode of aggregation, 
the formula is not exact. Or if there be agents in the 
system capable by volition of originating any motion 
whatever, again the law does not hold. Now all of 
these suppositions are quite simple, and full as easy to 
realize in thought as the assumption that the forces 
shall vary only with the spaces. Indeed, more or less 
of empty space seems of all grounds for force-varia- 
tion, the least rational and conceivable. Of course, the 
facts can be determined only by observation and ex- 
perience. There seems to be no way of satisfying the 
third condition except by giving up the extension of 
the atom altogether, and adopting Boscovich's notion 
of unextended force-centers.* The collision of inelastic 
bodies is invariably attended with the loss of energy 
unless they have a molecular structure, and the mole- 
cules fulfill the conditions mentioned. But if the atom 
be a solid, and not merely a force-center, it is impossible 
to view it as elastic. 

This general theorem of dynamics has been raised 
into importance by the mechanical theory of heat and 
tlic other molecular energies of matter. The discovery 
of their mechanical nature enables us to trace molar mo- 
tion into molecular motion, and conversely; and the de- 

* See essay b}^ Sir John Herscliel on the Origin of Force, in 
** Familiar Lectures on Scientific Subjects." 



210 STUDIES IN THEISM, 

termination of their mechanical equivalent enables us to 
say that the seeming loss of energy in case of molar 
collision is only apparent, the same amount of energy 
being reproduced in molecular forms. This discovery 
is a matter for just pride on the part of physics, but 
our exaltation must never lead us into making extrava- 
gant claims. The doctrine in question is proved only 
for a theoretical physical system; whether the actual 
system fulfills the theoretical conditions, must be de- 
cided by observation and experiment. Thus far experi- 
ment has given a very high degree of probability to the 
doctrine in the physical realm; but even there all ques- 
tions are not ansAvered. In particular, electricity and 
magnetism furnish some troublesome facts. Thus Tait 
and Thomson question Weber's law of electric currents, 
although it is in harmony with experience, because it 
conflicts with the law of conservation. The dogmatism 
of this procedure is evident; for it is by no means a 
first truth that natural forces must vary only with the 
space ; indeed, if we ask ourselves what ground for force 
variation there is in more or less of empty space, we 
shall find ourselves greatly puzzled to see any. The 
truth is, it is purely a question of experience, and not 
of con ceiv ability at all; and if experience point to other 
laws than those which the doctrine of conservation con- 
templates, we must admit them, no matter what the 
theoretical consequences may be. Still we must allow 
as highly probable, that for physical agents left to them- 
selves, the law is absolute. 

Remaining still in the physical realm, it must be fur- 
ther pointed out, that the appearance of simplicity which 



THE CONSER VA TION OF ENER GY. 211 

tlie doctrine lends to our physical theories is mostly- 
misleading. When the various activities of the ele- 
ments are all described as energy, we are apt to fancy 
that we have reduced the many to one; but, in truth, 
these forms remain as mysterious as ever. We have dis- 
covered that one form of energy can give rise to another 
according to the measure of its own vis viva, but we 
have no hint of why, or how, one form becomes another. 
We know that heat has a mechanical equivalent; but 
heat remains as mysterious and as separate as ever. 
We know that the other forms of energy also have 
mechanical equivalents, but still each one remains as 
peculiar as before. They are all modes of motion, it is 
said; but what is the nature of these motions? How 
are they produced and propagated? In what does a 
heat-motion differ from an electric or magnetic motion ? 
If alike, the effects would be alike; but if different, 
what is the difference? Some physicists are inclined 
to assume that the heat-motion is an expansion and con- 
traction of the atom upon itself, and not a vibration. 
Here is a realm of mystery, and of almost total dark- 
ness. In short, why many forms of energy and not 
one? or why so many and not more? We are shut up 
to the assumption that these differences must rest upon 
a complex qualitative nature of the atoms themselves, 
whereby these diverse manifestations are made possible. 
Upon this inner mystery the doctrine of conservation 
throws no light. We have to assume this complex 
qualitative nature; we cannot construe or deduce it. 
We must guard ourselves from thinking that grouping 
various forms of energy under a common name in any 



212 STUDIES m THEISM, 

way abolishes their differences. Sir John Herschel has a 
word on this point which still deserves consideration : — 

" Nor (while accepting with all due admiration as ap- 
proximate truths these great revelations as to the mu- 
tual convertibility of these correlatives according to 
the measure of vis viva appropriate to each) shall we 
advance any nearer to a rational theory of any one of 
them till it shall be shown with much more d.itinctnesg 
than at present appears in what these molecular move- 
ments themselves consist; by what forces (in the dy- 
namic acceptation of the term) they are controlled; in 
what manner or by what mechanism they are propa- 
gated from one body to another, and how their mutual 
intercon version is effected." * 

Whether, in addition to the mechanical agents which 
the law assumes, there are also vital and voluntary 
agents Avhose action is subject to other laws, is a point 
to be settled by observation. It is a vexatiousiy com- 
mon error with semi-scientific speculators to affirm the 
doctrine of conservation to be absolute, and then to 
conclude that there can be no vital or spontaneous 
agents in the system. The fallacy is evident, for it 
consists in deducing the premises from the conclusion, 
which, in turn, is true only on the preassumed truth of 
the premises. Herbert Spencer goes so far in his misun- 
derstanding as to declare the doctrine to be an a priori 
truth. He says it is " deeper than demonstration — deeper 
even than definite cognition — deep as the very nature of 
the mind." "Its authority transcends all other what- 
ever; for not only is it given in the constitution of our 
* "Familiar Lectures on Scientific Subjects," p. 472. 



THE C ONSER YA TION OE ENER GY. 213 

own consciousness, but it is impossible to imagine a 
consciousness so constituted as not to give it." * The 
absurdity is evident of calling that an a priori truth 
which is not true at all except upon certain con- 
tingent assumptions. Still more amazing is it, to call 
that a necessary deliverance of consciousness, which not 
one consciousness in a thousand can formulate. The 
truth is, Spencer is here confounding a physical truth 
with a metaphysical dogma. This appears from the 
following statement : " Thus by the persistence of force 
we really mean the persistence of some power which 
transcends our knowledge and conception. ... In other 
words, asserting the persistence of force is but another 
mode of asserting an unconditioned reality without 
beginning or end." Different things should be kept 
apart. Yet Mr. Spencer never seems to have the 
slightest suspicion that he is not on the high road of 
science; and in so far we must allow his claim, that the 
doctrine in question is " deeper than definite cognition," 
at least on his own part. But old friends often turn up 
in odd places. Spencer's doctrine of persistence, which 
he persists in confounding with the physical doctrine 
of conservation, is identical with Hamilton's doctrine 
of causation, namely, that the sum of being is change- 
less, and hence that the many are but flowing states of 
the one. In fact, Spencer's knowledge of physics is 
mainly verbal; and hence he understands scientific doc- 
trines by verbal exegesis. And as force may be ap- 
plied to any thing without manifest absurdity, there is 
no difiiculty in verbally identifying every thing, from 
* " First Principles." Chapter on Persistence of Forco 



214 STUDIES IN THEISM, 

gravitation and sunsliine to the force of prejudice or of 
an illustration. Unfortunately, Sj^encer is not alone in 
this verbalism. Speculators have largely made the doc- 
trine of conservation to teach a kind of pantheism, or 
all-engulfing substantialism. They have been led into 
this error by the phrases, correlation of forces, and 
transformation of energy. To an ill-trained mind both 
phrases are treacherous. We have but to hypostasize 
force or energy, and think of it as manifesting itself in 
different forms, and we have the pantheism of Spinoza. 
And this is the direction which the hybrid philosophical 
and scientific speculator has taken. Energy is first 
made substantial, and declared one, and then the easy 
conclusion is drawn that all things are but manifesta- 
tions of one omnipresent energy. What appears here 
as matter appears yonder as mind. What here is sun- 
shine, is yonder life and thought. At bottom all are 
one, and one is all. 

It may be that metaphysical considerations would 
lead us to a view not unlike this, but it is no deduction 
from the physical doctrine of conservation. This doc- 
trine is based on the conception of a manifold of ele 
ments of a certain kind, each of which is an individual. 
To guard against this interpretation of the doctrine, 
we must inquire into the meaning f :he t ra isf ormation 
of energy. 

Energy must always be the energy of something. 
Physical energy is the energy of the physical elements; 
and its so-called transformation, while practically allow- 
able, is only a figure of speech. Thus when a moving 
body puts another in motion and comes to rest itself, we 



THE C OXSER VA TION OF ENER GY. 215 

do not tliiiik of the motion of the first as transferred to 
the second, and for the reason that motion cannot exist 
without a subject. The motion of the first ceases, that 
of the second begins; but nothing is transferred or 
transformed. In like manner energy cannot exist with- 
out a subject. Bui the elements are so related to one 
another, that they mutually condition one another's ac- 
tion; that is, the activity of one may furnish the con- 
ditions of another's activity. In such a case, the activ- 
ity of the second will be greater or less according as the 
antecedent activity was greater or less. We may say in 
general, that the subsequent activity will vary with the 
vis viva of the preceding one. If the resultant activity 
be not of the same kind as the antecedent, still the same 
relation of intensity will hold. Speaking loosely, we 
say in such a case that energy has been transferred and 
transformed; but in truth no such thing has happened. 
Every element has acted out of itself; but the condi- 
tions of its action have been furnished by antecedent 
action, and the intensity of the consequent depends 
upon the vis viva of the antecedent. This is all the 
transference and transformation of energy mean, even 
in physics. There is no mysterious and ethereal some- 
thing gliding from one thing to another. No element 
receives anything from other elements, except that they 
furnish the conditions upon which it may mam f est its 
own power of action. No a priori reason can be given 
for such a relation, and still less why the activity of 
one should disappear in inciting that of another. To 
be sure the law of conservation would not hold in that 
case, but this law is purely a contingent one. 



216 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

With this imderstandiDg of the transformation of 
energy, the question whether thought is not trans- 
formed physical energy, is seen to involve mental con- 
fusion. Whether simple mental subjects exist can be 
determined only by psychological analyiis; but if they 
do, the transformation of energy in the case of thought 
is at least no greater than in the case of the physical 
elements themselves. The nerves would not supply 
the mind any thing but the conditions for unfolding its 
own proper powers; just as when a ball is thrown into 
the air, it does not receive attractive force from the 
motion, but is put in a position for manifesting its own 
inner attraction. In the reaction of body and soul, 
nothing would pass into the soul, and nothing would 
come out of it. Whether sensation and perception are 
attended with any loss of vis viva in the brain mole- 
cules, is unknown. It may be, that, if we could trace 
the nervous action, we should find each physical ante- 
cedent completely exhausted in the physical consequent, 
and should get no hint of the thought-series which the 
physical series summons. It may also be, that phys- 
ical energy is expended in rousing the soul to react 
with sensation and thought. A positive decision is 
impossible and needless. However it may be, there is 
no transformation, except in the sense that nervous 
action supplies the occasion upon which the mind de- 
velops its own proper activity, for this is all that 
transformation means in any case. The pretended 
deduction from the doctrine of conservation, that vi- 
tal, mental, and social forces are only transformed sun- 
shine, must be at once dismissed as simple moonsliine. 



#' 



THE CON SEE VA TTON OF ENEE GY. 217 

The following word by Professor Tait is severe, hut 
just: — 

" One herd of ignorant people, with the sole prestige 
of rapidly increasing numbers, and with the adhesion 
of a few fanatical deserters from the ranks of science, 
refuse to admit that all the phenomena, even of ordi- 
nary dead matter, are strictly and exclusively wdthin the 
domain of physical science. On the other hand, there 
is a numerous group, not in the slightest degree enti- 
tled to rank as physicists, (though, in general, they 
assume the proud title of philosophers,) who assert that 
not merely life, but even volition and consciousness, are 
merely physical manifestations. These opposite errors, 
into neither of which is it possible for a genuine scien- 
tific man to fall, ^o long at least as he retains his reason, 
are easily seen to be very closely allied. They are both 
to be attributed to that credulity which is character- 
istic xlil>e of ignorance and of incapacity. Unfortu- 
nately there is no cure; the case is hopeless, for great 
ignorance almost necessarily presumes great incapacity, 
whether it show itself in the comparatively harmless 
folly of the spiritualist, or in the pernicious nonsense of 
the materialist."* 

Of course, no one imagines that vital and spontane- 
ous agents, if they exist, are likely to upset all the laws 
of energy, and put physics to shame. On the contrary, 
we should expect in a rational system to find them tak- 
ing all lower forces and energies into their service. 
"Life," says Balfour Stewart, "is not a bully who 
swaggers out into the open universe, upsetting the laws 
* "Recent Advances in Physical Science," p. 24. 



218 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

of energy in all directions, but rather a consummate 
strategist, who, sitting in his secret chamber before his 
wires, directs the movements of a great army." Aris- 
totle defined life as the cause of form in organisms, and 
no later definition has equaled his in either simplicity 
or adequacy. Certainly, if we hold that a living agent 
is any thing substantial, we shall have to allow that its 
main function in the body is directive. The same re- 
mark is equally true for animal and human volitions; 
for while our wills must be able to originate some ma- 
terial change, unless we are pure automata, that change 
mainly consists in changing the direction of physical 
energies, which are thus guided to the end desired. 
Whether our wills can thus direct physical forces, is a 
matter for separate inquiry. The doctrine of conserva- 
tion is neutral; but, unless appearances are very deceiv- 
ing, our volitions do count for something in the course 
of events. 

Materialism finds no support from this doctrine; we 
have next to inquire into its bearings on atheism. From 
its first announcement, it has been the great demiurge 
of all atheistic systems. It seemed to teach the pos- 
sible eternity and self-sufiiciency of the physical sytstem, 
and also to exclude the design-argument. Hence athe- 
ists with one accord pounced upon it, and as usual mis- 
understood it. Of course, it could not be otherwise 
when one is under obligation to interpret a scientific 
theory, not by the facts, but by the irreligious use 
which can be made of it. In opposition, however, to 
A^erbal exegesis, an intelligent understanding of the 



THE COySKR VA Tl ON OF ENER GT. 219 

doctrine shows all such atheistic fumbling to be ques- 
tionable, if not entirely groundless. Indeed, as our 
science stands at present, the law of conservation points 
rather to a finite duration of our system. As far as 
.the meaning of the law is concerned, energy is energy, 
no ma tter what its form, while, in fact, energy has 
many forms. Now the continuance of the universe, as 
a dynamical agent, does not depend solely upon the fact 
that all these energies have a constant sum, but also 
upon the relations of these various forms to one an- 
other. And here the surprising fact comes out, that 
while it is easy to pass from some forms to some others, 
it is not so easy to pass back. This is pre-eminently 
the case with heat. Other forms can be entirely trans- 
formed into heat, but heat cannot be entirely retrans- 
formed into other forms. The descent to Avernus is 
easy, but the return is difficult, and in part, impossible. 
There is as much energy as before, but there is no pos- 
sibility of using it. For heat can do work only when 
there is an inequality of temperature, as water can do 
work only when there is a difference of elevation. If 
water stood at the same level all around the world, 
there would be no loss of water, but water-power 
would cease. Heat follows the same law, and is power- 
less when it has the same level in all bodies. But heat 
tends constantly to a common level, and thus becomes 
the great cesspool of energy, out of which there is no 
known redemption. This fact, that energy tends to 
sink to lower forms, ending at last as heat, has been 
called by Sir William Thomson the dissipation of en- 
ergy; a better term is, the degradation of energy. But 
15 



220 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

tlie continuance of the present dynamic system is as 
dependent on the differentiation of energy as upon its 
conservation. What, then, does this law of d(dgradation 
mean ? It points to a powerless homogeneity of energy 
as its goal. A little relief may be found for a time in 
the wreck and clash of solar systems, until all the mat- 
ter within the grip of gravitation shall be gathered into 
one great effete lump. It and the ether may be sup- 
posed to have conserved all their energy, but to no 
purpose, as transformation has become impossible. It 
would be a relief to our thought if such a system could 
be buried out of our sight. Why should it remain — 
useless, inert, effete — a fit inhabitant of chaos and old 
night ? 

From this fact of degradation many distinguished 
physicists have drawn the conclusion that the present 
system is a temporary one, at least, if the present phys- 
ical laws hold. Among these may be mentioned Thom- 
son, Tait, Balfour Stewart, Helmholtz, and Clausius. 
No names rank hi^her than these in physics. For our- 
self, we do not wish to insist upon the conclusion; 
we regard it rather as a pointing than a demonstration, 
and are not prepared to lay any stress upon it. The 
fact, therefore, that these men have drawn this conclu- 
sion from the law of conservation, is of less use ais a 
positive argument for theism, than as putting a stop to 
atheistic fumbling with it. At the same time, it must 
be allowed that no satisfactory answer has yet been 
made to their argument, although a great many have 
been attempted. Now, the gist of the argument for 
the temporary character of the present system is, that 



THE COKSER VA TION OF ENER G Y. 2 2 1 

a process of degradation eannot be eternal, and hence 
that what ends in time must also have a beginning in 
time. Many of the replies assume that the question is, 
whether the laws of heat directly prove the system to 
have had a beginning; and it is said, rightly enough, 
that they do not. But this is not the question. The 
claim is, that they point to an end of the dynamic sys- 
tem, and the beginning is an inference from the end. 
We give one or two quotations: 

" It will be seen that in this chapter we have regarded 
the universe, not as a collection of matter, but rather 
as an energetic agent — in fact, as a lamp. Now, it 
has well been pointed by Thomson, that, looked at in 
this light, the universe is a system that had a begin- 
ning, and must have an end, for a process of degrada- 
tion cannot be eternal. If we could regard the universe 
as a candle not lit, then it is, perhaps, conceivable to 
regard it as having always been in existence; but if we 
regard it rather as a candle that has been lit, we be- 
come absolutely certain that it cannot have been burn- 
ing from eternity, and that a time will come when it 
will cease to burn." "^ 

'' The very fact, therefore, that the large masses of 
the visible universe are of finite size, is sufficient to as- 
sure us that the process cannot have been going on for- 
ever; or, in other words, that the visible universe must 
have had its origin in time; and we may conclude, with 
equal certainty, that the process will ultimately come to 
an end. All this is what would take place provided we 
allow the indestructibility of ordinary matter; but we 
* " Conservation of Energy," by Balfour Stewart. 



222 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

may, perhaps, suppose that the very material of the 
visible universe will iltimately vanish into the invis- 
ible." * 

Most of the replies, however, consist in appealing to 
the unknown. We cannot tell what new laws may ap- 
pear under new conditions; and hence it is unspeakably 
rash to conclude that the visible system is temporary. 
One prominent atheistic writer, in his zeal against the 
contusion, questions the absoluteness of the law of con- 
servation, and even the principles of mechanics them- 
selves. His idea of the law seems to be, that it is true 
so far as it serves atheism, and false for the rest. This 
standard of truth is most ingenious and instructive. 
But all of these objections are irrelevant. No one ever 
dreamed that the doctrine in question admits of abso- 
lute demonstration. The proof is based on the assump- 
tion that the present mechanical and physical laws shall 
continue valid. Of course, any one can question this 
assumption, and suggest ineffable possibilities; and as 
long as he remembers that he is dealing with his own 
vagaries and fancies there is no objection to it. We 
do not know that some awful dragon will not appear 
to overturn the dead equilibrium, and set nature to 
work again. Such a suggestion is possible, but it can 
hardly be called scientific. We must, however, confess 
our surprise that no speculator has suggested as a way 
of escape a periodic change from attraction to repulsion; 
so that when attraction has gathered all matter to- 
gether, repulsion shall set in and scatter it again, and 
* " Unseen Universe," p. 127. See als p Tail's " Recen*. Advances 
of Physical Science." 



THE CONSEIIVATION OF ENERGY. 223 

thus in eternal oscillation. Of course this would be a 
mere fancy, but it would not be the first fancy which 
has been mistaken for science. But as long as we con- 
fine ourselves to the known laws of physics and me- 
chanics we make a sorry show in escaping Thomson's 
conclusion. Some invoke the notion of a space of 7i 
dimensions to save the system. Zollner, the German 
astronomer, uses this conception to explain the feats of 
tied conjurors, as a knot cannot really be tied in such 
a space. What more natural than that he should ap- 
peal to it here? Others, again, think that Thomson's 
theory is due to theological prepossessions. This is 
true, if the laws of mechanical physics are theological 
prepossessions. It is further urged that we cannot 
allow the conclusion,, for that would deny the self- 
sufticiency of the system, and necessitate the notion of 
miracle. Oddly enough, those who use this argument 
seem never to suspect that their objection is based, not 
on science, but on an atheistic prepossession. Whether 
men like Tait and Thomson, Helmholtz and Clausius, 
are liable to theological prepossessions the reader must 
judge for himself; but as a matter of fact, atheistic 
prepossessions are full as prominent in speculation as 
theological prepossessions. Of course, the former are 
far more scientific and respectable. And speaking of 
prepossessions, it is rather odd that every one may be 
Mispected of them, except the atheist. We allow for 
prejudice in judging the politician, the statesman, the his- 
torian, the philosopher, and the theologian; but we are 
expected to believe that the atheist, of all men, is abso- 
lutely impartial. Hence, also, he claims the largest 



224 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

right of twitting his opponents with prejudice, bigotry, 
and general incapacity; while for himself he claims the 
profoundest insight and the most immaculate mental 
integrity. There are some things which transcend 
even a mountain-removing faith, and this is one of 
them. Being still, for all slips of his, one of Eve's fam- 
ily, the atheist has no a priori claim to exemption from 
the frailties of human nature, and he certainly has no 
claim in experience. It is a hard saying, but we cannot 
avoid a secret conviction that if the known laws of 
mechanical physics pointed to the eternity of the system 
with half the clearness with which they indicate its 
temporary character, the theist would not be allowed 
to lose sight of the fact. Much would be said about 
the uniformity of nature, and about the folly of ap- 
pealing to the unknown against the known; but the 
atheist, like poor Yorick, is commonly " a fellow of infi- 
nite jest." The zeal with which Darwin's speculations 
have been taken up, and the coolness with which the 
theory in question has been received, are facts not 
without interest and instruction. 

But, as we have said, we do not wish to insist upon 
the conclusion. It is a pointing of the fundamental 
known laws of matter. That there are no compensa- 
tions in the system we affirm not. We adduce the ar- 
gument, less for its positive than for its negative effect. 
It is something to have the doctrine rescued from athe- 
ism and materialism. And yet it is almost a disappoint- 
ment to reach a result so different from what the 
rhetoricians lead us to expect. All those beautiful 
solutions of philosophic questions vanish, and leave not 



THE CONSERVATION OF ENERGY. 225 

a rack behind. We point out, in closing, that if the 
universe were dynamically conservative, so that trans- 
formation could go on encilessly if not interfered with, 
the atheistic conclusion would still not follow. Leib- 
nitz, as is well known, taught just such a doctrine of 
conservation, and held, also, that such a universe would 
be the highest possible proof of creative wisdom. Indeed, 
both he and Descartes held that it would be derogatory 
to God to suppose that the system tends to run down. 
The design-argument is left untouched by it; for the 
conservation of energy no more explains the teleolog- 
ical aspect of things than does the allied doctrine of the 
indestructibility of matter. As the latter doctrine is 
consistent with all kinds of meaningless and chaotic 
combinations, so the former is consistent with all kinds 
of meaningless applications of energy. Neither doc- 
trine accounts for form. Why there should be as 
many forms of energy as exist; why these should be 
related as they are; why things should work together 
to produce an orderly system and one replete with 
marks of intelligence — these questions find no answer 
in the conservation of energy. Upon the whole, we 
cannot see that the theist has any reason to be much 
afraid of this doctrine. 



226 STUDIES IN THEISM, 



CHAPTER VI. 

SUIiSTAlS'CES K-EJ) THEIR I:N^TERACTI0I^. 

TirilEN" discussing the relations of mechanism and 
teleology, we came upon the claim that the phys- 
ical system bears no marks of dependence except the 
traces of design seen in it; and these, it was said, were 
far from proving such dependence. The latter part of 
this claim was found to result in utter skepticism; for 
there is as much proof of mind in nature as in man. 
In the last chapter we saw that many of the ablest 
physicists are agreed that the best-known laws of the 
physical system point to a beginning and an end. We 
do not care, however, to insist too strongly upon this 
point, and leave the reader to give it such weight as 
he chooses. But now we claim, that, apart from the 
design-argument, and apart from the -indications of 
physics, it is strictly impossible, without insoluble con- 
tradiction, to regard a plurality of interacting things 
as independent. An interacting manifold is impossible 
without a co-ordinating and unifying one. This argu- 
ment serves to supplement the design-argument, which 
does not strictly exclude polytheism. Indeed, if w« 
should set out to prove the unity of God solely froui 
the unity of design in nature, it is not clear that we 
should succeed. The prominent facts of nature and 
life agree only too well with the notion of a dual, oi 



SUBSTANCES AND THEIR INTERACTION. 22 Y 

plural, origin of things. We are so accustomed to 
monotlieism, through the teachings of Christianity, that 
we fail to appreciate the facts which led the old phi- 
losophers into dualism. For us any argument which 
points to mind in nature is monotheistic, as a matter of 
course. But in strictness this conclusion is, at least, 
hasty. The world is a battle-field, and though the 
universal strife is consistent with the unity of God, it 
would be somewhat difficult to prove that unity, if we 
had no other facts on which to build. It is well, there- 
fore, to show upon other grounds that the fundamental 
reality of the universe is one, and that the mechanical 
system cannot be regarded as ultimate. This brings 
us to consider the nature of substances and their inter- 
action. We shall deal chiefly with so-called material 
substance. 

The phenomenal world reveals to us incessant change 
and motion; and the law of causation forces to supple- 
ment these facts with the notion of a subject. An act 
or change, without a subject which acts or changes, is a 
phrase which cannot be translated into thought. Xow 
these subjects are what we mean by substances; and the 
question is, how we must conceive them in order to 
make them the sufficient explanation of phenomena. 
Substance is often conceived as substratum, and various 
formal distinctions are made between it and being. It 
is easy to account for this notion, but, as we shall see, 
it cannot be allowed. Metaphysically, substance and 
being are identical; and both denote those real subjects 
from which change and activity proceed. But while 
their formal position in thought is plain, their conteiisfc 



228 STUDIES m THEISM. 

lacks definiteness. What content, then, must we put 
into the notion of substance in order to make it har- 
monize both with the laws of thought and with the 
facts which it is to ex]3lain ? The problem is one of iiT- 
ductive speculation. We hope by criticism to clear up 
the notion, and make its content more definite. 

The spontaneous thinking of men brings forth a sys- 
tem of natural metaphysics; to which belong such no- 
tions as cause and effect, matter and force, space and 
time, etc. But as this system is born of practical life, 
we should not be surprised at finding many of its defini- 
tions and logical junctions open to criticism. Practical 
thinking is molded by practical needs, and never stops 
to inquire whether the results are theoretically consist- 
ent. It is enough if they serve the purposes of our 
e very-day mental life. And what we should thus ex- 
pect, we find. The notions of natural metaphysics are 
always loosely, and often contradictorily, conceived. 
As specimens of this looseness take the common state- 
ment of the law of causation : every thing must have a 
cause. This statement, taken literally, would deny the 
law of causation entirely. Or take the current concep- 
tion of matter and force, according to which matter is 
at once inert, and the source of all activity — a kind of 
philosophical mermaid. Or take the doctrine of a past 
eternity and a future eternity; as if eternity were not 
necessarily one. Or take the common notion of the re- 
lation of the attribute to the thing; according to which 
the attribute is as external and as indifferent to the 
thing as a pin is to the pincushion into wliich it is 
tlirust. Pre-eminent among these notions, which are 



SUBSTANCES AND THEIR INTERACTION. 229 

full of implicit contradictions, is that of substance. 
This comes from the double root of the idea. The 
senses give us many things apparently inert and dead. 
The rock, the wall, the solid earth, seem inactive, and 
yet are manifestly real. -Hence we conceive of substance 
as something inert and changeless. This is the root of 
the substratum conception. But by and by it occurs to 
us that there are activities in the world; and these must 
have some subject. Then, without a thought of the 
contradiction, we ascribe them to the same subjects 
which we before defined as inert and dead. Thus we 
see that practical metaphysics are burdened w^ith many 
implicit contradictions. This fact, indeed, does not 
furnish a ground for their rejection; but it does lay 
upon the mind the necessity of attempting their rectifi- 
cation. The great common sense of mankind outlines a 
system of metaphysics, which speculation can neither 
improve upon nor ignore; in fact, the true and' only 
function of speculation is to elaborate, rectify, and de- 
fend the metaphysics of common sense. But as long as 
the law of non-contradiction is recognized, this rectifi* 
cation will be necessary; and to perform it will be not 
only the duty, but the inalienable right, of philosophical 
speculation. If such rectification should show many 
assumed principles to be only prejudice and uncritical 
dogmatism, it will be the place of common sense to ac- 
cept the results, if the showing be complete. Sound 
philosophy does not attempt to overawe common sense, 
but to correct its uncritical mistakes. At the same 
time, philosophy will not allow common sense dogmat- 
ically to settle questions beyond its province. 



230 STUDIES IN THEISM, 

But as the senses are the great source of error upoD 
this j)oint, the first thing is to throw off their bondage. 
The general theory of perception shows that external 
things can be perceived only as they affect us; and in 
Cliapter III we saw that the object is not so much per- 
ceived as posited or affirmed. Bemg or substance, we 
saw, is primarily a regulative notion in the mind; ard 
its content, when affirmed in objectivity, is not imme- 
diately apparent. This is a question for speculation. 
In addition, the elementary teachings of physics furnish 
absolute demonstration that this is not a question which 
can be settled by the eyes in any case. According to 
those teachings, the inaction of things is only in seem- 
ing. Underneath the dead rest which the unaided 
senses show, science discerns the most complex and 
constant activity. Every tiling, even the dead stone 
and resting clod, is seen to stand in the most manifold 
relations of action and reaction to every other thing. 
Science knows of nothing which just exists, and nothing 
more. Further, physics makes it plain that things as 
they appear are not the true subjects of natural activi- 
ties. Every appearing thing is a function of things 
which do not appear; and these non appearing things 
are the true subjects. Even extension, so far as we 
experience it, is purely phenomenal, depending upon 
sundry attractions and repulsions among the elements. 
If extension be affirmed of the elements themselves, it 
can only be on the authority of some necessity of 
thought, real or pretended, and never from experience. 
Physics further teaches that solidity also is not an ul- 
timate quality of the elements, but is the outcome of 



SUBSTAXCES AXD THEIR IXTER ACTION. 231 

their attractions and repulsions. We often think of the 
atoms as little cubes or spheres which are very hard, 
and which are piled up to make visible things, just as 
bricks are piled up in a heap. But this is the gravest 
mistake. The connection of the atoms is dynamic, and 
not that of mere juxtaposition; and if it be allowed 
that the atoms themselves are solid, it has to be allowed 
that that absolute solidity never comes in play; for the 
atoms are not in contact. Hence the only solidity of 
which we know any thing is based upon a dynamism 
back of it ; and there is no warrant for affirming any 
other solidity. Thus physics seems bent on overturning 
all our current ideas of. matter, by declaring that all 
materiality is phenomenal, and has a dynamic basis. 
Bat as soon as these elements of physics are grasped, it 
becomes clear that we can never hope to determine the 
nature, or definition even, of material substance by rea- 
soning with our eyes. It is purely a question of meta- 
physics, or of consistent thinking. 

In the second place, we observe that every defi- 
nition of substance must attend to the conditions of the 
problem. We are looking for the subjects of a group 
of complex activities, and whatever substances we postu- 
late must be capable of being such subjects. It is not, 
then, sufficient that the definition be logically consist- 
ent; it must be further capable of explaining the facts. 
Failure to notice this lies at the bottom of the error of 
the Eleatics, and of the Greek atomists. The Eleatics 
defined being as excluding all change, all motion, and 
all manifoldness. The definition is logically consistent; 
but it is philosophically worthless. For clearly such a 



232 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

being will not explain the phenomenal world of change 
and plurality. There was only one alternative: either 
the definition must be changed, or the phenoraenal 
world must be denied. The Eleatics, who were not 
wanting in the courage of their opinions, took the latter 
course, and declared the phenomenal world to be a 
delusion. The Greek atomists also committed a similar 
error. They defined their atoms as self-centered and 
independent. All element of relation was denied. This 
notion, again, is logically consistent; but they failed to 
notice that such atoms are worthless for scientific pur- 
poses. If truly independent and self -centered, they 
would be indifferent to one another; and hence quite 
incapable of explaining the solidarity of the actual 
world. Not atoms in general, but only inter-acting, in- 
ter-dependent atoms, will serve the purposes of science. 
And so we repeat once more, it is not sufficient that the 
notion of substance be logically consistent, it must fur- 
ther be such as to fit into and explain the facts. 

Two doubts come up just here; the one a prejudice, 
the other a misapprehension. The former urges that 
we have no right to attribute force to matter, as mat- 
ter has always been defined as passive. The reply is, 
that the physicist is supremely indifferent to prescriptive 
definitions. He aims to explain phenomena; and if lie 
can do it by a dynamic theory of matter, he will not 
hesitate to attribute to matter just such active proper- 
ties as may be necessary for his purpose. Certainly 
the dynamic theory of matter need not fear, if nothing 
more weighty than a traditional and arbitrary definition 
of matter can be urged against it. The misapprelien- 



SUBSTA ^'CBS AND THEIR INTERACTION. 233 

sioji consists in charging that the dynamic theory of 
matter contradic iS the law of inertia, which is at least 
as well established -as any other fact of science. This 
misapprehension prises from ignoring the facts upon 
which the doctrine of inertia is based, and then analyz- 
ing the word inertia. If matter be inert, of course it 
is a contradiction to call it active; but if we attend to 
the meaning, and let the dictionary go, this contradic- 
tion disappears. Scientifically, the doctrine is that no 
element spontaneously* changes its own state, whether 
of rest or motion; and further, every element opposes 
a certain resistance to any external attempt to change 
its state. It does not deny activity with regard to 
other elements, but denies spontaneity with regard to 
itself; and instead of affirming absolute passivity to ex- 
ternal action, it affirms a positive reaction and resist- 
ance. This is the only conception of inertia which has 
any scientific value; all others are but vain etymolog- 
ical imaginings. In like manner, the space-filling prop- 
erty both of the elements and of their combinations is 
at bottom dynamic. It is only as an element has the 
power to resist and drive back other elements, and thus 
assert for itself a position and volume in space, that we 
can talk even of matter as filling space. To call the 
gigantic force with which each element resists the ap- 
proach, within certain limits, of any other, a "mere 
passivi y," involves the very depths of bondage to the 
senses. When closely examined, even the statical phe- 
nomena of matter rest on an inner dynamism. 

It is clear, then, that the lump notion of substance, 
which is borrowed from the senses, must be ^iven up; 



234 STUDIES IN THEISM- 

for physics teaches us that lumpiness is not ultimate. 
The problem being to find the subject of a group of 
activities, nothing can be plainer than that we cannot 
regard that subject as dead inertness. On the contrary, 
it must be conceived as an individualized force or 
power, and active through and through. Push our an- 
alysis as far as we will, still, in the very deepest depths 
of metaphysic fog and night, it yet remains clear that 
only the active will explain action, and that we get no 
help in understanding action by postulating a hard core 
of inactive and dead materiality upon which the living 
activity may sit down and rest. The tyranny of the 
senses is very strong at this point; and we can escape 
it only by remembering that this is not a question of 
eye-sight but of consistency in reasoning. The dead- 
lump notion of substance has its origin in sense-delu- 
sions, and is plainly of 'no use. If such substances did 
exist, as doing nothing, they would be mere metaphys- 
ical loafers in every scientific system, and there could 
be no reason for afiirming them. For we reason from 
effects to causes, and where there is no effect, there is 
no ground for affirming a cause. The only definition of 
substance which will meet the conditions of the prob- 
lem is, that substance is an individualized force or pow- 
er. How a thing is made we do not pretend to know, 
but when it is made, its most general definition is as 
we have given it. The notion of real being is impos- 
sible without the two factors of power and individual- 
ity; and by our definition we mean only that every 
real thing is an individual unit, and that its essence is 
power or force. Being without force is nothing; force 



SUBSTANCES AND THEIR INTERACTION. 235 

without being is also nothing; both must be united in 
reality. One or the other of these elements is com- 
monly overlooked by speculators. Thus, matter is often 
spoken of as a function of opposing forces, as attrac- 
tion and repulsion. This view is utterly untenable, 
as attraction and repulsion are abstractions from the 
activity of something which attracts and repels. Again, 
things are often spoken of as made out of force, as if 
force existed before reality. In scientific speculations 
nothing is more common than to hear of '^ cosmic 
forces" which play on matter; but we nowhere get 
any hint as to the subject of these forces. They seem 
to drift around about half way between being and noth- 
ing. We repeat our definition: Substance is individ- 
ualized force or power. 

What a host of objections come up ! The first and 
most natural is this: Substance is not power, but has 
power. The substance is one thing, its power is quite 
another. This objection rests, first, upon the possibility 
of conceiving matter without any power of attraction; 
and this is mistaken for a proof that matter can be con- 
ceived as without power of any kind. It is plain that 
if this conception were possible it would be equivalent 
to the denial of matter; as that which can in no way 
act, can never come into knowledge. ' 

For the rest, the objection is based partly on sense- 
illusion and partly on mistaking a logical and gram- 
matical distinction for a metaphysical one. The sense- 
illusion is, that we seem to see things perfectly inactive 
and yet manifestly real; but the most elementary 
knowledge of physics serves to dispel this notion. 



236 STUDIES IN THEISM 

Further, the distinction between a thing and its power 
of action is a purely logical one. All of our attributive 
logical judgments express only subjective distinctions; 
or rather, they express what the thing itself is in cer- 
tain relations or from a certain point of view. We 
say a triangle has three sides; yet a triangle without 
sides is nothing. We say substance has properties; 
but a substance without properties is merely a hypos- 
tasized nonentity. So we say a thing has power; yet 
without that power it would not be a thing. If we 
ask the objector what he means by a thing which has 
no power, we get no answer. How do we distinguish 
something from nothing? Solely by the fact that some- 
thing acts and resists us, and nothing does not. And 
even if we should grant the distinction, we have to 
cancel it in the next breath; for either this substance 
is indifferent to its activity, now assumed to be sepa- 
rable from it, or it is not. If it is indiffeient, then 
the changing activity finds no ground either for its 
existence or its changes in the substance; in which case 
the substance becomes a worthless metaphysical ghost. 
If not indifferent, tlien it must in some way control 
this power. But to do so, it must have a power of con- 
trolling it. And now arises a difficulty. Either this 
power of controlling the power is the substance or it is 
not. In the first case we may as well stop with the first 
power of action; as a power of controlling a power is no 
more capable of standing alone than a simple power. 
But if this second power is not the substance, and de- 
mands a third something for its suj^port, we arc shut up 
to an infinite sories. In fact, being and power are but 



SUBSTANCES AND THEIR INTERACTION. 2^7 

different names for reality from different stand-points. 
Regarded as the abiding source of activity, we call it 
being; regarded as the possibility of activity, we call 
it power. Or, regarded as the subject of various acts, 
we call it being; regarded as the ground of those acts, 
we call it power. The name is indifferent. We may 
call it being if we choose, but the content of the notion 
must always be an individualized power; we only con- 
tradict ourselves when we regard being as a core of 
dead impassivity. We conclude, then, that though we 
can never penetrate the mystery of being so as to cre- 
ate any thing, still, after a thing is created, it must be 
viewed as a power and not as a lump. A power of ac- 
tion in some way is the only assignable difference be- 
tween something and nothing. This result is valid for 
all substance, whether spiritual or material. Whatever 
difference there may be must consist in the nature of 
the activity, and never in the presence or absence of 
power. Only absolute philosophical incapacity can find 
any help in comprehending the possibility of action by 
postulating a central core of passive materiality; to say 
nothing of the annihilating self-contradiction of the 
notion. 

But skepticism still remains, and expresses itself as 
follows: An atom has various forces — a force of gravi- 
tation, one of cohesion, one of chemical affinity, etc. 
Now, it is absurd to speak of any or all of these as 
constituting the atom. They belong to it, or inhere in 
it, but can never be thought of as being the atom. We 
quite agree with this skepticism, but regard it as no ob- 
jection to our view. For this objection rests entirely 



238 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

upon a personification of abstractions. An atom is not 
a composite of independent forces which are held to- 
gether, like a boy's kite-sticks, by a tack or a string; 
but, if real at all, it is a single unitary power, which is 
so related to other powders that now it acts in one way, 
and now in another. Its activity falls, therefore, in 
several classes; it attracts, it coheres, it enters into 
chemical combination. We observe these general 
classes, and then, misled by a persistent tendency to 
porsonification, we attribute them to separate powers 
in the atoms. Accordingly, it is not the atom which 
attracts, but the force of gravitation. It is not the 
atom which coheres, but cohesion itself. It is not the 
atom which acts chemically; chemical affinity is the 
great demiurge of the laboratory. In physics, too, 
heat, electricity, and magnetism are the great actors, 
and not things in the condition we call heated, electric, 
or magnetic. One can hardly open a scientific text- 
book without wondering whether the old scholastics 
and gnostics have not returned to earth in the guise of 
modern scientists, so freely do the airiest abstractions 
parade themselves before us as the most solid realities. 
Now all this is a mistake. Chemical affinity, cohesion, 
gravitation, etc., are not agents, but abstractions from 
certain classes of atomic action. The real agent is the 
atom; and it does not have a stock of powers concealed 
within it, so that when it wants to enter into a chem- 
ical combination it uses its chemical poAver, or when it 
wants to cohere it uses its cohering power. If this 
were our conception of the atom, Martinus Scribblerus's 
doctrine of the meat-roasting quality of the spit would 



SUBSTAXCI^JS AXI) TIIEIR JNTERACTIOK 239 

be not one whit more ludicrous. But, in fact, the atom 
must be conceived as one, as a relatively self-centered 
power, which reacts against external things in various 
ways under different conditions; and thus gives rise to 
the sh illow notion of various forces which inhere in the 
atom like pegs in a board, and which it is equally pos- 
sible to pull out or stick in. It is the single unitary 
atom which acts in all its manifestation, just as it is tho 
unitary soul which acts in all the mental life. These 
scholastic personifications being reduced to their true 
dimensions, we reaffirm our conclusion that the essence 
of all reality, whether material or spiritual, is power; 
and that the presence of power of some kind is the 
only thing which distinguishes something from noth- 
ing. It is not meant that the atom is chemical affinity 
or cohesion, etc., but only that to manifest itself in these 
ways it must be essentially forceful. The objection w^e 
are considering rests upon the false notion of inherence. 
We hear of forces " implanted," " imparted," " inher- 
ent," etc., as if forces were external to the active sub- 
ject. We hear of forces which " dwell " in things, as 
if things were little hollow boxes for forces which sally 
out upon occasion and perform divers feats. Upon oc- 
casion things are spoken of as the " fulcra " of forces, 
as if forces needed a kind of perch on which to roost. 
The way in which things are made, in this scheme, 
seems to be as follows: First, a proper amount of " pure 
being " is provided. This is absolutely inert, and with- 
out any positive quality or determination whatever ; 
but it furnishes a fulcrum for power. All qualities 
and determinations are next produced by bringing 



2-iO STUDIES IN THEISM. 

forces from no one knows where, and sticking tliem into 
tills indefiniteness. Thereby the being is enabled to do 
something, and the forces gain a fulcrum. But this 
process rests entirely upon a hypostasis of abstractions, 
and a mistake of subjective distinctions for objective 
fact. It further destroys itself, as it denies its own po- 
sition, that force cannot exist apart from being. But, 
in sound philosophy, the so-called forces of a thing are 
never external to it, but only express the way in which 
the relatively self-centered power, or subject, reacts 
against other things. The vulgar notion that a thing 
can be divided, except in unreal abstraction, into a pas- 
sive lump which represents the being of the thing and 
certain active properties, is impossible in philosophy. 

We may, however, make the following concession to 
some current views: It is conceivable that there should 
be material elements having only a simple force of ex- 
istence and space-filling, whereby each should assert 
itself against all others, but without any moving forces. 
That is, we might conceive of atoms with only a static 
force, and without any relation to dynamics. This 
appears to be the current conception among the specu- 
lators on this subject. It follows at once that such 
atoms, though still having force of a kind as their 
essence, would be quite incapable of accounting for the 
actual dynamic universe. It would be necessary by 
the sheer force of the definition, to assume some agent 
or agents outside of the atoms to account for their 
changes. In this case, however, it would not be allowed 
to speak of these external forces as inhering or residing 
in the atoms, or as in any way belonging to them. The 



SUBSTANCES AXD THEIU INTERACTIOX. 241 

only tenable conception would be that of an external 
agent acting upon the atoms, and causing and co-ordinat- 
ing all their movements. This view is logically possible 
and may be true; but its logical possibility is not enough 
to prove that such atoms exist. Moreover, the atheist 
who seeks to include all phenomena under atomic 
action, denies the existence of such atoms. His atoms 
are dynamic as well as static; and unless the conception 
be shown to contradict the fact, it must be allowed, 
and the question debated upon this basis. We allow, 
then, that the dynamic view of matter can be replaced 
by the static view in the sense explained, and the dy- 
namics of the universe can be accounted for by an extra 
atomic agent; but as we wish to hear the worst thing 
which can be said, we decide at present for the dy- 
namic theory, according to which the moving forces of 
the elements are not external to them. But if we 
adopt the dynamic notion, we must not mistake the 
possibility of conceiving merely statical atoms for a 
proof that the actual atoms possess their power only in 
an (external fashion; on the contrary, that power con- 
stitutes the central being of the atom; and its so-called 
forces are but abstractions from the various reactions 
of that power against external agents. If, then, any 
one say that every act must have a subject, we are 
quite agreed; we affirm the same with all possible em- 
phasis. It is the atom which acts in all atomic activi- 
ties, and nothing else. If it be further said, that power 
cannot siand alone, we are agreed again, if by power 
be meant only the personified abstractions to which we 
have been objecting. If it be taken in any other 



242 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

sense, we are so far from admitting that it cannot stand 
alone, that we rather affirm that nothing but a power 
can stand alone. We certainly get little help in this 
respect by postulating a passive inertness, as it is quite 
impossible to see how such a thing could enable any 
thing to stand or even to sit. If it be said, that all 
power must have a source back of itself, we agree once 
more, if this means that every act implies an agent. 
If it have any other meaning, we reply that it is a 
strange blindness which can imagine that any thing 
but power can be that ultimate source. In truth, we 
have here that wretched personification of a word again. 
Active agents are the only realities, and such an agent 
is an individualized force. It may be indifferently 
called being, or self-centered power, as one chooses, for 
these are but different names for the same thing. 

Let us, then, adopt the dynamic theory of matter, 
and see where it leads us. We have seen that the ele- 
ments must be regarded as active agents, and never as 
little lumps of passive materiality: but more must be 
said. The element of relativity in the atoms must 
next be considered, and we shall find that that element 
makes it impossible to regard them as independent. 
A superficial view of things leads to the view that ma- 
terial things are strictly self -centered and changeless, 
and that their properties inhere in them independently 
of every other thing : but a scarcely less superficial 
observation, serves to show that no attribute or quality 
belongs to a thing absolutely, but only under certain 
conditions or in connection with other thinjxs. A thinoj 



SUBSTAyCES AXD TIIEFR INTERACTION. 243 

has color only in the light. Water is liquid only at cer- 
tain temperatures. Weight, one of the ultimate tests of 
the quantity of matter, depends on the presence of an at- 
tracting body, and varies with its distance. Volume is 
never the same for any two consecutive instants. The 
activities of matter are even more clearly conditioned. 
Take the chemical activities of oxygen and hydrogen. 
Neither can act alone, but only in connection with the 
other, and under certain definite conditions. Under any 
other circumstances they cannot act; and hence the 
chemical activity of each is a function of both, and the 
disappearance of either would be the disappearance of 
both as chemical agents. If there Avere only one kind 
of element, there would be no chemistry. The ordinary 
way out of this difficulty is to say : The elements real- 
ly have chemical forces at all times, but they cannot act 
until certain conditions are fulfilled. That is, the so- 
called forces are forceless, that is, are not forces, except 
at the moment of combination. Of course, every thing 
must be such that when certain other things act upon 
it it will manifest the new activities which actually 
appear; but it no more follows from this fact that it 
has the power when the conditions are not fulfilled, 
than it follows that an egg has the power of cackling 
or crowing because, under appropriate circumstances, 
such a result may be reached. The simple fact is, that 
under certain conditions the elements combine; and, of 
course, they have at that moment the power of com- 
bination; but there is no need to stultify ourselves by 
saying that they have the power at other times, only 
they cannot use it. What is thus true of the chemical 



244 STUDIES IK THEISM. 

activities, is equally true of the physical ones. Gravi 
tation, cohesion, repulsion, et ccetera, are not absolute 
attributes of any atom, but only of the atoms in rela- 
tions. We express this result by saying that all atomic 
activities are conditioned. There is not one activity 
which can be viewed as belonging absolutely to any 
element. Any given atom is what it is, and does what 
it does, because all others are what they are and do 
what they do. Hence, atomic activities are functions 
only of the manifold, or of the atoms in mutual rela- 
tions. This, however, does not say that relations only 
are real, but it does say that the atoms are real only in 
relations. This conclusion flows directly from the un- 
doubted fact that all atomic activities are conditioned. 

To this it is urged, in rebuttal, that at most only 
the activities of the atoms depend upon their relations. 
Their being would remain the same under all changes 
of activity. This objection is due to sense-delusion, 
which gives rise to the delusion that being is simply 
static instead of dynamic. We have implicitly answered 
it in our criticism of the notion that qualities and ac- 
tivities are external to the thing instead of being the 
necessary results of the innermost nature of the thing. 
We content ourselves, therefore, with the following 
considerations: The every-day notion, that a thing re- 
mains unchanged while its activity changes, though 
allowable in daily life, is metaphysically untenable. 
The changing activity of any subject must have some 
ground, and an unchanging, inactive substratum fur- 
nishes no foundation whatever. If the subject a re- 
mains forever unchanged, there is not the shadow of a 



SUBSTANCES AND THEIR INTERACTION. 245 

reason why its action should change, and still less 
reason why its action should take one form ratlier than 
another. In fact, the activity of any thing is but the 
external expression of its internal state; and a change 
of activity is the outward expression of an inward 
change. Before any thing can happen outside of 
things, something must happen inside of them. The 
mechanical system of motions among things is but the 
spatial expression of a metaphysical system of changes 
in things. A definite form of action must correspond 
to a definite state of being; and a change of activity is 
impossible without a corresponding change of being. 
If the law of causation is worth any thing it is worth 
this. Hence we say, that the very essence of a thing is 
implicated in its activity; that the notion of a changeless 
substratum must be abandoned, and the very substances 
of the physical universe must be brought into the circle 
of change. But the activity of the atoms varies with 
their relations; and hence the very being or essence of 
the atoms is implicated in those relations, and varies 
with them. It may be that these considerations will 
make it impossible to rest in these atoms as the ultimate 
facts of the universe; but the results reached rest upon 
the most undoubted teachings of physical science and 
the simplest kind of reasoning. The argument may be 
summed up as follows: In opposition to the theories of 
matter which are taught by the senses, or which are 
held by unreflecting common sense, science and phi- 
losophy know nothing of mere passivity. On the con- 
trary, they regard all natural phenomena as the result 
of action of some sort. There are, then, active sub- 



246 STUDIES IX THEISM 

jects or an active subject. But that which distinguishes 
these subjects from non-existence — that which makes 
them subjects — is just their power of action; so that the 
ossence of being is not static but dynamic. Further, the 
activity of a thing is never separable in fact from its 
essence, but is rather the manifestation of its essence, 
so that both must vary together. Now if we postulate 
atoms as the subjects of natural activities, we are 
forced by the facts to postulate them as so interrelated 
and interdependent that out of these relations, or 
standing alone, they would be indistinguishable from 
zero. The atoms, then, must be thought of as con- 
ditioned in their very being. 

If we are not greatly mistaken, this conclusion will 
be met, not so much with skepticism, as with dogmatic 
denial. For has not the indestructibility of matter 
been demonstrated? and is not substance necessarily 
unchangeable? If we deny this, the universe has no 
constant factor; and we return at once to the doctrine 
of Heraclitus, that all things flow and nothing stands. 
Here, again, we have partly ignorance and partly dog- 
matic prejudice. The first mistake is, in confounding 
the scientific meaning of unchangeable when applied to 
substance with the etymology of the word. The ety- 
mology, indeed, excludes all change of any kind; but 
the scientific meaning is this: A given subject, a, undei* 
different conditions x, y, z, may pass into the varic>us 
states a^, ^25 (^h^ ^tc. ; by reversing these conditions, we 
may pass from a^, to <^2) <^ij ^^d finally to a again. An- 
other subject, J, has a series peculiar to itself, J,, h^, h^, 
etc.; c has the series Cj, c^, Cg, etc. Now the indestruc- 



SUBSTAKCES AND THEIR INTERACTION. 217 

tibility and unchangeability of matter, so far as tliey 
have any scientific meaning, do not affirm that the mate- 
rial substance remains unchanged throughout the series; 
but only the reversibility and numerical equivalence of 
the series when reversed; for examjDle, oxygen and hy- 
drogen combine to form vapor; vapor condenses into 
water, and water becomes ice. These are the ^i, ^2, a^, 
of our series. By reversing the conditions, we may re- 
verse the series; and obtain precisely the same amount 
of water, vapor, and gas which previously disappeared, 
provided always that the conditions which affect weight 
remain the same. Now practical science is under no 
obligation to affirm that tb^ substance remains abso- 
lutely unchanged in the passage from gas to ice and 
back again. It is not even under obligation to affirm 
that the restored gas is the same as that with which the 
experiment began. There is an equivalent amount as 
tested by weight, but equivalence and similarity are 
not identity. Of course, we do not mean to deny that 
it may be the same gas restored to its former state; we 
only point out that physics neither knows nor needs to 
know any thing upon this subject, beyond the fact of 
reversibility and numerical equivalence under the same 
conditions. The series, a, a^, a^^ etc., can be worked 
either way without loss; this constitutes the indestruct- 
ibility of matter, so far as it has any scientific meaning. 
The series, a, a^, ^g, etc., is a closed one and does not 
pass into the other equally closed series, 5, 5„ Jg? etc., 
c, Ci, Cg, etc. This constitutes the identity and un- 
changeability of matter. Within the series which ex- 
presses the nature of the thing, every thing is changeable 



248 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

to its inmost center. It never passes outside of this 
series, so that every thing could become every other 
thing; and in this sense only is it unchangeable. In- 
deed, a thing is simply such a series concreted, or made 
substantial. It is a flowing formula made real, ard 
not rigid duration. 

This conception of substance as changeable within 
certain limits, is forced upon us by the law of causa- 
tion, and by every fact of observation. But several 
objections reappear, and we give them a parting word. 
It is urged that a^^ c^ (^3, etc., are only states of «/ and 
that the substance remains the same in all its states. 
To this we reply, that ^i, c^s? ^''3? are no more states of a, 
than a is a state of each of these. Each may be taken 
indifferently as the base. Ice is no more a state of 
water than water is a state of ice. If it be said that the 
substance is the same in both; this is true only in the 
sense that the ice is such that if heated sufficiently it 
will become water; and conversely water is such that, 
if cooled sufficiently, it will become ice again. But 
what is a state? Is it any thing but a result of what 
the subject is for the time? and can a changing state 
be thought of as any thing but the outward expression 
of an inward change ? Finally, it is said : You say of 
the substance, " it changes," and you are constantly 
speaking of this " it " which abides across all the 
changes. Now we want to know what this " it " is, 
which abides. We reply that "it" is the changing 
thing, and that there is no " abiding " except in the 
sense explained. How a thing can have different 
states, we know not; but since the time of the Eleatics, 



SUBSTANCES AND THEIR INTERACTION 24 ^ 

it has been clear that the notion of a strictly change- 
less thing with changing states is an intolerable con- 
tradiction. It must be added, that complete reversi- 
bility is true only for material things; indeed, we do 
not know it to be strictly true there. The changes of 
the elements leave no traces in their external action, so 
far as we can discern; but whether they may not leave 
inward traces, so that the atom has a record of its his- 
tory within itself, we know not. In the case of the soul 
there is only a limited possibility of recovering a past 
state. Here unchangeability consists, not in any change- 
lessness of essence, but solely in the power of memory 
whereby the soul gathers up its past, and carries it with 
it as it advances from state to state. It is the same 
soul at different times only in the sense that the soul at 
any point contains the ground of its future develop- 
ment, and not in the sense of a metaphysical sameness. 
If asked what is the " I " which endures, we reply that 
it is the developing, changing soul. If this is not 
enough, we can only add that " I " is the pei'sonal pro- 
noun of the first person. 

We have dwelt upon some points in the preceding 
paragraphs which are not necesssary to our argument. 
We have done this to bring the dynamic character of 
all being more fully into view. We think it possible 
further to show, that personality only fills out the true 
notion of being, and reconciles the identity of the Ele- 
atics with the flow of Heraclitus. Change and iden- 
tity can be combined only in the personal. But we 
omit this point. We gather up for further use the 



250 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

following results: If we are to retain the atom in our 
science, w^e must cease to regard it as an indifferent 
lump, secure forever in solid singleness, but must ratlier 
postulate it as an active something, or as an individual- 
ized force which is so related to every other as to be 
sensitive to every change throughout the universe. 
!No other conception will satisfy both the facts and 
the laws of thought. This necessitates a double sys- 
tem: first, a system of spatial changes among the ele- 
ments, which as dealing with space, time, and motion, 
may be called the mechanical system; and, second, a 
system of changes in things which the law of causa- 
tion forces us to assume, and of which the mechan- 
ical system is but the spatial expression. This may be 
called the metaphysical system. As such, it is the 
fundamental condition of the mechanical system, and 
can never be explained by it. Beneath ail mechanism 
there is a universal dynamism. But how is this met- 
aphysical system possible ? May we stop with its af- 
firmation, or must we go further ? This brings us to 
the second question concerning the atoms, that of in- 
teraction. The atoms are postulated as separate indi- 
viduals, and yet the universe is one. The solidarity of 
the physical system is the capital, or rather the basal, 
fact of science; and yet the agents are viewed as an in- 
definite plurality of independent things. How can 
these two facts be reconciled ? How can self-dependent 
agents be brought into mutual relations of dependent 
action? The atomic notion seems to contain contra- 
dictory elements. We regard the atom as self-existent, 
and as conditioned by others external to itself. We 



SUBSTANCES AND THEIR INTERACTION 251 

regard it as self-centered, and as having its properties 
only as a member of a community. Tiiese are contra- 
dictory determinations. How can mutually independ- 
ent things be brought into interaction? 

The difficulties of this notion of interaction have led 
many philosophers to try to eliminate it from philos- 
ophy and science. The occasionalism of the Cartesians, 
and the positivism of Comte, are distinguished attempts 
of this kind. The former sprang more especially from 
the theoretical difficulty in understanding the connection 
of soul and body; and the latter sprang from a con- 
viction of the emptiness of the search after causes in 
general. According to the former, a change in the 
body is the occasion of a change in the soul, and con- 
versely ; but in no case is either the cause of the other. 
According to positivism, phenomena follow one another, 
but without causal connection. Both of these theories 
are valuable as practical methods of investigation; and 
practical science should never forsake this stand-point. 
When we have the order of succession among changes, 
we have absolutely all that is valuable in practical sci- 
ence ; and we should not be able to reap one jot more 
of practiral advantage if we could see through and 
through phenomena. Science, therefore, ought not to 
be diverted from practical pursuits by metaphysical 
inquiries. But Avhile valuable as methods of practical 
research, they are metaphysically worthless. For in 
order that changes in one being shall be the occasion of 
changes in another it must act upon it. If, with the 
positivists, we say that phenomena only follow one an- 
other, we must still allow that if a and b are to be fol- 
17 



252 STUDIES IN TUEISM, 

lowed by c, and not by Xj then a and h must determine 
the consequent c. Without this assumption any thing 
might be followed by every thing or by nothing; in- 
deed without this assumption each new phenomenon 
would be a self -creation. 

Another most renowned effort to escape the difficid- 
ties of interaction is Leibnitz's theory of a pre-estab- 
lished harmony; according to which, no atom, or monad, 
as he called them, really affects any other ; but all the 
monads are so constructed with reference to all others, 
that they shall act harmoniously together yet without 
any real interaction. There is no logical contradiction 
in this theory, but when applied to the actual universe, 
its complexity is so great that no one has ever been 
able to rest in it for any time. The mind is so bewil- 
dered in the attempt to comprehend the possibility of 
such a harmony, that the theory breaks down through 
sheer excess of complexity. It also comes into hopeless 
collision with the fact of freedom, and is essentially 
fatalistic. 

The notion of interaction, then, is necessary in science; 
and its possibility must be explained. The practical sci- 
entist may of course decline the problem, but theory must 
recognize it. The only attempt at solution which de- 
serves mention, is that which regards the atoms as en- 
dowed with sundry forces working between them, and 
producing manifold effects. This theory is born mainly 
of the senses, and has only a certain value for the imagi- 
nation. If we figure these forces as a system of length- 
ening or shortening lines or threads ; or if we think of 
force as a subtle ether raying out from a point — the im- 



SUBSTANCES AND THEIR INTERACTION. 253 

agination seems to have a bridge whereby to cross from 
one to the other. But when we come to take this theory 
in earnest, it appears at once as an imaginative make- 
shift which cannot be realized in thought. In the first 
place, we have seen that these forces are only hyposta- 
sized abstractions in any case. Observe now the exact 
nature of the problem. The fact of interaction, when 
reduced to its lowest terms, is this : When a changes b, 
c, d, etc., all change in definite order and degree ; or any 
change in one involves a change in all. To explain this, 
the scientist says that forces pass from a to the others 
and produce the effect. But this notion of a causa tran- 
siens represents at bottom a mental void rather than a 
thought. To explain any thing, it must tell us what 
this is which goes over and produces an effect. To say 
that action, or an influence, goes over, is only to restate 
the problem in another form; for an action or an influ- 
ence is not any thing which can float about in the void 
without a subject. We must keep constantly in mind 
that this is not a question of observation in any way, 
but only of consistent thinking. No one ever saw any in- 
fluences passing and #^passing. All that can ever be seen 
is, that mutual changes take place. Now we can think 
nothing under this notion of a passing influence unless 
we suppose the influence to be a real thing. But this 
supposition is doubly untenable. (1) If we suppose 
that an atom is constantly throwing off things, x, by 
which it affects other things, the diflicult and delicate 
question arises: whence has the atom its infinite store 
of ammunition ? (2) If this question were satisfactorily 
answered, the question remains where it was before. 



254 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

Suppose that a throws off x% and that these finally 
reach the neighborhood of Z>, why should b^ in conse- 
quence of this fact, take on quite new properties ? If 
b and a are independent, why should they not be as 
indifferent when side by side as when separated by 
empty space. Contiguity in space helps the imagina- 
tion, but not the understanding. Not action at a dis- 
tance, but interaction at all between independent things, 
is what the reason finds so difficult. 

We have all heard much of forces which play be- 
tween things; but this conception is only an hypothesis 
to explain certain facts. Its value for the imagination, 
and hence its practical admissibility, we do not deny. 
But when taken in earnest, we find it quite impossible 
to think it through. We only involve ourselves in the 
gravest difficulties, and gain no insight after all. Still 
worse is the notion that one thing transfers its condi- 
tion to another, and thus acts upon it. No condition 
can exist independently, hence cannot be transferred. 
The pretended transference rests upon this fact : a 
body, a, in the condition m, may become in some as 
yet unexplained way the cause why another body, 5, may 
take on the same condition; as where a magnet induces 
magnetism. But nothing passes over; no magnetic 
states hang for a time between a and /?, and, finally, 
enter into b ; but a^ by its action on />, however brought 
about, enables b to become magnetic. This notion of 
a transferred condition is further untenable because the 
great mass of interaction does not imply that a produces 
a similar condition in 5, but only a change of some 
kind. There is in no case a transference of any thing, 



SUBSTANCES AND THEIR INTERA CTIOK 255 

but each develops the new condition out of itself, upon 
occasion of the other's action. The proof is, that any- 
other conception breaks down upon analysis, and turns 
out to be a phrase which cannot be put into thought. 
When one man speaks to another, no ideas pass from 
one to the other, but upon occasion each constructs in 
himself the proper thoughts and feelings. 

Ultimate facts may be mysterious, but they must 
never contain contradictions; hence while the interac- 
tion of things may be mysterious, we may never admit 
contradiction into it. Observe once more the fact to 
be explained. Physical science forces upon us the rela- 
tivity and conditioned character of the atoms, even in 
their very being. Its most fundamental fact is, that 
every atom is sensitive to the changes in every other, 
and conducts itself accordingly. But there is a distinct 
contradiction in declaring, not atoms in general, but 
atoms of this kind, to be self -centered and independent. 
To declare in one breath that every atom must vary 
with every other, and yet has its sufficient ground in 
itself, is to fly in the face of all logic. We have seen 
that every attempt to fill up the gap between two inde- 
pendent things by any passage of influences or forces 
is utterly fruitless, and even meaningless. There is 
only one course left: we cannot deny the relativity of 
the atoms; we must, therefore, deny that they have 
their reason and ground in themselves, and reduce them 
to constant dependence on some one being who em- 
braces them all in the unity oi its existence — something 
as the mind embraces all its thoughts, feelings, and 
other mental states, in the unity of its existence. In 



250 STUDIES m THEISM, 

this way only is it possible to remove, not the mystery 
of interaction, but the contradiction of the notion. The 
infinite may freely posit the finite, and may, with equal 
freedom, posit an interaction between itself and the 
finite, but all interaction between mutually independent 
beings is impossible in thought, and hence unaffirmable 
in fact, except through some ultimate being who em- 
braces them all in the unity of itself. Below all mech- 
anism, and all plurality, there must be an all-embracing 
one. The proof is, that clear thinking finds any other 
conception irreconcilable with the facts of nature and 
the laws of thought. This is the conclusion to which 
all the great thinkers of the world have come, without 
exception. If thoughtless believers in the five senses 
are bewildered by it, they must remember, (1) that this 
is not a question of observation, but of consistent rea- 
soning; and, (2) that this conclusion is not a whit more 
metaphysical than the atomic theory itself. Both views 
claim to be inferences from the phenomena. The jus- 
tice of the inference must be decided by each for 
himself. 

The demands we have made upon the atoms thus far 
are purely formal, and result at once from the attempt 
to think of them as the subjects of natural activities. 
We have said nothing of the subjective side of atomic 
action. Our own action, which is all that we immedi- 
ately know, is conditioned by consciousness and a sense 
of effort. But we cannot say that all action must be so 
conditioned. Still, if we are to think of the atoms as 
acting, we must allow their action to be conditioned by 
inner states of some sort; and we must either content 



SUBSTANCES AND THEIR INTERACTION, 257 

ourselves with affirming an inner ground, without at- 
tempting to conceive it, or we must assimilate those 
inner states to our own sense of conscious effort. We 
merely mention the point, without offering any opinion 
upon atomic psychology. 

Now see the point to which we have come. The 
atheist rested his denial, not on the absentee of adapta- 
tion and harmony in things, but on the possible inde- 
pendence of the atoms, and he claimed that their 
dependence cannot be proved. In opposition, we found 
that his no-design argument was essential skepticism, 
and was, besides, self-destructive. Now we find the 
undoubted facts concerning them to be such, that the 
atoms which science must postulate if it will explain 
the facts, cannot be conceived as self-existent. Allow- 
ing the dynamic theory of matter, we can do nothing 
with the atoms without assuming a unitary and spon- 
taneous ground w^hich embraces and determines them 
all. And now the various teleological arguments come 
back with increased force. The possibility of science 
depends upon an objective reason, and a universal adap- 
tation of part to part. The teleological view is the 
only one which satisfies the human mind, and the me- 
chanical objections turn out to be quite irrelevant. 
Now what shall we say of this power which produces 
and maintains all things according to the laws of 
reason? Is it rational? Is it conscious intelligence? 
Nay rather, is it not the highest reason and the uncon- 
ditioned intelligence? It is possible to deny it still, 
and to maintain that this power does not know what it 



258 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

is doing, and hits upon all these harmonies, no one 
knows how. Bat this is not reason; it is volition, and 
is not amenable to argument. If we hold the atomic 
theory, the only conception which can offer any reasons 
for itself is, that the physical mechanism depends upon 
a free and rational creator. Thus we supplement the 
design-argument, and escape its polytheistic difficulties 
by studying, not the adaptations of things, but a much 
simpler and more unquestioned fact, the interaction of 
things. Our method has been critical and dialectic. 
We set off with the formal conception of being, or sub- 
stance, as the subject of activities and changes, and we 
found that this simple conception led, by the simplest 
kind of reasoning, to the conclusion that all finite things 
must depend upon an infinite being. And the order of 
nature is utterly opaque without conceiving this being 
as intelligent. 

But our doctrine of the atoms hints at another con- 
ception of nature, according to which the atoms appear, 
not as substanlml things, but only as modes of the ac- 
tivity of this all-embracing power. As such they are 
convenient practical fictions, but without external real- 
ity. This, too, is a possible and consistent conception. 
Our aim hitherto has not been to prove that atoms 
exist, but only to determine the way in which we must 
think them, if we assume them to exist. We ha"ve 
marked out the formal conditions which they must ful- 
fill if they are to be adequate to the facts. But there 
is no proof that atoms exist, and all the facts upon 
which the theory is based are capable of other explana- 
tions. The capital fact upon which the theory is found- 



SUBSTANCES AND THEIR INTERACTION. 259 

ed is, that the agent or agents which produce material 
phenomena work from points outward, and not contin- 
uously throughout the mass. Now shall we locate a 
separate subject at each of these points from ^Y^iich 
activity proceeds? or shall we regard these discrete 
points as the places where one universal agent acts or 
manifests itself in producing material phenomena ? The 
lirst is the atomic view. The second is the view which 
is daily becoming more common, and which represents 
nature as the product of a constant and orderly activity 
on the part of one infinite and omnipresent being. 
Neither view violates any law of thought, as both pro- 
vide a subject for all activities. Both views make 
science possible, as the chief value of science consists 
in getting the law of phenomena, rather than in any 
insight into essences. It is doubtful if a decisive solu- 
tion can be reached upon this point. The practical 
scientist will generally incline, from custom, to the real- 
ity of the atoms, while the theoretical speculator will 
commonly prefer to make matter a form of the infinite's 
activity. The atomic system cannot be worked without 
the omnipresent and ceaseless action of the infinite; 
and it seems simpler, therefore, and in every way more 
satisfactory, to resolve the physical system at once into 
the immediate activity of the infinite. The tendency 
to some such view is more patent in irreligious than in 
religious quarters. What has been materialism is rap- 
idly passing into pantheism, and many of the evolution- 
ists build expressly on the conception of one all-embrac- 
ing force. In scientific speculations, we find the atomic 
and pantheistic view side by side in the same work; 



260 STUDIES IN THEISM, 

and the author shifts from one to the other without any 
suspicion of the change of base. Accordingly, we find 
matter conceived of as a collection of atoms, and also 
as a mysterious unity. The pantheistic view, then, is 
possible; and this possibility brings up a new series of 
dangers. We have seen that the atomic theory cannv>i 
be held atheistically; but have we not, at the same 
time, dissolved the theory in pantheism? And this, 
though theoretically the antipodes of atheism, is prac- 
tically the same thing. We shall see in the next 
chapter. 



THEISM AND PANTHEISM, 261 



CHAPTER VII. 

THEISM AND PANTHEISM. 

/"VUR argument hitherto has been on the basis of the 
^ atomic theory, and we have seen that the atoms 
cannot be regarded as independent. Along with this 
conclusion has arisen a doubt of their reality, for there 
is no sufficient proof of their existence. The question 
is raised, whether a single unitary agent, whose activ- 
ity follows certain laws, be not a better explanation of 
nature. The defenders of this view divide into two 
schools: (1) idealists with regard to nature; and 
(2) thorough-going pantheists. For the first class there 
are created "Spirits and the uncreated spirit; and besides 
these there is no other. The whole material world is 
but a divine energizing under the forms of space and 
time. For the second class there is the one uncreated 
substance, and nothing else. This substance assumes 
various modes, but remains all and in all. With the 
first view we have no debate. We regard the question 
as incapable of decisive solution, though we think the 
probabilities all point to this alternative : either the 
atoms must be endowed with an inner life, after the 
fashion of Leibnitz's monads, or else they must be re- 
solved into flowing products of the one infinite agent. 
The thorough-going pantheistic view, which resolves 
all tilings, matter und spirit alike, into unsubstantial 



262 STUDIES IN TEE ISM 

modes of the infinite, without proper power and per 
sonality, seems to us a most poverty-stricken view, 
l^he infinite chokes up the universe, and instead of pro- 
ducing a universe of living spirits to rejoice in its full- 
ness and life, it can do nothing better than repeat itself 
to itself in a dreary, stupid, meaningless round of un- 
folding and infolding. Whatever of poetry there may 
be in pantheism lies entirely in idealism, and not in 
pantheism proper. The former view removes the hard 
angularity of mechanism, and brings the created and 
uncreated spirit in immediate communion. The latter 
view we cannot but regard as uninspiring and exces- 
sively dreary. We believe that examination will show 
it to be equally obnoxious to philosophical criticism. 

It has always been a favorite device of pantheistic 
reasoners, and especially of the later German pantheists, 
to boast of the great philosophical superiority of pan- 
theism over all other systems. Atheism is regarded as 
antiquated, and theism as anthropomorphic and super- 
stitious. Nevertheless, pantheism has always been in 
unstable equilibrium over against atheism. The prob- 
lem here is, to determine the relations of the finite and 
infinite, and pantheism has always tended to reduce 
the infinite to the sum of the finite, which is simple 
atheism. Nor does it appear to any greater advan- 
tage on the score of anthropomorphism and supersti- 
tion. On the contrary, we shall find it perpetrating 
the vilest anthropomorphisms and the most abject su- 
perstitions. As to its arguments, we shall find them 
to be mainly a play on words, so that strict panthe- 
ism might not improperly be styled a disease of Ian- 



THEISM AKD PANTHEISM. 2G3 

guago. We consider its theory, (1) of the infinite, and 
(2) of the finite. 

But to guard ourselves against logical jugglei y, we 
must first ask what we mean by the infinite and the 
finite. A little definition of these terms would liave 
paved philosophy great disgrace. We experience our- 
selves as conditioned by something not ourselves. Phe- 
nomena also appear as determined and dependent. We 
call ourselves and these phenomena, therefore, finite and 
dependent. But the momentum of thought carries us 
over to the affirmation of some being which limits and 
determines us and the phenomenal world; and this being 
we call unlimited and independent. Now this being is 
not infinite in the sense of being the all; for we expressly 
recognize the finite in order to affirm the infinite. Great 
glory has been won by philosophical sophists by defining 
the infinite to be the all. In this way many dishearten- 
ing puzzles have been invented. For example, how can 
the finite and the infinite co-exist, since the all must be 
all-embracing? How can evil be excluded from the 
infinite without canceling its infinity ? How can folly 
and impotence be denied to the infinite? These are 
possible modes of existence, and the infinite must in- 
clude all modes. How can the infinite be known ? for 
to know is to distinguish, and this is to limit. How 
can the infinite be positive ? for the positive is definite 
and determined, and hence limited. The infinite, then, 
is the void, the negation, the non-existent, the unknow- 
able. These and many other equally mortifying soph- 
isms rest upon the attempt to define the infinite by the 
etymology of the word, instead of attending to its psy- 



•264 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

chological genesis and content. But, as we pointed out 
in the first chapter, the true infinite is not the all, but 
tlie self-dependent source of the finite. As such it is 
the most positive of beings. It is both distinct from 
the finite, and related to it. It is not absolute in the 
sense of being out of relation to other things, for we 
have expressly assumed it in causal relation to the finite. 
It is absolute only in the sense that it alone is self-sufli- 
cient, and that all the relations between it and the finite 
are posited by itself, and are not restrictions imposed 
from without. The terms infinite, independent, and 
absolute, have all the same meaning as applied to this 
being; and the terms finite, relative, and dependent, 
have all the same meaning as applied to things. Care 
must be taken to keep the psychological content of 
these terms in mind, in order to guard against inter- 
preting them by their etymologies. 

The infinite, then, in sound philosophy, is not the all, 
but the independent being on whom the finite depends. 
If it should turn out to be the all, it would not be by 
the force of definition, but because the known facts 
about the finite force us to deny the substantiality of the 
finite, and reduce it to a mode of the infinite activity. 

To return to the pantheistic theory of the infinite, we 
inquire : Has the infinite consciousness and intelligence ? 
The pantheists generally deny this on two grounds: 
(1) That intelligence and consciousness are not needed 
to explain the phenomena; and (2) That these terms 
involve contradiction when applied to the infinite. The 
argument on the first point is something like the me- 
chanical objections to teleology, except that instead of 



THEISM AND PANTHEISM. 265 

mechanism, the pantheist speaks of automatism. Mech- 
anism is an impossible notion where there is not a 
spatial aggregation of discrete parts; arid of course it 
cannot be applied to the one. Herbert Spencer does 
attempt to apply mechanical laws to the " fundamental 
reality;" but the entire argument assumes an original 
plurality in the one, and almost every -where assumes 
the atomic theory. Mechanism, therefore, must be 
replaced by an inner automatism whereby the infinite 
necessarily brings forth the present order; and that, too, 
apart from any original conscious intelligence or pur- 
pose. The infinite comes to consciousness only in man; 
apart from man, the infinite is blind necessity, and such 
necessity is the first fact of the universe. Intelligent 
spontaneity nowhere exists. 

Considered simply as an hypothesis, which best ex- 
plains the facts — a conscious and free intelligence, or 
a blind, automatic power? If we deny the atomic 
theory, the facts upon which the atomic theory is 
based still remain; namely, the activity of some agent 
at myriads of discrete points. The pantheist denies 
that there is an individual agent at each of these 
points; but claims that it is the same agent which acts 
in all. Let us grant it; and still we have the discrete 
activities for explanation. Now each one of these ac- 
tivities is so related to every one of an infinite number 
of others, that a change in any one necessitates a chaiige 
in all the rest; and each one is determined constantly 
with reference to all the rest. This harmonious adjust- 
ment of the activity in any one place to the infinite 
other activities in infinite other places is a fact which 



266 STUDIES IN THEISM, 

pantlieism lias to explain. A]" >rt from any considera- 
tion of design in the organic world, the elementary fact? 
of physics are a tremendous problem for the j)antheist. 
The pretense that some automatic necessity forces the 
infinite to act at an infinity of discrete points, and to 
act at each with perfect adaptation to all the rest; and 
further, so to combine these discrete activities that 
myriad products should arise all luminous with intelli- 
gence and purpose, while all the time this power does 
not know what it is doing — is to abandon all rationality, 
and take refuge in arbitrary volition and caprice. The 
only analogy which can ever be offered in support of 
this astounding article of faith, is that of instinct. It 
is said that in instinct we see agents working with con- 
summate intelligence, yet without conscious purpose; 
and we may well conceive the infinite ground of things 
as an instinctive power, unconsciously realizing the high- 
est ends. This doctrine has drifted about in human 
thought since the earliest times. It appears especially 
in the teachings of some of the Stoics; and has lately 
made a new appearance in Hartmann's " Philosophy of 
the Unconscious." This theory attempts to mediate be- 
tween the mechanical and teleological views of nature; 
and, like all compromises, it satisfies neither party. It 
will never be popular with Avorking scientists, as it fur- 
nishes no stand-point for mechanics. It will never find 
favor with theists, as its unconscious reason differs in 
nothing from ordinary atheism. The doctrine is also 
barely intelligible in what it affirms, as the phrase, "un- 
conscious intelligence," is only saved from being self- 
contradictory by giving to intelligence a meaning quite 



THEISM AND PANTHEISM 207 

out of the common. It is in any case much easier to 
use the phrase than to understand any thing by it. In 
every-day speech intelligence is a power of knowing; 
and an unconscious intelligence would only mean a 
po wev of knowing which cannot know. To ascribe in- 
telligence and reason to a being, and withhold conscious- 
ness, the most essential factor of- both, will appear to 
most minds as a highly irrational procedure. Again, 
the objection assumes a knowledge of what instinct is, 
whereas, it is one of the darkest and most confused no- 
tions of natural science. In truth, it is a kind of scien- 
tific limbo, into which all the dark problems of animal 
psychology are thrust; so that explanation by instinct 
is simply an abandonment of the j)roblem. If, on the 
other hand, instinct finds a full explanation in the law 
of heredity, as all evolutionists teach, the impropriety 
of applying this notion to the infinite is evident; for 
that would make the infinite itself a product of evolu- 
tion. Finally, which is the more rational hypothesis — 
the blind instinct, which is in sad need of definition, to 
say nothing of explanation, or the intelligent creator? 
Certainly the pantheist who holds instinct to be a better 
origin of the order of nature than conscious reason, has 
little warrant for boasting against any irrationality 
which superstition ever invented. He is the true here 
tic, the snatcher of what his will, rather than his reason, 
dictates. In addition to these objections, drawn from 
the side of the facts, we have our previous conclusion 
drawn from the needs of scientific theory, that science 
must assume that the basal factor of the universe is in- 
telligent. 
18 



268 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

But the chief difficulty of this form of pantheism is, 
that it teaches a temporal development of the infinite. 
By its position as the source and cause of all dependent 
being, and of all reason and knowledge, the infinite can 
never transcend itself without contradiction, and can nev- 
er receive any thing from without. As independent and 
unconditioned, it must always be equal to itself. In its 
nature potentiality must be actuality. Still, the panthe- 
ism with which we are dealing teaches that the infinite 
itself grows to consciousness, knowledge, etc. ; and has 
not advanced very far yet, although it has had from 
everlasting to work in. Further, th(se conscious de- 
velopments of the infinite are in very instable equilib- 
rium, and tend constantly to fall back into the uncon- 
scious and irrational. Thus an element of weakness 
and imperfection is introduced into that which, by its 
position, is the perfect and complete. Thus, also, the 
infinite is made subject to the law of time, which is 
essentially the law of the dependent and conditioned. 
Against both procedures reason protest with all its 
might. When the theist regards the first cause as ab- 
solutely free and wise and good, and as dwelling in the 
unapproachable light of perfect holiness and wisdom, 
the pantheist protests against the anthropomorphic deg- 
radation. We look, therefore, for some transcendent 
glory in his theory of the infinite; and it turns out to 
be this beggarly notion of a developing god, who, when 
ho does his best, can reach no higher consciousness and 
knowledge than those of imperfect men. The panthe- 
ist twits the theist with making God imperfect; and wo 
turn to his own worship only to find him adoring the 



THEISM AND PANTHEISM. 269 

nnost abject superstition. When the theist urges that 
God is infinitely holy and wise and good, the pantheist 
charges that this is anthropomorphism; but when we 
look to see how he himself escapes from it, we find him 
committing the vilest anthropomorphism by declaring 
our narrow, limited, and often evil, mental life the sum- 
mit of a divine development. The god of this type of 
pantheist is simply the deification of all the imperfec- 
tions and limitations of men. It is hardly becoming, 
we think, for the disciples of this school to rail even 
at the abjectness of fetichism; indeed, fetichism and 
devil-worship are only two forms in which his deity 
worships himself. The pantheist further makes much 
of the charge that the God of theism can never be per- 
fect, and then comments on his own notions of perfec- 
tion by showing us a blind god which has striven from 
all eternity to become something, and has at last got as 
high as a man. This is delicious criticism on the part 
of a pantheist. No class of thinkers have ever been so 
loud in asserting their own power; and none have ever 
fallen so low. We hold in opposition to these fetich- 
isms that only the finite and dependent can be subject 
to a law of successive development. The self-depend 
ent, by its definition, contains the ground of all its de- 
terminations in itself, and can never be subjected to any 
law of development without self-contradiction. It is 
the source of law, not its subject. It founds necessity, 
instead of being ruled by it. Hence the infinite, or the 
independent, must always be regarded as the highest 
term of the universe in every respect. It is the com- 
plete and perfect fullness of life, power, wisdom, and 



270 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

goodness, of which the highest finite is but the imper-^ 
feet image. 

The pantheist has been betrayed into these philosoph- 
ical and religious fetichisms by an old logical saw and 
a pure ^abstraction. The saw is, that all determination 
is negation, and hence limitation. To be something 
is not to be something else. Hence the infinite, 
which is the all, excludes all determination. Only 
on condition of being nothing in particular can it 
be every thing in general. The infinite, therefore, 
is pure being, without difference and without determi- 
nation. We shall examine hereafter the saw in question; 
for the present we point out that this argument applies 
only to the etymological infinite, and not the real infi- 
nite. The infinite with which philosophy has to deal, is 
neither the sum of things nor the " being " which is sup- 
posed to be common to them all. It is the being upon 
which the finite depends; and as such, it is the most 
determined of beings. Whatever is, must be something, 
and must have definite powers or attributes; and vf hat- 
ever has no definite attributes of any kind, is simply 
and solely nothing. The strictly indefinite is the void. 
This is as true for the infinite as for the finite. Only 
the definite can exist and act. This "pure being" 
which plays such a part in pantheistic systems is ob- 
jectively nothing, and subjectively it is only the last 
term of a self -destroying abstraction. The pantheist 
takes this blank nothingness, and then figures qualities 
as stuck into it in some way, or rather figures this pure 
being as giving itself determinations. This intolerable 
hypostasis of an empty logical notion, with the added 



THEISM A ND PA NT HE ISM. 2 V 1 

absurdity of its action, is then paraded as the develop- 
ment of tlie infinite and the method of creation. This 
form of the pantheistic^ argument vanishes at once when 
we remember tliat pure being is nothing, and that the 
philosophical infinite is not the all. We conclude, 
therefore, tliat in any theory the infinite must be re- 
garded as the perfect and complete, beyond all laAV of 
development and forever equal to itself. 

This brings to the second objection, that we have 
joined together contradictory terms in ascribing intelli- 
gence and consciousness to the infinite. We have part- 
ly anticijDated this objection, and add the following con- 
siderations. The claim that intelligence is a limitation, 
is based on the doctrine that all determination is nega- 
tion. This doctrine is only true in disjunctive judg- 
ments. If a must be either b or c, then to afiirm h is to 
deny a But such disjunction only applies to the mem- 
bers of a genus which consists of several Impedes. Else- 
where the doctrine in question is utterly false. The 
afiirmation of a neither afiirms nor denies 5, c, or any 
other positive attribute; it only excludes non-a, which, 
as a negative attribute, is nothing. An essential quali- 
ty or power, like intelligence, is not a limitation, and it 
excludes nothing but non-intelligence. The power to 
know is not a weakness, but a power; and it excludes 
nothing but the lack of such a power. Infinite wisdom 
is compatible with infinite goodness, and with an infin- 
ity of other positive attributes. No one would pretend 
that a human being would be more perfect if he lost 
his intelligence. Human perfection lies altogether, not 



272 STUDIES IN THEISM 

in escaping from intelligence, but in escaping from its 
limits. The discursive reason, indeed, is fettered by 
limitations; but tbe essence of intelligence does not 
consist in methods, but in rational insight. In fact, the 
development of human intelligence is always away from 
discursive processes, and toward immediate intuition. 
The great mathematician is not the man who must 
reach his conclusions by tedious discursive reasoning, 
but he who lightens at once to them. It is entirely 
conceivable that there should be an intuitive intelli- 
gence which should not need to reason, but which should 
immediately apprehend all truth. Such is the idea 
which theists have of the divine intelligence. It is the 
absolute intuition of all reality and of all truth. To 
call such a power a limitation and imperfection involves 
the very depths of mental confusion. Moreover, if it 
be an imperfection to have this power, would it be any 
better not to have it? Is the intelligent lower than the 
unintelligent?. The only escape here is to deny that 
intelligence and non-intelligence form a complete dis- 
junction; and hold that besides these, there is a third 
something which is neither. The difficulty with this 
doctrine is, that while it pretends to say something, it 
really says nothing. What this third something is, 
there is no telling. It is a pure blank in thought, and 
there never can be any rational ground for affirming it 
in external fact. Those who defend it commonly just- 
tify themselves by saying that the limits of thought are 
not the limits of being, and, hence, there may well be 
orders of existence of which we can at present form no 
conception. Of all misunderstandings of the functions 



THEISM AND PANTHEISM 273 

of pliilosopliy, this is, without doubt, one of the worst. 
The aim of philosophy is not to speculate on possibili- 
ties, but to explain facts. The inner and outer world 
offer a great body of phenomena for which we are seek- 
ing an explanation. All causes of which we can form 
a «y conception fall under the head of intelligent or non- 
intelligent. If, then, the world is to be explained, it 
must be by one of these two classes; for it is no expla- 
nation of a thing to refer it to a phrase under which 
nothing can be thought. Theism explains the visible 
order by referring it to an intelligent cause. Atheism 
explains it by non-intelligent causes. Both views are 
intelligible; and there can be no doubt of the adequacy 
of the theistic explanation. But it is no explanation to 
refer the world to something which is a pure blank in 
thought. Moreover, there is no need of it because of 
the admitted adequacy of the theistic theory. We 
allow, then, the speculator to vapor at pleasure about 
the possibilities of being, and to coin phrases which 
represent sounds rather than thoughts; but we will not 
allow him to forget that in the present case the problem 
is to explain a definite set of facts; and we point out to 
him that there is some difference between coining a 
phrase and offering a true explanation. The hypothesis 
of the third something does not fulfill the first duty of 
a theory — that of being intelligible. 

But it is further urged, that all consciousness, and 
hence all intelligence, involves a distinction of subject 
and object ; and, therefore, the infinite cannot be con- 
ceived as conscious without positing something of which 
it is conscious, thereby annulling once more its infinity. 



274 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

The infinite of the speculators must have a sorry time. 
They will not allow it to know itself or any thing else, 
for fear of damaging its infinity; and yet it seems, that 
to deny it a power of knowing must be equally fatal. 
Their assertion is supported by a certain amount of 
misread psychology and an appeal to that metaphysical 
abortion, the etymological infinite. The only point 
which calls for attention is the psychology of conscious- 
ness. Not even in man does consciousness involve a 
distinction of subject and object in th^ sense of two 
distinct things. Self-consciousness involves only the 
distinction of thinker and thought, and never of self 
and not-self. Moreover, there are two factors in hu- 
man self-knowledge: (l) a direct feeling of self; and 
(2) a conception of self, or of the properties and powers 
of self. This conception of self is developed; but the 
feeling of self is present from the beginning. The child 
has little or no conception of itself, but it has the live- 
liest experience of itself. This experience of self is 
quite independent of all antitheses of subject and ob- 
ject, and is underived. But allowing all that can be 
claimed for the development of our self -consciousness, 
it does not lie in the notion of self -consciousness that it 
must be developed. An eternal self is metaphysically 
as possible as an eternal not-self. To say that because 
our self-consciousness is developed all ^elf-conscious- 
ness must be developed, is just as rational as to say that 
all being must have a beginning because we have. It 
is to transfer to the independent all the limitations of 
the finite, which is the very thing the pantheist claims 
to abhor. It is said of some free-thinkers with regard 



THEISM AND PANTUETSM. 275 

to Christianity, that they are always on the point of 
setting up a Buddhis.t ]3rayer-mill, or hanging up a 
fetich. It is certain that the contemners of anthropo- 
morphism have an irresistible tendency to anthropo- 
morphic idolatry. Now see what this affirmation of 
consciousness and personality on the part of the infinite 
means. It simply says that the infinite source of all 
activity, life, and intelligence, exists for itself, and 
knows what it is thinking and doing; and the astound- 
ing claim is made that this is to make it finite, anrl 
degrade it into imperfection. To such a pass has phi- 
losophy been brought by a mere play on words. Since 
the time of the elder Fichte, it has been a settled 
dogma with the majority of philosophers that the in- 
finite cannot be personal without limitation. Never- 
theless, we must say with Lotze that full personality is 
possible only to the infinite. It alone is in full posses- 
sion and knowledge of itself. We are rather acted 
upon than actors in many things, and whole depart- 
ments of our nature are dark to us. Full personality 
exists only where the nature is transparent to self, and 
where all the powers are under absolute control. Such 
personality is not ours; it can belong only to the in- 
finite, wliile ours is but its faint and imjDcrfect image. 
When thought is clear, reason will tolerate no other 
conception of the infinite than that it is the perfection 
of power, and wisdom, and selfhood. 

We have insisted upon design and adaptation in na- 
ture. This claim, also, is seized upon by the pantheist 
as incompatible with the infinity of the infinite. Here 
is another antinomy, which, according to him, wrecks 



276 STUDIES IK THEISM. 

our notion of an intelligent creator. This is so extra- 
ordinary a charge that it may be well to quote. Mr. 
J. S. Mill, though not a pantheist, has put this objectioD 
as follows: — 

"It is not too much to say that every indication of 
design in the cosmos is so much evidence against the 
omnipotence of the designer. For what is meant by 
design ? Contrivance — the adaptation of- means to an 
end. P»ut the necessity for contrivance — the need of 
employing means — is a consequence of the limitation of 
power. Who would have recourse to means, if, to at- 
tain his end, his mere word was sufficient ? The very 
idea of means implies that the means have an efficacy 
which the direct action of the being who employs them 
has not. Otherwise, they are not means, but an incum- 
brance. A man does not use machinery to move his 
arms. If he did, it could only be when paralysis had 
deprived him of the power of moving them by volition. 
But if the employment of contrivance is in itself a sign 
of limited power, how much more so is the careful and 
skillful choice of contrivances? Can any wisdom be 
shown in the selection of means, when the means have 
no efficacy but what is given them by the will of him 
who employs them, and when his will could have be- 
stowed the same efficacy on any other means ? Wisdom 
and contrivance are shown in overcoming difficulties, 
and there is no room for them in a being for whom no 
difficulties exist. The evidences, therefore, of natural 
theology distinctly imply that the author of the cosmos 
worked under limitations; that he was obliged to adapt 
himself to conditions independent of his will, and to 



THEISM AND PA NTTTEISM. 211 

attain his ends by such arrangements as those conditions 
admitted of." * Hence, it is concluded, a designing in- 
telligence and infinity, or absoluteness, will not go to- 
gether. 

This argument is so extraordinary in its misconcep- 
tions as to suggest that there must be some spell in the 
design-aTgument which puts its critics in an abnormal 
state of mind. No believer in design questions the 
power of God to produce by simple fiat all finite exist- 
ence; indeed, that is the way in which he conceives the 
creation of the elemental realities of things. He spake, 
and it was done. He commanded, and it stood fast. 
But the work must have some qualities; and in the 
arch of being thus sprung by a word, we find harmony 
and rational relation, the fitting in of part to part, and 
universal adaptation. The finite work, as such, is lim- 
ited ; but how its rational and purposive character 
should prove the creator limited is past all finding out. 
One may claim that the infinite cannot produce a finite 
creation, but certainly the inner consistency and adap- 
tations of the system cannot be urged in proof of the 
weakness of the creator. It sounds well to talk of 
securing ends without means, but the talk is largely 
meaningless, because the mass of ends either logically 
imply the means of their realization, or they are certain 
states or relations of things, and as such imply the 
things. Suppose happiness is an end; it implies the 
existc#ice of sensitive beings, and without them is ut- 
terly meaningless. Or let knowledge be an end; this 
end implies the existence of intelligent beings, and 
* "Three Essays on Religion," pp. 116, 177. 



278 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

without them is empty of the slightest significance. 
Now, most ends in nature are of this class, and the 
means which realize them are but expressions of what 
is contained in the notion of the end. I>irth cannot be 
the law of life without logically implying agents of 
some sort for the realization of the law. Nutrition can- 
not be the law of the organism without implying some 
sort of a nutritive apparatus. It is always open to the 
objector to fall back upon ignorance, and suggest that 
the means actually adopted are not the best possible; 
but his claim that any use of ends implies the weakness 
of the creator overlooks the fact that most ends exist 
only through means, and that apart from those means 
they not only do not exist, but have no assignable 
meaning whatever. When ends are not of this kind, 
but might be reached in various ways, we are not to 
think of God as in a difficulty and using certain means 
to extricate himself, but we are rather to think of the 
relation of the means to the end as expressing the inner 
consistency and rationality of the divine activity. But 
contrivance in this sense of logical consistency and in- 
ner harmony of part with part certainly implies no 
weakness on the part of the creator. This implication 
could be allowed only if contrivance denoted weakness 
and puzzle-headedness. 

We pass now to the pantheistic doctrine of the finite, 
and its relation to the infinite. Upon this point there 
are theories and theories. The vulgar pantheistic no- 
tion is, that things are a part of God. This view rests 
upon the vilest sense-delusion. It applies the notion of 



THEISM AND PANTHEISM 270 

quantity to the infinite one, and conceives that quantity 
after the analogy of a clay -bank, which can be used in- 
differently to make many things. Or it conceives of 
the infinite as an elastic or plastic substance, which can 
take on many forms. This is the conception which un- 
derlies most forms of philosophic evolution. But this 
notion is merely a picture borrowed from sense-experi- 
ence. It is the apotheosis of thoughtlessness. Still it 
is not surprising that a philosophy which is as crude as 
this, should fancy that it has sounded the secret of the 
universe, since arrogance commonly varies inversely 
as insight. Our discussion of being has led us to the 
conviction that every true subject is an individualized 
force, to which the idea of divisibility has no applica- 
tion. Every true substance niust be conceived as a 
strict unit, which, as such, excludes all division. We 
cannot, without annihilating self-contradiction, speak 
of the one as dividing itself into the many, for thereby 
w^e deny that it is the one. It is still worse when we 
speak of it as remaining the one after the division, for 
thereby we deny the division. Most pantheistic systems 
break down at this point. They explain the phenome- 
nal plurality by assuming that the one divides itself 
into the many — a phrase which can be realized in 
thought only as we assume that the one was not one, 
but an aggregate. That the truly one should divide 
itself into a manifold of things is an impossible concep- 
tion, a phrase and not a thought. It is as if we should 
epeak of the mathematical ujiit as producing number 
by a process of self-diremption. There is no thought 
which corresponds to the phrase. Moreover, if such a 



280 STUDIES IN THEISM, 

conception were possible^ such division must cancel the 
one, and the plurality would be all. The result is, that 
pantheism at this point has always tended toward athe- 
ism; and, when it reaches this point, it is atheism. We 
have seen in the last chapter that an interacting plural- 
ity cannot be conceived without a strictly unitary being. 
The one, then, exists; how shall we account for the 
many ? To speak of the one as dividing itself into the 
many is self -contradictory. We can only conclude that 
if a plurality exists, it must be created. It must b^ 
external to the one; that is, it is not derived from the 
one in the sense that the one is any less than before, or 
that God plus world since creation only equals God 
before creation. In brief, the notion that the infinite 
^reates by taking a part of himself, and making some- 
^;hing of it, is as coarse and gross a conception as ever 
;candalized philosophy. All emanation theories come 
under this condemnation. They regard the infinite as 
a juggler's hat stuffed with all that is to be brought out 
of it. Thus the unity of the one is again cancelled, and 
in its place w^e have merely an aggregate. Creation is 
the only tenable solution of the problem of the one and 
the many. * 

Hereupon the pantheist brings out his Medusa head 
— from nothing, nothing comes; and looks complacently 
that the theist should fall down dead at the sight. But 
if the theist only steadies himself a moment, there will 
be no difficulty in staring the monster out of countenance. 
For this wonderful senteuce only says that nothing can 
never produce any thing; it is far enough from saying 
that something, an active agent, cannot by its causal 



THEISM AND PANTHEISM. 281 

efficiency produce something. Now theism does not 
affirm that nothing produces something; but rather that 
(yod, the all-powerful, has caused the world to exist, and 
has done this in such a way that God is no less after 
creation than before. This is the only meaning of the 
doctrine of creation. It denies that the created is in 
any sense a part of the creator; it is rather the product 
of his activity. God posits the world, and remains 
equal to himself. How this is done, is indeed a mys- 
tery ; but it is no contradiction. But we need not be 
much concerned at the mystery, so long as every blade 
of grass, or even the transference of the simplest me- 
chanical motion, contains oceans of riddles for which 
our profoundest science has not the shadow of a solu- 
tion. The pantheistic theory, however, which regards 
the world as a part of God, or as in any way made from 
the divine essence, or as in any way connected with it 
except as effect and cause, is saddled with invincible 
contradictions. It is based upon the coarsest and most 
untenable notion of substance. It further denies and 
cancels the unity of the one; and at last, instead of 
the unitary infinite, it gives us merely the sum of the 
finite, thus vanishing into atheism. 

The same gross conception appears in the common 
pantheistic expression that finite things are modes of 
the infinite. The underlying notion here is that of a 
plastic or elastic substance which can be pressed into 
various shapes and molds; and this notion, again, rests 
upon the static conception of being. We strike out this 
imagination, and the statement takes on this form : The 
finite is in no intelligible sense a mode of the infinite; 



282 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

but all finite things are products of the activity of the 
infinite. The only pantheistic conception which does 
not involve insuperable contradiction is, that which re- 
gards all finite things as having no ground of action 
whatever in themselves, but as being the products of a 
constant divine activity. In this case the relation of the 
finite to the infinite would be like that of our thoughts 
to the thinking mind. The thought is in no way 
a part, or a mode, of the thinking subject; it is an act 
of that subject. At the same time, the thought has no 
substantiality in itself ; but exists only as it is thought. 
This conception is logically consistent; it remains to in- 
quire whether it fits the facts. 

Thus far w^c have only sought to develop a pantheis- 
tic concept *.on of the finite,- and its relation to the infi- 
nite, whi jh should be formally tenable or self -consistent. 
That conception turns out to be one which denies the 
finil/.:^ all substantiality and all activity, and reduces it 
to a flowing form of the activity of the infinite. The 
finite is simply a divine energizing according to cer- 
tain methods. When we come to apply this theory 
to the facts of experience, we find that in the case 
of so-called material things which have no selfhood, 
there are no strong objections to this view. It all 
comes to a question of probabilities and of ease of 
conception. We will restate the alternative mentioned 
in the beginning of the chapter: Either the elements 
must be endowed with an inner life, and thus made 
homogeneous with spirit, though probably on a lower 
plane than the human spirit; or, they must be re- 



THEISM AND PANTHEISM. 283 

garded as forms of the universal activity. Selfhood 
and freedom are the only marks which can distinguish 
the finit(3 from the infinite. Neither view could dis- 
turb phenomena, or things as they appear; and hence 
common sense cannot properly be invoked to decide 
the question. That material elements exist at all, 
is an hypothesis formed to provide an objective cause 
for our sensations and for their peculiar syntheses. 
Allowing them to exist, we have at once to supplement 
them by another being which conditions and mediates 
all their activities. If, then, beings are not to be mul- 
tiplied beyond necessity, and if the simplest hypothesis 
is the best; then it is plain to us, that the theory of 
material elements is operose and needless, and should 
be replaced by the theory that all lifeless existence is 
simply a form of the activity of the infinite. Indeed, 
the conception of impersonal existence cannot be dis- 
tinguished from that of a flowing activity. But when 
we come to spiritual beings, who have consciousness and 
personality, the theory fails to fit, except with important 
modifications. The thoughtless will hastily conclude 
that we have just as good reason for believing in the 
substantiality of the elements as in the substantiality 
of ourselves; but this will only prove that the term 
thoughtless is rightly applied. We do know that a 
sufticient cause of the phenomenal world exists ; but we 
do not know, and have nothing like proof, that material 
elements exist. We do know that we ourselves exist. 
No one denies an objective reality; but the nature of 
that reality is entirely a matter of speculation. To 

decide the question by appeals to sense-perception is 
19 



284 STUDIES IN THEISM, 

like attacking the Copernican theory on the same 
basis. 

Again, the thoughtless will urge that if nature is re- 
signed to pantheism, there is no reason for withholding 
the petty realm of the human spirit; but this objection 
totally misconceives the function of philosophy. It is 
akin to the claim, often heard, that because mechanical 
laws explain physical phenomena, they must also explain 
vital and mental phenomena; or that because necessity 
rules in the physical world, it must also rule in volition. 
One rnust always be on his guard against the imposition 
of extending a law from one realm into another without 
independent proof of its validity in that realm. Bear 
\r^ mind all the while that the duty of every philosophy 
is to explain the facts of consciousness, and not to explain 
them away. When this is remembered, the impossibil- 
ity of absolute pantheism is clearly seen. For the facts 
of personality, and volition, and individual conscious- 
ness, are the most fundamental facts of our mental life. 
Nothing is more indubitable, nothing is so indubitable, 
as these facts. How we are persons, how we can act, 
how we can be conscious, we know not; that we are 
persons, that we act, and that our volition counts for 
something in the course of events, we are absolutely 
sure. One can break down consciousness if he will; 
but pantheism cannot be built up by denying conscious- 
ness. Total skepticism must result from such heroic 
treatment. Now every pantheistic theory must recog- 
nize these f?.cts, and modify itself accordingly. Hence 
if the pantheist insist that we are unsubstantial products 
of the divine activity, he must still allow that that 



THEISM AND PANTHEISM. 285 

activity is such as to make and leave us persons. If 
the pantheist insists that God acts in all our willing, we 
know that we act too. However unsubstantial, then, he 
may declare the human spirit, it is still something which 
can act and be acted upon; can think, and feel, and will; 
but that which can act and be acted upon, is just what 
we mean by substance. No pantheistic theory can deny 
these conclusions and remain loyal to the facts or the 
data of the problem. He may form what theory he 
chooses of the way in which these facts are possible; 
they still remain as facts. But the theist claims no 
more than this. He does not pretend to know how our 
personality is made; or how our activity is related to 
the divine activity; or how the finite can have a relative 
independence over against the infinite: he only insists 
that our will and consciousness are our own. If the 
pantheist attempts to get behind these facts, the theist 
is justly incredulous of his results; but as long as the 
facts are undisturbed, the theist is indifferent to the 
theory. If we keep in mind that the aim of philosophy 
is not to deny the facts, but to explain them without 
in any way distorting them, we see that any tenable 
pantheism must leave just those facts which the 
theist regards as distinguishing the creature from the 
creator. Thus pantheism, when purged of its anthro- 
pomorphisms and philosophical crudeness, and when 
brought into harmony with the facts, appears not as 
pantheism, but as idealistic theism. In it all is life. 
There are no fixed points of dead inertness; but per- 
sonality and consciousness are every-where. The inef- 
fable tides of the infinite are poured round all, and 



286 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

flow through all, and upbear all. The vulgar attempt 
to identify God and the world, which degrades God 
without exalting the world, must be abandoned as vile- 
ly anthropomorphic, un philosophic, and contradictory; 
and in its place must be put the conception of the liv- 
ing God and Father of our spirits, who is never far 
from any one of us. 

The only tenable pantheism, we said, reduces to ideal- 
istic theism. But as we did not decide absolutely for 
idealism, no more do we decide absolutely for idealistic 
theism. We have rather aimed to criticise the panthe- 
istic doctrine so as to show the only form in which it 
can rationally be held. All theism must teach the im- 
manency of God; so that religiously there is no differ- 
ence between idealistic theism and immanent theism. 
It is also a mistake to decide positively where there are 
not sufficient data for a positive decision. 



RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD, 287 



¥ 



CHAPTER yill. 

RELATION OF GOB TO THE WORLD. 

E have reached the conclusion that all finite exist- 
ence depends upon a personal and intelligent be- 
ing. We have next to inquire how we shall think of 
his relation to the world, and its on-going. What we 
shall have to say will apply equally to realism and to 
rational idealism. There is no need, therefore, to decide 
for either. 

The philosophic thought of both England and Amer- 
ica has been ruled from time immemorial by the deistic 
conception of a mechanical world and an outside God. 
According to this conception, the world was made once 
for all, and thereafter it was able to take care of itself. 
To such an extent was this independence of the finite car- 
ried, that it seemed to be held that the finite would be 
undisturbed, even if the infinite should entirely vanish. 
Accordingly, the theistic argument turned largely on 
such questions as that of a prime mover, the only recog- 
nized use for God being to set the world a-going. On 
this account, very many still regard a dynamic theory 
of matter as fraught with atheism. God was not only 
apart from the world, but it almost seems as if he 
were to be conceived as spatially external. This deistic 
theory was simply the apotheosis of the crudest notions 
of common sense, in itself it belongs to the pr^-critical 



288 STaniES IN THEISM. 

stage of thought. It is also intelligible as a reaction 
against the insanities of extreme pantheism; but it is 
scarcely less mischievous, and is equally obnoxious to 
criticism. It contains the germs of materialism and 
theological rationalism. Its rigid mechanism allows no 
modification except by an irruption from without; and 
hence the vehement opposition to the supernatural of 
those who hold this view. Its further assumption, that 
the system contains all its factors unchanged from the 
beginning, makes it necessary to regard all outcome as 
the result of shifting the pieces in the great kaleido- 
scope. Hence, also, the necessity of regarding life 
and the soul as but peculiar phases of the ever-shifting 
constants of the system. The great kaleidoscope rolls, 
and the pieces assume new combinations, but there is 
nothing substantial in the products. They are phases 
only, and pass as the combination changes. No other 
view can be taken without allowing the introduction of 
new agents into the system; and this would be an aban- 
donment of its fundamental assumption. In this respect 
our theology has generally been in advance of our phi- 
losophy. With the Bible in his hand, the theologian 
could hardly help seeing that the natural and supernat- 
ural interpenetrate, so that nature is but the manifesta- 
tion of the supernatural, and the supernatural is but the 
omnipresent cause of the natural. Still our theology 
has not entirely escaped the influence of the deistic con- 
ception; as is shown by its failure to steadily affirm the 
doctrine of an immanent God. Even now it is not un- 
common to hear miracles and answers to prayer defend- 
ed on the ground that Uod made provision for them all 



RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 289 

in the original mechanism. Babbage wrote a treatise 
to show by the aid of his calculating machine that the 
mechanism of nature might have been so adjusted at 
the- beginning as to produce the wonder at the right 
time, When the hands pointed the hour the bell struck. 
The puintiers and the bell were kept together by an in- 
ner automatism which made mind as predicable as mat- 
ter. In this way the miracles were provided for, and 
above all, the laws of nature were preserved. This 
was esteemed a triumph for the theologians, as it 
saved them from the reproach of violating natural 
laws. That the logical outcome of this view is fatal- 
ism in no way diminished their satisfaction. In truth, 
it was only a striking illustration of the ease with which 
an uncritical habit of thinking is mistaken for a law of 
thought.^ 

The prominent part played by the deistic notion in 
scientific speculations need only be mentioned to be 
recognized. The arguments for evolution and material- 
ism in life and mind are feeble enough when viewed 
from the side of the facts. The positive evidence gives 
but the smallest support to the great conclusion; but if 
we may assume Jjhat our system bas received no new 
factors from the beginning, these doctrines follow as a 
matter of definition. In a given system, which receives 
no additions and suffers no loss, all phenomena of what- 
ever character must be due to varying combinations of 
the constant factors. We may be unable to see how 
the phenomena result, but the conclusion is in no way 
disturbed, for, by hypothesis, the primal elements are 
the only things concerned. No amount of breaks in the 



290 STUDIES IN THEISM, 

genealogical series, and no inability to understand the 
metliod of evolution or the development of mind from 
matter, can have the least weight as an argument so 
long as this basal assumption is allowed to stand. Un- 
less the opponents of these views have the courage to 
deny the mechanical self-sufficiency of the system, and 
to affirm the introduction of new factors into it, their 
opposition even to the most materialistic f oi rn cf evo- 
lution might as well cease. The importance of this 
question will best appear from some illustrations. 

The nature of life is one of the great battle grounds 
of materialism. The materialistic, or mechanical, theory 
is commonly misunderstood. In its best form it does 
not teach that physics or chemistry can explain life, or 
that we have any mechanical insight into the origin of 
life. It only asserts that just as the elements when 
brought together in certain relations, manifest chemical, 
magnetic, and other properties, so when brought togeth- 
er in certain other relations, they manifest vital quali- 
ties. It may be that they manifest them only in con- 
nection with living things, but however manifested, the 
activities of every organism are but the resultants of 
the activities of the component elements. The doc- 
trine is often coarsely held as if electricity or chemistry 
are able to give us some insight into life; but in its 
best form, it claims only that in any atomic complex 
the properties depend on the nature of the atoms, which 
nature, however, may be as mysterious as we please. 
This is what is meant by the current propositions to in- 
clude life in the definition of matter. Of course this 
view assumes, in the atoms, all that afterward appears, 



RELATION OF GOD TO TEE WORLD. 291 

and in one sense explains nothing; but it does, at least, 
furnish a landing-place for our thought, in that it pro- 
vides some subject for the organic activities. Formally, 
at least, the thought is complete. The agents which 
])roduce organisms are specified; and, in addition, the 
thought of any irruption or meddling from without is 
warded off. The non-mechanical view, on the other 
hand, is not so clear on this point. Frequently the 
mechanical view of life is misconceived, as if it were 
taught that mechanical processes, in the common mean- 
ing of the term, could explain life. Moreover, we hear 
much of vital properties and activities in the body, but 
we are not told to what subject they belong. To at- 
tribute them to the body is mere thoughtlessness, for 
the body is only an aggregate. Here, then, are activi- 
ties in the body: what acts? If we say that the ele- 
ments act, we have not escaped the mechanical theory. 
If we attribute the vital qualities to the elements, again 
we have not escaped the mechanical theory. But if 
there be any thing beyond the elements, what is it? 
And above all, whence is it ? If we say that life acts, 
we have not simplified the problem, for while the name 
life is one, the thing is many. The fact is not univers- 
al and singular life, but discrete, individual lives, and 
these often of the most diverse nature. We can escape 
the mechanical theory only by affirming a separate vital 
subject for each living thing. But in that case, whence 
has this swarm of lives their origin ? Shall we say that 
the original vital element has indefinitely reproduced 
itself? That would make it creative; for we have seen 
that every true subject must be a unit. Shall we say 



292 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

that it has re-enforced itself from the unorganic world? 
So far as such a statement would have any meaning, it 
would be the very essence of the mechanical theory. 
Shall we, then, affirm a sejDarate creation for eveiy liv- 
ing thing ? These questions express the real difficulty 
of the non-mechanical doctrine; and it is these objec- 
tions which make converts to the opposite view, rather 
than any insight or demonstration which that view can 
give. It is also plain, that on any theory of a mechan- 
ical world and an outside God, the non-mechanical view 
cannot make headway against these considerations. 
The holder of this theory is shut up to one of three 
views: (1) The pre-existence of all organic germs from 
the beginning; (2) the creation of a vital element for 
each organism; or (3) that the directive or unifying 
agent in all organisms is the omnipresent God, who pro- 
ceeds in each according to his own chosen and orderly 
methods. The choice is practically between the last 
two views; and it must be clear that one who has not 
the courage to choose one of them and maintain it con- 
sistently is powerless against the mechanical doctrine. 
Vacillation on this point gives the victory to mechanism. 
Mechanism, on the other hand, is not based upon fact 
and knowledge, but on an assumed metaphysical theory. 
At bottom, this is a battle of metaphysics. 

For the present, we decide for neither of these views, 
but pass to a more important question. From the ear- 
liest times, the origin of the human soul has been a 
vexed question; and here, too, the deistic conception of 
an absentee God has had great influence. Only throe 
views are self -consistent : (1) The pre-existence of alJ 



DELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 293 

souls; (2) their creation in connection with the organ- 
ism; and (3) mental phenomena inhere in no substantial 
subject, but result entirely from material combinations. 
The doctrine of pre-existence found favor with some of 
the early Indian and Greek philosophers; and an occa- 
sional theologian holds it still; but it involves us in so 
many gratuitous difficulties that it will never have any 
general acceptance. Practically, the only theories are 
materialism and creationism. In unclear thought an 
attempt is sometimes made to steer between these views, 
and represent the soul of the child as in some way pro- 
duced by those of the parents. This view has its origin 
in the deistic notion; and its outcome is materialism. 
It is defended only by a large use of vague phrases and 
half thoughts. It is said, for instance, that there is a 
law, or a world- order, according to which souls are pro- 
duced, yet without being created. Unfortunately, a 
world-order, or a law, is only a conception, and always 
needs some agent or agents to realize it. In order, then, 
to make this theory intelligible, we must know what the 
agents are which realize this order. If it be said, that 
God has made the elements such that when combined in 
certain ways mental phenomena result, this is simple 
materialism. The mind is the unsubstantial outcome of 
organization. If it be said, that when the elements are 
combined in certain ways a substantial soul results, this 
is to allow creation. The only difference between this 
and creationism proper is, that it does not say what 
creates. But the notion that the elements, or that the 
souls of the parents, give off something out of which 
new souls can be made, is utterly untenable. We are, 



294 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

then, shut up either to an acceptance of materialism, or 
we must admit the direct creation of human souls, the 
doctrine of pre-existence being practically obsolete* 
l->ut creation cannot be maintained upon any theory 
which regards God as an absentee, or as any thing but 
immanent in the natural, as its bond and upholder. 
Failure to see this lies at the bottom of a great deal of 
theoretic materialism. The spiritualists have been nei- 
ther clear nor consistent in their doctrine concerning 
the origin of souls; and most commonly have adopted a 
theory of the relation of God and the world, which is 
essential materialism. Thus the case has gone against 
them by default, rather than by any force of opposing 
evidence. 

Again, when we take up the question of the evolution 
of higher from lower forms, and of the organic from the 
inorganic, w^e find the grip of the affirmative argument 
to consist in the deistic theory of an outside and absent 
God. And it is plain that, if we accept this theory, we 
must adopt at once the most thorough-going form of 
materialistic evolution. Tyndall may explode all the 
experiments which claim to prove spontaneous genera- 
tion. Virchow may declare that anthropology discred- 
its more and more the notion of our ape-like origin. 
He may also denounce the materialists as pernicious 
dogmatists of the firm of Carbon & Co., and he may 
assail Darwinism as a huge bubble company. Darwin, 
too, may admit the insufficiency of natural selection as 
a complete account of the origin of species; and a mul- 
titude of naturalists may point out genealogical breaks 
of o;reater or k^ss extent. But these considerations 



R FLAT [ ox OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 205 

weigh nothing unless we deny the basal assumption of 
a universe ontoh^gically complete from the beginning. 
Accordingly, a favorite procedure with evolutionists is 
to deduce the results of the opposite view. That view, 
it is said, denies the continuity of nature, and intro- 
duces miracle — a notion which is the death of all science. 
The cause of evolution is declared, with endless itera- 
tion, to be a belief in continuity against miracle, and in 
law against arbitrariness. The emphasis with which 
this statement is made shows how little of positive evi- 
dence can be adduced. Meanwhile the opponents of 
evolution continue to insist upon breaks, as if they had 
the slightest significance so long as the underlying con- 
ception of continuity is allowed. On the other hand, if 
the non-evolutionists would break, not with the facts 
but with the metaphysics of the evolutionists, the facts 
upon which the latter rely would lose very much of 
their significance. Ontological continuity is compatible 
with a lack of phenomenal continuity, and conversely 
phenomenal continuity does not prove ontological con- 
tinuity. 

The bearing of the last clause will become clearer if 
w^e inquire what is meant by evolution. The very no- 
tion is often surrounded by a nebulous haze not unlike 
the primeval fog itself. The root idea is an unfolding 
or unrolling, and this, by an easy transition, is applied 
to denote the several stages of an individual, or of a 
changing systeiTx, In both cases there is the thought of 
hidden powers which come gradually to manifestation. 
But the idea has no application to the production of the 
substantial. This must be either eternal or created. 



296 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

A process of creation is meaningless except as it de- 
notes successive creations. But a thing must either be 
or not be; there is no half-way possible. Hence crea- 
tion and evolution are not properly opposed. The op- 
posite of creation is eternal existence. In speculation, 
however, evolution is commonly applied to the succes- 
sive stages of the system; and here the conception im- 
plies at least two factors: (1) an agent or agents; and, 
(2) a product. It is hard, indeed, to conceive an ev( ♦lu- 
tion without a third thought of a goal toward which 
the process tends, and by reference to which its prog- 
ress is measured. Without this thought evolution is 
only a meaningless stir, from which all thought of prog- 
ress must be excluded. In that case, evolution would 
be neither progress nor regress, but simply change. 
It w^ould be only a new form of Heraclitus's doctrine, 
that all things flow. What, then, is the agent or 
agents in evolution? Every process demands some 
definite agent, or set of agents, for its realization. It 
is not uncommon to find evolutionists ignoring this 
simple consideration. This may be due to the exalted 
state of mind in which many of them are. The bare 
word is a talisman which nothing can withstand; and 
indeed it seems to be a synonym, not only for all that 
is profound, but for all that is holy and reverend. 
Hence a certain emphasis, and even unction, may be 
noticed in their pronunciation of the sacred name. 
Having thus got used to evolving things, many are 
prepared to evolve every thing without any hint of 
what conducts the process. Accordingly, they are no 
longer content to evolve life from the lifeless, and 



BELATFON OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 297 

higher from lower forms; but they insist on evolving 
the chemical elements, and even the ultimate atoms 
themselves. This tendency is easily understood as the 
outcome of a blind passion for construing and explain- 
ing which often seizes upon minds which are not in full 
possession of themselves. It overlooks the fact that 
explanation cannot go on forever, but always supposes 
some definite reality more ultimate than the thing ex- 
plained. In this way the crude notion often obtains 
with the thoughtless, that evolution is able to explain 
both the being and forms of the universe, all alike being 
evolved from nothing. But this attempt to compre- 
hend the realities of the universe as the result of proc- 
esses which they themselves make possible, must be 
passed over as the outcome of a misplaced and inverted 
curiosity, which fancies that every thing is product and 
nothing is producer. The proposition to evolve matter 
implies that matter is not substantial, but only a pass- 
ing phase of some universal activity. To the question, 
then, What is the agent or agents in evolution ? we may 
say : (1) God is the active agent in all evolution. 
(2) An omnipresent, but blind, mechanical power is the 
agent. (3) God has created things so that they unfold 
by their own inherent energy. (4) The physical ele- 
ments are the sole agents in evolution. (5) We may 
combine (l) and (3), and regard God as an omnipresent, 
but not the only, factor in evolution. In the first view, 
evolution is but the continuous activity of God realizing 
an unfolding plan. In the second, it is the continuous 
activity of a blind power, according to an order of 
which it knows nothing. In the third, evolution is the 



298 STUDIES IN THEISM 

unfolding of possibilities originally given in germ. In 
the fourtli, it is the successive phenomena and com- 
binations of the physical elements in their ceaseless 
striving after equilibrium. As such it is purely phe- 
nomenal, and exists only for the perceiving mind. 
The elements themselves know nothing of the process, 
and are indifferent to it. It is all the same to a mole- 
cule of iron, whether it is coursing in the veins of a 
man or blazing in the fires of the sun. The current 
evolutionist speculations are an odd compound of mate- 
rialism, hylozoism, and Spinozism; and Spinozism, in 
turn, is a contradiction made up of the Eleatic and 
Heraclitic philosophies. But w^here there is great ig- 
norance of the history of philosophy, antique w^hims 
and superstitions are easily mistaken for new discover- 
ies. The same ignorance conditions their acceptance. 
That such a theory is fatal to science we have pointed 
out in chapter iii. 

We have next to inquire what is evolved. To this 
question, also, there are various answers. Some of the 
more enthusiastic, as pointed out, fancy that every thing 
is evolved ; but this view needs no further notice. And 
as the organic world is the great field of evolution, we 
confine our attention to that for a moment. In discuss- 
ing organic evolution, the great question is, not w^hat is 
a species, but what is an individual. If the individual 
Is a substantial subject, it cannot be regarded as a 
product of evolution, but as a new factor introduced 
into the system; in short, a creation. It is, indeed, pos- 
sible to assume that it has existed in germ from the 
beginning, but this view is practically obsolete. But 



RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 299 

whether we view it as a new germ dropped into the 
stream of things, or as the development of a pre-exist- 
ing germ, it is equally impropei* to speak of it as evolved 
as to its existence. Evolution applies only to its un- 
folding, and assumes that the germ and its potentialities 
are already there. But if, on the other hand, the indi- 
vidual is nothing substantial, but only in a combination 
of the elements, or a passing phase of the universal 
activity, then both individuals and species are mere phe- 
nomena; and the difference between one species and an- 
other, or between the organic and the inorganic, is purely 
phenomenal. This conclusion applies to any theory, 
theistic, atheistic, and pantheistic alike, which denies 
creation in connection with every living thing, and the 
pre-existence of all germs from the beginning. On the 
theory of idealistic theism, or of atheistic pantheism, 
such a denial would reduce all things to unsubstantial 
forms of the omnipresent activity. An individual would 
be but the locus of a particular activity, and nature 
would be the locus of the sum of the activities: or, since 
a locus in mathematics denotes the path of a point mov- 
ing under a certain law, we may call a thing the law of a 
particular activity determining a certain locus; and we 
may call nature the law of the sum of the activities, 
determining the general locus of the universal activity. 
In this case both individuals and species would be phe- 
nomenal, and could be neither derived nor transformed. 
These terms apply only to the substantial. Individuals 
would be phenomenal phases succeeding one another ac- 
cording to a certain law, but without any essential con- 
nection. Species would be, externally, phenomenal 
. 20 



300 STUDIES IN THEISM, 

groups of phenomena ; internally, they would be the 
norms according to which the universal power con- 
sciously or unconsciously proceeds in producing the 
phenomenal individual, and the transformation of spe- 
cies would mean only the variation of these norms of 
production. But whether the norm changed or re- 
mained constant, the only relation between the individ- 
ual combinations would be that of sequence. 

If we adopt the materialistic view, which regards 
life as the result of mechanical combination, we reach 
similar conclusions. On that theory the universe is a 
great self-rolling kaleidoscope, whose pieces are for- 
ever shifting. We do not speak of the figures in 
a kaleidoscope as evolved from the preceding ones, 
or as transformations of them. There is a succession 
of phasQ^ and forms, but no proper evolution and no 
transformation. So when we look into the great world- 
kaleidoscope w^hich materialism posits, we see only a 
succession of phases and forms. The elements abide 
unchanged through all, and are indifferent to the 
outcome. As the mist knows nothing of the rainbow 
which it reflects, so the dark mechanism of the universe 
knows nothing of the phantom of evolution which it 
founds. The underlying realities do, indeed, contain 
the ground why one phase should succeed another, but 
the phases and forms themselves, as purely phenomenal, 
could have no relation but that of sequence or co-exist- 
ence, and (;ould not exist at all except in the mind of an 
observer. It would not alter the case in the least if an 
unbroken genealogical sequence existed between the 
highest and lowest forms. It would still be unmeaning 



RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 301 

to speak of the higher as derived from the lower, or as 
transformations of the lower, for only the substantial 
can be derived or transformed. A transformed phe- 
nomenon is another phenomenon, and for the reason 
that the essence of a phenomenon is a certain manner 
of appearance. Suppose, then, we allow an unbroken 
genealogical sequence between man and the monkey, 
we are still not allowed, upon this theory, to speak of 
man as a transformed monkey, or as derived from the 
monkey. For both man and monkey are but unsub- 
stantial phases of the eternal flow, and hence there is 
strictly nothing either to derive or transform. The 
monkey is one form in the kaleidoscope, man is another; 
there can be no other connection. In short, the evolu- 
tion, derivation, and transformation of species are in- 
exact expressions on any theory except that of mediaeval 
realism. The individual, we repeat, is the great mys- 
tery, and there is no more difficulty in passing from one 
species to another than in passing from one individual 
to another. If the individual is any thing substantial, 
we can only view it as a new beginning, having no 
more ontological connection with its ancestors than one 
atom has with another. The impossibility of viewing 
it as made of some universal substance has been shown 
in the previous chapter. If the individual is real, spe- 
cies are, externally, groups of similar individuals, and, 
int ernally, they are the norms according to which crea- 
tive power proceeds in positing individuals. The con- 
stancy of species would mean the constancy of these 
norms. The transformation and derivation of species 
would mean the variation of these norm^. The evolu- 



302 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

lion of species would mean the passage from simple to 
more complex and differentiated norms. But in any 
case, the individual would be something for itself, not 
an old thing made over, and afterward to pass into 
something else, but an abiding unit of being with a 
fixed law in itself. No theory contemplates the trans- 
formation of the individual, but only of the species. 
A flowing curve consists of fixed points; and if we re- 
gard the organic world as composed of such flowing 
curves, we have still to regard the individual as, at 
least •^latively fixed. 

At this point the old realism rules our thoughts to 
an unbecoming degree ; and we fancy that there is 
an essential something which glides unchanged from 
mdividual to individual. Hence when man is* said to 
be a transformed monkey, we overlook the force of 
the adjective, and regard man as a monkey still. The 
realistic fancy which underlies this notion is evident. 
It overlooks the element of individuality, and dreams 
of an abiding essence in the species. Theism, how- 
ever, cannot regard species as anj^ thing more than 
the norms of the creative activity; and if these norms 
grow in complexity and diversity, so that individuals 
become more and more differentiated, and organic his- 
tory show a passage from the simple to the complex, 
there is nothing in the fact at which a sound mind 
should take offense. It merely describes the way in 
whLh the basal reality acts, and decides nothing as to 
the 3haracter either of the producer or of the product. 
To the question. What evolves ? we found several an- 
swers given. In like manner there is no agreement as 



RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD 303 

to the product of evolution. It may be an unfolding 
plan constantly passing into reality. It may be a se- 
ries of blind activities without any substantial product. 
It may be an unsubstantial succession of material com- 
binations which have no existence for the realities which 
conduct the process. It may be only the latent capa- 
cities of germs originally given or dropped upon occa- 
sion into the stream of things. 

It is becoming clear that th*e facts on which the de- 
fenders of either view depend are quite ambiguous 
without an underlying metaphysical conception. We 
have previously pointed out that the fact of breaks is 
powerless against even materialistic evolution, so long 
as its assumption of the completeness of the system 
from the beginning is denied. Moreover, there is noth- 
ing in the doctrine of evolution which makes it neces- 
sary to maintain the continuity of organic forms, or that 
nature never makes a leap. Great phenomenal unlike- 
ness, as in the case of the butterfly and the caterpillar, 
is compatible with genealogical connection. We point 
out, on the other hand, that the facts of observation, 
though they were a thousand-fold more pertinent, are 
powerless to prove the metaphysical conception on 
which atheistic and pantheistic evolution rests. That 
conception denies freedom, creation, purpose, control of 
any kind, and reduces all change to an aimless shufile 
of material elements, or a necessary motion in the uni- 
versal substance. Now, if it were possible to arrange 
all organic forms in linear genealogical order, the denier 
of such evolution need not be in the least dismayed; 
for such a fact in no way decides what the individual 



304 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

is, or what the power is which underlies the process. 
He can claim that the history of things is not mere 
shuffling of the same elements, but is underlaid by a 
personal and creative power which introduces new fac- 
tors according to a certain order. Such a conception 
would undoubtedly be greeted with a cry of ^' fiddle- 
sticks," and the fiddle-sticks would be brandished all the 
more lustily that this conception cannot be discredited 
in any other way. It rarely happens that an advocate is 
willing to allow his adversary to state his own case, and 
the average evolutionist is no exception. He delights in 
charging his opponent with denying the continuity of 
nature, and styles his theory a doctrine of "breaks" and 
'^supernatural irruptions." In order to increase the 
opprobium, he conceives a "break" as equivalent to a 
smash, and pictures an "irruption" in the most scenic 
manner possible. Where mental ossification has set in 
early, or has reached an advanced stage, these consider- 
ations will be conclusive. But the rational non-evolu- 
tionist does not deny the phenomenal continuity and 
intellectual consistency of nature, and he does not deny 
the metaphysical continuity of the ultimate ground of 
nature. He repudiates only that most empty and unnat- 
ural notion of continuity which makes it consist in a 
ceaseless and purposeless shuffling of the same elements. 
The only continuity which has any value is no such dice- 
box continuity, but a continuity and unity of thought or 
plan, and the consistent guidance of all activities and 
of all agencies, whether one or many, whether new or 
old, toward its realization. It is the continuity of an 
argument in which all the facts and reasonings look 



RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 305 

toward the conclusion. It is the continuity of the ora- 
torio, in which all the performers are bound by a com- 
mon law. It is entirely open to the non-evolutionist, 
who is also a theist, to declare that belief in an intelli- 
gent power back of nature necessitates the admission of 
intellectual continuity and unity in his works, so that 
every antecedent is a preparation for every consequent, 
and makes the advent of that consequent a logical ne- 
cessity. He might even hold that certain inorganic 
antecedents imply the appearance of organic conse- 
quents; not as if life were the product of inorganic 
agents, but that such is the intellectual continuity of 
the system that when certain states of the inorganic 
are reached, the inner consistency of the system de- 
mands the appearance of living things. In short, he 
may hold with Leibnitz that there is a logic in nature, 
and that the system is so truly one that every part of 
it is conditioned by every other part, and at the same 
time is necessary to every other, every thing and every 
change being the necessary logical supplement to every 
other thing and change. In such a system there would 
be the strictest unity and phenomenal continuity. All 
things would unfold with absolute logic, but God would 
be the logician. All these assertions are quite compat- 
ible with complete denial of materialistic or philosophic 
evolution. That phenomenal science could have no ob- 
jection to such a view is almost self-evident. So, then, 
we see that the great case of evolution vs. creationism 
is not so much fact against fact, as it is one metaphys- 
ical theory against another. The notion that any pos- 
sible observation can decide the case, indicates a state 



306 STUDIES IX THEISM. 

of mind which is almost hopeless. No careful student 
of the debate can have failed to notice that the argu- 
ment for evolution has become almost entirelv meta- 
physical, and rests upon a denial of freedom and cre- 
ation. 

Our aim, thus far, has been to suggest questions and 
possibilities, rather than to make positive affirmations. 
We have not decided for any of the views presented as 
possible. Our chief aim, perhaps, has been to show 
how largely metaphysics enters into this and kindred 
questions. Nevertheless, this long digression will not 
be without value for the development of our own views. 

The discussion of the last two chapters has con- 
vinced us that nature is in constant dependence upon an 
omnipresent power, and that this power is both personal 
and intelligent. In so far, we have repudiated the 
deistic conception in advance. We have also seen that 
the world is not to be viewed as in any way a part of 
God, but rather as a product of his activity. This de- 
nies the substantialism of the pantheistic evolutionists. 
Finally, we have rejected the view w^hich would make 
the Infinite subject to a necessary and unconscious de- 
velopment, but regard it as self-determining. We have 
now to develop the consequences of this view. And, 
first, we must view the world as having its existence 
only through the divine will and purpose. It has in 
itself no ground of being, but exists only because of its 
place in the general plan. Of course, this view is inca- 
pable of demonstration; but it flows as a consequence 
from theism itself, and is a necessary postulate of 



RELATION OF GOD TO TEE WORLD. 307 

theoretical science. The theist is forced to hold that 
every thing has its properties and place in the system, 
not because of some fathomless necessity, but because 
of the plan which the system exists to realize. Hence 
the system and its members can be properly understood 
only through the end for which they exist. That end 
may be to us inscrutable, or may be known only in the 
faintest outlines; but none the less must both the theist 
and the scientist hold that there is an end which condi- 
tions all the means of its realization. That the plan of 
the infinite demands the existence of CA^ery finite thing 
from the beginning, is sheer assumption. The concep- 
tion is eqxially possible that that plan includes the in- 
troduction of new factors into the system along the line 
of development. Creation is no less conceivable as suc- 
cessive than as single. Which of these two possible 
conceptions represents the facts, can be determined only 
by observation; but neither of them has any a priori 
right above the other. The facts of physics, taken 
alone, would incline us to the former view; but if we 
hold to the reality of the soul, we must adopt the latter 
view. The indications of the facts must decide this 
question. But in judging this case, we must not regard 
the introduction of new factors as breaks in the order 
of nature, or as something for which there was no pre- 
vious preparation. The theist is bound to protest 
against any such conception. He must assert the 
unity of the system, both in its co-existences and in 
its sequences; and hence he must assert that given 
antecedents demand certain consequents, not, indeed, 
as a materialistic necessity, but as a logical necessity. 



308 STUDIES IN THEISM 

If the sequence failed, tlie system would contradict 
itself. 

Concerning a divine guidance and providence we shall 
speak hereafter; for the present we confine ourselves 
to the general features of the system; and here the 
theist must hold that there is a logic in the system 
which absolutely determines all co-existences and se- 
quences. Thus there arises the thought of a phenom- 
enal order which is consistent and unbroken, but which 
is, nevertheless, only the outcome . of the consistent 
activity of the all-embracing God. The continuity 
and unity of this system would not consist in a rigid 
duration of the same factors, but in the subjection of all 
factors, new and old, to a common thought and a com- 
mon law. Ontologically, a river is not the same for 
any two consecutive instants; phenomenally, it is always 
the same, for the new water is subject to the old condi- 
tions. This subjection of every thing in the system to 
what the plan of the system requires, constitutes its only 
unity and continuity. This unity would not be in the 
least disturbed if we adopted the pantheistic theory of 
nature. The divine activity would be consistent in its 
contemporaneous and in its successive acts; that is, the 
thought or plan of the whole would condition all the 
discrete activities, whether discrete in space or time, so 
as to bind them all into a unity of result. Now it is 
utterly gratuitous to claim that the conception of com- 
ing and going factors involves disturbance of the phe- 
nomenal order, or is in any way inconsistent 'with phe- 
nomenal science. It is equally gratuitous to claim that 
such new products are the results of mere arbitrariness, 



RELATICy OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 309 

and without connection with their antecedents. On the 
contrary, they are always demanded by the laws and 
logic of the system. But from this point of view, the 
question of spontaneous generation, or of the origin and 
transformatiorf of species, would lose all significance 
for the theist. An apparent instance of spontaneous 
generation would only mean to him, that the invisible 
God produces living things under other than the ordi- 
nary circumstances; but the divine action would be no 
less and no more real in such a case, than it is in all 
reproduction. If the highest forms could be genealog- 
ically connected with the lowest, the theist would find 
in it only a successive appearing of individuals, each of 
which is only a phenomenon, or else is ontologically 
distinct from every other. In the former case, the in- 
dividual is properly nothing; in the latter, it is a new 
factor. In truth, a reflective theist can hardly help ad- 
mitting just such a sequence of phenomena as the evo- 
lutionist postulates. He must allow the intellectual 
unity of the system; and he must allow that the purpose 
of the system conditions all its details, whether of co- 
existence or of succession. He must, therefore, allow 
that any given state of the system logically conditions 
its subsequent states, so that a complete knowledge of 
the antecedents would involve an equally complete 
knowledge of the consequents, provided, always, that 
the conditioning purpose is unchanged in all respects. 
He would differ from the materialistic evolutionist only 
in denying that these several states do of themselves 
dynamically condition succeeding states. The logic of 
the system is of itself only a conception, and cannot 



810 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

realize itself. There must be some agent or agents to 
whom this lo2:ic is law. The materialist holds that the 
j}hysical elements are these agents. The theist teaches 
that the realizer of this logic is the all-embracing God. 
The development of the system is but tl!e unfolding of 
a divine argument, every step of which conditions suc- 
ceeding steps. But as premises and conclusion fall 
hopelessly asunder without the unity of the thinking 
mind, so premises and conclusion in the world-process 
are united only in and through the unity of the divine 
activity. We decide for this general view of the rela- 
tion of God and the world. Whether all organic forms 
have a common genealogy we are content to leave to the 
naturalists to decide. The question is entirely without 
religious or philosophical significance. Hitherto it has 
been so infested with irreligious implications, and by 
consequence has been so befumbled by the irreligious 
rabble who were more anxious to be disagreeable to 
religion than to find the truth, that it has been well 
nigh impossible to discuss the question on its merits. 
Whether new factors have been introduced into the 
system in connection with animal life -depends upon the 
view we take of physical life. If we regard it as a func- 
tion of the elements, or as a peculiar phase of divine 
activity, there is no such introduction. If we view a 
living thing as being a substantial and individual agent 
which is the ground of the form and unity of the organ- 
ism, then we must hold that all reproduction is attended 
by creation. In only one case can we get behind phe- 
nomena so as to be sure that there is any thing truly 
individual and abiding behind the appearance. This 



RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. oil 

is the case of tlie soul. We are abiding persons. 
Every attempt to explain mental phenomena as the re- 
sult of a plurality of elements, fails utterly. The con- 
ception of a unitary and abiding soul, is the only one 
which is not hopelessly shattered by the most patent 
facts of consciousness. In the other cases mentioned, 
the known facts do not allow a positive decision; but in 
this case, the known facts compel us to regard the soul 
as a new factor in the system. It is not introduced, 
however, without antecedents, nor without regard to the 
character of the antecedents. On the contrary, because 
of the unity of the system, the antecedent logically de- 
termines both the consequent and its character. Hence 
the facts of heredity. To the question whether such 
new factors are immortal when once introduced, only a 
formal answer is possible. The finite begins to exist 
only because the general plan of the system calls for it. 
It follows that its existence would cease, if at any time 
its significance were lost. No finite thing has any claim 
to immortality simply in its right as substance. 

A first impression will doubtless be that we are claim- 
ing a large and intimate knowledge of that which is 
essentially unknowable; but this impression, though 
natural, is entirely mistaken. The question which con- 
cerns every theorist is, how to conceive the ground of 
phenomena. The human mind cannot help forming 
some conception; it only remains, therefore, that the 
conception be adequate and self-consistent. When such 
a conception is reached, the mind has done all that it 
can do in its effort to grasp reality. Now, as we have 



312 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

before pointed out, every scientific hypothesis is but an 
attempt to form a sufficient conception of the cause of 
certain facts. The chemist displays an intimate ac- 
quaintance with the composition of chemical molecules, 
and is ready to write the most elaborate diagrams of 
their inner constitution. The physicist who holds the 
mechanical theory of gases, sees amazing atomic storms 
with his mind's eye. But these and similar views are 
only the conceptions which these men form of that 
which lies behind phenomena; and we might say of 
them, as well as of the theist, that they display a pro- 
digious amount of knowledge about that which is essen- 
tially unknowable. The theistic conception, therefore, 
cannot be discredited by any such suggestion as this. 
It is no more metaphysical than the atheistic conception. 
It is no more unscientific than the atomic theory. It is 
no more mysterious than the materialistic doctrine. 
The theist's only claim is, that no other conception is 
adequate to the facts. He admits the mystery of the 
divine method and the unsearchability of these secret 
ways of God. He admits, also, that the all-conditioning 
purpose of the system can at present be only faintly 
dreamed of, and that it is quite impossible to see how 
many of the details of the system have any significance 
for the whole. His belief that they have, rests upon 
his faith in the divine intelligence; and inability to see 
a meaning does not prove that there is none. But on 
skU these accounts he prefers that daily science shoidd 
use the language of daily life, as being at once more 
compatible with reverence and with the needs of phe- 
nomenal science. But when he leaves the phenomenal 



RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 313 

and asks for an ultimate conception, he hesitates not to 
confess his belief that all finite being, and change, and 
progress, depend upon the immanent God. 

This position will not commend itself to the ossified 
mind. After all deductions are made from the empir- 
ical philosophy as a complete philosophy of mind, it 
must still be allowed, that as a philosophy of prejudice 
it is a most valuable section of philosophical study. 
The ease with which habits of thinking are mistaken 
for laws of thought ; and, on the other hand, the com- 
plete opacity of the sluggish mind to a new idea, re- 
ceive from the philosophy of prejudice a complete ex- 
planation. The habit of associating being and matter 
leads to the notion that all being must be material; and 
such mental paralysis is even paraded as proof that 
spiritual being is impossible, even in conception. And 
though both physics and metaphysics unite to discredit 
the vulgar notion of substance, still the typical concep- 
tion of being is that of a lump. The tendency of most 
scientific speculation is toward a pantheistic conception, 
in which all phenomena are but passing phases of the 
one; but still our conception, though similar in many 
points, will not appear any less objectionable even to those 
who hold the pantheistic view. In particular, it will be 
urged thnt we have made a wholesale use of miracle, 
and have thereby struck at the root of all science. To 
the latter part of this claim we reply that science is only 
one of many interests, and must never assume that the 
Avorld exists solely for scientific purposes. The men- 
tally one-eyed scientist perpetually forgets that the world 
may have a higher destiny than to justify his calcula- 



314 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

tions. It is conceivable, without any great mental 
strain, that it should exist as a means for the instruc- 
tion and development and service of free beings. The 
objection has no greater force here than against the doc- 
trine of freedom. Some speculators have felt justified 
in denying human freedom on the ground that it would 
make science impossible. The order of things would 
be incessantly modified, and the calculations would be 
discredited. But this is sheer cant, which has mistaken 
itself for science. A general phenomenal constancy 
must exist to make a rational life possible. Any thing 
beyond this the scientist must regard as a fortunate cir- 
cumstance, not as a necessity of any sort. Or rather, 
we may say that the uniformity of nature which science 
assumes means only that the same events always happen 
under the same circumstances ; but there is nothing 
in this principle to forbid the notion that human and 
divine will may be of the determining circumstances. 

Moreover, science need only assume the constancy of 
phenomenal laws. As soon as it inquires into the pro- 
duction of phenomena, it becomes speculation and not 
science. As to the charge of assuming miracle, the 
chief difficulty lies in the coarse deistic conception of 
miracle, according to which some awful figure suddenly 
takes shape from the empty air, and having overturned 
all the laws of nature within reach, retires again to 
some supernal region. An interference is represented as 
taking place from without, as if some terrible hand sud- 
denly appeared and wrenched nature out of its course. 
But when these vulgar notions are abandoned, there is 
little in the notion of miracle, or interference, to call 



RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 315 

for opposition. For ourselves we do not hesitate to 
allow that the natural is a constant miracle, and that all 
things stand, and all events come to pass, only because 
3f the omnipresent jDower of God. But this notion of 
miracle demands further explanation. A man's action 
can be modified in two ways — either by external force 
or by changing his mind. In like manner, social forms 
may be changed, either by violence or by discussion re- 
sulting in opinions other than those on which the given 
forms rest. The modification would be as real in the 
latter case as in the former, and vastly more abiding. But 
.^.here would be the great difference, that in the one 
Gase the change would be forced upon men from with- 
out, while in the other it would be reached through the 
laws of the mind itself, and in such a way as to seem 
but an unfolding of the mind's own nature. Now the 
current conception of miracle contemplates only the 
method of violence— a working against nature instead 
of working through nature. But we have seen that 
the mechanism of the universe is not the ultimate fact, 
but is merely the expression of the inner nature of 
things. A mechanical system of changes among things 
is but the translation of a metaphysical system of 
changes in things. The latter conditions the former 
and determines its outcome. But this inner nature of 
things can only be viewed as the expression of the 
world-plan. The theist must hold that the divine pur- 
pose in creation contains the true reason why anything 
is as it is in any of its relations, and why events occur as 
they do. Below the realm of mechanical necessity, 

there is a realm of ends which condition and control 
21 



316 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

that necessity. Here nature is fluid. Here are the roots 
of nature. Here nature appears, not as an independent 
something, but as a constant flowing forth of divine 
energy. It has no laws of its own which oppose a bar to 
the divine pux^pose, but all its laws and all its on-goings 
are but the expressions of that purpose. In our dealings 
with nature, we have to accommodate ourselves to its 
laws; but we are not to think of such a relation be- 
tween God and nature. With him the purpose is orig- 
inal, the law is but its cotisequence. Hence even the 
rigid system of mechanical necessity is itself absolute- 
ly sensitive to the divine purpose, so that what the di- 
vine purpose demands, finds immediate expression and 
realization, not in spite of the system, but in and 
through the system. We repeat, that nature is no in- 
dependent power over against God, which must first 
be conquered before it can be modified ; it is only the 
divine purpose flowing forth into realization. The 
constancy of nature, also, must be viewed as founded 
not in some mysterious necessity, but solely in the con- 
stancy of the divine purposes. We do not, then, re- 
gard the supernatural in its ordinary working as break- 
ing through phenomenal laws or through the chain of 
mechanical necessity, which is supposed to rule in 
nature; but we regard it as founding and maintaining 
that necessity by which the phenomenal order is real- 
ized. While, then, we maintain in its strongest form 
the doctrine of a divine guidance and control both of 
the world and of the individual life, we also regard the 
common conception of this doctrine as very crude and 
superficial. Both those who assert and those avIio deny 



RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. oil 

are equally obnoxious to such a criticism; their con- 
ception of control and interference being that of ex- 
ternal violence offered to a self-dependent system. On 
the contrary, we teach no breaks in the phenomenal 
order, or in the mechanism of nature, but rather that 
that mechanism, in all its phases, is pliant to the divine 
purpose, and is but an expression of the divine purpose. 
We have a faint illustration of this susceptibility 
in our human modifications of nature. The concep- 
tion of an end, accompanied by the mental state called 
volition, at once impresses itself upon the body, so 
that it realizes that end. We cannot really think 
that any thing flows out of the soul and grasps the 
nervous system. Even the sense of effort and strain 
attendant upon action, is in fact only the result of our 
volition upon the organism. The will, in itself, is as 
boundless as the conception; and if there were no re- 
flex action from the body, the will would quickly shat- 
ter it. All we can say of this action of the soul on the 
body is, that the system is, such that volition cannot 
exist in the soul without finding an immediate echo in 
the organism, and through that, in external nature also, 
In this way, the face of the earth is changed. Mr. 
Marsh, in his work, "Man and Nature," has shown 
that human volition has been one of the great modi- 
fiers of physical events in our earth. If we should read 
bak the history of our globe, we should find, of course, 
l]i« leading features quite independent of human voli- 
tion; but we should also find a multitude of details 
which had their origin in human thought and will. 
They would have a mechanical explanation, so far as 



318 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

mechanism can explain any thing; and at the same 
time they would have their roots below mechanism. 
This serves to illustrate what we mean by speaking of 
nature as absolutely sensitive to the divine purpose. It 
also illustrates how "interferences" and new begin- 
nings are quite compatible with unbroken phenomenal 
order. Every believer in freedom is forced to hold 
that the physical system is constantly modified from 
without, and that it was intended to be the pliant, 
subtle servant of mind. There are many det^ails which 
cannot be traced back to the nebula, but find an abso- 
lute beginning in man's volition. Beyond that point 
they are not represented by any thing. We believe 
in a similar divine working in the world, so thi^^ the 
system of things is constantly taking up new threads 
and new factors which enter into the general plan of the 
web without disturbance, and without strangeness, for 
each such new factor is fitted for the place it is to fill. 
In the same way we think of a constant divine guid- 
ance and providence which descends to the smallest 
details of the individual life and well-being. Of the 
truth or falsehood of such a belief science can say 
nothing. We frequently hear it announced with a 
great flourish, that science knows nothing of a divine 
control in nature; that every thing takes place by in- 
variable sequence; and there seems to be a general 
notion that such a remark is very important, both in 
its affirmation and in its denial. In fact it is a truism, 
and owes its significance entirely to mental confusion. 
The roots of phenomena do not lie behind them but 
beneath them; and no observation can ever reveal 



RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 319 

how phenomena are produced. Unbroken phenomenal 
order, or invariable phenomenal sequence, is entirely 
consistent with incessant modification. The notion that 
science conflicts with the doctrine of a divine providence 
is sufficient to convict one of hopeless philosophical 
incompetency. It is the outcome of thoughtlessness 
which has degenerated into cant. No observation of 
human action would reveal a controlling mind. So far as 
we can see, the antecedents are all mechanical, and the 
sequence is invariable. There are nerves, and bones, 
and contracting muscles, whose action is purely mechan- 
ical, and reveals to observation no trace of a directing 
mind. Now if one should get so confused by this phys- 
ical mechanism as to deny the existence of a controlling 
mind, he would do just what the man does who, from 
fumbling among the invariable phenomenal sequences of 
nature, concludes that there is no "interference," and 
that prayer is useless. Argument of this kind has 
become very common of late; and it serves to mark 
the philosophical degeneracy which has resulted from 
an exclusive study of physical science. On the other 
hand, the belief in prayer and providence can never 
justify itself by any study of nature, any more than a 
belief in the human mind can justify itself by an in- 
spection of nerves and muscles. Nature is indifferent 
to both the belief and the denial. The belief must 
])a3e itself on general inference from the character of 
God and from the general drift of national and per- 
sonal history, and especially on revelation. If there be 
^any facts which justify such a belief, there is abso- 
lutely nothing to discredit it. 



320 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

But it may be urged that the very notion of mechan- 
ism is hostile to interjections, since every state must 
determine the succeeding state. We have ourselves 
insisted upon this factor in the chapter on Mechanism 
and Teleology, and have drawn divers conclusions from 
it. But this position is true only for an absolute or 
independent mechanism; and the drift of all our argu- 
ment has been to show that the mechanism of nature is 
of no such sort. ISTeither its existence, nor its laws, nor 
any of its circumstances whatever, are founded in any 
necessity, but solely in the divine purpose. It advances, 
also, from stage to stage by no inherent necessity, but 
solely as the unfolding purposes of God require it. In 
strictness, then, we should say that no one stage condi- 
tions its consequent, but all stages are immediately con- 
ditioned by the requirements of the divine plan. Or we 
may reply to the objection from another stand-point. 
The science of mechanics assumes its forces, and the 
whole of theoretical mechanics consists entirely in get- 
ting the resultant of the forces assumed. It points out 
that given forces must have a certain resultant, but the 
necessity lies not in the forces themselves, but in their 
outcome when given. Celestial mechanics assumes at- 
traction and the constancy of its law, and with this 
outfit it can demonstrate that certain orbital and other 
motions are necessary results under given conditions. 
But gravity itself, as a simple fact, is quite without the 
range of this necessity. Yet so subtle is the work of as- 
sociation, that by and by the necessity which attaches to 
the conclusion onl} upon the assumed truth of the prem- 
ises, is carried over to the premises themselves, and then 



-RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 321 

nature is said to be bound by an adamantine fate. But 
in truth tliis "adamantine fate" is based much more 
upon blockheadism than upon any thing else. Indeed, 
necessity has a clear meaning only when applied to the 
conclusions from given premises, or to the results from 
assumed causes. At all events, it has only this meaning 
in mechanics. There we assume forces which might 
conceivably be altogether different in every respect 
from what they are, and then we determine their nec- 
essary resultant. We conclude then, (1) that the viola- 
tion of mechanical necessity can only mean the causing 
of given forces to have a different resultant from their 
proper one, and that without the addition of any new 
force. It is safe to say that no believer in miracles and 
providence contemplates any such performance. We 
conclude, (2) that it is erroneous to speak of mechanical 
necessity as ruling in nature. The forces of nature 
being what they are, the results must be what they are; 
in any other sense the notion is without foundation. 
Thus once again it appears that reality of things is 
below mechanism, and conditions it. But this condi- 
tioning reality the theist must regard as itself con- 
ditioned by the divine purpose. Mechanism belongs 
only to the phenomenal, and can never conflict with the 
real. There is nothing whatever in the true notion of 
mechanical necessity which contradicts the absolute 
sensibility of the system to the divine purpose. For 
ourselves, we believe in both. 

With regard to the introduction of new factors into 
the system only a word need be said. We regard the 
universe as existing in God, not as a given volume in a 



322 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

larger volume, but as constantly depending on him, and 
in such a way that God is present with every part. We 
deny that space is for him a limit or a condition, so that 
to reach a given point he must cross over an intervening 
space. Even this crude notion rules popular concep- 
tions. God is supposed to be in an cvLtside region, and 
the existence of the finite is not only figured as some- 
thing spatially external, but is supposed to be secured 
only by being outside of God. But our discussions 
have led to the conclusion that the infinite is truly om- 
nipresent. Hence, when we speak of new factors as 
being introduced into the system, we have no such 
coarse imagination as if God had first made a soul in 
some extra-siderial region, and then carried it to a cer- 
tain point and put it into a body, as a bird is put into a 
cage; but we mean that where and when the order of 
things which God has adopted as the rule of his action 
calls for it, there and then a soul begins its existence. 
If other factors besides souls are introduced along the 
line of events, we think of their introduction in the 
same general way. They are not arbitrary. They are 
not unrelated to their surrounding^, but are in every 
respect what the laws of the system call for. 

The influence of association in our daily thinking is 
so much greater than that of reason, that to many minds 
this conception will seem irredeemably absurd. Some 
who have been accustomed to associate being only with 
matter will appeal to the five senses against the divine 
omnipresence. That this view, like the Copernican as- 
tronomy, is a matter of reasoning with which the five 
senses have nothing to do, will l)e an impossible insight 



RELATION OF GOD TO THE WORLD. 323 

to them. Others, again, who have advanced beyond 
this crudest stage, and who have been accustomed to 
talk about atoms and ethers, will still find this concep- 
tion difiicult, because they have not been used to think- 
ing of the divine omnipresence. They will talk with 
the greatest ease and fluency about their views as facts, 
and discard our view as a metaphysical dream. It will 
certainly be difiicult, if not impossible, to convince them 
that one theory is no more metaphysical or unscientific 
than the other, and that it is purely a question of con- 
sistent thinking. Others again, like the Spencerians, 
who have got used to the notion of an omnipresent 
force, will find grave difiiculty in conceiving that force 
as intelligent; and having totally misconceived what 
they are pleased to call the " persistence of force," the 
notion of creation will be especially obnoxious. Still 
others will appeal to common sense against a doctrine 
so bizarre; and this appeal to a judge without jurisdic- 
tion will pass for a final settlement. To all such the 
customary is the clear, and clear because customary. 
Finally, some will make merry over some aspects of the 
doctrine, and ask of what great value many of these 
new souls are. To which it may be enough to say, that 
none of us have such supreme worth as to make it safe 
to press this question. But while allowing the unsearch- 
ability of these ways of God, and also the many difii- 
culties before wliich human wisdom is dumb, we still 
claim that the conception we have presented is the only 
one adequate to the facts. Here philosophy must adopt 
thi apostle's words, and say, " In him we live, and move, 
and have our being." If we reject this view, we must 



324 STUDIES IN THEISM, 

adopt some form of deism^ or materialism, or atheism, 
or pantheism; and when we remember the difficulties 
and implications of these views, we decide for the one 
we have presented as the most rational, and as attended 
with fewest difficulties. 

We may sum up the results of this discussion as fol- 
lows: Creation is successive rather than single. The 
divine plan contains the reason why any thing is as it 
is, and the divine will is the source of all finite exist- 
ence. The finite has no ground of being in itself, but 
is absolutely and always dependent upon the divine will 
and purpose. With the exception, therefore, of the 
free will, it is not to be thought of as offering in any 
way a barrier to the divine working, since it is but ai 
form of the divine working. It cannot be our purpose, 
however, to represent this conception to the fancy, or 
in any way to construe the methods of the divine mind. 
Has God always created? How comes he to create? 
To these and similar questions there is no satisfactory 
answer. Here all human wisdom is at an end, and 
silence rather than speech is true wisdom. No more is 
it our purpose to picture the relation of the human and 
the divine personality. There is great fascination in 
this problem for mystical minds. Is God a person over 
against us, as a finite person is over against us? Or is 
there a unity and identity in the former case which 
does not exist in the latter? Is our thought a condi- 
tioned divine thought? Is our love for God, as Spi- 
noza said, but the love with which God loves himself ? 
Such questions have a value for devout feeling; and as 



RELATION OF GOD TO THE WOULD. 325 

long as the New Testament declares that we are the 
temples of the Holy Spirit, and heirs with Christ of 
God, they cannot be charged with irreverence. But 
they admit of no theoretical answer. Such a feeling of 
union with the divine, or such a longing after commun- 
ion with the divine, will always serve to stimulate 
thought, but it can never do the work of thought; and 
thought is obliged to rest content with affirming the 
human and the divine personality as two facts, whose 
connection is lost in mystery. 



326 STUDIES IN THEISM. 



CHAPTER IX. 

THE RELATION OF GOD TO TJIUTH AND EIGHTEOIJSNESS. 

r\UR previous discussions have led us to the convic- 
^ tion that God is one, personal, omnipresent, eternal, 
and independent. The meaning of the first two attri- 
&fLtes is clear; that of the third and fourth needs a 
word of explanation. The notion of the divine omni- 
presence has two factors. The first is the thought of 
the immediate presence of God with all finite reality. 
The second is negative. We finite beings are limited 
in our immediate presence, so that to reach most things 
we have to pass over more or less of intervening space, 
or to use some medium of influence. This necessity we 
feel as a limitation. Now when we teach the divine 
omnipresence, there is the double purpose, (1) to afiSrm 
the immediate presence of God with all things, and, 
(2) to deny totally this Limitation. God has not to 
cross a sj)ace to reach a given point, or to employ any 
foreign means of connection; but at every point he is 
present as the living God. It is not in our thought to 
affirm a bulk of God, as if he filled infinite space with 
an infinite volume. Such a conception of omnipresence 
is only the crude attempt of the imagination, and has 
no value for reflective thought. In like manner the 
doctrine of the divine eternity is as much negative as 
positive. We feel time, also, as a limitation. We are 



RELATION OF GOD TO TRUTH. 327 

not sufficient to ourselves. We weary, grow old, and 
pass away. The chief aim. in ascribing eternity to God 
is the neo-ation of these limits which we find in time. 
The thought of eternity as simply filling out infinite 
time by an infinite duration is a product of the fantasy 
latlier than of the reason. But it is not our purpose ^i 
dwell upon these points. The other attribute, that of 
independence, contains a question of much speculative 
interest — the relation of God to truth. He is independ- 
ent of things, but is he independent of truth? He 
founds and creates the world of things? does he also 
create the system of rational principles ? What is the 
meaning of the divine independence, or absoluteness? 
The same question also appears in the theological dis- 
cussions concerning the divine omnipotence. Is om- 
nipotence only the greatest of possible powers, or is it 
truly unconditioned power? Can it do all things, or 
only the doable? Can it make the impossible possible, 
and conversely? or are the bounds of the possible de- 
termined by some bottomless necessity, to which even 
God must submit? The same question appears in 
moral discussions. Does God make the right, or only 
recognize it ? If he makes the right, then he is himself 
above right; but in the other case we seem to trespass 
on the divine independence, in that we set up a stand- 
ard which is independent of him, and which he must 
recognize. Indeed, to think about God at all seems a 
limitation; for that implies that the laws of thought 
and the forms of our conception are valid for the abso- 
lute. Without this assumption, all possibility of con- 
ceiving any thing whatever about the absolute falls 



028 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

awa,y; but with it, we seem to imply that logical and 
rational necessity binds even God himself. The prob- 
lem in this discussion is to find the most satisfactory 
conception on this point, or the conception which, while 
satisfying the laws of thought, shall conserve at once 
the independence of God, and the absolute character of 
truth and righteousness. 

Our experience can hardly fail to mislead us on this 
point. We have previously spoken of our minds as 
recognizing truth, not making it. Certainly truth pre- 
sents itself in our experience as independent of our- 
selves. It is impersonal and universal. It has no past 
and no future, but simply is. It is neither yours nor 
mine. We discover it or admit it, but undiscovered or 
unadmitted it is none the less true. When a new fact 
or law is discovered, truth is not extended, but knowl- 
edge is increased. To us, therefore, it seems like a 
self-centered kingdom, secure against all attack and 
overthrow. It suffers no dictation; on the contrary, it 
is law-giving for reality itself. Righteousness, also, has 
equal independence in our experience. It is an absolute 
imperative which may be ignored or resisted, but can- 
not be changed. The suggestion that it can be made, or 
even tampered with, is sure to arouse the indignation 
of the common conscience. The laws of righteousness 
must be the same for God as for man; and if his gov- 
ernment can be vindicated only by claiming that the 
divine righteousness is different in principle from hu- 
man righteousness, why, then, his government is not 
righteous in the only intelligibU^ sense of the word. 



► 



L'ELATIOX OF COD TO TRUTH. .320 

To call it ngliteous, meaiung by that word .t, and not 
what men understand by it in daily life, is weakness or 
knavery. This character of truth and righteousness in 
our experience is well fitted to make us overlook the 
fact that their relation to God cannot be the same as it 
is to us. If they were really creatures, they would still 
have the same objective character to the finite mind 
which they have in our experience. 

Still more misleading is the persistent tendency to 
take abstractions for things, which is so marked a feat- 
ure of the human mind. We need not go back to the 
scholastics for illustrations. Such phrases as natural 
law, or the reign of law, are excellent examples. The 
bulk of the statements into which such phrases enter, 
assume that law is a real sovereign, enthroned no one 
knows exactly where, probably in the neighborhood of 
Plato's ideas, but at all events actually regnant over 
reality. If any thing happens, it is in obedience to law. 
If any thing is to be explained, law is the magic word 
which makes all clear. Many who would guard them- 
selves against this hypostasis of an abstraction in the 
case of derived phenomenal laws, would still fall a prey 
to it in the case of the laws of motion. They must cer- 
tainly be held as determining all space-changes by an 
inherent necessity which cannot be infringed. Nothing 
is easier, as nothing is more common, than to regard 
these laws as primal necessities which material things, 
at least, cannot but obey. And just as these laws are 
hypostatized, and reality is made subject to them, so 
also rational and ethical truths are erected into a realm 
of necessity which would exist if all reality were away. 



330 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

Nevertheless, a little reflection will convince us, at least 
in the case of natural laws, that we here fall a prey to 
our own abstractions. No law of nature is the ante- 
cedent, but the consequent, of reality. The so-called 
laws of attraction and repulsion are but results of the 
inner nature of things. Their rate of variation, also, is 
but a result of what the things are. Even the laws of 
motion are far enough from being either rational or 
ontological necessities. They are but the outcome of 
the nature of material things, which might conceivably 
have been altogether different. This is palpably the 
case with the more complex derived laws. Instead of 
expressing what things must be, they only reveal what 
things are. All natural laws, then, must be regarded 
as consequences of reality, and never as its foundation. 
Still, so easily do we mistake abstractions for things, 
that after we have abstracted the law from the action 
of things, we next regard the things as the subjects, if 
not the products, of the laws which they themselves 
underlie. It is only one step more on the same road to 
regard these laws as existing before all reality as the 
expressions of some all-controlling necessity. When 
reality appears, it has nothing to do but to fall into the 
forms which these sovereign laws prescribe. Thus the 
cause is made subject to the effect, and reality is ex- 
plained as the result of its own consequences. 

Many would allow this criticism witli regard to natu- 
ral law, who would still insist that truth is independent 
of reality, and law-giving for it. Nevertheless, we hold 
that the notion of a realm of truth independent of real- 
ity, is just as empty as the notion of a realm of law in 



RELATION OF GOD TO TRUTH. 331 

the void. Both notions are abstractions mistaken for 
facts. For what is truth in this connection ? It can- 
not mean a truth of fact, for such truth depends upon 
the fact itself, and comes and goes with it. By truth, 
then, we can only mean rational and formal truth, that 
i«, the laws of thought and the formal sciences of logic 
and mathematics. So, also, by right we cannot mean 
any specific form of action, because particular duties 
depend entirely upon the particular circumstances. We 
can only mean the ethical principles of love and justice 
which underlie all specific action. Truth, then, as we 
now use it, is sometimes called eternal truth, to indicate 
its imchangeability and independence; and the claim is 
ventured that if God and the world were both away, this 
truth would continue to exist. But the eternal truths 
express only fundamental laws of mental action or for- 
mal relations between ideas; and to affirm their univer- 
sality can only mean that these laws are valid for all 
mental action, and that these relations always exist be- 
tween the appropriate ideas. But these truths are utter- 
ly meaningless, apart from a mind whose law they ex- 
press. For example, truths of number do not exist apart 
from the mind. They express the methods of the mind 
in grasping a multitude of units. Apart from mind, 
number and series cannot exist; both break up into unre- 
lated units. When one speaks of truth as valid, even in 
the void, he curiously fails to see that his conception of 
the void is only a conception, and that he is himself pres- 
ent with all his ideas and laws of thought. And when 
along with his conception of the void he also has other 

conceptions, and finds that the customary relations be- 
22 



332 STUDIES IN THEISM, 

tween tLem continue to exist, he fancies that he has tru- 
ly conceived the void, and has found that the laws of 
thought would be valid, if all reality should vanish. But 
in every such case, the void is only a thought; and the 
mysterious necessity reached is only the necessity of 
thought. The whole art of finding oat what would be 
^■rue in the void, consists in asking what is now true for 
the thinking mind. The true void would be the indis- 
tinguishable nothing; and the ideal distinctions of truth 
and error, right and wrong, possible and impossible, 
would have no meaning, to say nothing of application. 
But as a realm of truth apart from reality is only an 
empty abstraction, we must allow that all truth, both 
speculative and ethical, is but a consequence of funda- 
mental being. The true, the right, the possible, are 
founded in the nature of things. The converse propo- 
sition is an attempt to comprehend reality as the prod- 
uct of its own consequences. 

Here the defender of the absolute independence of 
truth may say that he does not insist upon a realm of 
truth and necessity apart from being, but in being; but 
this changes the expression more than the meaning. 
For these necessary truths must either found the nature 
of being, or be founded in it. The former conception 
is empty; the latter must be adopted. We cannot, then, 
subject the being to the necessity which it founds. The 
attempt to find something more fundamental than the 
real, and to subject the real to the necessary, is not 
based upon clear thought. It finds one of its most 
striking illustrations in the old cosmological argument 
for the divine existence. This argument concluded from 



RELATION OF GOL TO TRUTH -3^3 

contingent being to necessary being; and the doctrine 
was, that fundamental being is necessary being. The 
scanty truth in this argument is simply an analytical 
jxidgment. It is the conclusion from dependent being 
to independent being; but as these are strictly correla- 
tive notions, the one implies the other. For the rest, 
the argument is untenable. In speaking of mechanical 
necessity, we pointed out that the necessity lies in the 
resultant of given forces, but not in the forces them- 
selves; and that the necessity attributed to the forces 
is but the result of habit uncorrected by criticism. So 
here from the notion of dependent being, we necessarily 
conclude to the notion of independent being; and then 
by a transposition very easy to make, we pass from the 
necessity of affirming such being, to consider the neces- 
sity as an attribute of the being itself. The necessary 
affirmation of existence is changed into the affirmation 
of necessary existence. That this conclusion is in ex- 
cess of the premises, is plain ; for the reality of the de- 
pendent can only justify the conclusion of the reality of 
the independent. Moreover, it is hard to say what 
necessity would mean in this case, beyond the self-suf- 
ficiency of the real. As we pointed out in the previous 
chapter, necessity has a clear meaning only when ap- 
plied to the conclusions from assumed premises, or to 
the resultants of assumed causes. When applied to 
being, it is hard to see in what it increases the notion 
of the fundamental reality. The ground of this doc- 
trine, however, is evident. Speculators, misled by the 
changes of phenomena, and probably also by their own 
feelings of weariness, have thought that the simply real 



334 STUDIES IK THEISM. 

might not be able to maintain itself, and thus might gc 
off in a puff, or might fade and flicker out. It would, 
therefore, be a great relief to our feelings if we fancy 
some inexorable necessity in the real against which real- 
ity may lean. Hence the notion of God as the necessary 
being; and hence, also, the attempt to introduce de- 
grees of comparison into the notion of being, such as 
the 6718 realissimurri of the earlier speculators. But 
while the attempt is easily explained, it is perfectly 
futile. No momentum of thought will ever logically 
carry us beyond the affirmation of the independent and 
the real. The bottom fact of the universe is not a ne- 
cessity of any sort, but an unconditioned, self -centered 
reality, which by its existence founds necessity and 
truth, and gives them all their meaning. 

Here it may occur to some that this position is like 
that of Mr. Mill about other worlds, where two and two 
make five. If we make truth and right the consequences 
of being, instead of its foundation, then it follows that 
both would be different if being were changed. Thus 
the absoluteness of truth and right is destroyed as much 
as by Mill's doctrine. We reply: Mill's doctrine based 
truth solely on individual experience, and denied, there- 
fore, any universal rationality. We, on the contrary, 
base truth not on the nature or experience of the 
finite individual, but on the nature of the one all-em- 
bracing reality; and hence we affirm a universal and 
consistent rationality for all beings. The claim that if 
fundamental being were different from what it is truth 
would be different, is quite empty; for it merely says 
that if every thing were absolutely otherwise nothing 



RELATION OF GOD TO TRUTU. 835 

would be as it is. It is a purely formal statement with 
no thought corresponding to it. Our conception of 
reality is built up from rational elements; and without 
them, the notion is a pure negation. But reality exists, 
and the laws of rationality which it founds. It is, then, 
needless to ask what would be true if, unfortunately, 
reality did not exist, or did not exist as it does. 

We regard God, then, as the foundation of truth and 
right. This view must be carefully distinguished from 
the notion that God can either make or unmake truth 
and right. The latter view is speculatively as erroneous 
as the view which makes truth independent of God, 
while morally it is unutterably pernicious. We shall, 
perhaps, make our own conception clearer by an exami- 
nation of these opposing views. The one asserts the 
divine absoluteness with regard to both speculative and 
ethical truth; the other affirms that the laws of truth 
and right are sovereign, even over God. As two dis- 
tinguished philosophical representatives of the respect- 
ive views we name Descartes and Leibnitz. 

According to Descartes, all truth and right depends 
upon the arbitrary will of God. God is absolute, and 
makes truth and right. In this affirmation he has been 
joined by many philosophers and theologians. The de- 
fenders of this view, however, are far from making com- 
mon cause with the skeptics who declare truth and just- 
ice to be matters of custom and prejudice. The Greek 
sophists held this view;^' and at a comparatively recent 
period, Hobbes taught that positive law was tl^e source 

* See Plato's " Tlieaetetus and Gorgias " for an exposition of this 
doctrine. 



336 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

of all right and justice. But the Cartesians and others 
who have viewed truth as created by God, held no such 
doctrines. Their chief aim, of course, was to assert the 
absolute independence of God ; although the view has 
sometimes been held from polemical reasons. Sundry- 
obnoxious theological dogmas have sometimes been de- 
fended on the ground that justice in God is not what it 
is in man, but is purely the creature of the divine will. 
This doctrine of divine arbitrariness is often held by 
the unthinking, because arbitrary, lawless power is the 
highest conception they can form. Finding both reason 
and right irksome in their own experience, they take a 
kind of revenge by placing God above them. But 
these cases are of value only to the mental and moral 
pathologist. We confine our attention to the philo- 
sophical aspects of the question. 

Curiously enough, Descartes, at the very beginning of 
his system, employs an argument for the divine exist- 
ence which directly contradicts his own position. That 
argument is made to turn upon the divine veracity, which, 
it is said, would be compromised if our faculties should 
deceive us; and this, in turn, would compromise the 
divine perfection. But if any thing which God wills i« 
right on that account, it is plain that this argument falls , 
to the ground. The theologian who holds the same 
view, commits a like inconsistency when he attempts to 
justify the ways of God; for such justification can only 
take the form of showing that God is just as we con- 
ceive justice. But by hypothesis God is not just as we 
conceive justice, and further, whatever he does is just 
on that account. A justification, then, is both unneces- 



RELATION OF GOD TO TRUTH. 337 

eary and impossible. Moreover, even the positive state- 
ment that God can make truth and right fails to say 
what is meant, but rather results in just the opposite. 
To affiim God's independence of truth is equally to af- 
firm that truth is independent of God. The statement 
that God is perfectly arbitrary with regard to truth, 
assumes that truth exists apart from the divine volition ; 
for if truth had not a fixed meaning on its own account, 
the arbitrary will which is supposed to act upon it 
would have no object. So, too, the statement that God 
makes truth is equally unintelligible without assuming 
that truth has a meaning apart from the act which cre- 
ated it. For why should the product of that act be 
called truth rather than error, unless it agree with cer- 
tain standards of truth, with which error disagrees? 
To object to this test, is to declare both truth and error 
to be only subjective distinctions without any validity in 
fact; but this would be an utter abandonment of the 
absoluteness of truth with which we set out. The ques- 
tion, then. Can God make the false true ? assumes that 
true and false already have a definite meaning and 
measure. If the two notions were not sharply and 
clearly distinguished, there could be no question about 
changing one into the other. Hence, all such statements 
as that God can make the false true or the impossible 
possible, imply that the standard of truth and possibili- 
ty exists independently of God. Thus they afiirm the 
very thing they were meant to deny, namely, that truth 
is not a creature of the divine will. Without some 
valid standard of truth and possibility, we cannot dis- 
tinguish between true and false, possible and impos- 



338 STUDIES m THEISM. 

sible; and hence the affirmation that God is independent 
of truth, cancels itself. 

The view which we have been considering is often 
put negatively, in the claim that God can unmake or 
break truth, but it is just as inconsistent as the positive 
form of the doctrine. For in order that truth shall be 
broken, it must first exist as truth. If any proposition 
which is to be overturned, say the law of identity or a 
mathematical equation, were not in itself true, there 
would be no truth to break. For example, we say that 
a straight line is the shortest distance between two 
points; and we think that we have therein a truth 
which is self-supporting and infrangible. Now, if we 
suppose God overturning this proposition, he cannot be 
said to make it false unless it were first true. The 
proposition that a curved line is the shortest distance 
between two points cannot be made false, for it is false. 
Or, suppose the purpose is to overthrow the law of 
causation; can God make events come to pass without 
a cause? Here, again, the inner contradiction is evi- 
dent; for we are forced to assume God as causing 
events to come to pass without a cause. Thus we come 
back again to the point that to make truth a creature 
of the divine volition is not only an impossible concep- 
tion, but it breaks down through its self-contradiction. 
It does not escape the dualism of referring truth to 
some other source than reality; and in this respect it 
becomes identical with the opposite view. This dual- 
ism can be escaped only by declaring that for God 
there is no truth and no error. lie is absolute arbitra- 
riness, for which thought has no laws and consistency 



BELATION OF GOD TO TRUTH. 330 

no obligation. In that case, truth and error would be 
only the fictions of our own minds. But this view, 
again, overshoots its mark; for the aim of those who 
insist upon the divine independence is not to make God 
without truth or righteousness, but to make him their 
creator. Thereby they think to exalt even more his 
absolute truth and goodness; for as truth and goodness 
are the most august and reverend facts of the universe, 
their creator must be all the more glorious. Unfortu- 
nately this view, by its inner dialectic, passes over into 
a denial of both truth and goodness. While, then, we 
are in full sympathy with the motive which underlies 
the attempt to make God independent of truth, we are 
forced to admit that the common statement, instead of 
reaching its end, overthrows itself. 

The claim, on the other hand, that truth and right 
are independent of God, saves, indeed, their absolute- 
ness, but only at the expense of the divine independ- 
ence. Here, also, the motive is good, but the thought 
is unclear. We have already considered the abstract 
form of this doctrine, and content ourselves with exam- 
ining a concrete illustration of it. According to Leib- 
nitz, truth does not exist as a necessity outside of God, 
but it exists as a necessity within the divine mind. To 
the divine intelligence all truth is present as a series of 
eternal possibilities. As such they are recognized by 
God, but not created. They have their foundation in the 
eternal nature of reason, and can be neither made nor 
unmade. Logical sequence is unbreakable even by om- 
nipotence. To the charge that this is an encroachment 
upon omnipotence, the answer is, that power has no re- 



840 STUDIES IN THEISyi. 

lation to truth. They belong to totally different realms, 
and can never collide. Accordingly, in discussing the 
origin of the world and the problem of evil, Leibnitz 
claimed that all possible systems existed in the divine 
mind, each of which must logically lead to one certain 
outcome. It was not, then, in the divine choice to de- 
termine the results of a given system; this, as a matter 
of logic, was independent of the divine volition. In a 
given system every thing "results with strict logical ne- 
cessity, and nothing could be changed without contra- 
dicting the system. Thus, in mathematics every detail 
flows with necessity from the axioms and intuitions at 
the base; and not even the most unimportant corollary 
in the remotest regions of mathematics could be denied, 
provided it were rightly deduced, without dragging the 
whole science down into ruin. Leibnitz conceived a 
similar relation to exist between all the parts of the 
real system. The whole conditions the parts no more 
than the parts condition the whole. God, then, has 
nothing to do with determining the consequences of a 
system, or with the logical possibility of a system. An 
infinite number of systems are possible, and their con- 
sequences are all determined. All that God can do is to 
determine which of these possible systems he will real- 
ize. It belongs not to him to set the bounds of possi- 
bility, but only to realize that which, apart from him- 
self, is eternally possible. In choosing between the 
possibles, God is guided by the conception of a good; 
and that system will be realized whose outcome is the 
best possible. Where there is infinite goodness to 
prompt, infinite wisdom to foresee, and infinite power 



RELATION OF GOD TO TRUTH. 341 

to execute, the best course must be taken. Optiiaisra 
is an a priori necessity of Leibnitz's system — a fact 
which critics have commonly failed to notice. They 
have thought it relevant to insist upon the evil in the 
world, as if Leibnitz ever dreamed of denying it. He 
claimed only that the system, taken as a whole, both in 
its co-existences and sequences, is the best possible. 

This system seems unquestionable at first sight, but, 
upon reflection, it is most obnoxious to criticism. This 
doctrine of a divine fantasy which forever produces pict- 
ures of all possible worlds, seems a gratuitous anthropo- 
morphism. The notion of a best possible system, also, 
is a distinct contradiction, like that of a largest possible 
space or number. Every finite must be definite both 
in intensity and degree of j)erfection. It will, there- 
fore, be always possible to imagine something higher 
still. God alone is the best possible. For any finite 
system we must be content with saying that it is good. 
Moreover, the Leibnitzean system falls into the dualism 
of which we have complained. It regards reason as 
imposed on reality, instead of being founded in it, or as 
being reality. In this way we once more fall a prey to 
abstractions. We have seen repeatedly that a realm of 
necessity and reason, apart from actuality, is only an ab- 
straction mistaken for a fact. Moreover, if a realm of 
reason could exist a23art from reality, it could never be 
known except as a second and parallel realm existed in 
reality as its essential law. The rational can be known 
only by the rational. But this realm of reason in things 
would make it unnecessary to postulate a realm apart 
from things. Hence the ground for the distinction be- 



342 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

tween truth and error, right and wrong, the possible and 
the imiDossible, must be found in God himself; and we 
must repudiate the notion that these distinctions exist 
as objective norms and limits for God. They are but 
the consequences of what God is. 

So, then, we object to the statement, either that God 
makes truth and right, or that he only recognizes them. 
He is rather their source and foundation; and they, in 
turn, are the fixed modes of his manifestation. We 
may, then, regard them as consequences or expressions 
of the divine nature, or as the laws of the divine activ- 
ity, or as the constant modes of the divine manifesta- 
tion. The first form is, perhaps, the least satisfactory; 
but, when reduced to its true meaning, it is identical 
with the other two. We devote a paragraph to its ex- 
position. 

Objections have long been urged against making the 
divine activity and manifestation dependent on the di- 
vine nature. It is claimed that this view must lead to 
a complete determinism, and thus destroy the divine 
freedom. This thought of God as superessential ap- 
pears in the various trinities of the Greek philosophy, 
and has often re-appeared in modern speculation. The 
unoriginated God is regarded as above mind, and rea- 
son, and essence — ineffable and incomprehensible. The 
Cartesians tended to place God, as perfect being, above 
both matter and mind. Schelling, also, in his later 
philosophy, regards the divine nature as something de- 
rived. The central factor of the absolute is will; and 
all the mental and moral attributes are viewed as self- 



RELATION OF GOD TO TRUTH. 343 

determinations. They are in no respect what we might 
call constitutional with God, but are the product of the 
absolute will. The same view has been elaborated at 
length by M. Secretan in his work on Absolute Liberty, 
(De la Z/ibey^te absoltte.) Both writers make will the es- 
sence of fundamental being. This central and essential 
will is the foundation of the divine nature. It has no 
constitutional determinations of any sort, but makes it- 
self all that it is by its own absolute self-determination. 
Any other view is regarded as fatal to the independence 
of the absolute, by making it subject to its own nature. 
There seems to be here an overstraining of the notion 
of nature, and a misunderstanding of it founded on the 
limitations of our own experience. Our experience is 
well fitted to mislead us upon this point. Our mental 
life has a successive unfolding; and, indeed, the finite in 
general is subject to the same laiv. When, then, new 
faculties or properties appear, they are said to be an un- 
folding of the nature. Thus there arises the thought of 
some unconscious antecedent energy, which, by a myste- 
rious necessity, unfolds itself into manifestation. The na- 
ture is forthwith hypostasized, and is thereafter regard- 
ed as the source, if not of the being itself, at least of all 
its outgo. Then, by the force of habit, we think of the 
divine nature as having similar' antecedence in the di- 
vine life and manifestation. Again, our mental life is 
not self-sufficient, and we cannot reach its roots. The 
mental streams rise in an undiscovered country, and 
consciousness lights up but a small part of the soul. 
We (explain this, also, by referring to our nature. Thus 
the nature comes to mean a mysterious and impenetra- 



344 STUDIES IK THEISM. 

ble power ruling in us, and making us what we are. 
When we add to this the thought of necessity as the 
law of that power, we have already reached complete 
determinism, and have justified the repugnance to 
speaking of the divine nature. For thereby we reduce 
tlie divine life and character to products of a blind con- 
stitutional necessity. But here we commit a twofold 
error: (1) we transfer to the divine the limitations of 
the human, and (2) we fall a prey to an abstraction. 
No one, upon reflection, would think of the divine na- 
ture as temporally antecedent to the divine wisdom and 
goodness. It only remains, then, to think of it as the 
mysterious source from which the divine life springs. 
But this mysterious source is only a myth ; for the na- 
ture of a being, except in unreal abstraction, is indis- 
tinguishable from the being itself. All that we can 
mean by a being's nature is just the law of its essential 
activities. Thus, the soul knows, feels, and wills. We 
explain these activities by referring them to the soul's 
nature; but that nature, in turn, is merely to do these 
things. Again, we say that the atoms attract, and ex- 
plain it by their nature; but when asked what the na- 
ture of the atoms is, we reply, to attract. Thus we ex- 
plain the outcome by the nature, and define the nature 
by the outcome. We may say that the nature of a 
thing is not the law of its essential activities, but is that 
factor in the thing which founds both the law and the 
activities. But here, again, we are the victims of a 
persistent delusion. The thing itself founds its own 
law and outgo. A thing is not a hollow something in 
which natures and forces are stowed like springs in a 



RELATION OF GOD TO TRUTH, 345 

box. A true thing is an indivisible unit whose essential 
activity has a certain law; and this law is its nature. 
Yet, mi&led by a pernicious tendency to personify ab- 
stractions, we make this law a thing, and then put it 
back of itself to explain itself. The unsatisfied imagina- 
tion will urge that there must be something in a thing 
which makes it what it is; but this is either a false 
claim or else it is an attempt to conceive how a thing is 
made. The truth is, that this itch of the imagination is 
the real source of the idle mystery of the thing in it- 
self, and also of the bulk of the objections to freedom. 
The nature is hypostasized and put behind the thing; 
and then we lament that we cannot know something, 
when, in truth, there is nothing to know. However far 
we may push our analysis, we can always fancy a mys- 
terious nature which will forever elude us, and at the 
same time will forever rule us. But this mystery is 
only a philosophical will-o'-the-wisp. Instead of hunt- 
ing this delusion, we should be much nearer the truth 
if we declared the law of a thing to be the thing in it- 
self. Being without essential law is nothing. Law 
apart from being is also nothing. Both must be united 
in reality. Being, then, is substantial law, and law is 
the expression of being. The substantial law is the 
being, and back of it there is nothing. This is the true 
and only thing in itself; and the only insoluble question 
concerning it is, how is it made? In a previous chapter 
we condemned the attempt to separate reality into two 
independent factors, being and force, as mistaking log- 
ical distinctions for real ones. The separation of real- 
ity into the two factors of being and law rests upon the 



3 46 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

same confusion. How a soul is able to think, feel, and 
will we cannot know. It is an ultimate fact of the soul's 
life. The thinking, feeling, and willing soul is given in 
experience. We get no insight from hyposlasizing 
faculties or natures which are only abstractions fiom the 
facts to be explained. The ultimate fact of the universe 
is an unconditioned reality. This reality is as it is, and 
the law of its activity is as it is; but neither admits of 
any deduction. Hence we can never get behind the 
fact that the principles of reason and right are the laws 
of the essential divine activity. To refer to the divine 
nature as something more ultimate, is only to delude 
ourselves with a figment of the imagination. But in 
calling these principles the laws of the divine activity 
we do not think of them as external norms, but as es- 
sential expressions of God himself. 

The other part of the claim, that the nature even of 
fundamental being must be mysterious to itself, is also 
groundless. This claim, also, transfers to the infinite 
the limitations of the finite. In treating of the divine 
personality, we said that full personality exists only 
where the nature is transparent to itself, and where con- 
sciousness grasps with perfect insight the being and all 
its activities. What is meant by this insight and trans- 
parency may be faintly illustrated by reference to the 
discursive activity of our minds. The mind, in reason- 
ing, is not the prey of some inner nature ; but finds its 
processes transparent to itself. There is in this case no 
back-lying mystery which the mind cannot penetrate, 
and out of which the activity proceeds ; but the mind 
is conscious of itself as self-determined and resrnant in 



n EL ATI ox OF GOD TO TRUTH. 345^ 

it6 activity. This which is measurably true for us in 
our reasoning, we regard as absohitely true for God in 
•all his activities. 

We conclude, then, that the divine nature can only 
mean the law of the divine activity, or manifestation. 
I'o base truth and right upon the divine nature is the 
same as declaring them to be the laws of God's essen- 
tial activity. To some this view, also, will seem a lim- 
itation of the divine absoluteness; and they w^ill claim 
that God, to be absolute, must give himself a law. If he 
is subject to a law which he does not give himself, then 
he is not properly independent. Opposite errors min- 
gle here. One is a hypostasis of law; the other is an 
overstraining of the meaning of absolute. The former 
error we have sufficiently considered; the latter calls 
for a word of criticism. All reality must be definite, 
and all activity must have a certain form or law. 
Without this element of definiteness, the notion even 
of the absolute and the omnipotent becomes perfectly 
void, and indistinguishable from zero. To demand that 
the absolute be utter indefiniteness and emptiness, in 
order that it may be the source of all definiteness and 
fullness, is to make even its existence a limitation. 
This overstraining of the term defeats itself. It cancels 
the absolute as a reality, and leads to the attempt to 
construct both the living God and the created universe 
out of nothing. The claim that definiteness is a limita- 
tion, is based on that etymological conception of the 
infinite to which we have so often referred. LogTcally, 
even existence is a limitation; for, instead of embracing, 

it excludes non-existence, and thus fails to fill up the 
23 



MS STUDIES m THEISM. 

whole sphere of the thinkable. But such logical limita- 
tion is no real limitation. In discussing pantheism, we 
found that the claim that all determination is negation 
and limitation is entirely false, except where a true dis- 
junctive judgment applies. But in any other case, thi«? 
claim is true only in a purely formal sense. Thus wo 
can always affirm of a either b or non-b; and to affirin b 
is equivalent to denying non-5. But non-5 is no positive 
predicate; it is only the absence of the positive predi- 
cate, b. Thus to affirm knowledge of God is to deny 
non-knowledge; to affirm power is to deny non-power. 
In this sense only is it universally true that all predica- 
tion is negation. But these negations are such only in 
form. They exclude nothing real from the subject. In 
truth, they are but the double negatives which make an 
affirmative. 

Perhaps the emptiness of this claim, that a definite 
mode or law is incompatible with the essential activity 
of the absolute, may be best seen in a concrete case. 
Thinking is governed by the law^s of thought. These 
laws are nothing which is external to the mind, or which 
exercises any compulsion upon the mind. The mind 
does not feel them as a yoke or a limitation. Our lack 
of insight, and our inability to trace all the results even 
of our simplest intuitions, we do feel as a limitation; 
but the laws of thought themselves are never felt af^ 
such. The reason is, that they are essentially only the 
forms of the thought-activity, and are reached as formal 
laws only by abstraction from the results of thinking. 
The basal fact here is a thought-activity; and reflection 
shows us tliat it has certain forms. These forms are 



RELATION OF GOD TO TRUTH 349 

next abstracted as laws of thinking; and finally, these 
laws are imposed upon the mind as a kind of external 
sovereign. Then the mind is said to be subject to the 
laws of thought ; and thus the fancy arises that possibly 
these laws are hinderances and limitations to knowl- 
edge. But in this entire pVocess w^e are merely the 
dupes of our own abstractions. No one upon reflection 
can regard the laws of thought as in any true sense 
limitations of the mind. They are simply the essential 
modes of all mental manifestation. They are not pow- 
ers of any sort which rule the intellect; they simply 
express what the intellect is. Probably habit has much 
to do with our confusion at this point. We are used 
to thinking of law as implying external compulsion; and 
thus we unconsciously import this thought into our con- 
ception of a being's essential law, which is never any 
thing but an expression of what the being is. In this 
way the fancy arises that essential law is a limitation. 
The implications of words are a constant source of error. 
As the notion of a nature commonly carries with it the 
thought of a mysterious background, so the nature of 
law is generally connected with the thought of necessity 
and compulsion. Both implications are misleading in 
the present case, and w^e must guard against them. 

The positive outcome of this discussion is, indeed, 
very small. The aim was to secure the best expression 
for the relation of God to mankind and ethical princi- 
ples. All propositions which view them as in any w^ay 
a product of volition, human or divine, we have rejected 
as not merely absurd, but contradictory. T'he opposite 
doctrines, which view these principles as having an 



350 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

existence independent of God, we have also rejected. 
The view which founds them on the nature of God, 
transforms itself, upon examination, into the statement 
that they are properly the fundamental laws or modes 
of the divine activity and manifestation. As such they 
are as changeless as God himself. We deny, then, that 
God can either make or unmake truth and right; not, 
however, because they exist independently of him, but 
because he cannot deny or contradict himself. The 
notion is essentially absurd; for a contradiction is noth- 
ing. The expression of a contradictory phrase is not 
the expression of a thought, but of its absence. The 
notion that such a phrase may be made to represent a 
fact rests entirely upon a play upon the word omnipo- 
i tent, or almighty; and is sufficient to convict one of 

mental flabbiness. To the question whether God may 
not have other and ineffable modes of manifestation, we 
reply that the ineffable is no subject for discussion. 
Both affirmation and denial would be empty. For us 
God is a spirit who is essentially righteousness and 
wisdom; and all laws of his activity, which are essen- 
tially unrelated to these factors, are only words without 
any corresponding thought. Spinoza, in the beginning 
of his speculations, affirmed that the infinite has an in- 
finity of essential attributes, of which, however, we can 
conceive only thought and extension. But before long it 
became clear that all these attributes were only words, 
and, therefore, empty of any real affirmation. We 
should reach the same result here, if we attempted to 
speak of ineffable laws of the divine activity, other than 
those of reason and right. To the question whether 



RELATION OF GOD TO TRUTH. 351 

God raay not change even the fundamental laws of 
his being, we reply that this is (1) to ask whether God 
can contradict himself; and (2) to reaffirm in a new 
form that truth and right are products of the divine 
volition. We have to content ourselves with saying 
that God is the foundation of truth and righteousness, 
in that rational and ethical principles are the essential 
laws of his action. Further than this we cannot go; 
and the attempt would only result in deceiving our- 
selves ^with logical distinctions mistaken for things. 
Questions concerning the order of rank among the fac- 
ulties are insoluble even for human psychology. Fichte 
made a great effort to deduce the intellect and the will 
from a moral root. The destiny of man is to be moral; 
and to be moral, he must have intelligence. Fichte 
positively thought any thing deduced when he had 
shown that without it a moral system would be impos- 
sible. The mystic may, also, believe that the essence 
of God is love, and that all which God is in attribute or 
action, flows necessarily from love as the divine essence. 
But this is not a deduction of the divine wisdom, for 
the love which does this is already a seeing, knowing 
love. It perceives its goal and the means of realiza- 
tion. Nevertheless, we must be careful not to make 
our mental experience too exact a standard for the di- 
vine mind. With us, for example, volition often comes 
only at the end of a long debate between opposing 
possibl'ties; and action must wait for opportunity. 
Thus the will and intelligence are made to seem sepa- 
rable; and the being is split up into independent faculties. 
But in no case are the faculties more than modes of 



352 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

the being's manifestation. An intelligence without will 
or feeling is as impossible as a will without intelli- 
gence. They are inseparable manifestations of the one 
living spirit. It is also plain that those features of our 
experience which we have just mentioned, cannot be 
thought of in connection with God. With infinite 
goodness to prompt, infinite wisdom to perform, there 
can be no hesitation in choice, and no delay in execu- 
tion. Thought and act are contemporaneous, and 
move on together in indivisible unity. The living 
God is supreme reason and righteousness in eternal act 
and self-realization. 

Our claim that God does not make reason nor obey 
reason, but is substantial reason, will, perhaps, be al- 
lowed; but the claim that he is substantial goodness 
and righteousness is open to two objections. One is a 
difficulty of moral theory; the other is drawn from the 
existence of evil. We consider them in their order. 

After all, it will be urged, we have made righteous- 
ness constitutional with God, which is a moral contra- 
diction. Righteousness and unrighteousness are purely 
matters of the will, and lose their essential characters 
when viewed as an outcome of the nature. Yet we 
have declared ethical principles to be the laws of the 
divine activity, and have further declared that God 
cannot reverse them. They are, then, necessary; or if 
we dislike that word, they are unconditional and un- 
changeable facts. Hence God is bound by himself. 
He is, then, righteous not by an act of will, but by 
nature; yet natural righteousness is a contradiction in 
moral science. We have reached utter determinism. 



RELATION OF GOD TO TRUTH. 353 

If we are to talk at all upon this subject, it can only be 
in terms of our own experience; and it is hard to avoid 
a feeling that this matter lies beyond human knowledge. 
Still, as the objection is raised, we may point out that 
the statement just made is not entirely free from con- 
fusion. In the first place, it confounds right action with 
ethical principles; and it also confounds essential, Avitli 
volitional, activity. In speaking of a being's law, we 
were careful to define it as the order of its essential 
activities. In a free being there is one series of mani- 
festations and activities which express what the being 
is; and there is another series which ex]3resses what 
the being chooses to be. The order of the first series 
Ave call its nature, its constitution, its essential law. 
Now in declaring ethical principles to be the laws of 
the divine activity we had this series in mind; and 
hence we declare them to be unchangeable expressions 
of what God is. But the will, also, has a work; and 
the question of regarding these principles in volitional 
activity is not decided by the nature, but remains a 
subject of choice. Certainly, the notion of an un- 
changeable nature, or essential law, cannot be more 
deterministic in the case of God than in the case of man. 
Man, as well as God, is bound by himself. In the 
human mind, also, rational and ethical principles are 
primarily not truths, but laws of the spirit's activity. 
They are beyond the reach of our volition; and in so 
far, we are absolutely determined. The determination, 
indeed, is not by external agents, but in our own being. 
Yet this realm of changeless fact, or of necessity, if one 
prefer it, is not incompatible with another realm of fre^- 



354 STUDIES IN THEISM, 

dom. The laws of reason are absolnte. hnt it is in our 
power to reject them and choose the irrational. They 
do not control us completely, unless the will, or rather 
the soul, accepts and ratifies them. Ethical principles, 
too, are forever secure against all overthrow; but that 
does not compel obedience. It is in our power, not 
indeed to unmake them, but certainly to flout and re- 
ject them. Here, again, an act of freedom is necessary 
— -an acceptance and ratification — in order to give these 
principles the sovereignty which is their due. The 
highest form of human freedom is not to be found 
in our subordinate acts whereby we change or resist 
external nature, and least of all is it to be found in act- 
ing against reason and right. The highest act of the 
free soul is the acceptance of our true nature, or the 
choice of right reason to be the law of our entire being. 
It is sometimes urged that God cannot be free, because 
with infinite wisdom and goodness there can be but one 
outcome; but this objection strangely fancies that free- 
dom consists in doing the unrighteous and irrational, 
instead of in freely accepting and realizing what ra- 
tional and ethical principles demand. Schleiermacher 
defined moral action to be the imposing of reason upon 
nature; we regard it rather as the imposing of reason 
upon one's self. But what is thus a fact with man must 
be allowed as possible with God. We view the divine 
righteousness, therefore, as no constitutional necessity, 
but as the ceaseless ratification, by the divine will, of 
those rational and ethical principles which are founded 
in the divine nature. The divine nature expresses what 
God essentially is; the divine character expresses what 



RELATION OF GOD TO TRUTH. 355 

God chooses to be. The claim, then, that our doctrine 
leads to determinism we regard as untenable. 

The objection based on the existence of evil is a more 
serious one, for the problem of evil admits at present of 
no complete speculative solution. That there is a per- 
fect solution is a matter of faith, and not of knowledge. 
Nevertheless it may be well to point out that the denial 
of the divine benevolence is not so absolutely necessary 
as is often taught. The belief in the divine goodness 
and love is not born of a study of physical nature; it is 
based on conscience and the heart. Love and justice 
are the most reverend qualities in the universe, and the 
human mind, haunted by the idea of the perfect, has 
never been able to believe but that these principles 
must exist in their highest form in that infinite being 
from whom all realities and all principles, whether of 
truth, or right, or beauty, have flowed. The empiricist, 
who fancies that we learn every thing from external 
nature, is at a loss to understand this, and he loses pa- 
tience that men should have such absolute faith in the 
divine love and justice in the face of a world like ours. 
But as he never loses confidence in his own philosophy, 
he next proceeds to explain the common faith as mental 
abjectness produced by a worship of mingled fear and 
fawning. No one has had the courage to question this 
belief, and at last it has settled into an article of faith 
that God is good; while all the time the whole creation 
groans in horrid pain and torture, such as a devil would 
hardly have the heart to inflict. To a diatribe of this 
sort, the philosophical theist listens with great interest, 



356 STUDIES IX THEISM. 

both because of the innocence and because of the ear- 
nestness of the speaker. When it is done, he replies that 
in the face of all these facts he has taken up his faith, 
and in their face he will hold it fast. He does not go 
to external nature to be taught that God is love. The 
on y claim he will allow is, that while the world cannot 
prove the divine goodness, possibly it may disprove it. 
The question, then, is this: Are the facts of nature and 
life inconsistent with the belief that God is good. 

The early philosophies and extra-Christian theologies 
generally explained the problem of evil by the doctrine 
of a good, and an evil principle in ceaseless conflict. 
In accordance with the moral and rational instincts of 
the soul, the good principle was always viewed as the 
v'tronger of the two, and sometimes it was viewed as 
sure of ultimate triumph; but thus far, the evil princi- 
ple has opposed a successful resistance to its universal 
sway. Even in very recent periods this ancient dual- 
ism has found favor with some speculators who have 
abandoned Christianity. But in general. Christian mon- 
otheism has overturned this view, except so far as a 
rebellious will in a created being is a dualism. The 
result has been that the ancient war between the good 
and the evil principle has been displaced in theory by 
the notion of an antimony between the divine powe? 
and the divine benevolence. We cannot maintain, it is 
commonly said, that God is both almighty and good. 
Whichever attribute we choose, the other must be aban- 
doned. As a result of this conviction, it has been the 
fashion since the time of Leibnitz to explain evil by 
saying that God could not help it. A government by 



EEL ATI OK OF GOD TO TRUTH. 857 

general laws necessarily implies individual hardship; 
yet the system is not only good on the whole — it is also 
the best possible. The eternal truths of reason, and the 
invincible might of logical sequence, forbid the system's 
being other than it is. In our shortsightedness we fancy 
that some particular feature could be improved; and so 
it could, as an isolated thing, but not as a part of the 
whole. Nothing is single, and nothing exists for itself 
alone. Every thing is bound up in infinite relations to 
all co-existences and sequences, so that its conditions 
could not be changed without injuriously affecting the 
good of the whole. The petty present gain, then, must 
be paid for by a greater loss elsewhere in space or time. 
It would be losing both vessel and crew to save a single 
cabin-boy or scullion. 

In criticising this view, one must sympathize with its 
protest against overstraining the meaning of omnipo- 
tence. The meaning of this word cannot be determined 
by its etymology, but by reason only; and reason de- 
clares that contradiction and absurdity cannot be real- 
ized in existence by any power whatever, and for the 
simple reason that they express nothing but the condi- 
tions of mental palsy. The one who utters them has 
said, and straight unsaid, and thus has canceled all 
meaning. It is the irrational imagination only which is 
disturbed with the notion that proper contradictions 
express some possible existence. So far, then, as the 
non-existence of evil can be shown to involve a contra- 
diction, in so far is it justified. Unfortunately this 
solution is clearly applicable only to the Vg^^^blem of moral 
evil, considered as a necessary possibilf^'bf a free sys- 



358 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

tern. That the non-existence of pain in its present de- 
gree, or even its utter absence, involves a contradiction, 
or runs counter to some eternal truth, is a proposition 
which is in sad need of proof. So far as we can see, 
pain in the animal world is the outcome of purely con- 
tingent arrangements. Whatever good purposes tooth- 
ache, and neuralgia, and pestilence, and fang, and 
venom, and parasites may serve, it is certainly sheer 
assumption to say that any eternal truth is to blame for 
their presence, or would be damaged by their absence. 
There is no relief in this direction. These facts have 
all the marks of purpose, and it only remains to look for 
some justification in their consequences. 

But before passing on, we must protest once more 
against that contradictory notion of a best possible sys- 
tem. We have before pointed out that the notion of a 
best possible finite system is as absurd as the notion of 
a largest possible number, or a largest possible bounded 
space. Leibnitz has certainly led speculative thought 
astray by his adoption of this untenable conception. 
No theist, therefore, is under obligation to prove that 
the present system is the best possible, and for the sim- 
ple reason that there is no best possible finite. As 
Plato taught, there is but one best possible, and that is 
God himself. Of any finite system whatever the ques- 
tions would be possible, Why thus, and not otherwise? 
Why now, and not then ? Why on this plane, and not 
some other? Why so much, and not more or less? 
With regard to our own system, we can ask. Why be- 
gin in the germ, and not full grown in every faculty ? 
Why live sixty years, and not six hundred ? Why not 



RELA TJON OF GOD TO TRUTH 359 

have ribs and nerves of steel, instead of the fragile ones 
we have? Wh}^ is anything as it is? All questions 
of this Vind are utterly insoluble, and should be left to 
debating youths and philosophers of the phrenological 
type. To ask them betrays a certain mental immatur- 
ity. Certainly no grown-up thinker of average reflect- 
ive power will long consent to busy himself with such 
problems. We may, however, expound this notion of 
a best possible system in another way. In itself the 
phrase is essentially ambiguous. We may judge a sys- 
tem by its outcome, and this outcome may be either 
quantitatively or qualitatively different from that of 
other systems. In the former case, the system with the 
largest outcome is the best. In the latter case, the sys- 
tem wath the highest kind of outcome is the best. Yet 
this qualitative best is also quantitative in that it may 
vary in intensity, and also in extent; and hence the no- 
tion of a best possible finite system, even when taken 
qualitatively, is a contradiction. In addition to this 
ambiguity, another is found in the fact that a system 
may be called good or bad, not with reference to the 
quality of the end, but with reference only to the way 
of reaching the end. We may regard the system as an 
instrument, and leave ends out of sight. There is no 
contradiction in the notion of a best possible instru- 
mental system, for the perfection of such a system is 
determined solely by its fitness for its proper work. 
When an instrument exactly corresponds to its purpose, 
it is perfect. In this sense a very imperfect system, 
absolutely considered, may be perfectly adapted to the 
work assigned it. Even defects may be perfections; as 



360 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

in the case of the eye, tlie shortcomings of the normal 
eye as an optical instrument, are positive advantages in 
it, considered as an eye. Thus we see that the phrase, 
best possible system, is essentially ambiguous, and in 
its obvious meaning is contradictory. AH, then, that 
can be required of the theist is, to show that the actual 
system is not incompatible with a rational belief in the 
divine goodness. Finally, we do not recognize the need 
of limiting either the divine power or benevolence to 
account for unmoral evil. We believe it much more 
rational to confess that we have no sufficient data for 
the speculative solution of this problem. When, then, 
belief in the divine benevolence seems to conflict with 
belief in the divine omnipotence, except always in the 
case of contradiction, we limit neither, but decide that 
the solution of the problem lies at present beyond the 
horizon of the human mind. Meanwhile, though clouds 
and darkness are round about Him, we think it rational 
to hold that righteousness and judgment are still the 
habitation of his throne. 

Having thus admitted the impossibility of a theoret- 
ical demonstration of optimism, we cannot be suspected 
of being blind to the shortcomings of the optimistic 
argument. We next proceed to examine the pessimist's 
attack upon the goodness of the actual world. The 
pessimistic argument, like the optimistic, is very apt to 
drag in considerations drawn from the notion of a best 
possible system. All these Ave rule out as indecisive, 
even when not absurd. Further, the pessimist is always 
tempted to overstrain the notion of omnipotence, so as 
to make it able to accomplish the impossible and the 



RELATION OF GOD TO TRUTH 361 

contradictory, as well as tlie possible and the consistent. 
We find thii tendency in his unwillingness to allow the 
claim that evil may be a necessary means for securing 
the good. He says that the necessity of employing 
means of any sort, especially of a severe and painful 
kind, only proves that the Creator is limited, and can- 
not have what he wants by direct exercise of power. 
Another grave fault of the average pessimist is, to deal 
with pain in the abstract. He heaps up all the misery 
of all beings, past, j)resent, and future, and forthwith 
makes a sum so great as to hide all well-being from his 
vision. Thus he resembles the man who should heap 
up in one thought all the sickness of the world, and 
should become so confused thereby as to conclude that 
health and soundness nowhere exist. The very large 
sum-total of sickness does not prove that the earth is 
only a great hospital, or a festering lazar-house. On 
the contrary, the race has always been in tolerable 
health. The pessimist is apt to forget that pain in the 
abstract is nothing, and has existence only as felt by 
sensitive beings. If, then, the universe is a miserable 
universe^ it can be so only as the beings living in it are 
consciously miserable. This point can be decided only 
by appeal to consciousness. We have in this abstract 
dealing with the question a parallel of the mistake com- 
mon in discussions of future punishment. There we 
ask ourselves, Could God be justified in creating a be- 
ing who he foreknew would persist in sin, and thus fall 
into endless punishment? Is he not bound to restore 
every one to happiness before the great cycle of eternity 
shall have rolled away ? From this abstract stand-point, 



362 STUDIES JN THEISM. 

the case seems entirely clear; and we even advance at 
times to declamation against the blasphemy of the oppo- 
site thought. But when we take another stand-point, 
the certainty grows less. If one should sny, I am a 
mature, rational, and free being. The divine love lor 
me has been manifested in the most afflicting ways. 
The divine pardon has been offered me on the sole 
condition of forsaking sin. Nevertheless, I choose to 
disregard the laws of God and of my own soul. For 
God is under absolute obligation to save me from my- 
self, and there can be no vindication of God's love and 
righteousness unless I am finally saved. If I throw 
myself away, even with my eyes open, God is a mon- 
ster and an omnipotent devil. He had no right to 
make me free, unless he intended afterward cunningly 
or secretly to cancel my freedom, and make me at least 
an automatic saint. If one should speak thus, he prob- 
ably would not find a single conscience to agree with 
him. It is doubtful, indeed, if any one to whom years 
and light have come, would dare to make this claim for 
himself. It is strange that the claim which seems so 
tenable when made in the interests of an abstract no- 
body, is one which none of us would have the face to 
make for ourselves. But if we cannot maintain the 
claim in the first person, and if we should hardly care 
to make it for the second person, what becomes of it as 
applied only to the third person ? Life and death are 
both in the first person. But just as the abstract per- 
son must be dismissed in this case, and in his stead the 
first person must be dealt with, so in the case of the 
misery of being we must cease reflecting upon the ab- 



RELATION OF GOD TO TRUTH. 363 

stract integral of pains, and ask for living beings to 
come forward and testify. The abstract man cannot 
be miserable, but only concrete, conscious men. Now 
how many are there who, apart from their own folly 
and sin, have found life an evil rather than a good? 
How many, apart from all consideration of good or evil 
to come, would gladly abandon even this life? How 
many are there whose natural lot has been such that 
they would prefer non-existence? Yet such, if such 
there be, are the only proper pessimists. Others may 
fancy that God should have done more for them than 
^e has, but these are egoists rather than pessimists, and 
what they need is not so much argument as a keener 
sense of shame. 

We consider, next, some specific objections. The 
existence of pain of any sort is objected to as inconsist- 
ent with the divine benevolence. No thoughtful person 
will venture to affirm that the mystery of physical pain 
can be entirely cleared up ; but it can certainly be less- 
ened. On the other hand, no one has a right to declare 
it an outcome of malevolence, unless he has a complete 
knowledge of the system of things. Pain in general has 
a double function. It appears either as a warning and 
an incentive to development, or as the consequence of 
transgressing some condition of existence. As a warn- 
ing, its function is plainly beneficent, and as an incen- 
tive to development, things being as they are, it is plainly 
necessary. There is no assignable way of preserving 
organisms from speedy destruction without making them 

subject to possible pain. Again, if pain did not exist iu 

24 



364 STUDIES IN THEIS2L 

possibility, it is impossible to see what security we 
should have for either physical or mental development. 
Even the animal world would lose itself in a mollusk 
flabbiness, as devoid of meaning as it w^ould be of 
beauty. To this the pessimist will reply, that God 
should have made things perfect from the start. Mind 
and body should both have been complete, and the 
dangers and risks of development should have been 
avoided. He is willing to allow that, as things are, pain 
and privation haA^e in general a beneficent function. 
Exercise, resistance, struggle, and the spurs and finger- 
posts of pain, are all necessary for the development of 
such beings as actually exist. But why are things as 
they are ? Why does not another kind of beings exist ? 
Above all, why does not God interfere to prevent ail 
ill, when he might just as well do it as not? Mr. Mill 
gives the extremest expression to this feeling in tho 
following passage: — 

*' For, how stands the fact ? That next to the great- 
ness of these cosmic forces, the quality which most 
forcibly strikes every one who does not avert his eyes 
from it, is their perfect and absolute recklessness. They 
go straight to their end, without regarding what or 
whom they crush on the road. Optimists, in their at- 
tempts to prove that ' whatever is, is right,' are obliged 
to maintain, not that Nature ever turns one step from 
her path to avoid trampling us into destruction, but 
that it would be very unreasonable in us to expect that 
she should. Pope's ' Shall gravitation cease when you 
go by?' may be a just rebuke to any one who should be 
BO silly a^ to expect common human morality from na- 



RELATION OF GOD TO TRUTH. 3G5 

lure. But if the question were between two men, in- 
stead of between a man and a natural phenomenon, that 
apostrophe would be thought a rare piece of impudence. 
A -^an Avho should persist in hurling stones or firing 
cannon when another man ' goes by,' and having killed 
him, should urge a similar plea in exculpation, would 
very deservedly be found guilty of murder." * 

It is curious what different oj)inions men hold. When 
the Christian teaches a doctrine of divine providence, 
according to which God is in living and loving contact 
with every being in the system, and is caring for all, 
and guiding all to the best results, his doctrine is often 
denounced as a miserable anthropomorphism ; but here 
Mr. Mill appears with a demand that gravitation shall 
be suspended, fire shall not burn, water shall not drown, 
cold shall not freeze, and no natural law have its prop- 
er effect, if in any way we should be injured there- 
by. Some speculators, especially of Mill's own school, 
will not allow God to suspend a law of nature in order 
to attest a divine revelation to man; but if laziness or 
blockheadism bring one into trouble, God must hasten 
to shield him from the consequences, under penalty of 
being charged Avith murder, etc. It is difficult not to 
detect an odor of insanity in the passage we have 
quoted, for certainly it would be impossible to imagine 
a more contemptible sj^stem than one in which such 
perpetual miracle should occur. It would be a uni- 
versal nursery for the perpetuation of helplessness and 
incompetency. Surely if any one will criticise the uni- 
verse, he ought to suggest improvements instead of 
* " Tlire<3 Essays on Religion," p. 28. 



366 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

disastrous modifications. Yet the improvements sug- 
gested by various critics have always been such as would 
pr vve calamitous if adopted. In this state of the case 
the critics fall back upon the suggestion that every 
thing might have been quite otherwise to advantage. 
But such a statement is verbal, and belief in the divine 
goodness is not seriously endangered by these attacks. 

The amount of evil in the animal world, apart from 
man, is commonly greatly exaggerated, owing to the 
influence of what is called biological anthropomorphism. 
Evil in this realm is purely a question of pain; and 
there is no proof that the lower animals endure any 
thing like the pain which human beings suffer. On the 
contrary, a multitude of facts indicate that even the 
more highly organized animals are far less sensitive to 
pain than men are; and no one can see a wasp continu- 
ing to eat after its waist has been cut in two, and believe 
that it suffers much from the operation. Keen senses 
and keen sensibility are by no means necessarily connect- 
ed; the latter seems reserved especially for man. While 
no one would care to maintain that there is no excess of 
pain among the lower animals above what is needed to 
w^arn and develop them, it is still a grave error of 
physiology to attribute to animals any thing like human 
sensibility. With the simple organic forms, sensibility 
is probably a vanishing quantity. Moreover, even with 
men, w^ho live rationally, the amount of physical pain is 
very small, whether in living or in dying. It is in our 
personality, in our power of looking before and after, 
and, above all, in our affections and conscience, that we 
find the chief source of woe. If these were aw\ay, our 



RELATION OF GOD TO TRUTH. 3G7 

physical pains would be very small, after deducting 
those which we bring on ourselves. Where these are 
away, as in the case of the animals, and where the phys- 
ical sensibility is certainly much less, the amount of 
physical evil is not so great as the pessimist would have 
us believe. So far as pain in the animal world tends to 
the preservation and development of life, it is a good, 
and testifies to divine beneficence. So far as it seems 
motiveless and malignant, the pessimist is entitled to 
his conclusion only as he shows, (1) that it is without 
any justifying outcome; and, (2) that it is really the 
work and purpose of God. Man has wrought evil and 
devastation in nature, and it is an entirely possible 
thought that there are more potent energies of diabo- 
lism than the human will. Of course it will be said, that 
allowing this, it only removes the difficulty one step 
farther back. We shall deal with this question here- 
after. For the present, we content ourselves with point- 
ing out that the amount of necessary and unrelieved 
physical evil in the animal world is far enough from 
warranting a denial of the divine benevolence. 

In considering the case of man, we deal first with the 
natural evil to which he is subject. The human soul, 
as it exists, can be made perfect only through struggle 
and suffering. Nowhere else have these elements so 
beneficent an office as in the case of man. The higher 
manifestations of character spring almost entirely from 
the soil of sorrow. If we should strike out from human 
history the heroic and saintly characters which have 
been born from suffering, all that is noble and reverend 
in it would depart. If we should strike from literature 



368 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

all to which sorrow has given birth, its inspiration 
would perish forever. Even the presence of death has 
brought a solemn tenderness and dignity into human 
affection which had otherwise been impossible. Virtue, 
too, acquires sturdiness only from resisted temptations; 
and even mind itself grows only through obstacle and 
resistance. But it will be objected that all these things 
might have been made outright, and thus the struggle 
and the pain would have been escaped. To which we 
say, (1) It is by no means clear that they could have 
been created; and, (2) It is very far from certain that 
the well-being would have been any greater. For well- 
being is measured only by happiness, and not by quan- 
tity of attainment or possession. Bodies might easily 
have been made in their mature form; but it would be 
an incalculable loss to humanity if the ministry of child- 
hood were wanting. It is, also, conceivable that the 
mental faculties should begin in a far more developed 
stage than they do; but it is not clear that the outcome 
for well-being would have been much greater. There 
is a distinct demand in human nature for self-develop- 
ment; and hence no one has a tithe of the enjoyment in 
things or thoughts inherited, which he has in things or 
thoughts produced by himself. Even the child finds 
more delight in the crudest toy of his own manufacture 
than in the finest product of the shops. The joy of in- 
tellect does not consist in mere knowing, but in con- 
scious development and growing self-possession. Mental 
good does not consist in reaching some fixed altitude, 
but in ever moving onward. Concerning the relation 
of physical nature to man, it must be said that its per- 



RELATION OF GOD TO TRUTH. 369 

fection consists in its imperfection. A nature which 
furnished no obstacle to man, but spontaneously sup- 
plied all his wants, would not only be paralyzing, it 
would be intolerable. A perfect physical world would 
be for human purposes a perfect failure. We want 
Bomething to conquer and subdue; and in such conquest 
we win vastly more delight than from any amount of 
inactive gratification. We also want something to crit- 
icise. Over-against the stupidity of nature we want to 
put our conception of a better; and we seek to force 
nature to accept our improvement. To the healthy 
mind there is no more contemptible conception of hu- 
man destiny than simply immortal good feeling. No 
true man wants to have good showered upon him; he 
wants only a f;air chance to win good for himself. The 
beggar is willing to live on charity; but the man insists 
upon earning his bread. 

Even in the case of the lower and constitutional 
goods, the mind is dissatisfied unless it has a share in 
their production. In the case of the higher goods of 
character, the mind will not recognize them as goods 
at all, unless they are its own product. Created or 
automatic sainthood it does not understand. Here is 
the field for the imperial will. And whatever of hard- 
ship may be necessary for the development of good 
character the soul cheerfully accepts as the condition 
of its chiefest blessing. The high good of independ- 
ence is impossible to contented beggary; and for the 
reason that the two notions are contradictory, except in 
a lying consciousness. So the supreme good of virtuous 
character is incompatible with any thing but self -con- 



370 STUDIES IN THEIS2L 

quest and self-cletermination. For the great good in 
moral development is not so much the point reached^ 
as it is the self-development in accordance with the 
perceived laws of righteousness. This highest of goods 
cannot be created, because that is a contradiction. It 
must be won, or conquered, by every being for him- 
self. The goods, then, which the human mind in its 
normal condition most craves and venerates, are not 
passive pleasures of any sort, but goods of the active 
nature, and the very notion of these implies obstacle, 
resistance, and hardship, as their necessary condition. 
Moreover there are good reasons for believing that a 
perfectly friendly nature would be less favorable to 
moral development than a partially hostile one. The 
theist believes that the immortal soul is rich only in 
itself and God. The temporal and the earthly furnish 
the conditions of moral action; but there is a strong 
tendency in the soul to forget itself and God in its 
surroundings. To correct this, a certain hostility of 
nature is necessary. Thus only can the soul be thrown 
back upon the spiritual, and the divine, and the eter- 
nal. This general feature of our system, therefore, is a 
proof of the divine benevolence. It will be seen other- 
wise only to the epicurean mind, from which all that 
is noble and reverend has departed. In addition, the 
theist will also hold that great physical calamities 
may at times be introduced for the express purpose 
of checking moral evils of corresponding magnitude. 

But the reply will be made, that these general con- 
siderations do not remove the fact that evil is overdone 
in connection with man. There are friohtful evils 



BEL A TION OF G OB TO ^ Til UTII. 371 

which develop nothing, but rather crush out both fac- 
ulty and possibility. They also reproduce themselves, 
and like some malignant venom spread from man to 
man, and from generation to generation, poisoning 
soundness and blighting life with death. The laws of 
heredity and of social solidarity are leagued for human 
ruin. By the former the sins of the fathers are visited 
uj^on the children unto distant generations: by the 
latter, whole classes of men are handed over to igno- 
rance and destitution of all that makes up a truly hu- 
man existence. It is hardly possible for multitudes 
to be human beings, owing to the miserable arrange- 
ments of society. But none of these things are good. 
Their only effect is blighting and destructive. 

All this and vastly more is true. But it must be 
pointed out that none of these results are necessary 
consequences of the system. They are implied in it as 
possibilities, but the actual outcome is determined by 
man himself. The chief ills under which man suffers 
are the results of his own doing. Even our physical 
ills, the physicians tell us, are mostly the product of 
our artificial and improper modes of living. Few 
bodies are engines of torture until physiological law has 
been outraged and violated, either by the person him- 
self or by his ancestors. When used rightly, the body 
is a willing, faithful, and effective servant of the soul. 
Only as it is abused does it break out into rebellion. 
The law of heredity, too — that fruitful source of fright- 
ful ills — is in its natural operation most beautiful and 
beneficent. It is the only thing w^hich makes our chil- 
dren truly our own, and knits the generations together 



372 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

in vital unity. With no law of the present order would 
we longer refuse to part than with this, if men were 
what they ought to be. Human sin it is which has 
changed this law into a curse. And so with the law of 
social unity. Universal community of interest, all for 
each and each for all, is a divine ideal. Absolute self- 
sufficiency of the person, and indifference toward others, 
is not an ideal state for either God or man. But the 
mutual interdependence which this ideal implies makes 
it possible that this law should be the prolific mother 
of woes. But the system is not to be charged with 
the results of its abuse. The benevolent purpose of the 
Creator is thwarted by the creature; and the creature 
alone is to blame. 

This brings us to the problem of moral evil. The 
existence of sin has been viewed by some as a reflec- 
tion on the divine righteousness and benevolence. This 
view also arises partly from overstraining the meaning 
of omnipotence, and partly from denying the freedom 
of the creature. There is no vindication of God pos- 
sible on any deterministic theory. Such a view makes 
him the real sinner in all sinning; and the apparent 
sinners are but the cunning automata through which tlijp 
omnipotent sinner works. But we leave this point for 
the present, and point out that moral evil cannot exist 
if there be no moral order. In its very notion it is a de- 
parture from moral order; and hence necessarily implies 
it in the system. Sin in the system, therefore, implies 
righteousness in the founder of the system; and the 
sin appears as a rebellion against the moral law which has 



RELATION OF GOD TO TRUTH. 373 

been legislated into the very nature of things. If the sys- 
tem were not essentially founded in righteousness, there 
could be no proper sin. Where there is no law, there is 
no transgression. Where there is only unrighteous law 
transgression is not sin, but virtue. Sin is impossible, 
then, where righteous law does not pre-exist. But how 
can this law be transgressed ? Why does not God prevent 
it ? We answer : A free system is better than a me- 
chanical system ; and freedom necessarily implies the 
possibility of sinning. This possibility, then, is given in 
the fact of freedom. But could not God so act upon 
the will by some hidden constraint of motive, as to lead 
it in any given direction ? Some hold that God does so 
act in every case, and thus becomes properly the author 
of sin. This device of a secret constraint is a favorite 
method for reforming incorrigible sinners and devils. 
But in truth, it is only a roundabout way of canceling 
freedom, and a return to the notion of automatic saint- 
hood. It is a demand that the free being be degraded 
to an automaton and mechanically rearranged. If it be 
asked. How could sin originate in a state of innocence? 
the reply is easy: We have a complex nature, every 
part of which, in its place, is innocent and becoming. 
Moreover, our desires and impulses are in themselves 
unlimited and also unmoral. But the health of the soul 
demands that an ideal order be maintained in it; and 
morality consists, not in introducing new factors into 
the soul, but in ruling ourselves according to the soul's 
ideal law. At bottom, sin is allowed disorder. It is 
permitting the soul to live at random. It is the acquies- 
cence of the will in a usurpation of supreme rule by the 



374 STUDIES IN THEISM 

lower powers. But the possibility of sinning does not 
necessarily involve a taint or evil tendency in the soul. 
But not all these considerations suffice to fully explain 
the facts of life. If the consequences of sin were con- 
fined to the sinner, there would be less difficulty in tho 
problem. But as it is, the innocent suffer and perish as 
well as the guilty. Why was sin permitted to have 
such terrific consequences? We may admit the good- 
ness of the laws of heredity and social solidarity in a 
righteous world, but their effect is so blighting and so 
unjust in a sinful world, that it seems as if they could 
not be excused. To this there is but one sufficient 
answer. The present life is a time of probation ; and as 
such, it is a time of abnormal moral adjustment. But 
there is another life in which everyone shall be judged 
according to that which he hath, and not according to 
that which he hath not. There men shall take their 
places according to their moral character; and there the 
Judge of all the earth shall do the best, for saint and 
sinner alike, which the eternal laws of righteousness will 
permit. To one who has this faith, life presents indeed 
a dark problem; but to one who has it not, blindness 
is the only refuge from despair. There is no use in 
further argument. We admitted at the start that a 
speculative solution is impossible, and we now repeat the 
admission. We do not agree with the pessimist, but 
our chief reason is, our faith in a future life. If he can- 
not advance to this faith, we shake hands and separate. 
He chooses the gospel of despair; we choose the gospel 
of hope. The future must decide between us. 



THE SOUL: SPIRITUALISM OR MATERIALISM. 375 



CHAPTER X. 

THE soul: spiritualism or materialism. 

A THEISM is commonly allied to materialism and 
-^^ physical fatalism; and, conversely, these doctrines 
rarely fail to pass into atheism. On the other hand, the 
belief in an active, substantial soul, implies a belief in a 
personal God. If the spiritual philosophy can be justi- 
fied, most of the objections to theism disappear. Hence 
the propriety of discussing the subject in the present 
work. 

The tendency of the uncritical mind is to lose itself 
in its objects. Hence it finds nothing so real as the ob- 
jects of sense-perception. The typical conception of 
the real is the tangible or visible. When this tendency 
is uncorrected by either reflection or instinct, we have 
the coarsest tyj)e of materialism. From constant deal- 
ing with the object, the subject at last forgets that 
there is and must be a subject of knowledge. Because 
of this objective tendency of the unreflecting, the ma- 
terialistic argument seems very strong to crude common 
sense. We know nothing of mental phenomena except 
in connection with a body. Mind and body begin to- 
gether, advance together, decay together, and, so far as 
our observation goes, they perish together. In fact as 
well as in poetry, the grave remains the undiscovered 
country from whose bourn no traveler returns. There 



376 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

is nothing in experience to suggest that mind and body 
are separable. During life, the mind is most rigorously 
conditioned by the body; and we never find it apart 
from the body. What conclusion, then, can be more 
probable than that the mind is simply a function of the 
organism? By this is not meant that mental phenom- 
ena are material, or that they can be assimilated to any 
mechanical phenomena whatever; it would never occur 
to any sane materialist to teach such a doctrine. His 
theory is, that mind is only a general word for mental 
phenomena; and that these phenomena result from 
physical organization. They are the melody of the in- 
strument. They are the rainbow which is painted on 
the dark cloud. And as the melody is unlike the in- 
strument, and the rainbow is unlike the cloud, so men- 
tal phenomena are totally unlike the dark physiological 
processes which underlie them. But as the melody dies 
when the instrument is broken, and the rainbow vanishes 
when the cloud is shed; so mental phenomena disap- 
pear when the organism is shattered. Mind does not 
belong to the substances, but only to the phantoms of 
the universe. 

This argument seems to be in perfect harmony with 
common sense; and the inductive canon, known as the 
method of concomitant variations, appears to justify the 
conclusion. Yet the superficiality of the argument is 
evident. Materialism always starts with the assumption 
that matter is a perfectly clear notion, and that it is 
known as a noumenon. It is an almost impossible in- 
sight to the materialist that matter as noumenon is a 
purely metaphysical and speculative notion. It rarely 



THE SOUL: SPIRITUALISM OR MATERIALISM. 377 

or never occurs to him that his atoms and molecules are 
as purely matters of inference as are God and the soul. 
Accordingly, he insists that there is no telling what 
matter can do. Every day it is growing in mystery and 
capacity. Hence, hp- says, it is the height of rashness to 
say what matter cannot do. We see it explaining the 
organism; and we see nothing but matter in the organ- 
ism. The simplicity of this position both disarms crit- 
icism and renders it unnecessary. We merely mention 
it to put the reader on his guard against the unconscious 
imposition which the materialist practices upon himself 
at this point. In truth, materialism is based less on ob- 
servation than on a metaphysical theory; and its meta- 
physics are based on the imagination rather than on 
reason. It does not think in concepts, but in images; 
and its reasoning is a train of misapplied sense-pictures. 
In this respect materialism is still on the level of the 
brute mind; in which, probably, all seeming reasoning is 
but a semi-pictorial association of sense-experiences. 
The essence of superstition, also, consists in mistaking 
sense-images, with their spatial and temporal conditions, 
for thoughts and principles. In this respect material- 
ism belongs to the family of superstitions. 

We said that to unreflecting common sense the ma- 
terialistic argument must seem very forcible. However, 
common sense lives more by instinct than by logic; and 
on this account it has never favored materialism. The 
word soul, occurring in all cultivated languages, and the 
content of the word, indicates a general belief that the 
soul is not a passing phase of matter, but an abiding 
essence. In its spontaneous language the race ha'^> re- 



3*78 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

corded its verdict against materialism; and this fact 
constitutes a great presumption in favor of the spiritual 
philosophv. We proceed to the argument. 

The positive argument for materialism is weak and 
indecisive. Apart from any opposing facts or argu- 
ments, it could never prove more than a possibility. 
This positive argument consists entirely in repeating the 
unquestioned fact that the body affects the mind. But 
this is no new discovery; it has been known and un- 
doubted from the beginning. And the various discov- 
eries of physiology in connection with the nerves and 
the brain, have no more significance than the general 
fact of interaction between mind and body. Confusion 
is very common at this point. Some one discovers that 
if some little nerve be diseased, or if some peculiar drug 
be taken, there may be an abnormal mental outcome. 
And such a fact is at once trumpeted abroad as a new 
proof of materialism. Yet such a fact reveals no new 
principle. It is only one further specification of the 
undoubted fact that the body affects the mind. The 
general fact means as much as any amount of detailed 
fact; for the detailed fact is but the general fact speci- 
fied. Suppose it were proved that the brain acts in 
parts, or that the localization doctrine were fully estab- 
lished, materialism could find no more in such a fact , 
than in the general fact that, at present, the mind is 
conditioned by the brain. To say that the mind acts 
through the brain at all, is fully as materialistic as to 
say that it acts through certain parts of the brain. In 
seeing, the optic nerve is chiefly concerned. In hear- 



THE SOUL: SPIRITUALISM OR AIATERIALISM. 379 

ing, the auditory nerve is chiefly concerned. What is 
there more materialistic in saying that in some forms of 
mental activity, some pai'ticular part of the brain may 
be concerned more than some other part ? A curious 
delusion seems to possess both the spiritualist and the 
malerialist on this point. The spiritualist admits the 
general fact of interaction vt^ith great cheerfulness; but 
he forgets that a general interaction can exist only 
through a multitude of specific and particular interac- 
tions; and hence he grows nervous when he hears of 
^-ome new doctrine about the brain. On the other hand, 
the materialist fancies that detailed and obscure inter- 
actions have vastly more significance than the patent 
ones with which we have always been familiar. Both 
views are plainly erroneous. The fact that rum or 
opium produce peculiar mental effects, or that when the 
brains are out the man will die, is fully as significant, as 
far as materialism is concerned, as the most occult facts 
of brain physiology. And this universal admission of 
interaction between soul and body renders the material- 
istic conclusion from it worthless. For upon any the- 
ory the same facts would exist. Those who believe in 
the existence of the soul never pretend that it is inde- 
pendent of the body, or that it can carry on its activities 
without regard to physical conditions. On the contrary, 
they clearly recognize that at present mental activity is 
conditioned by the body, and more especially by the 
nervous system. This being so, they expect the condi- 
tion of the organism to affect the mental product. It 
is perfectly plain on their supposition, that the condi- 
tion of the body must be a factor of the mental out- 
25 



380 STUDIES IN THEISM, 

come. If the machine be in order, so that it follows its 
proper law, and supplies thie right conditions for the 
unfolding of mental activity, then we may expect a 
normal unfolding. But if the machine be abnormal, of 
course the mental phenomena must be disturbed and 
abnormal also. If the nerves should begin to storm 
the soul with strange and chaotic sensations, which 
should traverse and break up the accustomed order, the 
mind would be lost in hopeless bewilderment and insan- 
ity. If, on the other hand, the mind were in full pos- 
session of itself, but the nerves were disordered, the 
signals by which one mind communicates with another 
would become incoherent and meaningless. If, then, 
these facts were all, the result must be a drawn battle 
between materialism and spiritualism. The materialist 
would hardly be willing to allow this; but that only 
shows that he cannot distinguish between facts of expe- 
rience and his metaphysical theory, that all being is 
material. But as this theory is, to say the least, sheer 
assumption, we allow it no weight as an argument. 

The question is : How shall we account for the facts 
of the mental life ? The spiritualist says, that we must 
assume an abiding mental subject. The materialist says, 
that we can explain it by the activities of matter. And 
here we repeat once more, that this is not a case of fact 
against theory, but of theory against theory. The ma- 
terialist's matter is as much a speculative assumption as 
is the spiritualist's soul. Nor is the question, what we 
shall call the cause of mental phenomena; but, rather, 
how we shall think of it. A great difficulty of the ma- 
terialistic doctrine is, that it makes more of the word 



THE SOUL: SPIRITUALISM OR MATERIALISM. ^^\ 

matter than of the thing. We have no definition of 
matter; and while the name is constantly repeated, the 
notion is left very indefinite. The spiritualist points 
out that matter, as commonly conceived, cannot be the 
cause of mental phenomena, because mentality and ma- 
teriality are absolutely incommensurable. The essential 
phenomenon of matter is motion. The essential phe- 
nomena of mind are thought, feeling, and volition. By 
no possibility can these be identified, or can the latter 
be deduced from the former. To explain one phenom- 
enon by another consists in identifying it as a special 
case of the other; and when there is no common factor, 
identification is impossible, as a matter of definition. 
Now if we conceive a brain composed of material ele- 
ments, and conceive all kinds of shakings to take place 
in it, we see nothing but other shakings as the result. 
No matter how complicated or rapid these motions may 
be, they remain motions still. In short, the movable, 
as such, is only capable of motion; and motion is totally 
tinlike thought. It is a matter of definition only, that 
the merely movable contains no explanation of mind. 
The complete unlikeness of mental and material phe- 
nomena makes it impossible to regard the former as 
phases of the latter. A small quibble is sometimes at- 
tempted, based on the double meaning of such words as 
light, heat, sound, etc. Sound is unlike the instrument, 
but is a product of it, nevertheless. The answer is evi- 
dent. Sound, physically, is vibration either in the in- 
strument or in the air. Sound, physiologically, exists 
only in the mind, and is not properly produced by the 
instrument. While we remain in the physical realm we 



382 STUDIES IN TUEISM. 

have on]^^ vibration following vibration, and no essen- 
tial unlikeness. The same is true for the other words. 
The modern materialist recognizes this difficulty, and 
proposes to escape it by a new definition of matter. 
Matter, as the movable, explains only motion; but may 
not matter as mystic explain mind ? Mentality and ma- 
teriality are, indeed, incommensurable, but both are phe- 
nomenal. Why may they not both be the manifestation 
of the same substance, so that what appears here as 
matter, appears yonder as mind ? If by matter we mean 
only a swarm of little lumps, like grains of sand but 
very much smaller, of course it is impossible to get life 
and thought from them. But why may we not enlarge 
our notion of matter, and think of it as something higher 
and better than we have been accustomed to do ? We 
think of it as something crude and groveling, and fail 
to notice the wonderful and mystic powers which it has. 
Among recent writers, no one has insisted upon this 
extension more strongly than Professor Tyndall. The 
notion that matter, as ordinarily conceived, can explain 
life and mind, he denounces as " absurd, monstrous, and 
fit only for the intellectual gibbet." At the same time 
he ^' prolongs his vision backward, and discerns in mat- 
ter the promise and potency " of every thing. To the 
philosophical student, this doctrine is nothing new. He 
recognizes in it the hylozoism of the early Greek spec- 
ulators, according to which matter is a plastic something 
with wonderful powers, which it manifests upon occa- 
sion. The doctrine is just vague enough to suit the 
materialist. By forgetting that atoms, if real, are indi- 
viduals, the doctrine can be turned into pantheism. By 



THE SOUL: SPIRITUALISM OR 2LiTERIALIS}L 383 

resuming the principle of individuality, we can pass 
back to atomism. By judiciously remembering and 
•forgetting, we can be atomists and pantheists at pleas- 
ure. We can reduce every thing to molecular mechan- 
^^s, and we can dilate on the unknowable "mystery of 
matter." By leaving the notion of matter quite unde- 
termined, it is also easy to deduce every thing from it. 
We have but to assume that all being is material, and 
enlarge the notion to meet the exigency. If we only 
call it matter, we can rely on common sense, taking the 
Word in its ordinary meaning; while by meaning some- 
thing, no one knows exactly what, but at all events 
something quite out of the common, we shall be able to 
defend ourselves against the spiritualists. This indefi- 
niteness is of great value in materialistic polemics. 
The argument is rather curious. We cannot tell what 
matter can do, therefore, it may well explain mind. 
After a moment's stay in the potential mood, nothing is 
easier than to pass into the indicative, and announce that 
matter is all-sufficient. The fact that the known prop- 
erties of matter give no hint of an explanation of mind 
would seem to form a presumption that the unknown 
properties will succeed no better. A possible yes is 
also a possible no. But this simple fact never occurs to 
the j-naterialist. The great art of materialistic argu- 
ment at present, consists in appeals to the unknown pos- 
sible, and in calling that unknown possible, matter. 
Matter will not explain thought and feeling, says the 
spiritualist. How do you know it will not? asks the 
materialist. Its known properties do not, of course, 
but its unknown properties do. And this is an expla- 



3'84 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

V:itioii! As if the debate were about a name, or as if 
one speculator had not as much right to the unknown 
possible as another. Every- where else explanation of one 
thing by another must rest upon what we know; but here 
explanation may rest upon what we do not know, and 
may pass for explanation still! Every other speculator 
must show some positive title before taking possession; 
the materialist moves in, like an intellectual squatter, 
and refuses to go without a writ of ejectment. Yet this 
dealing with fancied possibilities serves to amuse the 
materialist, and to confuse the simple-minded. Through- 
out this hylozoistic speculation, there run the baseless 
assumptions to which we have referred: (1) That matter 
is known as causal noumenon. (2) That all being is ma- 
terial. (3) That creation is impossible. It is further 
vitiated by the notion that the name is the thing in de- 
bate; whereas, since matter is an undetermined notion, 
we set out to determine how we shall think of it, in 
order to make it the sufficient explanation of the facts. 
The hylozoists forbid us to think of it as common sense 
does. It is the mystic and marvelous something, accord- 
ing to Professor Tyndall, which performs all the won- 
ders of nature. It being mystic and marvelous, what 
shall hinder us from viewing it as intelligent, if .the 
facts point that way? If we can tell what matter is only 
by observing what it can do, why may we not ascribe 
intelligence to it, if it acts intelligently? Certainly in- 
telligence is a better explanation of intelligible action 
tlian any amount of mystical qualities. Here the hj^- 
lozoist draws back, and thus shows the contradiction of 
his position. At one time he holds the vulgar notion 



THE SOUL: SPIRITUALISM OR MATERIALISM. 385 

of matter, at another he holds the hylozoistic. It is 
perfectly clear that if we give no definition of matter 
except that it is the cause of nature, and explain mind 
by spiritualizing or mysticizing matter, the debate 
threatens to become a war of words. Indeed, this hylo- 
zoistic revival must be viewed as a scientific regress. 
It is useless to the theoretical physicist, as he stops with 
molecular mechanics, and does not ask how mechanics 
is possible. It is also useless in scientific explanation. 
There are two clear notions, mechanism and final cause, 
on which all rational explanation depends. Mechanism 
"as the law of all spatial changes, and final cause as the 
determining principle of mechanism, afford the mind 
rest and rational satisfaction when a phenomenon is in- 
terpreted by them; and no other principles will be 
found sufficient. But hylozoism confounds both and 
leaves room for neither. It has no more value in psy- 
chology. It does not explain mentality, but by an act 
of violence posits mentality and materiality side by 
side in the same subject. This juxtaposition of incom- 
mensurable qualities is mistaken for an explanation. 
The hylozoistic revival is entirely due to the attempt 
to make matter all-embracing. By consequence, all 
principles and definitions are confounded, and the out- 
come is still greater confusion, "Mind-stuff" and 
" double-faced somewhats " are now playing an import- 
ant part in materialistic arguments. The result is a 
school of philosophical mermaids, such as cannot be 
found this side of the earliest Greek speculation. 

We shall gain nothing by further examination of the 
materialistic argument. In its best estate, it is less an 



386 STUDIES IX THEISM. 

argument than an uncritical and infantile assumption. 
The largest possible conclusion of the argument, as we 
have seen, is the possible truth of materialism; but as 
the same facts are equally well accounted for on the 
opposite theory, the result thus far is a drawn battle. 
For the sake of progress, therefore, we pass to inquiro 
whether there are any facts of our mental life which 
turn the scales in favor of spiritualism. And in dis- 
cussing this question we limit materialism to some form 
of the atomic theory. When matter is viewed as one 
rather than discrete, it is not properly materialism but 
pantheism, or philosophic substantialism. With this 
understanding, we are willing to allow both the hylo- 
zoist's and the idealist's assumptions concerning the 
atoms. Even if we view each atom as having a soul, 
or as endowed with a kind of life and the most myste- 
rious and wonderful powers, it is still impossible to un- 
derstand the mental life without assuming a single and 
abiding soul. There are great capital facts of expe- 
rience which cannot be explained on any other theory. 
There are the unity and possibility of conscioupness, the 
facts of memory and reasoning, and our power of action. 
This last fact is often described as freedom, but the two 
notions are not coextensive. Determinism, as well as 
true freedom, is incompatible with materialism. For 
whatever can act, even though its activity be deter- 
mined, is a true subject. It is not necessary, therefore 
to insist upon proper freedom; a power of determined 
action is inconsistent with materialism. These general 
facts have long been urged by the spiritualist, and have 
never been explained away. In this strait of his sys- 



WE SOUL: SriniTUAIMM OR MATERIALISM. 387 

tern the materialist contents himself with calling the 
argument an old one, as if an old argument might not 
be solid. Until it is refuted, therefore, the spiritualist 
will continue to urge it. We deal with the facts in 
the order mentioned. 

The unity of the thinking subject is affirmed by many 
to be a direct utterance of consciousness. This is 
rather hasty. Consciousness does not tell us how we 
are made; and we cannot properly be said to be con- 
scious of the falsehood of materialism. The unity of 
the thinking subject is less a deliverance of conscious- 
ness than a necessary condition of all consciousness. 
We shall return to this point hereafter; at present we 
call attention to some unquestioned facts of conscious- 
ness. Thus I think, I feel, I act. I exist to-day; I ex- 
isted yesterday, and through all the past to which my 
memory reaches. No one can question these facts as 
they exist for himself. To deny them, or to throw 
doubt upon them, would plunge us into hopeless skep- 
ticism, and science does not lie in that direction. Now, 
wherever there is an act there is something which acts. 
Wherever there is a state, there is a subject of that 
state. Wherever there is thought there is a thinker. 
Now, I think; ,what is this "I" which thinks? The 
spiritualist says it is the unitary, substantial soul, which 
abides across the years, and gathers up its past and 
present experiences in the unity of its own existence. 
This view is so much like the direct voice of conscious- 
ness, that many fail to distinguish between them. It 
is in complete harmony with the facts of experience 



088 STUDIES IN TUEISM 

and with universal common sense. The materialist de- 
nies that there is any substantial soul which thinks, 
feels, acts, etc. ; but he is bqund to tell us what does 
think, etc. He will say that the brain thinks, but this 
is not clear. The brain is not a unit, but an assemblage 
of atoms; and an assemblage, as such, is nothing. The 
reality of an assemblage is the elements which make it 
up. We are apt, here, to confuse ourselves with the 
notion that when several things work together they may 
do something for which no one of them is accountable. 
Of course, things may act differently in combination, 
but the act is still the act of the things, and not of the 
combination; for a combination is only the sum of the 
individuals, and the act of a combination is only the 
sum of the acts of the individuals, just as public opinion 
is only the integral of individual opinions. The e£fect 
must be distributed among the causes; and if there be 
any effect which is indivisible, it must be referred to a 
single cause. Hence, to say that the brain thinks, can 
only mean that the elements think which compose the 
brain. But which of them? Do they all think ? Why, 
then, is not the ego many instead of one ? Is my com- 
plete thought in each of the elements just as it is in each 
mind which thinks it? In that case we explain my 
thought by positing an indefinite number of thinkers, 
instead of the single thinker which the spiritualist af- 
firms. But if my complete thought is not in each of 
them, what is meant by attributing a fraction of a 
thought to each? And how could these fractions be 
brought together to form a complete thought? The 
notion bafHes comprehension, and still more, construe- 



THE SOUL: SPIRITUALISM OR MATERIALISM. .^80 

tion. But if all the elements do not think, but now one 
and now another, how does the second know what was 
going on in the first, so that it can take up the thread 
of conscious thought just where the other dropped it, 
and that, too, so deftly that mental continuity is in no 
way disturbed ? How comes there to be any unity in 
our mental life on this theory ? It must be remem- 
bered that these atoms are ontologically just as distinct 
as the persons in a crowd; and hence they contain no 
explanation of the unity of the ego. But as they ap- 
pear to be substantial and abiding egos, why not allow 
our own souls to be such also? 

But the materialist would hardly have the courage 
to attribute proper thought and consciousness to the 
elements. He thinks that in some way thought and 
consciousness may result without any substantial sub- 
ject. Accordingly, he says that the elements do not 
properly think, although they are very mysterious; but 
when the elements are combined in certain ways mental 
phenomena result. These hang over the physical stream 
as the bow hangs over the cataract, but they have no 
substantial subject. Here, however, consciousness pro- 
tests, and declares that the ego is the substantial sub- 
ject of the mental life; but materialism assures us that 
consciousness is quite mistaken. The ego which seems 
to think, feel, and act is nothing but the sum of the 
pljcnomena, and never their source. In fact, there is 
nothing which thinks and feels; but there is thinking 
and feeling. The elements do not think, and the self is 
nothing. But this is so long a step toward utter skep* 
ticism that we ' hesitate to take it. If the self who 



890 STUDIES IN TIIEISK 

thinks is really not the determining subject of the 
thought, one can hardly trust the thought; that, also, 
may well be a chimera. But here the understanding 
protests that it cannot even conceive what is meant by 
thoughts and feelings without a subject. They are 
words which have a meaning only in connection with 
some subject which feels and thinks. Apart from this 
connection they are empty of all content. We have 
here a depraved form of scholasticism. Sensations, 
thoughts, etc., are only known as states or acts of a 
mind. " The materialist breaks them from the only con- 
nection in which they have any meaning, and then pa- 
rades them as the prius of the mind itself. Now, as the 
materialist will not allow the substantiality of self, and 
as thoughts must have a subject, the materialist can only 
return to the doctrine that the atoms think. But this 
brings back all the difficulties which beset the attempt 
to explain the unity of thought and consciousness from 
the action of a manifold. We pass over these objec- 
tions, and point out that proper consciousness cannot 
exist at all without a unitary subject. The conscious- 
ness of an instant is a vanishing quantity; and if there 
were no means of summing up many states into one, 
consciousness would perish as fast as it is born. The 
fleeting state must in some way be fixed before con- 
sciousness is possible; and this can be done only by an 
abiding subject, which gathers up in the unity of its ex- 
istence the states which else were lost. In any act of 
consciousness we find a composite of this kind. Pres- 
ent states, remembered states, imagined states, all enter 
into a single phase of consciousness. But these fall 



THE SOUL: SPIRITUALISM OR MATERIALISM 301 

hopelessly asunder, except as tliey are the states of a 
common subject. At this pomt both materialist and 
empiricist commit a grave oversight. They both speak 
of consciousness as a series or succession of states, and 
never raise tlie question how a series is possible, or how 
succession can be known as such. Succession can be 
known only by something which abides. We must be 
able to contrast the passing with the abiding before suc- 
cession can be recognized. Hence, a consciousness which 
was only a succession could never be aware of itself as 
such. Moreover, succession is not a series. That things 
should really follow one another does not constitute 
them a series. They form a series only as the members 
of the succession are grasped in one and the same 
thought. The necessary condition, therefore, for the 
existence of a series is, that one and the same being shall 
grasp all its members in one thought. If the subject 
were composite, the series or the succession could never 
be known to exist. Hence, the many can exist, as such, 
only for the one. Apart from the unifying thought, 
the many is but a repetition of the individual. It is not 
number, but the unrelated unit repeated, and it becomes 
properly plural only in thought. Hence we say that 
not merely our consciousness of unity, but much more 
our consciousness of plurality, is impossible without the 
strict unity of the thinking subject. While, then, the 
materialist insists that our consciousness of our unity 
may be illusive, we point out that the unity of self is 
an indispensable condition of all consciousness whatever. 
We pass next to the fact of me-mory. This fact, 
again, cannot be questioned without landing us in hope- 



392 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

less skepticism. Now, physiology teaches that the body 
is incessantly changing, but none the less does the per- 
sonality remain imchanged. I am the same person that 
I was years ago, and I now recall the events which tlien 
happened to me. Here is another fact which every the- 
ory must explain. Spiritualism explains it by saying that 
the soul is a substantial subject which has existed through 
these years, and which is able to gather up its parts and 
carry it with it. Materialism rejects this view, but none 
the less must it account for the fact. There is memory; 
what remembers? Consciousness says I, the abiding 
person, remember; but materialism says, there is no 
abiding self. What, then, does remember? Sometimes 
it says, the brain remembers; but this we cannot allow, 
for the reasons recently given. If the brain remembers, 
that can only mean that the elements which make the 
brain remember. But the elements in the brain to-day 
are not the elements which composed the brain a month 
or a year ago. And yet these elements, which now ap- 
pear here for the first time, have, somehow or other, got 
possession of my past mental life. Here is a capital 
fact. The materialist has to explain it. Here is the 
passing stream of atoms, but here is the abiding person. 
The atoms which had my past experience have gone, and 
we should suppose they would have carried the expe- 
rience with them. But, strangely enough, the experience 
has remained, and these new atoms know all about it. 
Did the passing atoms whisper it to the new-'.'omers as 
they slipped out? Were they able to give a kind of 
pass-word or countersign as they went away? And 
were the incoming atoms able so to improve the hint 



THE SOUL: SPIRITUALISM OR MATERIALISM. 393 

^iven that Ave should never dream of the change? But 
this would be to turn science into sheer f etichism, and to 
invoke magic as an explanation. No one can seriously 
believe that any thing of the kind takes place. Yet 
here are the elements which, by hypothesis, are here 
for the first time, and yet they have with them the 
whole of our mental life. The materialist must give 
some explanation. 

To escape these whimsical implications of his doc- 
trine the materialist often resorts to an illustration. 
He will not allow that the elements remember, but there 
is remembering without any thing which remembers. 
In a sense, he says, the body remembers its past expe- 
rience. In particular, scars abide across all bodily 
change, and never wash nor wear out. Here we have a 
case of physical memory. Unfortunately, this is only a 
figure of speech, and the illustration fails to illustrate. 
If the scar were conscious of itself as a unitary, think- 
ing subject, and an abiding personality, then the illus- 
tration would be pertinent. Until we have some ground 
for regarding a scar as a conscious ego, we shall reckon 
this illustration among the superficialities which, like a 
clinging curse, seem inseparable from materialistic rea- 
soning. In fact, a scar is not ontologically the same for 
any two consecutive instants; but, like a river, has its 
identity only in the mind of the observer. The same is 
true for the claim that the identity of the personality 
rests on the identity of the body. In a proper sense, 
the visible body has no identity. As Leibnitz long ago 
pointed out, we know of only one case of true identity, 
and that is the case of the conscious spirit. This is the 



394 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

type of ar unity and identity to us, and we know of 
no other. Now if we allow the existence of a unitary 
soul in connection with the body, the facts of memory 
become clear and luminous. If we deny it, they are 
utterly opaque and unintelligible. The mental lii 3 falls 
asunder, and becomes merely a magical illusion. But 
we must go further, and declare of memory, as of con- 
sciousness, that it is strictly impossible without a unit- 
ary subject. For memory is not constituted by a suc- 
cession of experiences. It exists only as the successive 
experiences are gathered up in a single act which binds 
them together in one. Some materialists, however, ap- 
ply heroic treatment to this question. They say that 
memory, like all mental acts, is only a function of mat- 
ter, and precisely similar bodies must have precisely 
similar memories, no matter what their past history 
may have been. Imagine a body about to be formed 
which shall be an exact copy of that of Socrates as he 
was conversing with his disciples on the fatal night. 
The deed is done, and a living being stands before us 
whose memory reports the trial, the conviction, the 
sentence, and all the other events of the real Socrates's 
life. It would be the real Socrates. Memory, there- 
fore, has no relation to time. It is only a peculiar phase 
of mental action, and the distinction of past and pres- 
ent is delusive. On this theory, for all we know, we 
have just been made. This view needs no criticism; its 
statement is enough. And yet consistent materialism 
must accept this view, or else allow that the atoms truly 
remember, and that the outgoing atoms pass the history 
on to those which come after them. Any theory which 



THE SOUL: SPIRITUALISM OR MATERIALISM. 395 

makes the mental life depend merely on the fornv or 
mode of combinatfon of the elements, is forced to deny 
that memory has any relation to time, but is only a 
si^ecial form of mental illusion. 

The general fact of reasoning needs only a brief no- 
tice, as the course of the argument is evident. The sim- 
plest syllogism is impossible unless the mental subject 
is strictly one. If A think the major premise and B 
the minor, there can be no conclusion. All reasoning 
implies that the same subject shall think both premises 
in order to the conclusion. If the subject be plural or 
composite, the conclusion fails. Now the whole of our 
rational life is a process of comparing and distinguish- 
ing, and its product is a system of relations. The dis- 
covery of relations is the great aim of science and reason- 
ing. But to compare and relate, the comparing subject 
must be a strict unity. Thus from every side the unity 
and reality of the soul are forced upon us. These 
amazing atoms, it must be remembered, are no facts of 
observation; they are ilierely the materialist's hypoth- 
esis for explaining the unity of thought and conscious- 
ness. And as they utterly fail to account for the facts, 
we decide for the spiritual theory, w^hich finds the sub- 
ject of the mental phenomena in a single substantial 
soul. As a rule, materialism is held more from thought- 
lessness than any thing else. Its disciples commonly 
fail to come to close quarters with the problem, but 
content themselves with a few metaphors about the 
bow on the mist, the melody from the deaf instrument, 
etc. These figures of speech contain all the argument 

needed; to inquire whether they apply to the case would 
26 



':>96 STUDIES IX THEISM. 

be ^ useless labor. The reason why the professional 
materialist, who is forced to recognize the capital facts 
we have mentioned, prefers his violent distortions of ex- 
perience to the simple and luminous doctrine of the soul, 
is, that he assumes at the start that all being is material 
His argument owes all its force to this begging of the 
question. Some of the coarsest type of materialists 
would say that they believe in matter because they can 
see it, while they cannot see a spirit; but any material- 
ist whose opinion is entitled to any consideration, would 
be ashamed of such crudeness. 

The last fact we offer in evidence is our power of ac- 
tion. I think, is no more a fact of experience than I 
act. I count for something in the course of events; I 
am a source of activity; I am a power. These facts are 
given in the universal consciousness, and materialism 
must furnish some explanation. This power of action, 
hovvever, must not be confounded with freedom. Thus 
the atom, if real, has a power of acting under given 
circumstances, and of acting o5t of itself. Whenever 
it does act, it is the source of the action; yet the atom 
is not free. A thing may have power, and yet be de- 
termined in its activity; but whatever has power must 
be a thing. A j^ower of action is just what constitutes 
a thing and distinguishes it from nothing. The mate- 
rialist oddly enough confounds philosophic determin- 
ism with physical fatalism; and then claims all deter- 
minists as agreeing with him! But the two notions are 
totally distinct in philosophy, though identical for mor- 
als. In philosophic determinism, the soul is a true sub- 
ject, but its activity is determined. This determination, 



THE SOUL: SPIRITUALISM OR MATERIALISM. 397 

however, is from within and not from without. It is a 
determination by the soul's nature, and not by external 
agency. This .doctrine allows that the soul is a source 
of action, but claims that under given circumstances it 
can act in only one way. No more does it question our 
consciousness that we act, but only the alleged con- 
sciousness that we might have acted otherwise. Leib- 
nioZ, who, with Spinoza, is the founder of determinism, 
also asserted in the strongest manner the spontaneity 
and reality of the soul. Both writers repudiated the 
notion of an external compulsion of any kind. Physical 
fatalism, on the other hand, denies that the soul is any 
thing. It rejects not merely our alleged consciousness 
of pluripotentiality, but our consciousness of action of 
any kind. We do not act. Our volition counts for 
nothing. But as this is opposed to consciousness, we 
must declare our consciousness of action to be sheer de- 
lusion. We must, also, declare that consciousness in 
general is only a powerless attendant upon the physio- 
logical processes; for otherwise we should have to at- 
tribute power to it. These processes determine every 
thing, and would go on just the same if consciousness 
were away. For since consciousness is powerless, its 
presence adds nothing, and its absence would change 
nothing. The body is properly an automaton, and the 
mental life is a sort of delusive halo which glows about 
the automaton, yet without in any way affecting it. 

Nor is this merely a conclusion of our own. Some ex- 
pressly declare that we are only conscious automata, 
and that consciousness itself depends on the imperfect 
adjustment of physiological processes. But the adjust- 



398 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

ment of inner relations to outer relations is ever grow- 
ing in exactness; and the physiological processes are 
working more and more smoothly. When the adjusi:- 
ment is complete, consciousness will cease; and whereas 
we are now conscious automata, we shall then be un- 
conscious automata, perfectly adjusted to the "environ- 
ment." In a scheme of " universal progress," this notion 
is remarkable as a specimen of anticlimax. Now to this 
notion of physical fatalism, we oppose the testimony of 
universal consciousness; and we expressly forbid the 
attempt to smuggle this notion into respectability by 
fathering it upon philosophical determinists. A doc- 
trine which can be held only by flying in the face of 
universal common sense must be hooted from the world 
of thought, unless it can show the strongest evidence in 
its favor. And what is this evidence ? What justifies 
this buffeting and crucifixion of common sense? Why, 
the simple postulate that all being is material. Where is 
the proof of this postulate? There is no proof; postu- 
lates are assumed. Yet to carry through this postulate, 
which is totally without proof, and which belongs only 
to the infancy of speculation, consciousness is denied, 
common sense is outraged, and science is plunged into 
hopeless skepticism. Finally, to make the farce as 
roaring as possible, this procedure styles itself advanced 
science. In truth, it is simply insane speculation, the 
dogmatism of the five senses. The history of thouglit 
abounds with insanities, but certainly with none greater 
than this. When once the unifying and formulating 
mania takes possession of a man, unless regulated by 
constant comparison with reality, it L sure to treat him 



THE SOUL: SPIRITUALTSM OK MATERIALISM. 309 

as the devils used the Gadarenes' swine. It drives him 
over bush and brier, and finally plunges 'him down steep 
placesof absurdity into unfathomable depths of nonseuse. 
But nothing avails to cast the mania out. Every thing is 
sacrificed to it. To his whim of making matter all suffi- 
cient, the materialist sacrifices God, religion, science, phi- 
losophy, the universal convictions of the race, memory, 
consciousness, and, finally, his own personality. Every 
thing is delusion which conflicts with the sole reality of 
matter. And how do we know that matter is all? We 
have the materialist's word of honor for it; and this, 
together with a boisterous and vehement assertion of the 
fact, must suffice. The entire theory is an odd illustration 
of the principle that all things are possible to him that 
believeth. But reason has its revenge. Materialism 
repudiates it, and it repudiates materialism. 

On all these accounts we reject materialism as a 
theory of the mental life, and decide for the spiritual 
theory. The plainest facts of consciousness establish 
the reality and unity of the soul. Both from the side 
of philosophy and from the side of the facts, material- 
ism appears as an uncritical and superficial dogmatism. 
Its explanations are no explanations, and its conclusions 
are mainly a begging of the question, based on the as- 
sumption, (1) that matter is known in itself and as 
causal; and (2) that all being is material. According 
to spiritualism, body and soul mutually condition each 
other. At present the soul depends on the body for 
the conditions of mental manifestation; and the bodv is 
the appointed servant of the soul. It is, however, ex- 
ternal to the soul, and i« in fact only that portion of the 



400 STUDIES m THEISM. 

outer world with which the soul' stands in immediate 
relations of interaction. The existence of such a rela- 
tion is purely contingent. That a mental life should 
exist apart from a body is fully as conceivable as that 
it should exist in connection with a body. The present 
order can only be viewed as founded in a purpose which 
to some will appear scrutable, to others inscrutable. 

The bearings of pantheism upon the doctrine of the 
soul have been partly discussed in the chapter on The- 
ism and Pantheism. Pantheism, as well as materialism, 
cannot be allowed to ignore facts in the interests of a 
theory. We have admitted that there are no decisive 
facts against resolving all impersonal being into the 
activity of the infinite; and we have pointed out that 
personality is the only sure test of finite existence. But 
pantheism must recognize the facts of the mental life 
on which we have been dwelling. No matter how we 
are made, no matter what our relations to the infinite 
may be, we are active persons. As such we have a rela- 
tive existence and independence over against the infi- 
nite. To deny this can only land in skepticism and the 
break-down of reason and science. It will be very 
hard for the average pantheist to steady himself at this 
point. One is hardly himself when the unifying mania 
seizes him. Therefore, the pantheist will deny the 
facts in the interest of his theory. Such an act, how- 
ever, must not be viewed as founded in reason, but in 
a certain irrational itch of the speculative faculty. But 
every one who cares for facts, and who seeks to save 
philosophy from the insane extravagances which in 
time past have made the very word a stench to sober 



THE SOUL: SPIRITUALISM OR MATERIALISM. 401 

common sense, will insist with equal emphasis on the im- 
manence of God, and on the reality of the soul. 

Concerning the future of the soul, philosophy can say 
but littla. The pantheistic doctrine of absorption is 
an utterly untenable notion, resting, as it does, on a 
crude image borrowed from the senses, and repudiated 
by reason. Materialism, of course, holds that death 
ends all; but on its own principles this conclusion 
is hasty. Our personality is not dependent on the 
whole body, nor even on the whole brain. Great losses 
of brain matter are compatible with consciousness and 
the possession of all our faculties. Besides, material- 
istic physiologists have made us very familiar with the 
notion of physiological units which contain the directive 
force of the organism. It is equally possible to imagine 
molecular units which contain the principle of person- 
ality. These units may be the basis of all organization, 
and through organization they may come to conscious- 
ness. It is, therefore, possible to conceive some such 
organic units surviving the wreck of the visible body, 
and reproducing its conscious life in other places and 
forms. Of course this is merely a speculation, but it is 
no wilder than materialism itself; and materialism must 
allow such a possibility. It is very strange that ma 
terialists and atheists are willing to attribute wonderful 
wisdom to matter until we come to man, and then mat- 
ter suddenly turns blockhead. It is omniscient and 
omnipotent up to this point, and then an inherent dolt 
ishness manifests itself. This seems to be an inconse- 
quence. This matter, which has done so much, must sure- 



402 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

ly be able to do all things well. When the scientist finds 
the realm of law forever growing on the realm of dis- 
order, he hastens to proclaim law strictly universal. 
So when we find matter managing the uni^ erse with a 
skill which even intelligence could not surpass, and also 
with an eye to moral ends, the continuity of thought 
seems to demand the conclusion that whatever wisdom 
and righteousness may call for, that matter will victo- 
riously accomplish. But the materialist regards such a 
conclusion as absurd. Yet why absurd? We can tell 
what matter can do only by observing what it does do. 
Would it not, then, be the supreme glorification of mat- 
ter to baldly claim that omnipotent and omniscient 
love and righteousness cannot surpass the capabilities 
of matter? With well-grounded faith, therefore, may 
we intrust ourselves and our lot to mysterious matter. 
It may well have great experiences in store for us, and 
some which shall even rival the Christian conception of 
the heavenly life. It strikes us as a new kind of blas- 
phemy that the materialist should declare that matter 
has found in man and his longings more than its match. 
But half-heartedness is one of humanity's besetting sins. 
The Christian distrusts God when things do not go as 
he wishes, and the materialist has not full faith in 
matter. 

Our doctrine that the soul is a simple agent is held 
by many to imply eternal life. The soul, as a simple 
substance, is incapable of dissolution, and is hence im- 
mortal. This conclusion by no means follows. A sim- 
ple agent might cease to be through the vanisliing of 



THE SOUL: SPIRITUALISM OB MATERIALISM. 403 

its power of action; and this power is not a thing of 
parts, but of intensity. All that can be allovved is this: 
Since nature shows no trace of annihilation, there is a 
presumption that nothing perishes. When, then, the 
soul no longer manifests itself in the accustomed way, 
there is a certain presumption that the soul itself has 
not ceased to exist. The ordinary channels of commu- 
nication no longer exist, and, by consequence, the man- 
ifestation ceases. This, however, establishes no more 
than a presumption. From our stand-point no finite 
thing has a right to continued existence. It begins to 
be solely because the divine order and plan call for it. 
If, then, at any time a thing should lose significance for 
the general order, it would cease to be. But, owing to 
pur ignorance of the system, we cannot reach any spe- 
cific conclusions from this principle. That brute souls 
will or will not continue to exist, we cannot say. Their 
significance may be exhausted in this life; and, on the 
othej hand, they, too, may be called to endless devel- 
opment and unfolding. A certain vulgarity of imagina- 
tion, aided by a corresponding weakness of the under- 
standing, always finds this latter view hopelessly absurd; 
but the difiiculty is purely subjective. On the other hand, 
that human souls have such supreme significance for the 
system that they are to pass on to a future life, is also 
something which, on grounds of experience, we cannot 
positively assert. No more can we assert that any soul 
wiFx €' er so lose its value for the great whole, that it 
shall cease to be. This indecision of the speculative 
reason can only be overturned by arguments drawn 
from the moral nature or from revelation. If there be 



404 ' STUDIES IK THEISM. 

such arguments, neither science nor philosophy has one 
word of valid protest; rather must they both rejoice 
that what appears to them only as a possibility, with a 
vague presumption in its favor, has .been lifted into 
reality. For our belief in a future life we are thrown 
back upon our trust in the divine love and righteous- 
ness; and as it is forever impossible to justify the ways 
of God to men, if death ends all, w^e hold that a belief 
in a future life flows necessarily from our conception of 
God, and is the only one which is compatible with rev- 
erence for him. Whether all men shall share in this 
life, or whether the great mass of spiritual rubbish shall 
cease with death, cannot be decided by speculation. 
Personally, we believe that God can be trusted with our 
future. This most singular and extraordinary belief 
seems shared by very few. All kinds of speculations 
are rife in religious quarters concerning both the pres- 
ent and the future; through all of which there runs the 
tacit assumption (1) that God does not know what he is 
doing, and is in sad need of our advice ; and, (2) that God 
cannot be trusted to do what is right. We advise, we 
prescribe; and, in a kind but firm way, we announce, 
what must be found very discouraging, that we shall be 
unable to trust God if our advice is not taken. Some 
dyspeptics conclude that things are so out of joint that 
God must quickly appear to wind up the world. Others 
spend their time, not in combating sin, but in informing 
God how he must deal with sinners if he is to retain 
their respect. That the Judge of all the earth will do 
right, is denied by no theist; and it is a necessary as- 
sumption of religion. But when it comes to prescribing 



THE SOUL: SPIBITUALISM OR MATERIALISM. 405 

what the eternal laws of righteousness call for in carry- 
ing on the universe, we may well doubt whether we 
have the data for detailed judgments; and we may well 
question whether it be not more compatible both with 
reverence and with reason, to leave the government of 
the world in the Creator's hands with the confession, 
that both the administration and the criticism of the 
universe demand a deeper knowledge than ours. We 
have established a right to believe in a God of love and 
righteousness as the author and administrator of nature, 
who is also the Father of our spirits; and we repeat our 
strange confession of faith, that man and the world arc 
safe in his hands. 



406 STUDIES IN THEISM. 



CHAPTER XI. 

POSTULATES OF ETHICS. 

TN chapter iii we showed that every system of rna- 
^ terialism, or of aimless evolution, ends necessarily in 
skepticism and the destruction of knowledge. A sifting 
chaos of atoms, or a blind, self-transforming world-sub- 
stance, leave no place for either truth or error. We 
concluded, therefore, that a free, personal God, is the 
postulate and support both of science and philosophy. 
This conclusion plainly embraces the less comprehensive 
one that God is the necessary postulate of theoretical 
morals, and hence we might rest content with this 
showing. Yet owing to the peculiar state of affairs in 
the speculative world, it seems well to examine more in 
detail some of the fundamental postulates of ethics. 

Irreligious speculators have always had trouble with 
morals and religion; and never have they been in 
greater straits than now. In the last century, when one 
advanced to atheism and fatalism' he commonly had the 
courage of his opinions, and, in theory at least, repudi- 
ated religion and morality altogether. There was a cer- 
tain whole-heartedness about the old-fashioned atheist 
which was not without its attraction on the score both 
of clearness and of honesty. But a change has come 
over our modern atheists; and the result is a certain 
inconsistency in dealing with the claims of morals and 



POSTULATES OF ETHICS. 407 

religion. They are sliy of the names of atheist and 
materialist, and prefer to call themselves agnostics. 
But agnosticism is only atheism spelled and pronounced 
in a different way. No sensible atheist claims to prove 
the negative that God is not; he only claims that expe- 
1 ience and the visible universe give no proof of his ex- 
istence. He does not pretend to know that there is no 
God; he claims only that he finds no ground for affirm- 
ing the divine existence. But this position differs in 
nothing from agnosticism; both allow a possibility, and 
both deny any ground in experience for regarding the 
possibility as real. The name materialist, too, is a great 
offense to our advanced speculators. They do not hes- 
itate to teach that the human mind is only a function of 
matter in certain combinations, which will certainly 
perish when the combination breaks up ; but when they 
are charged with materialism, they frequently break 
out into indignation against the slander. They are not 
atheists; they are not materialists. Then follow sundry 
hysterical remarks about flinging dirt, and the odium 
theologicum. It has come to pass that references tu 
the odium theologicufn are as useful to the irreligious 
speculator, and are used in much the same way, as the 
burst oi tears with which some women reduce refractory 
and recalcitrant husbands to obedience and submission. 
Meanwhile the simple critic who imagines that the use 
of woMs is to 'denote things, is filled with w^onder at 
this rejection of the word when the thing is retained; 
and if he be acquainted with Bible history, he will not 
fail to recall the cursing and swearing of Peter when 
charged with being a disciple of Christ. It seems to us> 



408 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

that atheism and materialism are the very best of isms, if 
true; and we see no reason for being ashamed of them. 
On the contrary, the enthusiasm of humanity and every 
instinct of manhood call for a vigorous assertion of the 
new truths, and a rigid deduction of their consequeitces. 
Our friends of the other side have often assured .is that 
truth can never do harm; and hence we are all the more 
alarmed at this half-heartedness; for thereby humanity 
suffers loss. A scientific generalization, whose conse- 
quences are not developed, remains comparatively, if 
not quite, unfruitful. It is desirable, therefore, that the 
new truths shall be thoroughly and fearlessly developed; 
otherwise we shall lose the greater and perhaps the 
richer part of the blessings contained in them. It is a sad 
evidence of human frailty, perhaps of the debilitating 
influence of Christianity, that many gentlemen of the 
advance seem to lose both heart and head at this point, 
and make desperate attempts to sew the new cloth on 
the old garment, with, of course, the usual result of this 
experiment. This, however, is not true for all. Nota- 
bly in Germany, where they do nothing by halves, some 
are beginning to raise their voice in favor of consistency. 
Having abandoned the postulates of ethics and religion, 
they demand that ethics and religion be abandoned also. 
But this meets with no favor from the majority. They 
speak of the sturdy and honest animalism of their pre- 
decessors as ^'obsolete brutality;" and do their best to 
show that a high type of morality, if not of religion, is 
compatible with their views. 

This inconsistency in irreligious speculation is a sign 
of moral progress. The obsolete l)rutalities of Ilobbes 



POSTULATES OF ETHICS. 409 

and D'Holbach would find as little echo among the bet- 
ter class of skeptics to-day as in Christian circles. For 
somehow the idea has got abroad that moral distinc- 
tions are facts which every theory must recognize; and 
that any theory which has no place for them is thereby 
condemned. No matter how the notion originated, it 
is here in power; and speculators have to take account 
of it. In this way the moral nature is proving itself 
more and more an embarrassment to advanced specula- 
tion. Scarcely a point can be touched concerning 
which the question does not arise, What about con- 
science ? And worst of all, the sturdy disturber will 
not be ignored. By consequence we find most atheistic 
and materialistic speculators making very earnest efforts 
either to provide some satisfaction for the religious and 
moral nature, or else to assure the world that in any 
case morals are safe. The notion that morals, or even 
religion, depend on a belief in God and freedom, is de- 
clared to be a mistake. Mill and Comte have sought to 
provide a religion without a God, collective humanity 
being the object of worship. Strauss and Clifford ex- 
"hort us to worship the Cosmos, thus replacing theism by 
idolatry. The efforts in this line can hardly be pro- 
nounced a success. If there be no God to worship, we 
can do bettor than go back to ancestor- w^orship, espe- 
cially as Wo now know that our ancestors were only 
functions of carbonic acid, water, and ammonia. We 
propose to inquire whether the assurances that morals 
are safe have any logical foundation; and oui thesis is, 
that the denial of God, freedom, and immortality, leave 
morals without any foundation. 



410 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

Common sense is the Philistine of philosophy. It is, 
in the first place, somewhat incredulous of all specula- 
tion, and, at least, takes little interest in it. It is 
strongly inclined to keep its feet on the solid earth, and 
it lives mainly by instinct. The speculators rail at it; 
but none of these things move it. This fact has both a 
good and a bad side; and the bad side is sometimes un- 
pleasantly prominent. This indifference of daily life to 
speculation often results in a positive protection of 
error. A system stands or falls by its logic, and is 
responsible for whatever is logically contained in it. 
An inconsistent system is none. But great practical 
common sense cares nothing for systems, but lives in- 
tellectually from hand to mouth; and as long as the 
upholders of a theory behave themselves, common sense 
is willing to live and let live. In this way, many a 
theory which, if compelled to be consequent, would 
perish at once, is enabled to live along, and even to lay 
claim to recognition and respect. Sensationalism in 
philosophy and fatalism in morals live only on these 
conditions. They can always rely on common sense to 
protect them from themselves, and thus they have all 
their strength for attack. Another vexation must be 
mentioned. Certain critics, with eyes only in the back 
of their heads, seeing that the instincts of common sense 
commonly serve to correct the aberrations of tlieorj. 
grow by turns merry and severe over deducing " logical 
consequences." Dreadful logical consequences, they say, 
have been deduced from almost every thing sinc^e the 
world began, and yet it has contrived to keep a-going. 
And this fact they oddly mistake for a proof that life 



POSTULATES OF ETHICS. 411 

and morals are independent of any belief. That this 
is the outcome of the instinctive side ot man which has 
counteracted the belief, they cannot see. That a sys- 
tem must be judged by its logic, and that it cannot be 
saved by the inconsistencies of its holders, is to them 
an utterly impossible insight. Accordingly they mis- 
take speculative inconsequence for speculative justifi- 
cation. Meanwhile the philosopher who is so unfortu- 
nate as to stand by, cannot help recalling Cardinal 
Wolsey's reflection: "How much, methinks, I could 
despise this man, but that I am in charity bound 
against it." 

In claiming, however, that morals depend on a belief 
in God, freedom, and immortality, we do not mean to 
assert a conscious connection between our sense of duty 
and any belief whatever. Morals depend on God just 
as reason depends on God. The connection in both 
cases is an intricate one, and manifests itself only in the 
reflective consciousness. We live and act long before 
we reflect and speculate. Our life at the start is spon- 
taneous and instinctive, and the mind makes just such 
assumptions as the special case calls for. But Avhen we 
come to full and reflective self -consciousness, we begin 
to ask for the foundations of our mental life, and wheth- 
er its several factors are in harmony. Then the anti- 
nomies of reason manifest themselves, and doubts take 
wing, until at last we are forced to say with Descartes 
that God is the only foundation of truth and knowledge. 
In like manner our moral life begins in instinct, and we 
yield ourselves to the law within us without thought of 

its authority or of what it is going to do with us. But 

27 



412 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

by and by the restless reason, which questions all things, 
turns its glance in this direction also, and asks for the 
authority and foundation of the moral law. And then 
it appears that God is the postulate and support of con- 
science as well as of intelligence. Nor do we mean to 
sajT- that conscience, as a psychological fact, is depend- 
ent on belief, but only that its authority is not a self- 
centered thing. The skeptic does not deny that we 
have conceptions of reality, but he insists that they are 
subjective illusions. They remain just as they were, 
psychologically, but their significance has gone. The 
moral skeptic, also, does not question the existence of 
conscience as a subjective fact; he allows the fact, but 
regards it as illusive. The question with him is not the 
existence, but the authority of conscience. Finally, we 
do not mean to affirm that atheists and fatalists are nec- 
essarily bad men. We do not deny that the sense of 
right and wrong, and of the beauty of right living, may 
be very strong in men who think themselves atheists 
and without any immortal destiny. As Ernest Naville 
says: "There are men all of whose convictions have 
fallen into ruins while their conscience remains stand- 
ing, sole remaining witness of a demolished building." 
It would be strange if there were no cases of this kind. 
God, the eternal Love, is not to be abolished by any 
one's unbelief. The Holy Spirit, the Light and Life of 
men, is not extinguished even if man's faith does falter 
and die. And human love, too, abides in the human 
heart, burning up baseness and spreading its flaming 
wings for illimitable flight. It is not strange, then, that 
a sense of moral beauty and obligation should remain 



POSTULA TES OF ETJUCS. 4 1 3 

after its rational supports have fallen. Indeed, we 
should view it as a most atheistic utterance to say that 
the work of God in the heart and in the world would 
cease if human faith should falter. The kingdom of 
righteousness is built on something stronger than man's 
opinions. Our only claim is, that morality has no ra- 
tional ground, and that conscience itself abates its high 
claims when God, freedom, and immortality are denied. 
Morality may live on, as a mind and irrational instinct, 
under such circumstances; but it can offer no rational 
justification of its existence. Concerning the practical 
tendency of such denial there is no need to speak. The 
history of philosophy records the results of many such 
experiments. Modern speculators, when questioned 
concerning the effect of their speculations on conduct, 
assume that conscience is well able to stand alone. They 
do not know that the experiment has been tried again 
and again, and invariably the theoretic denial has in- 
volved morals in ruin. Whatever else is doubtful, it is 
better to be noble than base, true than false, loving 
than selfish. Here, says the speculator, I take my stand. 
And yet the deepest and most persistent doubt of the 
human mind has been on just these points. Is it better 
to be noble than base? false than true? loving than self- 
ish? Is there any difference at bottom? Are not both 
sin and righteousness the subjective illusions of a bub- 
ble thrown up by the seething, aimless tides of the in- 
finite? With the human mind in general, as judged by 
its history, these are the points where doubt first mani- 
fests itself. Conscience and duty, least of all, can claim 
exemption from the inroads of skepticism. And if the 



414 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

denials mentioned are maintained, we believe that this 
practical result admits of theoretic justification. 

In examining the assurances of our advanced specu 
lators, that in any case morality is safe, we are struck 
by a peculiar inconsequence with regard to the moral 
nature in general. They aye, in short, sensational mor- 
alists, who are forced, by the straits of their position, 
into holding the highest type of intuitional ethics. The 
resulting idol is a very odd compound of gold and clay. 
When one suggests that atheism or materialism is fatal 
to rational ethics, we are always treated to a homily 
conceived in the spirit of the highest intuitional mo- 
rality. God or no God, we are told, there is an eternal 
distinction between right and wrong. Whether there 
be a future life or no, it is still an imperative duty to 
live nobly here. In particular the eternal sanctity of 
truth, and its supreme value for the seeking soul, are 
largely ^welt upon. The advanced thinker must have 
no other motto than the heroic words, " I covet truth;" 
and he must resign all the comforts, all the joys, all the 
hopes of his heart, if they seem to conflict with the eter- 
nal veracities. No illusions, no dreams for him. No 
belief because it is useful or because it is pleasant. 
However bleak and barren it may be, he will know the 
truth. It may leave him an orphan and hopeless in the 
universe, still he will know the truth. Christians are 
often twitted with believing immorally, — that is, with 
preferring the rest and happiness of unfounded beliefs 
to the heroic and noble disquiet of absolute loyalty to 
truth. Even the belief in immortality is rejected, not 



POSTULATES OF ETHICS. 415- 

merely as unproved, but as tending, by its selfish 
hopes, to dim the luster of absolute loyalty to right 
and duty. The homily is apt to close with a whis- 
pered prayer, just loud enough to be overheard, that 
he " may join the choir invisible of those immortal de?.d 
who live again in souls made better by their presence." 
By this time the objector is heartily ashamed of him- 
self, and, as he gazes on this noble being, in whom 
self is crucified and duty is all and in all, he wonders 
how he could ever have made his unfortunate sugges- 
tion, that any conceivable change of opinion could re- 
move from duty the seal of inviolable obligation. This 
moral enthusiasm glows with all the fervor of a He- 
brew prophet; but, unfortunately, our satisfaction and 
appreciation are partly obscured by the fact that when 
the origin and nature of conscience are in debate, the 
same eloquent worthies are quite sure to tell us that 
conscience has a very earthly origin. Then we learn 
that there is no absolute right, and that moral opinions 
depend entirely on custom and circumstance. The 
moral nature has its roots in physical desire. Love of 
pleasure, fear of pain, a bit of sympathy, and a large 
amount of selfish expectation, will produce a conscience 
when thrown together in the same being, and worked 
over by the chemistry Qf association. Our distinctions 
of right and wrong rest upon no eternal nature of 
things, but express merely the way in which we have 
been brought up. Had the " environment " been dif- 
ferent, both truth and righteousness would have been 
different. Let the theist but construct an argument for 
the existence of God on the nature of conscienae, and 



416 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

lie will quickly learn that conscience has little reason 
to be proud of its pedigree. Now, one cannot help 
feeling surprise when he learns that the expounder of 
this doctrine is the same superior being who before 
made such a glowing and thrilling defense of absolute 
truth and right. We should be justified in calling a 
halt right here, and insisting on a choice between the^e 
two views. Both cannot be held at once. If conscience 
have the genesis just described, it is folly to speak of 
any obligation higher than that of common prudence. 
What has been put together can be taken apart. It is 
vain to imagine that conscience could maintain its au- 
thority if this view of its origin were fully accepted. 
Self-respect would not permit us to be ruled by an im- 
postor, and the mob of passions would turn out in wild 
glee to drag the usurper from power. If this did not 
happen, it would be because the holy voice of nature 
secretly condemned the theory, even in the moment of 
its triumph. The absolute authority of conscience can- 
not be united with this, theory of its origin. To hold 
now one view and now another, according to the exi- 
gencies of the argument, impresses one with the same 
feeling of awe which invaded the minds of William 
Nye and Truthful James at the wonderful play of " Ah 
Sin." Common honesty, and that supreme truthfulness 
which has been set up as the chief virtue, demand that 
a choice be made here. We say it deliberately and 
with emphasis; this fundamental inconsistency can be 
rescued from the charge of knavery only by postulating 
an ignorance alike dense and profound. If truth be so 
supremely valuable, and if our views lead to the over- 



POSTULATES OF ETHICS. 417 

throw of ethics, why not say so? This halting between 
tT^o opinions, and holding both and neither upon occa- 
sion, is not calculated to produce a favorable impres- 
sion either of one's truthfulness or of one's insight. 

We pass to the specific denials mentioned; and, first, 
we consider the denial of freedom. One point on 
which advanced speculators seem to be agreed is, that 
the soul is properly nothing, and that all mental states, 
feelings, thoughts, aspirations, and volitions, are the 
necessary outcome of the physiological processes which 
underlie consciousness. But when we object to this 
view, that it denies and overturns true morality, the 
speculator is very fond of using the great Calvinistic 
theologians to screen himself from attack. When Pro- 
fessor Huxley made his address, " Are Animals Autom- 
ata?" he warned his critics in advance that if he were 
to be summoned to answ^er for his doctrine of autom- 
atism, he should not appear alone, but should bring 
Calvin and Edwards with him. This position is partly 
the confusion of philosophic determinism with physical 
fatalism, to which we referred in the last chapter, and 
partly a misrepresentation of Calvinism. Calvinism 
does not deny freedom, but sets up other doctrines 
which its opponents regard as incompatible with free- 
dom. The predestination which it affirms is expressly 
said to be of a kind which does not conflict with, but 
rather establishes, the freedom of the creature. To the 
average mind this is not much of a predestination after 
all, but it is certainly intolerable to charge the Calvinist 
with denying freedom. Indeed, it would be much near- 
er the truth to say that Calvinists were first among 



[ 



as STUDIES IN THEISM. 

modern theologians to affirm a natural freedom in man. 
But, however this may be, the question before us is not 
one of great names, but of simple logic. For our own 
part, we should be quite undismayed if Edwards and 
Calvin did appear as Mr. Huxley's supporters. The 
law of identity and non-contradiction cannot be bioken 
by any weight of authority. No more is the question 
whether theoretic deniers of liberty have practically ad- 
mitted it. No system can be saved by the inconsisten- 
cies of its friends. The great attraction of advanced 
thought is its claim of consistency. If it is to abandon 
logic and consistency, and live by instinct, we might as 
well stay where we are. Christianity suits our instincts 
as well as physical fatalism; and if the latter can show 
no better logic there is no reason for exchange. Incon- 
sistent theology is bad enough, but inconsistent atheol- 
ogy is worse. 

Let us, then, deny freedom, what would theoretically 
follow? The fatalist, appealing this time to Butler, 
says nothing would follow. If there be any necessity 
we are now living under it, and daily life would re- 
main unchanged if we became conscious of that neces- 
sity. But, as usual, the fatalist mistakes his author- 
ity. He mistakes Butler's argumentum ad hommeni 
for a defense of fatalism. Now, the claim that daily 
life would remain the same applies, at best, only to 
the external form of action, and not to the iimer life. 
This sameness of external form is, probably, what Pro- 
fessor Huxley means by one of his symposiimi utter- 
ances, which says that when it is seen that the conse- 
quences of moral law are as inexorable as those of 



POSTULA TES OF ETHICS. 4 1 9 

physical law, men will break the one no sooner than 
they will the other. A fatalist Avill not put his hand in 
the fire any sooner than the believer in freedom; and 
when it is clear that moral law has consequences just as 
fixed, no theory will seriously affect conduct. In so 
far as morality is identical with prudence, there is a 
certain force in this, although even this doctrine tacitly 
denies physical fatalism. That wbich can foresee re- 
sults, and determine itself accordingly — that which can 
'' think twice " before acting — is a person and not a ma- 
chine. Here again Mr. Huxley confounds philosophic 
determinism with physical automatism. A machine 
does not think twice. Consciousness has no power over 
the mechanism. The outcome is, in every case, but the 
resultant of mechanical processes which are independent 
of our imaginary volitions. To advance thus far is pure 
skepticism; to stop short is to abandon fatalism. More- 
over, if we may trust consciousness at all, we know 
that the resulting action would not remain unchanged. 
The kind of opinions which our brains grind out de- 
pends very largely on the kind already there. Spencer 
represents reasoning and volition as a conflict between 
different ideas, which in turn are but the subjective side 
of nervous action. " Nascent motor excitations " orig- 
inate m the brain. Subjectively these appear as differ- 
ent ideas. When a nascent motor excitation occurs 
alone it passes at once into action. Such are instinctive 
and reflex action. But when two or more arise to- 
gether there is a conflict. Subjectively this conflict ap- 
pears as comparison and reasoning. Finally, the strong- 
est carries the day, and issues in action. Subjectively 



420 STUDIES IN THEISM 

this appears as volition. But the original and independ* 
ent fact is the conflicting nascent motor excitations, 
and volition and reasoning are only the subjective shad- 
ow which the objective realities cast. We see, on this 
theory, how important it is to have the right kind of 
nascent motor excitations in the brain. Now, as a mat- 
ter of fact, the nascent motor excitations corresponding 
to ideas of right, duty, freedom, responsibility, are the 
great breakwaters which prevent other unpleasant nas- 
cent motor excitations from, issuing in action, which, on 
the old theories of ethics, would be decidedly objection- 
able and blameworthy. We are persuaded, therefore, 
that the removal of these conservative nascent motor 
excitations would lead to the appearance of other nas- 
cent motor excitations whose result would not be pleas- 
ant to contemplate. If, for instance, the lazy and crim- 
inal classes were freed from the sense of right and 
wrong which now turns them into cowards, many social 
problems would, we doubt not, receive a sudden solu- 
tion. To the claim, therefore, that action would be 
unaffected by an acceptance of fatalism and a denial of 
guilt and responsibility we oppose this most scientific 
showing, based on the profound doctrine of nascent 
motor excitations. Indeed, it is a necessary conclusion 
from physical fatalism that any change of opinion points 
to a change in the nervous processes, and must, there- 
fore, lead to a change in action. It is, then, highly unr 
scientific to teach that new opinions are compatible 
with tlie old forms of action. Poor, pachydermatous 
common sense is so imbued with the instinct of free- 
dom, that it fails to hold these speculators to their own 



POSTULATES OF ETHICS. 421 

views, and mistakes the implications of the theory for 
aberrations of the critic. 

But even if we should allow^ that action would re- 
main unchanged, we have not saved morals. We have 
no longer a moral system, but only a caricature. What 
we have, in fact, is a herd of automata who exter- 
nally mimic the action of moral beings. They re- 
ward and punish, praise and blame, just as if good 
and ill deserts were facts, but in truth they are only 
"the cunningest of nature's clocks." Now, we are so 
made that when we fairly grasp this view we can no 
longer attribute merit or demerit, guilt or innocence, 
or responsibility of any kind, to such beings. Sin and 
righteousness vanish. Remorse and shame fade away, 
and the sting of sin is drawn. Punishment is not ret- 
ribution, but self-defense. It has no element of justice 
in it; it is but the brute struggle for existence. The 
so-called good man has no claim to approval, and the 
bad man deserves no blame. Both alike are what their 
viscera have made them. Healthy viscera give rise to 
what we call right action; diseased viscera produce 
wrong action. If there were only some way of making 
one responsible for his viscera, we might save morals; 
but, unfortunately, the viscera are too strong for us. 
The morals of fatalism, then, must be purely external, 
and the difference of action must be sought in the out- 
come. There is no moral difference in the actors. But, 
unfortunately, even this system of external morals is 
not plainly possible on the principles of fatalism. If 
there w^ere some one somewhere wdio was independent 
of his viscera, and who could, by modifying the condi- 



422 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

tions, guide the viscera of others to happy external re- 
sults, there would be some hope. Or if, among these 
" cunningest of nature's clocks," there were some self- 
adjusting clock which could also re-adjust the other 
clocks when they get out of order, the case would not 
be hopeless. But when all are automata, it seems im- 
possible to change the future. Prudence, and foresight 
of results, we are told, would avail to prevent iminoral 
action even in a fatalistic world; but, unhappily, fore- 
sight of results seems quite useless unless we have some 
power of acting in accordance with the new knowledge. 
A foresight of results will not help one out of the cur- 
rent of Niagara. In fact, prudence and foresight, as 
controling factors, are as incompatible with physical 
fatalism as are merit and demerit. Even determinism 
has always had difficulty at this point, and has been 
forced to posit a power of '^ thinking twice," and of in- 
definitely postponing action. By skillfully and judi- 
ciously overlooking this difficulty one may contrive to 
give an air of rationality to fatalism; and common sense, 
the great philosophical pachyderm, will always take the- 
hard-pressed fatalist under its protection because of his 
inconsistencies. If, after announcing pure automatism 
and fatalism, the speculator is only careful to say, "Now 
let us all do our duty," every one is satisfied. If some 
unhappy bystander should ask how an automaton can 
have duties, the speculator at once holds him up as a 
moral outcast; and thick -headedupss says, "Served him 
right." But there are previous questions in morals as 
well as elsewhere; and when, then, the teachers of pliys- 
ical automatism urge us to do the duty which lies next 



POSTULATES OF. ETHICS, 423 

as, we shall insist on knowing how an automaton can 
have duties. In the present state of the case an answer to 
this question is much more important than any amount of 
moral exhortation. It is also a duty of theists to insist 
upon consistency or surrender at this point. Gentlemen 
of the advance, take heart and courage. Remember what 
you have said about the supreme virtue of truthfulness. 
Remember, also, your high claims in the matter of log- 
ical consistency; and either abandon the language of 
morals J which has me^aning only in a scheme which you 
repudiate, or else confess that you dare not and cannot 
be consistent. In the latter case, reflect on this ques- 
tion: Is illogical atheism in any way superior to illog- 
ical Christianity? The new cloth will not join to the 
old garment. 

Happily, however, these inconsistencies are disap- 
pearing. An enthusiastic German evolutionist, F. v. 
Hellwald, in a work* published in 1874, insists upon 
the struggle for existence, and the right of the stronger 
as the only basis of morals. There is neither freedom nor 
soul, neither absolute truth nor absolute morality. He 
claims that the word morality should be banished from 
scientific writings, because it is empty; and he describes 
all philanthropic efforts to raise men to ideal manhood as 
" humanity-hypocrisy," {Jiunicmitdts-henchelei,) Worst 
of all, he insists that advanced speculation must come to 
this. If, now, we ask how to deal with social problems 
in such a scheme. Professor Tynd all gives us an answer 
in his address, '' Science and Man," before the Bir- 
mingham and Midland Institute. He represents him- 
^ CultiorgescJiichte in ihrer natilrUchen Entwickelung, 



424 STUDIES IN THEISM 

self as arguing the point with a " robber and ravisher/^ 
and he gives the conchision of the whole matter as 
follows : "You offend, because you cannot help offend- 
ing, to the public detriment. We punish you, because 
we cannot help punishing, for the public good." When 
proposing to put the "robber and ravishei " to death, 
the professor says to him: "The public safety is a 
matter of more importance than the very limited chance 
of your moral renovation." Of lesser punishment he 
says : " It will make you think twice before venturing 
on a repetition of your crime." To the robber afore- 
said he says : " We entertain no malice or hatred 
against you, but simply with a view to our own safety 
and purification, we are determined that you, and such 
as you, shall not enjoy liberty of evil action in our 
midst," Now this is something like. The professor recog- 
nizes that no one is to blame, and expressly founds the 
right to punish on public utility. Our only ground of 
hesitation is, that remark about "thinking twice; " for 
we have seen that thinking twice is incompatible with 
physical fatalism. A striking peculiarity of advanced 
speculation is, that a profound and subtle exegesis is 
commonly required to find what the writers mean; and 
nothing is more common than charges of misrepresenta- 
tion, after the critic has done his best. Sometimes, 
too, the critic is overwhelmed with indignation, and 
held up as a moral outcast, for doing what he could 
not help. However, the explosion of wrath is also 
necessary, although only in unreflecting minds. But 
in spite of traces of the superstition of freedom, a care- 
ful collation of passages indicates that the professor 



rOSTULA TES OF ETHICS. 425 

means to deny all spontaneity, and to base all differ- 
ence of action on its outcome. 

The professor has done well ; but we regret that he 
has not done better. He has merely made a very feeble 
beginning, and has quite failed to appreciate the grandeur 
of the new ethics. Perhaps it would be well to let the 
doctrine remain an esoteric one, otherwise our reasoning 
might be retorted upon ourselves. The criminal is no 
more dangerous to society than society is to the crim- 
inal ; and he is morally no worse than the best. Which 
shall be called criminal and which virtuous is only a 
question of relative frequency, or of majorities. It is 
quite conceivable that criminals should be in the majority, 
and should begin to say to us : "We entertain no malice 
or hatred against you, but simply with a view to our 
safety and comfort, we are determined that you, and 
such as you, shall not live in our midst." We experi- 
ence great enthusiasm for the new ethics, but such is 
the hardness and uncircumcision of the natural heart, 
that the coarse fetichisms of Christianity will probably 
be necessary for the mob for some time to come. But 
we may suggest for the inner circle of the initiated 
some valuable applications of the new principles. We 
have got clear of God and goodness, and have set up 
utility as the justification of action. Now it is a sad 
fact that the mass of men do not seem worth keeping. 
They are without any assignable reason for existence, 
and they are undoubtedly a great embarrassment both 
to themselves and to society. Under the old notions 
of right and wrong and God, such people were a knotty 
problem for society; but how beautifully simple the 



426 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

question is from the new stand-point. The new prin- 
ciple is in sociology what the law of gravitation is in 
astronomy. At once the social heavens fall into order. 
Why should not such people be killed off? Some one will 
reply that they have done nothing worthy of death ; but 
he is still in the gall of bitterness and the bondage of 
Ch]*istian iniquity. He forgets that there is no longer 
any crime in the old sense ; being a nuisance is the only 
crime recognized under the new dispensation. Why not, 
then, abate the nuisance by practical measures ? The 
bondage of the old morality may still be strong, and our 
feelings may at first be shocked, but that only proves 
that we are not fully indoctrinated. Advance to new 
truth is never accomplished without mental friction ; 
and there is always a tendency to import the old into 
the new. The early Jewish Chrisiians insisted on car- 
rying Judaism into Christianity; and it needed all the 
logic of Paul and of events to convince them that the 
day of the old was done. This most paltry and un- 
worthy illustration may serve to show how the tradi- 
tions of the old gospel will for a time creep in and 
corrupt the new and most glorious gospel of advanced 
speculation, unless we resolutely keep watch against 
them. There is a seduction in all forms of error- and 
the old gospel is peculiarly seducing. It has little in 
it fitted for the strong man, but most men are not 
strong. Human hearts will ache, owing, of course, to 
maladjustment to the environment ; but they ache 
nevertheless. The cry of the mourner goes up from 
every quarter under heaven. And the conscience, too, 
IS filled with pain and Avith gloomy and solemn sus- 



POSTULATES OF ETHICS. 427 

picions. Hence the old faith, with its absurd and de- 
grading doctrines of a Father in heaven, a loving and 
forgiving God, and a future life, is just fitted to capture 
the ci^owd who reason only with their feelings and from 
their pains and longings. It is a sad fact that Christ, and 
Moses, and the prophets, seem to the mob better teach- 
ers than the advanced speculators. This makes it neces- 
sary always to be on our guard against the poison of 
the old contagion. So subtle is it and pervasive, that 
only eternal vigilance will secure immunity. Now in 
any case there is little hope of the moral improvement 
of the wretches we have mentioned ; and if it should 
occur, it would only be an improved kind of physiolog- 
ical action. What relief would come to society and to 
families if tramps and criminals, and sickly, deformed, 
helpless and unpromising children, and persons who 
are hopelessly diseased or are in their second child- 
hood, could be quietly disposed of; not, indeed, with 
malice or hatred, but gently, as if we loved them ! How 
many there are, also, who have large possessions which 
they are not using for the public good, but which their 
heirs are eager to send into the general circulation. 
Yet these people live on, obstinately and even mali- 
ciously, and apparently with no purpose but to balk the 
happiness of their friends. What a field for operation 
in this direction! And not only do public and private 
interests demand that the classes mentioned be dis- 
patched, but philanthropy and the enthusiasm of hu- 
manity re-echo the demand. We owe it to the future 
to root out some of this accursed stock. We who 

labor for ideal manhood and for ideal society are con- 
28 



428 STUDIES IN THEISM, 

stantly disheartened by the tremendous force of hered- 
itaiy evil which works ceaselessly and mightily against 
us. What solution is there so simple and so thorough 
as to kill off a million or two of this class every year, 
until the festering cess-pools and mkismatic swamps of 
humanity shall be freed from their poison and defile- 
ment ? Such action would probably beget a new set 
of nascent motor excitations in those who remain, and 
might result in very general reformation. Hitherto we 
have kept our hands off of these wretches only on ac- 
count of sundry obsolete notions of God and human 
rights ; but now that we are freed from these whims, 
can we, as lovers of our race, stand by and see the pesti- 
lence threatening posterity without making determined 
efforts to stamp it out? We avow it: the reigning 
sentimentality in this matter is the outcome of Chris- 
tian superstition. The old philosophers knew better. 
The divine Plato recommended the exposure of infants 
and the killing off of the helpless. The Fijians, too, 
with the profound insight of a nature uncorrupted by 
contact with Christianity, did the same thing ; but since 
the advent of the missionaries they have fallen from 
this high estate. Some of them carried considerations 
of utility still further, and ate such people as it was 
found inconvenient to keep ; but this action, though 
quite allowable on the new principles, and not without 
its advantages on the score of economy, is hardly m 
accordance with our present tastes. Perhaps a com- 
promise might be effected on the basis of the opinions 
of some advocates of cremation, who have dwelt at 
length on tlie waste of the present custom of burial 



POSTULA TES OF ETHICS. 42 9 

These matters of detail, however, may be left to the 
progress of opinion ; but at all events it is plain that 
nature is bent on rooting out the unfit ; and both duty 
and interest call upon us to lend a hand. The mawk- 
ish and invertebrate sentimentality of Christian philan- 
thropy is a foul sin against the Cosmos and posterity. 
Think of the wretches it tolerates and vainly tries 
to reform. Think of the great army of deaf, and 
dumb, and blind, and helpless, and idiotic, and insane, 
which it taxes us to keep. What a blot on the other- 
wise brilliant universe ! What a trial to our feelings 
and taste ! Above all, what an expense ! And even 
Christianity itself, and the whole machinery of religion, 
what an expense to no purpose ! Heavens and hells 
have vanished. The fires are out ; and the furnaces 
are cold ; and the great white throne is a dream. There 
is large room for killing in this direction. It is not 
to be thought of that we should leave the weak, and 
ignorant, and credulous, to be preyed upon by these 
pious swindlers. For a time, perhaps, we may allow it 
to go on ; but our conscience, our self-respect, and our 
regard for humanity will not forever tolerate these mum- 
meries which merely frighten and deceive, and which 
serve no purpose except to maintain an army of locusts 
which eat up every green and good thing. Already 
we have laws against getting money on false pretenses ; 
it is plain that the whole swarm of ministers come 
under its operation. Of course we have no feelings of 
malice or hatred for any one, because no one is blam- 
able. The unhappy Christian or theologian is not re- 
sponsible for his obsolete notions, but we think that the 



430 STUDIES IN THEISM, 

pointings of utility and duty are very plain in the mat- 
ter. Perhaps, however, they are not so plain. Upon 
reflection, we find that we have unconsciously been 
false to our new principle. On the old theory, the 
falsehood of religion would warrant our opposing it ; 
but on the new theory, we may find a use for religion 
after all. ISTow these notions of God and duty have an 
undoubted value for society. The highest and most 
valuable satisfactions of life depend upon them. Let 
a man be fully possessed by them and he will become a 
better father, or husband, or son, or brother, or citizen, 
or neighbor. This cannot be doubted ; and hence we 
are thrown into doubt concerning the propriety of clear- 
ing out the preachers. On the contrary, since the ad- 
vanced speculator has done little for science and specu- 
lation except to disgrace them ; and since his views 
have no public utility, but great public mischief in 
them, must we not conclude that the most judicious thing 
would be to kill off the speculators and leave the 
preachers? This seems to be a plain pointing of utility. 
It is to be regretted, that Professor Tyndall did not 
extend his principle to these cases. Our conclusions 
seem to us to be the plainest deductions from his 
premises. Man is a machine, totally without moral 
character; our moral notions are the product of custom 
and prejudice ; and earthly utility is the foundation 
of such morals as remain. Perhaps, however, he 
failed to state them because of their evident truth, 
deeming it sufiicient to lay down the principle, and 
leave it to others to apply it. It is possible that even 
the professor would draw back from some of these de- 



POSTULATES OF ETHICS. 431 

diictions; for reformers are seldom conscious of the 
full results of their principles; but that would only 
prove a certain mental inertia or ossification which pre- 
vents his shaking off all the influences of association 
and habit. To the pure reason, however, all is clear. 
Towering above the niists and miasms of custom and 
superstition, it clearly perceives the goodly land flowing 
with milk and honey. As a means of helping one to 
an appreciation of the new ethics we suggest the follow- 
ing problems : Why should we not set up the law of 
the strongest as the law of life ? And why should not 
a man kill and eat his mother if his tastes, inclinations, 
or interests should lie in that direction? It is hoped, 
however, that no advanced speculator will attempt to 
solve this problem by the method of instincts; for if 
we are to work out problems by this method, we had 
better go back to Christianity, as that satisfies the in- 
stincts very much better than do materialism and fatal- 
ism. The great attraction of the advanced doctrines is, 
their logical consistency ; if that is abandoned, they 
have no reason of existence. 

Let us pass to the second point, the denial of a future* 
life. Here, too, the denier takes high ground in favor 
of- intuitional morality, and repeats the common re- 
marks about the absolute sanctities, etc. If there be no 
life to come, it is a duty to be noble and not base. 
There is a sublime grandeur in heroic struggle and sac- 
rifice, oven if we sink into nothingness the next moment. 
He is also careful not to miss the opportunity of ex- 
pressing his scorn for the selfishness of those who look 



432 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

for a future life. But unfortunately, this worthy is 
commonly entangled in the doctrines concerning con- 
science and freedom which we have mentioned; and 
tliat leaves us in doubt whether his fine talk is due to 
ignorance or knavery. There is no noble and no base 
on his theory, for every thing is opinion and prejudice. 
There is also no noble and no base, for every thing is 
mechanical. What fine strategy this is, to grab up for 
the sake of a sneer notions which elsewhere he expressly 
repudiates! What an instructive illustration of his no- 
tions of truthfulness and honesty! It is possible to raise 
a very small quibble, and say that there is difference of 
worth even in mechanisms; and hence that the mechan- 
ical doctrine does not exclude the distinction of noble 
and base. But the answer is evident. A watch is bet- 
ter than a piece of pig-iron; and a horse is better than 
a hog. But the better in these cases has no moral sig- 
nification; while the better and worse which we are 
considering are exclusively moral. But we omit to 
press these difiiculties; and point out that struggling, 
agonizing, etc., are not heroic in themselves, but only 
when they have an heroic object. One might struggle, 
*and even agonize mightily, to walk a thousand miles in 
a thousand hours, but it would not impress any one as 
especially heroic. To struggle for nothing is the mark 
of a fool and not of a hero. Hence before we give way 
to sentiment about self-sacrifice and agonizing, reason 
asks, (1) how an automaton can struggle and sacri- 
fice itself; and (2) what the self-sacrifice and agonizmg 
are for. These are previous questions in moral theory, 
and demand an answer The facts on which this seem- 



POSTULATES OF ETHICS. 433 

ingly high-toned morality is based are these: The moral 
law, as revealed in every normal conscience, is not cut out 
on the pattern of prudence or of self-interest. No more 
is it cut out with supreme regard to animal or earthly 
interests; on the contrary, it claims to outrank them if 
they collide with it. Any thing may, and must, be sac 
rificed rather than violate the sanctity of conscience. 
Thus the moral law appears in our lives as an uncon- 
ditional imperative, commanding and giving no reasons. 
It is not based on calculation, but appears as an orig- 
inal instinct of our nature. It is this fact which has 
led many intuitionists to imagine that the law is self 
supporting. But this law, like all other laws, must 
justify itself to our reason. This instinct, barely as in- 
stinct, may rule the life until reason comes ; but then it 
must give some account of itself. As a simple, opaque 
fact, disturbing animal happiness and flouting earthly 
prudence, we want to know its authority and its mean- 
ing. No amount of sentiment can avail to answer or 
resist this rational demand; and it is one of the great 
-services of the utilitarian moralists so to have forced 
this point upon the consideration of intuitionalists that 
it is now generally admitted. The law of a being de* 
pends on its destiny and flows from it. There is a dis- 
tinct absurdity in placing a temporal being under the 
law of the eternal; and there is intolerable injustice in 
placing a being under a law which is hostile to its inter- 
ests, or which is out of all proportion to its well beiag. 
Any law which any being is under obligation to obey 
must be a law contrived for its highest good; and if it 
appear that any law runs counter to our true good, that, 



434 ' STUDIES JN THEISM. 

law ceases to have any obligation, both reason and con- 
science being judges. The law of a being, we repeat, 
must be measured by its nature and destiny. There is 
nothing unbecoming in an earthly being's living for the 
earth; and if the heavenly life is a dream, it is both ra- 
tional and becoming that we should live for this. It 
cannot be a duty to live for the unattainable; the bare 
notion is an insult to both reason and conscience. The 
thoughtless intuitionist will be startled at this, and may 
possibly advance to denial; but this is due to over- 
looking our stand-point. We do not mean, that practi- 
cally, men measure duty by utility, or are constantly 
asking. What shall we have therefore? But while we 
may in practice command obedience without asking 
reasons, we must in theory always be able to give rea- 
sons. Otherwise our command is irrational and. arbi- 
trary. Without doubt the stand-point of practical 
morals is that of command; but theoretical morals must 
furnish some justification of the command. 'What, 
then, is the authority and meaning of this moral law, 
which disturbs our lives, crosses our plans, and mars 
our peace? Christianity gives an answer. It says that 
we are under a law too big for the earthly life, because 
our real life is not measured by our earthly existence. 
This life is but the beginning, and not the end. It re- 
veals this life as photographing itself indelibly upon 
the life to come. It tells of moral development and 
dignity beyond all thought at present. We are called to 
communion with God. We are called to be like God. 
We are called to eternal life with God. This is our 
destiny, and our law is correspondingly great. What- 



POSTULATES OF ETHICS. 435 

ever conflicts with this destiny must be trodden under 
foot. Hence when hand or foot offends, we must cut it 
off and cast it from us. Hence we are to struggle and 
agonize to enter into life; for the gain of the world 
were nothing if the soul were lost. At once we see the 
tremendous significance of action, and the baseness of 
surrender to the brute within us. It is infinitely worse 
than Prince Hal, if he had preferred to remain among his 
boon and boozy companions in the Boar's Head at East- 
cheap when called to the throne of England. From 
this stand-point the moral law appears as no wanton or 
arbitrary impertinence, but as the organic law of the 
soul's life and peace. But if we reject this view, the 
law^, so far as it transcends earthly prudence, appears 
as monstrous injustice. The moral nature itself turns 
against it. The law no longer appears as something 
godlike, but rather as a demon-hand thrust enviously 
up to clutch at the little happiness which his short life 
makes possible. Man is called upon to render justice, 
and shall the universe be unjust to him? 

Christianity gives a reason for the moral law, and 
justifies it to our intelligence. Let us abandon the 
Christian theory and see what rational ground there is 
for obeying the moral law beyond the limits of earthly 
prudence. Much sentiment is poured out at once, and 
in particular the selfishness of our view is dwelt upon. 
We will not insist on the fact that this decrier of self- 
ishness is commonly the one who bases the moral na- 
ture on the most abject selfishness, and who by his 
doctrine of fatalism denies and destroys all moral dis- 
tinctions. For the sake of a sneer he is willinof to steal 



436 STUDIES IN THEISM, 

the notions which belong only to his opponent; and we 
are willing to indulge him in it. But we must point 
out that this attack on selfishness misses its mark. It 
is not the selfish instincts, but the moral nature, which 
protests against a law out of all proportion to the good 
of its subjects. Nor is it the selfish who have insisted 
upon a future life, but Socrates and Plato, Paul and 
Christ. Not the brutal, but the spiritual, perceive 
what a ghastly farce this life is when taken alone. The 
implied claim of the positivists, that they themselves are 
the only ones who have emancipated themselves from 
selfishness, would be infamous if it were not so ludi- 
crous. But, it is urged again, it certainly is selfish to 
refuse to sacrifice ourselves for the good of others unless 
we see our own advantage in it. Here, also, the objec- 
tion fails to touch bottom. There is nothing more ab- 
horrent to the moral nature than just this law of sacri- 
fice, except on one condition. That the one should be 
essentially and utterly sacrificed to the many is to empty 
all morality and reason out of the system of things; 
and the world becomes the strict parallel of a helpless 
ship in mid ocean, whose crew, driven to cannibalism by 
starvation, kill the weaker, one by one, in order to satisfy 
their horrid hunger. If such were the case, both pity 
and conscience would command, not that some should 
submit to be eaten, but that all should stand by and go 
down together. No amount of sentiment will help us 
out of this trouble, or make such a universe other than 
a moral horror. Our atheistic sentimentalists, in their 
attempts to escape selfishness, constantly undermine 
their own position. Absolute unselfishness in theory 



POSTULATES OF ETHICS. 437 

reduces to absolute selfishness in practice. For if one's 
own happiness ought not to be a good to himself, there 
is no reason why he should secure happiness in another. 
If every one should find happiness in another's good, 
then we can do the best for others by doing the best 
for ourselves, and letting others know how well off we 
are. Or instead of living for the future, we should 
rather live for ourselves, and let the future rejoice in 
knowing what a good time we had. The general sum 
of happiness would remain the same; and a bird in the 
hand is notoriously worth more than a flock in the bush. 
No one ought to care for happiness; hence it can be no 
duty to produce it. Every one ought to find his hap- 
piness in that of others; hence we can best further the 
moral welfare of others by letting them rejoice in our 
prosperity. Thus the theory passes into its opposite 
and cancels itself. Of course, men do instinctively 
recognize the duty of unselfish action; but they do not 
instinctively recognize the postulates of such a moral 
- community. We look only at the side of the indi- 
vidual, and not at the side of those benefited. We 
take it for granted that it is quite the noble thing for 
them to take all they can get. They tell of a Russian 
woman in a sleigh with her children pursued by wolves. 
And as the wolves were about to overtake the sleigh, 
she threw a child to them. This she did again and 
again, and finally reached the village alone. She told 
her story; and a peasant, seizing his ax, cleft her head 
at a blow. She had no right to be saved at such a cost. 
And that is precisely what the universe is if there be 
no hereafter in which the interests of the one and the 



438 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

many shall be reconciled. No rational theory of self-sac- 
rifice is possible on the su]3position that the one is really 
and essentially sacrificed to the many. Here is an an- 
tinomy of conscience which conscience itself cannot re- 
solve. Intuitional moralists have almost 'in\'ariably 
overlooked the dualism of conscience on this subject; 
for conscience justifies a rational self-love as much as it 
does self-sacrifice. The New Testament reconciliation 
is the only possible one: He that saveth his life shall 
lose it. This is the law of unselfishness. But he that 
loseth his life the same shall save it. This is the clause 
which reconciles the law, not to .our selfish feelings, but 
to our conscience, our reason, and our sense of justice. 
Personal good and the universal good must be at bot- 
tom one ; and this they cannot be if the individual's 
faithfulness is to result in his destruction. Without 
this assumption there is nothing upon which the con- 
science turns more fiercely than upon this law of sacri- 
fice. If one is unwilling to admit this reconciling 
thought of a future life, let him at least cease to dwell • 
on the duty of self-sacrifice. Of course if any one finds 
delight in self-sacrifice, no one objects. As a refined 
form of egoism, it justifies itself; but it can never bo 
commanded as a duty. Of course, the advanced specu- 
lator will once more forget his theory that right and 
wrong are conventional, and that men are only autom- 
ata, and will swagger out sundry attempts to sneer 
at this doctrine as base and groveling; but such an ex- 
hibition will merely serve as a standard of his mer*al 
power. 

Our claim, then, is not merely that selfishness o\-r- 



P OS TULA TES OF ETHICS. 439 

rides conscience when a future life is denied, but that 
conscience itself abandons its high claims in that case. 
Here are the facts: In a few years it will make no dif- 
ference to me what I have been. In a few centuries 
it will make no difference to the universe what the 
human race has been. Whether happy or unhappy, 
moral or immoral, all will have passed away and left no 
sign. The difference between right and wrong will 
have disappeared, and the righteous and the wicked will 
have reached a common goal. Now the holder of this 
view attempts to preach morality, and what can he say ? 
Worldly prudence every one can understand, and we 
need no moralist to teach that. But what room is there 
for any thing more ? Of course we do not mean that 
every body would plunge into beastliness if the belief 
in immortality were gone. Differences of taste would 
still remain, but that is all. Duty would be an empty 
word, and taste and prudence must give the law of life. 
But taste has no law, and every one must be left to his 
own de^'ices. Here it might occur to some enthusiastic 
moralist to speak of the joy and dignity of right living; 
but as for the joy, most of us find duty a yoke and a 
burden; and as for the dignity, we now know that it is 
only an improved kind of physiological action, and 
nothing to be proud of. Sadly enough, the taste of the 
masses does not lie in the direction of moral growth 
and self-development. Men are annoyed and vexed at 
any apparition of duty, and they would gladly shut it 
out of both thought and life. Now how could a hu- 
mane unbeliever in immortality justify himself in dis- 
turbing a pleasant worldly life by this nightmare of 



440 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

duty ? Even if his fatalism did not make, appeals to 
duty miserably irrelevant, there could be no duty to 
strive after the unattainable. Whereupon the advanced 
speculator once more breaks out in his grand way, that 
there is an essential nobility in duty; but in the as- 
sumed circumstances, this can only mean that his tastes 
run in that direction, and that he chooses to stigmatize 
the tastes of others as base and groveling. But he has 
no right to do so. His egoism and self-esteem are sat- 
isfied in one way, and he then assumes to lord it over 
others who differ from him. To increase at once his 
own glory and the opprobrium of his opponents, he 
calls his own views noble, dignified, etc., while those 
of the other side are called base and brutal. But in 
all this we detect the influence of heredity and the 
moral environment. Such notions Avill disappear when 
he fairly masters his* own principles. Each must be 
allowed to go his own way, free from all interference, 
except such as utility may suggest, and from insolent 
assumption of superiority on the part of others. If the 
egoism of one man delights in certain psychological 
fineries, let him choose them, so far as he can choose 
them. If another is better pleased with the more sub- 
stantial goods of the senses, let him be equally free, so 
far as he can be free. Above all, let moral absolut- 
ism, which alone is true morality, die the death. The 
critic must allow that if a future life be denied, the 
present life would be more comfortable if the sense of 
duty were toned down. If at any time the advam^ed 
speculator should feel tempted to attack these conclu- 
sions, let him first of all reflect on his own theory, tl\at 



POSTULA TES OF ETHICS. 44 1 

right and wrong are purely conventional, and that men 
are merely machines without any proper moral charac 
ter. If this does not avail to stop the nuisance of his 
periodic outcry, let him further reflect whether a theory 
which he denies every time he opens his mouth, anof 
whieh in turn denies all those truths by which men and 
societies live, be not a doubtful one. Or is it, perhaps, 
th(»- glory of advanced speculation to be received only 
by pure faith, and in opposition to all the teachings of 
life and reality? 

It is unnecessary to discuss the effects of atheism 
upon morality, as it implies the difficulties already mer. 
tioned. We close this discussion by pointing omt tha? 
upon any theistic theory it is impossible to justify tho 
ways of God either to conscience or to reason without 
a future life, and without the Christian theory of thai 
life. God is either the perfect, or he is nothing. His 
purposes also must be worthy of him, or the mind will 
deny him outright. To think less than the highest of 
God will, by an inner dialectic of thought, pass on to 
his denial. But creation has as yet reached no end 
which justifies it to our reason. If we think of a period 
a few thousand years further on, when the present order 
shall have passed away, and the ancient silence and 
loneliness of God shall have returned, we cannot help 
asking the question, What is it all for? This meaning- 
less stir of creation, which is soon to sink back again 
into silence, is it worth while ? It is at this point that 
we comprehend the despair of the Indian religions. 
We Occidentals have had a childish readiness to view 
Qod as the creator of the finite order; that is just what 



442 STUDIES IN THEISM 

the Oriental mind has found impossible. It did not 
doubt the Infinite, but questioned whether the Infinite 
could connect itself with such a finite. The finite, as 
we know it, is unworthy of the Infinite. He cannot 
descend from his sacred, everlasting calm and silence to 
found or take part in this stupid, senseless turmoil of 
the finite. Hence the finite does not exist. It is a 
dream only, an illusion. God is not in it, for it is un- 
worthy of him. Hence let us, also, seek to escape from 
it, and by reflection on the eternal, and by withdrawal 
from action, let us lose ourselves in the infinite rest and 
silence. Until very recently, this conception was im- 
possible to Western thought. It was a matter of course, 
that God could not want any better business than to 
make and maintain our world. As for the world, it 
was a great success — a little blackened, indeed, by the 
Bible, but upon the whole a very excellent thing. All 
this has changed. Pessimism has made mighty ad- 
vances in science and philosophy. It is becoming fash- 
ionable to deride the universe, and the cant of progress 
is receding. Whoever has the words of eternal life, it 
is at last settled that science and philosophy have them 
not. From the Indian stand-point the Indian notion is 
profoundly true. The finite, as we experience it, is not 
worthy of God. If the drama of our existence is to end 
with the earthly act, there is no unity in it, and we can- 
not ascribe it to a rational being. Conscience and rea- 
son are satisfied only as we advance to the Christian 
doctrine — that the full purpose and magnificence of cre- 
ation become manifest only in eternity. " It doth not 
yet appear what we shall be; but when He shall appear, 



POSTULATES OF ETHICS. 443 

we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is." 
By a necessity of thought, when we abandon this stand- 
point speculation recedes toward atheism or panthe- 
istic substantialism. All speculation between these ex- 
tremes is in unstable equilibrium. 

We have not sought to prove that our advanced spec- 
ulators are bad men, but that their doctrines deny mo- 
rality. Neither sentiment nor personal character is con- 
cerned, but simply and solely logic. Hence appeals to 
sentiment and charges of misrepresentations are irrele- 
vant in reply. We do not urge the results deduced as 
any disproof of the premises, we only insist that they 
flow from the premises. There is no injustice in put- 
ting premises and conclusion together. If it be said 
that the conclusions are insane, we do not deny it; but 
that does not prove that they do not follow from the 
premises, but rather that the premises are insane also. 
And we suggest, as a topic for reflection, whether a 
doctrine which denies consciousness, conscience, and all 
the great principles on which life, and society, and gov- 
ernment are founded, has not almost reached a redicctio 
ad absurdmn. But if. any will insist on holding the 
premises, let them be forced to accept the conclusion. 
We have given the question this prominence because 
we believe that mischief has been done by ignoring it. 
The minds of many are confused by the prevailing in- 
consistency on this point. They are led to assent to 
much solely by the assurance that morals shall suffer no 
harm. The critic, of course, cares nothing for conse- 
quences, but he must insist on consistency. We might 
29 



444 STUDIES IN THEISM. 

as well fall back on Christianity, if we are to give up 
logic. The old faith had its Nemesis, according to its 
critics, and its Nemesis was always logic. If the Nem- 
esis was fatal to the old, why should it show pity on 
the new ? Let, then, the question be dragged into 
light, and let" it be kept there until loose- jointed skepti- 
cism shall learn what it is doing, and until speculative 
trickery shall be forced to be consistent, and to accept 
the logical outcome of its opinions. The question for 
our advanced speculators to consider is, whether we 
shall live by instinct or by logic ? If by instinct, then 
logic has nothing to do with life and practice; and we 
are left to find that theory of life and the world which 
shall best satisfy our instincts, and bring most peace 
and dignity into life. But if we are to live by logic, 
then let us live by logic, and abandon all views which 
are not in harmony with our prof essecf opinions. 



THE END. 



JUL 31 190 y 



^ 



-!> nO 



